Difference between revisions of "Virtue" - New World Encyclopedia

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The notion of virtue played a central role in ethical theorizing up until the [[Enlightenment]]. Major figures such as [[Plato]], [[Aristotle]], and [[Thomas Aquinas]], all place virtue at the centre of their moral theories. However, as a result of the influence of [[Kant]] and [[Utilitarian]] thinkers such as [[Bentham]] and [[Mill]], who focussed mainly on actions rather than character, theorising about virtue took something of a back seat until the latter part of the 20th century. Recent years have seen a regeneration of philosophical work on virtue as a result of result of dissatisfaction with Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism.
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[[Image:Efez Celsus Library 2 RB.JPG|thumb|225px|Personification of virtue (Greek ''ἀρετή'') in Celsus Library in Ephesos, Turkey]]
  
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A virtue is a state of a person’s character. People may be wise, courageous, modest, kind, self-controlled, and just. These are all virtues, which they may or may not possess. Virtues are dispositions of character. A disposition is a tendency to have certain responses in particular situations: responses such as emotions, perceptions, and actions. People who have the virtue of (e.g.) courage, then, are those with the disposition to ‘stand fast’ under trial, where this includes a complex of attitudes and emotions, behaviour, and perceptions.  
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A '''virtue''' is a trait or disposition of character that leads to good behavior, for example, [[wisdom]], [[courage]], [[modesty]], [[generosity]], and [[self-control]]. There are also public virtues that characterize the spirit of a nation, such as [[justice]], [[honor]], and [[peace]]. Every culture has its lists of virtues, such as the biblical "fruits of the [[Holy Spirit|Spirit]]:" [[Love]], joy, peace, [[patience]], [[kindness]], generosity, [[faithfulness]], gentleness, and self-control ([[Galatians]] 5:22-23), or the Japanese ''[[bushido|bushidō]]'' code: ''Gi'' (義; rectitude), ''yū'' (勇; courage), ''jin'' (仁; [[benevolence]]), ''rei'' (礼; [[respect]]), ''makoto'' (誠; [[honesty]]), ''meiyo'' (名誉; honor), and ''chū'' (忠; [[loyalty]]). These define what people regard as most valuable in a human being.  
  
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==Historical Overview==
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[[Greek philosophy|Greek philosophers]] such as [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]] dealt with virtues in terms of character traits of the [[soul]]. They held that virtues are conducive to personal and social [[happiness]] ''([[eudaimonism|eudaimonia]])'', while lack of virtue leads to suffering and downfall. The world's [[religion]]s universally encourage people to cultivate virtues, and attribute their source to ultimate reality (''[[dharma]],'' ''[[Brahman]],'' ''[[Dao]],'' Heaven, or [[God]]). Plato likewise rooted virtue in a higher reality, the [[form and matter|Form]]s. Every culture on earth is grounded in teachings and practices that cultivate personal virtue in order to promote social and moral [[responsibility]], so that people may be able to live peacefully on earth and beyond.
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In philosophy, the notion of virtue played a central role in ethical theory up until the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]]. However, virtues took something of a back seat after the emergence of [[Kantianism]] and [[utilitarianism]], as philosophers focused less on dispositions of character and more on the rightness or wrongness of actions. Recent years have seen a revival of what is called [[virtue ethics]], following the Greek tradition of Plato and Aristotle.
  
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Virtue (arête) is along with [[eudaimonism|eudaimonia]] one of the two central concepts in ancient Greek [[ethics]]. Greek ethical thinking focuses on character states known as aretai (virtues), which are understood to be distinct properties of the soul. For example, someone with the virtue of justice is concerned with the fair treatment of other people; someone with the virtue of courage responds correctly in situations of trial (particularly in warfare) by overcoming his fear. And something similar is thought to be true of self-control or moderation, piety and wisdom. Each virtue ensured that its possessor acts in the correct ways pertaining to a situation that he or she might encounter over a life. Possessing the virtues ensures that one practices good (agathon) and fine (kalon) courses of action.  
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==Virtues in world religions==
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All [[religion]]s in the world recognize the importance of [[morality]] in our lives, and all cultivate a self-discipline and social and moral [[responsibility]], for the sake of happiness and peaceful living on earth and beyond.  
  
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Socrates as he appears in Plato’s writings was (in the western intellectual tradition) the first to make systematic investigations into the virtues.  (What we know of [[Socrates]] philosophy is almost entirely derived from [[Plato]]’s Socratic dialogues. Scholars typically divide Plato’s works into three periods: the early, middle, and late periods. They tend to agree also that Plato’s earliest works quite faithfully represent the teachings of Socrates and that Plato’ own views, which go beyond those of Socrates, appear for the first time in the middle works such as the Phaedo and the Republic.) Socrates’ thinking on the virtues seems to be distinguished by two main features. Firstly, Socrates seems to think that virtue is a kind of knowledge. In Plato’s dialogue, the Euthydemus (See also Meno (88a ff)), Socrates gets Cleinias to agree that wisdom is a kind of knowledge. He draws an analogy between wisdom and a carpenter’s knowledge of his trade or craft (technê), claiming that the successful carpenter must not only have proper tools but know how to use them. Here Socrates position seems to be that goods as health, wealth, and beauty, as well as the (moral) virtues of justice, moderation, courage, and wisdom (279a-c) are all subordinate to wisdom. Wisdom is a  sort of knowledge about how best to use all the other goods. Without wisdom about when to apply these virtues (e.g. when to exercise self-control) each would be liable to misuse.
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===Hinduism===
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[[Hinduism]] regards ''[[dharma]]'' (the path of righteousness) as the first chief aim of human life, encouraging us to cultivate virtues and do good deeds in order for us to be liberated from the chain of ''[[karma]].'' So, the ''[[Bhagavad Gita]]'' teaches: "O Arjuna there never exists destruction for one in this life nor in the next life; since dear friend anyone who is engaged in virtuous acts never comes to evil."<ref>[http://www.bhagavad-gita.org/Gita/verse-06-35.html ''Bhagavad Gita,'' 6:40.] Retrieved January 20, 2021.</ref> Although the actions of humans are usually caused by mixtures of the three different qualities of ''sattva'' (purity), ''rajas'' (vitality), and ''tamas'' (darkness), one is encouraged to increase the quality of ''sattva'' by cultivating virtues and doing good deeds. Virtues are modes of ''sattva,'' and they include [[altruism]], moderation, [[honesty]], cleanliness, protection of the earth, universality, [[peace]], non-[[violence]], and reverence for elders.
  
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The second distinctive feature of Socrates’ thinking on the virtues is that he, in contrast with common Greek thought, seems to have maintained that there is strictly only one virtue. This is sometimes called his doctrine of the unity of the virtues. In Plato’s dialogue, the Protagoras, Protagoras defends the view that the virtues are distinct traits so that a person can possess one virtue without possessing the others. (329d-e). Protagoras’ view is that of the common Greek: some people are courageous without being wise, and some are wise without being courageous (and so on).  Socrates argues against this, maintaining that apparently separate virtues of piety, self-control, wisdom, courage and justice are in some way one and the same thing – a particular type of knowledge. His view seems to be that distinctions between virtues are nothing other than distinctions between different spheres of application of the same state of knowledge. Given this unity of the virtues, it follows that a person cannot possess one virtue independently of the others: if he possesses one, he must possess them all. Both Plato, in the Republic, and Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics subscribe to variations of this idea. In Aristotle’s version only the practically wise person will be capable of fully fledge virtue.
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===Buddhism===
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The [[Eightfold Path]] of [[Buddhism]], consisting of right understanding, right [[intention]], right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration, is a course on virtuous living on the path of righteousness, which would lead to the cessation of ''[[dukkha]]'' (suffering) and the achievement of ''[[bodhi]]'' ([[enlightenment (concept)|enlightenment]]). Buddhism has a few other ways of classifying virtues. It has the four ''[[Brahmavihara|Brahmavihāra]]''s (abodes of ''[[Brahma]]''), known also as the four "immeasurables" (''apramāṇa'' in [[Sanskrit]]), which are ''maitrī/[[metta|mettā]]'' (loving-kindness or benevolence), ''[[karuna|karuṇā]]'' ([[compassion]]), ''mudita'' (sympathetic joy), and ''upekṣā/upekkhā'' (equanimity); and they may be more properly regarded as virtues in the [[Europe]]an sense. [[Theravada Buddhism]] has developed the Ten Perfections (''dasapāramiyo'' in Pāli; singular: ''Pāramī'' in Pāli; ''[[paramita|pāramitā]]'' in Sanskrit), shown in the second chapter of the ''Buddhavamsa,'' part of its [[Pali Canon]], and they are ''dāna pāramī'' (generosity), ''[[sila|sīla]] pāramī'' (good conduct), ''nekkhamma pāramī'' (renunciation), ''paññā pāramī'' ([[wisdom]]), ''vīrya pāramī'' (diligence), ''khanti pāramī'' (patience), ''sacca pāramī'' (truthfulness), ''adhiṭṭhāna pāramī'' (determination), ''mettā pāramī'' (loving-kindness or benevolence), and ''upekkhā pāramī'' (equanimity). A stress on the importance of such virtues can be seen in the following passage in the ''[[Dhammapada]],'' part of the Pali Canon: "Sandal-wood or Tagara, a lotus-flower, or a Vassikî, among these sorts of perfumes, the perfume of virtue is unsurpassed."<ref> [https://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/sbe10/sbe1006.htm ''Dhammapada,'' 4:55.] ''Sacred Texts''. Retrieved January 20, 2021.</ref> [[Mahayana|Mahayana Buddhism]] lists the Six Perfections (''şaţpāramitā'' in Sanskrit) in the [[Lotus Sutra]], and they are ''dāna pāramitā'' (generosity), ''śīla pāramitā'' (good conduct), ''kṣanti pāramitā'' (patience), ''vīrya pāramitā'' (diligence), ''[[dhyana|dhyāna]] pāramitā'' (one-pointed concentration), and ''prajñā pāramitā'' (wisdom). Four more Perfections are listed in Mahayana Buddhism's ''Dasabhumika Sutra:'' ''[[Upaya]] pāramitā'' (skillful means), ''praṇidhāna pāramitā'' (determination), ''bala pāramitā'' (spiritual power), and ''jñāna pāramitā'' ([[knowledge]]).
  
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[[Plato]]’s view of virtue may be understood as a development of Socrates’. In his greatest work, the Republic, Plato raises the question of why virtues are valuable to their possessors. He argues that virtues are states of the soul, and that the just person is someone whose soul is ordered and harmonious, with all its parts functioning properly to the person’s benefit. By contrast, Plato argues, the unjust person’s soul, without the virtues, is chaotic and at war with itself, so that even if he were able to satisfy most of his desires, his lack of inner harmony and unity thwart any chance he has of achieving eudaimonia.  
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===Chinese religions===
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"Virtue," translated from Chinese ''de'' (德), is an important concept in [[Chinese Religions|Chinese religions]], particularly [[Daoism]] and [[Confucianism]]. ''De'' originally meant normative "virtue" in the sense of "personal character, inner strength, or integrity," but semantically changed to moral "virtue, kindness, or morality." Note the semantic parallel for English "virtue," with an archaic meaning of "inner potency or divine power" (as in "by virtue of") and a modern one of "moral excellence or goodness." In Daoism, the concept of ''de'' is rather subtle, referring to the lifestyle of ''[[wu-wei]]'' (無為; non-action) that an individual is expected to realize, in order that he may return to nature and allow the ''[[Tao|Dao]]'' ("The Way") to unfold in the manner that it is meant to unfold. This non-action is reflected in the three basic virtues called ''sanbao'' (三寶; three jewels) in the 67th chapter of ''[[Dao De Jing]]'': ''ci'' (慈; [[compassion]]), ''jian'' (儉; frugality), and ''bugan wei tianxia xian'' (不敢為天下先; not daring to be ahead of all under heaven, or humility in a concise form).
  
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[[Aristotle]]’s account of the virtues, as presented in the Nicomachean ethics is by far the most influential of the ancient accounts of the virtues. The fact that many modern thinkers consider themselves to be ‘neo-Aristotelians’ is testimony to this fact. Aristotle see the virtues as flexible dispositions of character, acquired by moral education training, which are displayed in action as well as patterns of cognitive and emotional reaction.  This basic account of virtue is accepted by most modern philosophers and will be considered in detail in the next section.
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Confucianism played a key role by presenting its teaching of virtues to [[Far East]]ern countries such as [[Korea]] and [[Japan]] beside [[China]] as they built their social systems. Confucian moral manifestations of virtue include ''ren'' (仁; humaneness or benevolence), ''xiao'' (孝; [[filial piety]]), and ''zhong'' (忠; [[loyalty]]). Originally, ''ren'' had the archaic meaning of "virility" in the Confucian Book of Poems and then progressively took on shades of ethical meaning.<ref>Lin Yu-sheng, "The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of Jen and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy," ''Monumenta Serica'' 31 (1974-75): 172-204.</ref> In any case, Confucius considers these virtues to be connected with the ''ming'' (命; "ordinances of Heaven"), without whose knowledge one cannot become a superior man. One important normative value in much of Chinese thinking is that one's social status should result from the amount of virtue that one demonstrates rather than from one's birth.
  
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The medieval theologian and philosopher [[Thomas Aquinas]] developed and extended Aristotle’s theory into a Christian context, introducing another category of virtues called ‘theological’ virtues. The three main theological virtues, faith, hope, and love, have God as their immediate object. According to Aquinas, non-Christian people can not display theological virtues, although they can manifest the other non-theological virtues such as courage. However, Aquinas seems to hold that all the non-theological virtues, for example, those recognized by the Greeks are subordinate and grounded in the virtue called charity, which is theological virtue. (For other influential contributions to the theory of virtue, see the articles on [[Hume]], [[Schopenhauer]], and [[Nietzsche]].)
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===Judaism===
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The [[Hebrew Bible]] contains 613 commandments including the [[Ten Commandments]]. But, [[Judaism]] is not simply about following rules. When teaching these commandments, it actually aims at fostering moral virtues in the hearts of people, so that human relationships may become more [[harmony|harmonious]] for the betterment of the world. So, one striking virtue taught in Judaism is [[compassion]], resembling the compassionate [[God]]. It is indicated in the repeated injunctions in the Hebrew Bible that the widow, the [[orphan]], and the stranger shall be protected. Kindness to the poor is another example, and it is considered to be repaid by God ([[Proverbs]] 19:17). In the teaching that "you shall love your neighbor as yourself" ([[Leviticus]] 19:18), "neighbor" can be a stranger and does not mean an Israelite exclusively (Leviticus 19:34). [[Justice]] and impartiality are stressed (Leviticus 19:15, 36; [[Exodus]] 23:3). Jewish [[family]] ethics involves virtues such as reverence for parents (Exodus 20:12) and [[chastity]] (Leviticus 18:18-20).  
  
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Interest in the concept of virtue and ancient ethical theory more generally has enjoyed a tremendous revival in the twentieth century. This is largely as a result of Elizabeth [[Anscombe]]’s article “Modern Moral Philosophy” which argues that duty based conceptions of morality are incoherent for they are based on the idea of a law but without a lawgiver. Her point is roughly that a system of morality conceived along the lines of the [[Ten Commandments]], as a system of rules for action, depends on someone having actually made these rules. However, in the modern climate, which is unwilling to accept that morality depends on God in this way, a rule-based conception of morality is stripped of its metaphysical foundation. Anscombe recommends a return the virtue ethical theories of the ancients, particularly Aristotle, which ground morality in the interests and well being of human moral agents ([[eudaimonia]]), and can do so without appeal to any questionable metaphysic.  
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A classic articulation of the [[Golden Rule]] came from the first century [[Hillel the Elder|Rabbi Hillel the Elder]]. Renowned in the Jewish tradition as a sage and a scholar, he is associated with the development of the [[Mishnah]] and the [[Talmud]] and, as such, one of the most important figures in Jewish history. Asked for a summary of the Jewish religion in the most concise terms, Hillel replied (reputedly while standing on one leg): "What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor: That is the whole Torah, while the rest is the commentary thereof; go and learn it."<ref>[http://www.come-and-hear.com/shabbath/shabbath_31.html Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Shabbath, Folio 31a] Retrieved January 20, 2021.</ref>
  
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===Islam===
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In the [[Islam]]ic tradition, the [[Qur'an]] is, as the word of God, the great repository of all virtues in earthly form, and the [[Muhammad|Prophet]], particularly via his ''[[hadith]]'' or reported sayings, is the exemplar of virtue in human form. The very name of Islam, meaning "acceptance," proclaims the virtue of submission to the will of [[Allah|God]], the acceptance of the way things are. Foremost among God's attributes are [[mercy]] and [[compassion]] or, in the canonical language of Arabic, ''rahman'' and ''rahim''. Each of the 114 chapters of the Qur'an, with one exception, begins with the verse, "In the name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful." A good Muslim is to commence each day, each [[prayer]], and each significant action by invoking God the Merciful and Compassionate, that is, by reciting ''Bi Ism-i-Allah al-Rahman al-Rahim''. The Muslim [[scripture]]s urge compassion towards captives as well as to widows, [[orphan]]s and the poor. Traditionally, ''[[zakat]],'' a toll tax to help the poor and needy, was obligatory upon all Muslims (Qur'an 9:60). One of the practical purposes of fasting or ''[[sawm]]'' during the month of [[Ramadan]] is to help one empathize with the hunger pangs of those less fortunate, to enhance sensitivity to the suffering of others and develop compassion for the poor and destitute. The list of Muslim virtues is a long one: prayer, [[repentance]], honesty, [[loyalty]], sincerity, frugality, prudence, moderation, self-restraint, [[discipline]], perseverance, patience, [[hope]], dignity, [[courage]], [[justice]], tolerance, [[wisdom]], good speech, respect, purity, courtesy, kindness, gratitude, generosity, and contentment.
  
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===Virtue in Chinese philosophy===
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===Christianity===
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In [[Christianity]], there are three [[theology|theological]] virtues: [[faith]], [[hope]], and [[love]]/[[charity (virtue)|charity]], among which the greatest is love ([[1 Corinthians]] 13:13). The "theological" virtues are so named because their immediate object is [[God]]. The [[Bible]] also lists several virtues as the "fruit" of the [[Holy Spirit]]: Love, joy, [[peace]], patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control ([[Galatians]] 5:22-23).
  
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Virtue (translated as "te" 德) is also an important concept in Chinese philosophies such as [[Confucianism]] and [[Taoism]].  Chinese virtues include [[humanity]], [[xiao]] usually translated as [[filial piety]], and [[zhong]] meaning [[loyalty]]. One important normative value in much of Chinese thinking is that one's social status should be the result of the amount of virtue that one could demonstrate rather than by one's birth. In the ''[[Analects]]'', [[Confucius]] stated that perfect virtue consists of the global practice of five things: gravity, generosity of soul, sincerity, earnestness, and kindness.
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These biblical lists of virtues are accepted to all [[Christian]]s. [[Catholicism|Catholic theology]] calls them "supernatural" virtues, and additionally comes up with what it calls "natural" virtues, which include the four [[Plato]]nic virtues of prudence ([[wisdom]]), [[justice]], fortitude ([[courage]]), and temperance, as adopted by theologians such as [[Augustine of Hippo|Augustine]] and [[Thomas Aquinas]]. These four virtues from Plato are called "cardinal" virtues (''cardo'' in Latin, "hinge"). The three theological virtues and the four cardinal virtues together constitute the so-called "seven virtues" of Catholic theology. These seven virtues, however, are to be distinguished from the seven holy virtues ([[chastity]], [[abstinence]], generosity, diligence, patience, kindness, and humility), which the poet Prudentius (348-c.410 C.E.) in his descriptions of battles between the virtues and vices contrasted with the corresponding [[Seven Deadly Sins|seven deadly sins]] (lust, gluttony, avarice, sloth, wrath, envy, and pride).  
  
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==The nature of virtue==
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According to Catholic theology, the supernatural virtues differ from all other virtues, that is, natural virtues, in that they can be obtained only by being supernaturally "infused" through [[divine grace]] and not by human effort. According to Thomas Aquinas, non-Christian people can not display the supernatural virtues, although they can manifest the other, natural virtues such as fortitude. However, Aquinas seems to hold that all the natural virtues are subordinate and grounded in the virtue called charity, which is the supernatural queen of the virtues.
  
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Contemporary understanding of the virtues shares much in common with [[Aristotle]] (see Nicomachean Ethics). Most modern thinkers adopt Aristotle’s view that virtues are flexible dispositions of character, which are displayed in specific types of actions, as well as cognitive and emotional reactions. This conception of virtue may be explained by considering its various components in turn.  
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==Virtues in community==
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Although often influenced by [[religion]], specific lists of virtues became influential in various [[culture]]s and communities. Among the best-known:
  
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Firstly, virtues are states of a person’s character. Judging someone to be (e.g.) courageous or wise is to make a judgment targeted at the character of a person rather than specific actions. We call actions right and wrong but when we say that another person is generous, we are making a claim about the moral worth of the person concerned. We are saying that he or she possesses a certain virtuous trait of character.  
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===Roman virtues===
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The Roman virtues,<ref> [http://www.novaroma.org/nr/Roman_virtues Roman virtues] ''Nova Roma''. Retrieved January 20, 2021.</ref> were the heart of the ''Via Romana'' (the Roman Way). They gave the citizens of the [[Roman Empire]] the moral strength to conquer and civilize the world. Private virtues, aspired to by individuals, included: ''auctoritas'' (spiritual authority), ''comitas'' ([[humor]]), ''constantinum'' (perseverance), ''clementia'' ([[mercy]]), ''dignitas'' (dignity), ''disciplinae'' ([[discipline]]), ''firmitas'' (tenacity), ''frugalitas'' (frugalness), ''gravitas'' (gravity), ''honestas'' (respectability), ''humanitas'' ([[human nature|humanity]]), ''industria'' (industriousness), ''pietas'' (dutifulness), ''prudentia'' (prudence), ''salubritas'' (wholesomeness), ''severitas'' (sternness), and ''veritas'' (truthfulness). Distinguished from personal virtues were public virtues to be shared by all of society in common, and they included ''abundantia'' (abundance), ''aequitas'' ([[equity]]), ''concordia'' (concord), ''iustitia'' ([[justice]]), ''libertas'' ([[freedom]]), ''pax'' ([[peace]]), and ''salus'' ([[safety]]). Many of the public virtues were personified as [[deity|deities]].
  
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Secondly, a virtue is a dispositional state of a person’s of character. A disposition is a tendency to have certain responses in particular situations: responses such as emotions, perceptions, and actions. It is important to notice that the idea of a disposition is made out in terms of the situations in which certain characteristics would be displayed. To see this, consider the property of ‘fragility’. Fragility is a dispositional property: to say that a teacup is fragile is to say that it would be broken easily if it were dropped. Notice that this is described in terms of what would happen under certain conditions, which may not currently obtain. Similarly, to say of a person, e.g., the president, that he is a generous man, is to say more than he has behaved generously in the past. If he has the virtue of generosity, then he would behave generously in situations in which generosity is called for. When we ascribe a virtue to a person we assume that this attribute is so ingrained a part of him that he will respond in the same manner in a variety of different circumstances. Virtues are then deep dispositions of a flexible kind.  In dealing with the virtues, one is, then, dealing with enduring patterns of response, which characterise a person when he or she is in situations of a given type.  
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===Chinese martial morality===
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Traditional schools of [[Chinese martial arts]], such as [[Shaolin temple|Shaolin]] [[Kung fu|Kung Fu]], base martial arts on a system of [[ethics]] called ''wu-de'' (武德; martial morality), where ''wu'' (武) means martial and ''de'' (德) means virtue or morality. ''Wu-de'' has two aspects: the morality of deed, which concerns human relationships, and the morality of mind, which is meant to cultivate inner harmony within oneself, and whose ultimate goal is to reach ''wu-ji'' (無極; no extremity), closely related to the [[Daoism|Daoist]] concept of ''[[wu-wei]]'' (無為; non-action). This martial morality spread to [[Korea]] and [[Japan]]. The morality of deed includes virtues such as ''qian-xu'' (謙虛; [[humility]]), ''zhong-cheng'' (忠誠; [[loyalty]]), ''zun-jing'' (尊敬; [[respect]]), ''zheng-yi'' (正義; [[righteousness]]), and ''xin-yong'' (信用; [[trust]]). The morality of mind includes ''yong-gan'' (勇敢; [[courage]]), ''ren-nai'' (忍耐; endurance), ''heng-xin'' (恆心; patience), ''yi-li'' (毅力; perseverance), and ''yi-zhi'' (意志; will).
  
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Thirdly, the possession of a virtue entails a wide range of responses including actions, perceptions, attitudes and emotions. In this vein, Rosalind Hursthouse helpfully characterises virtues as multi-track dispositions. She says: “A virtue is not merely a tendency to do what is morally desirable or required. Rather, it is to have a complex mindset. This includes emotions, choices, desires, attitudes, interests, and sensibilities” (Hursthouse 2003). One important point to notice here is that is possible to do the right thing (always do the right thing) even without possessing the virtues. A person who fully possesses a virtue is effortlessly moved by the range of considerations pertinent to the situation in which he or she acts, and displays the emotions particular to the virtue in question. This is to recognise a distinction drawn by [[Aristotle]] between the virtuous person and the strong-willed person. Someone who is strong willed acts correctly but has to control his desires and emotions, which are not properly tuned to the display of the virtue in question. The main point is that full virtue requires a harmony between one’s actions and emotions and attitudes. Someone who does not possess this harmony may act correctly but will nonetheless fail to be (fully) virtuous.
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===Samurai virtues===
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[[Samurai]] virtues were developed as the code of the samurai in the ''[[bushido|bushidō]]'' (武士道; way of the warrier) during the [[feudalism|feudal]] period of [[history]] in [[Japan]]. It stressed frugality, [[loyalty]], mastery of [[martial arts]], and honor to the [[death]].
  
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==Main differences between [[Aristotle]]’s conception of virtue and modern conceptions==
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The central seven virtues of the Bushido code were: ''gi'' (義; rectitude), ''yū'' (勇; [[courage]]), ''jin'' (仁; benevolence), ''rei'' (礼; respect), ''makoto'' (誠; [[honesty]]) or ''shin'' (信; honesty), ''meiyo'' (名誉; honor), and  ''chū'' (忠; [[loyalty]]). Others that were sometimes added to these were ''kō'' (孝; [[filial piety]]), ''chi'' (智; [[wisdom]]), and ''tei'' (悌; care for the aged).
  
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These, then, are some main features of virtue which modern thinkers tend to take from Aristotle. But in what ways do modern accounts diverge from Aristotle?
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===Virtues according to Benjamin Franklin===
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[[Benjamin Franklin]] (1706-1790) taught thirteen virtues, which he called "moral perfection." He kept a checklist in a notebook to measure each day how he lived up to them. They became known through his autobiography and inspired many people all around the world. Authors and speakers in the self-help movement report being influenced by him. For example, Anthony Robbins based a part of his "Date with Destiny" seminar on Franklin's concept. Franklin's list is as follows:<ref>Paul Ford, [https://www.ftrain.com/franklin_improving_self Benjamin Franklin on Moral Perfection] Retrieved January 20, 2021.</ref>
  
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===The scope of virtue===
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#[[Temperance]]. Eat not to dullness; drink not to elevation.
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#[[Silence]]. Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself; avoid trifling conversation.
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#Order. Let all your things have their places; let each part of your business have its time.
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#Resolution. Resolve to perform what you ought; perform without fail what you resolve.
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#[[Frugality]]. Make no expense but to do good to others or yourself; i.e., waste nothing.
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#Industry. Lose no Time; be always employ'd in something useful; cut off all unnecessary actions.
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#[[Sincerity]]. Use no hurtful deceit; think innocently and justly, and, if you speak, speak accordingly.
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#[[Justice]]. Wrong none by doing injuries, or omitting the benefits that are your duty.
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#[[Moderation]]. Avoid extremes; forbear resenting injuries so much as you think they deserve.
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#Cleanliness. Tolerate no uncleanness in body, clothes, or habitation.
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#Tranquility. Be not disturbed at trifles, or at accidents common or unavoidable.
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#[[Chastity]]. Rarely use venery but for health or offspring, never to dullness, weakness, or the injury of your own or another's peace or reputation.
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#Humility. Imitate Jesus and Socrates.
  
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The word Greek word arête is usually translated into English as ‘virtue’. One problem with this translation is that we are inclined to understand virtue in a moral sense, which is not always what the ancients had in mind. For a Greek, arête pertains to all sorts of qualities we would not regard as relevant to ethics, such as, for example, physical beauty. So it is important to bear in mind that the sense of ‘virtue’ operative in ancient ethics is not exclusively moral and includes more than states such as (e.g.) wisdom, courage and compassion. The sense of virtue which arête connotes would include saying something like ‘speed is virtue in a horse’, or ‘height is a virtue in a basketball player’. Doing anything well requires virtue, and each characteristic activity (such as carpentry, flute playing, etc) has its own set or virtues. The alternative translation ‘excellence’ might be helpful in conveying this general meaning of the term. The moral virtues are simply a subset of the general sense in which a human being is capable of functioning well or excellently. So Aristotle’s conception of virtue tends to be a lot broader than a modern understanding.
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===The Virtues Project===
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In civil society, there are a number of [[non-governmental organization]]s that promote virtues for the betterment of society. For example, The Virtues Project, founded in 1991 based on the conviction that "Virtues are the very meaning and purpose of our lives, the content of our character and the truest expression of our souls"<ref>[https://www.virtuesproject.com/virtues.html What are the Virtues?] ''The Virtues Project''. Retrieved January 20, 2021.</ref> is a worldwide organization with some inter-religious flavor, which has developed [[education]]al programs for [[religion|religious]] and non-religious individuals, [[family|families]], [[school]]s, [[health]] care agencies, [[corporation]]s, and so on, so that they may be helped "to live authentic, purposeful lives, to raise children of compassion and idealism, and to create a culture of character in our schools and communities."<ref>[https://www.virtuesproject.com/strategies.html What are the Five Strategies?] ''The Virtues Project''. Retrieved January 20, 2021.</ref>
  
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===Teleological underpinning===
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==Virtue as a concept in philosophical ethics==
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Virtue (''aretê'') is, along with well-being ([[eudaimonism|''eudaimonia'']]), one of the two central concepts in [[Ancient Greece|ancient Greek]] [[ethics]]. In Greek ethical thinking, virtues (''aretai'') are character states of the [[soul]] (''psyche''). They include [[courage]], temperance, etc. Each virtue ensures that its possessor acts in the correct ways pertaining to a situation that he or she might encounter over a life. Possessing the virtues ensures that one practices good (''agathon'') and fine (''kalon'') courses of action.
  
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This idea of excellences and of particular tasks and functions to which each organism is best suited, is particularly important for [[Aristotle]]. His basic thought is that well- being (eudaimonia) will only be attained if a creature develops its capacities properly. The virtues reflect the proper development of human beings. Aristotle holds that rationality is peculiar to human beings so that the function (ergon) of a human being will involve the exercise of his rational capacities to the highest degree. (However, he also recognises that human beings are not entirely rational but also possess irrational appetites and partly rational emotions.) This move in Aristotle, namely, arguing that human beings have a particular function (ergon) is central to his project: Aristotle holds virtues to be perfections of a human organism. States are therefore grounded as virtues essentially as a result of natural biological facts about human agents, about the sort of creatures which we are. Aristotle’s ethics is a version of what has come to be called ‘perfectionism’ (see the article on [[teleological ethics]]).
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===Socrates===
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[[Socrates]] as he appears in [[Plato]]'s writings was the first in the Western intellectual tradition to make a serious investigation into the subject matter of virtue. What is known of Socrates' philosophy is almost entirely derived from Plato's Socratic dialogues. Scholars typically divide Plato's works into three periods: the early, middle, and late periods. They tend to agree also that Plato's earliest works quite faithfully represent the teachings of Socrates, and that Plato's own views, which go beyond those of Socrates, appear for the first time in the middle works such as ''Phaedo'' and ''Republic''.  
  
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===Historical variation ===
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Socrates challenged the [[Sophists]], professional [[rhetoric]]ians who promoted moral [[relativism]], [[skepticism]], and secular, [[materialism|materialistic]] lifestyles. [[Protagoras]], one of the major Sophists, argued that [[good and evil]] are a matter of interpretation. Some Sophists even held a [[Machiavelli]]an view of value, arguing that good and evil are determined by a winner. Thus, the Sophists generally promoted a view of value based upon power, [[wealth]], and [[honor]]. For Socrates, however, the foundation of [[morality]] consists in the world of eternal [[truth]] beyond the world of everyday reality. It transcends human interpretations. Eternal truth is both transcendent of and immanent in the [[soul]] at the same time because people cannot really grasp it, while they are aware of it. The soul is not some kind of [[ghost]]ly [[substance]] at all but rather the the structure of [[personality]] that has the capacity for [[intelligence]] and character. The soul, which is at least aware of eternal truth, needs to be cultivated, so that it may have true [[knowledge]] of eternal truth. Virtue indeed consists in the cultivation of the soul in this sense. Therefore, virtue means knowledge of eternal truth on the part of the soul. Conversely, vice means ignorance. Ultimately, virtue relates to the form of the Good; to truly be good and not just act with "right opinion," one must come to know the unchanging Good in itself.
  
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[[Aristotle]]’s presentation of the virtues does not seem to take account of the fact that what counts as a virtue is influenced by historical factors. A particularly conspicuous example of this is that Aristotle regards a character trait called megalopsuchia, ‘greatness of soul’, as a virtue, whereas we would likely not do so. Megalopsuchia is a ‘virtue’ which pertains to being able to conduct oneself well in social circumstances. So Aristotle counts something as a virtue which most moderns would not. Conversely, Aristotle does not include kindness amongst his list of the virtues and so leave out one of the central Christian virtues. This links up with the point already noted, viz., that [[Thomas Aquinas]] held that faith hope and love are peculiarly Christian virtues. So it seems that there is historical variation in what states are counted as virtues. Modern virtue theory attempts to take account of this fact.
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Socrates seems to have maintained that there is strictly only one virtue, which is knowledge of eternal truth. This is sometimes called his doctrine of the unity of the virtues. In Plato's dialogue, ''Protagoras'', Protagoras defends the view that virtues are distinct traits so that a person can possess one virtue without possessing the others (329d-e). For example, some people are [[courage]]ous without being [[wisdom|wise]], and some are wise without being courageous. Socrates argues against this, maintaining that apparently separate virtues such as wisdom, courage, self-control, and [[justice]] are in some way one and the same thing. His view seems to be that the distinction between virtues is nothing other than the distinction between different spheres of application of the same state of knowledge. Given this unity of the virtues, it follows that a person cannot possess one virtue independently of the others: If he possesses one, he must possess them all.
  
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===The unity of the virtues===
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===Plato===
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[[Plato]]'s view of virtue may be understood as a development of [[Socrates]]'. In his greatest work, ''Republic,'' Plato shows his tripartite conception of the [[soul]] as having [[reason]], [[spirit]], and appetite, which he developed from common experience of internal confusion and conflict within the soul. Reason seeks the true goal of human life in view of eternal [[truth]], of the [[Form]]s, and spirit is the drive that is neutral at first but responds to the direction of reason. But, appetite is the [[desire]] for the things of the [[body]]. The soul can achieve order and [[peace]] only if the rational part is in control of the irrational parts of spirit and appetite. But, after the soul enters the body, the body stimulates the irrational parts to defeat the rulership of reason. Hence disorder happens, and the soul's former [[knowledge]] of eternal truth is lost. Plato calls the regaining of this knowledge "recollection" (''[[anamnesis]]'') and relates it to the regaining of reason's control over spirit and appetite. So, like Socrates, Plato believes that knowledge is virtue.
  
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As already discussed, [[Socrates]] held that all virtues are strictly one state of knowledge, and that differences in virtues simply pick out different contexts in which a person may have to apply this knowledge. This is the doctrine of the unity of the virtues. It follows from this that people either have all the virtues or don’t have any of them. [[Aristotle]] diverges from Socrates in that he recognises different virtues, but he does endorse the Socratic idea that one cannot have one virtue without having them all. This is because of the emphasis he places on the intellectual virtue of phronesis or “practical wisdom”. Aristotle maintains that one cannot properly possess any of the virtues unless one has developed practical wisdom. Conversely, if one has practical wisdom, then one has all the virtues.
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Corresponding to the three parts of the soul, however, there are three distinguishable virtues: [[Wisdom]], [[courage]], and temperance. The virtue of wisdom is achieved, when reason remains undisturbed by the irrational parts of the soul to see eternal truth in the Forms, especially the Good. The virtue of courage is achieved, when the energy of will, coming from spirit, follows the direction of reason aggressively yet defensively even in situations of trial, avoiding headlong or rash action. The virtue of temperance is attained, when appetite is kept within limits and in its measure, avoiding excesses in [[pleasure]]s and desires so that they may not dominate the other parts of the soul. Plato also talks about a fourth virtue, which is [[justice]]. The virtue of justice is attained, when each part of the soul fulfills its function. For justice means giving to each part its own due. The attainment of justice, then, means that the soul achieves not only inner [[harmony]] but also [[happiness]] or well-being ([[eudaimonism|''eudaimonia'']]).
  
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Although Aristotle’s account of phronesis continues to be very influential in modern thinking about virtues, most contemporary thinkers will not recognise the strong sort of dependency between (e.g.) courage and practical wisdom. (For more on phronesis, see Broadie (1991).
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===Aristotle===
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[[Aristotle]]'s account of the virtues, as presented in the ''Nicomachean Ethics'' is by far the most influential of the ancient accounts of the virtues. The fact that many modern thinkers consider themselves to be "neo-Aristotelians" is testimony to this fact. Unlike [[Plato]], Aristotle believed that eternal [[truth]] is embedded in [[human being]]s, not separated from them, so that it can not only be known by studying [[human nature]] but also be attained through practice. According to Aristotle, the human [[soul]] as the [[form and matter|form]] of the human self has three parts: the rational (which is distinctively human), the appetitive (which is shared with [[animal]]s), and the vegetative (which is shared with [[plant]]s). What is pertinent to human [[morality]] is the relationship between the rational and appetitive parts of the soul. Although the appetitive part in and by itself is irrational, being shared with animals, nevertheless it is also rational as long as it is under the control of the rational, that is, as long as there is the rational ability of the soul to control appetitive desires. Indeed, moral virtues consist in various forms of the rational ability of the soul in this sense. So, "in the continent man it obeys the rational principle and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient."<ref>Aristotle, [https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/ari/nico/nico013.htm ''Nicomachean Ethics,'' I, 13.] Retrieved January 20, 2021.</ref> These moral virtues are each not [[instinct]]ive but learned through teaching and practice to become a [[habit]] (''ethos''), a slight [[linguistics|linguistic]] variation of which has given rise to the word "[[ethics]]" (''ethike''). Unlike Plato's idea that virtue is basically knowledge alone, therefore, Aristotle's understanding is that each virtue involves the self-control of the soul in addition to rational knowledge. Aristotle considers many more moral virtues than Plato, and includes virtues such as magnificence, liberality, [[friendship]], sincerity, and self-respect. As habits, moral virtues are character traits. Most moral virtues are to be understood as falling at the mean between two vices, that is, the two extremes of defect and excess. For example, the virtue of courage is the mean between cowardice (defect) and rashness (excess). This is called the doctrine of the mean.
  
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==Virtue Ethics==
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Aristotle posits virtues of another kind, which consist in purely rational abilities of the soul unrelated to controlling the appetitive part. They are intellectual virtues, and they include "philosophical wisdom" of first principles (''sophia'') and "practical wisdom" of the good (''phronêsis''). While the moral virtues can lead us to [[happiness]], the intellectual virtues constitute even higher forms of happiness.
  
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Many philosophers today follow the ancient ethical thinkers such as [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]], in situating virtue at the centre of their ethical theories. As a result, Virtue ethics has come to be recognized as an alternative to [[utilitarianism]] and [[Kantian ethics]] in the sphere of normative theory. In this section, the main differences between virtue ethics and utilitarianism/Kantian ethics will be discussed.
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===Kantianism and utilitarianism===
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Since the time of the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], moral theorizing has shifted its focus from the issue of what sort of person one should be to that of what one ought to do. Thus, the main questions to be addressed have become: What actions should one perform, and which actions are right and which ones wrong? Questions such as: Which traits of character ought one to develop? and, Which traits of character are virtues, and which ones vices?, have been ignored. For instance, according to classical [[utilitarianism|utilitarians]] such as as [[Jeremy Bentham]] (1748-1832) and [[John Stuart Mill]] (1806-1873), one ought to do actions that promote the greatest [[happiness]] for the greatest number of people. The principle of utility is a criterion of rightness, and one's motive in acting has nothing to do with the rightness of an action. Similarly, for [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724-1804), one ought to act only on maxims that can consistently be willed as universal laws. Kant, of course, does give motivation a central place in his theory of [[morality]], according to which the morally virtuous person is someone who is disposed to act from the motive of [[duty]]. But this idea, of someone who always does the right thing from the desire to do the right thing, may not be an accurate picture of the virtues of the moral agent's character. This trend after the Enlightenment continued until the middle of the twentieth century.
  
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The subject matter of normative ethics is this: how ought one to live? Two subsidiary questions may be distinguished with this question. (1) What ought I to do?  (What actions should I perform? Which actions are right and which ones wrong?) (2) What sort of person should I be? (Which traits of characters ought I to develop? Which traits of character are virtues, and which ones vices?) Since the time of the [[Enlightenment]], most moral theorizing has focused on the first question. For instance, according to Classical [[Utilitarianism]], one ought to do actions that promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Similarly, for Kant, one ought to act only on maxims that can consistently be willed as universal laws. By contrast, the primary focus of virtue ethics is not discrete actions but rather: What sort of person should I be, try to be, or want to be? The focus of this aspect of normative ethics is the agent’s character. Instead of asking questions about which actions are right and wrong, virtue ethics primarily looks at questions such as: (1) What is a virtuous person like? (2)What is a vicious person like? (3) What makes traits of character virtuous or vicious?
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===Twentieth century: Virtue ethics===
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Interest in the concept of virtue and ancient ethical theory more generally has enjoyed a tremendous revival in the twentieth century. This is largely as a result of [[Elizabeth Anscombe]]'s 1958 article, "Modern Moral Philosophy," which argues that duty-based conceptions of morality are incoherent because they are based on the idea of a law but without a lawgiver.<ref>G.E.M. Anscombe, [https://www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/mmp.pdf Modern Moral Philosophy] Retrieved January 20, 2021.</ref> Her point is roughly that a system of morality conceived along the lines of the [[Ten Commandments]], as a system of rules for action, depends on someone having actually made these rules. However, in the modern climate, which is unwilling to accept that morality depends on [[God]] in this way, a rule-based conception of morality is stripped of its [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] foundation. Anscombe recommends a return to the [[virtue ethics|virtue ethical theories]] of the ancients, particularly [[Aristotle]], which ground morality in [[eudaimonism|''eudaimonia'']], that is, the interests and well-being of human moral agents, and can do so without appeal to any questionable metaphysics. The primary focus of this virtue ethics is not discrete actions but rather: What sort of person should one be, try to be, or want to be? The focus is the agent's character.
  
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How exactly do these questions of virtue ethics differ from the question of what one ought to do? Firstly, they have a different focus. Normative theories of right action focus on discrete actions. They are mainly interested in formulating decision procedures for making practical choices. In contrast, virtue ethics downplays rules, consequences and particular acts. It places the focus on the kind of person who is acting. What is primary in virtue ethics is the notion of a good moral character.
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Many philosophers today follow ancient ethical thinkers such as [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]], in situating virtue at the centre of their ethical theories. They criticize [[utilitarianism]] and [[Kantianism|Kantian ethics]], by stating that both neglect the importance of moral motivation, or provide a distorted conception of moral motivation. As a result, [[virtue ethics]] has come to be recognized as a promising alternative to utilitarianism and Kantianism in the sphere of normative theory.  
  
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===Why virtue ethics?===
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====The nature of virtue====
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Contemporary [[virtue ethics]] shares much in common with [[Aristotle]]. Most modern thinkers adopt Aristotle's view that virtues are flexible traits of character, which are displayed in specific types of actions, as well as [[cognition|cognitive]] and [[emotion]]al reactions. This conception of virtues may be explained by considering its various components in turn.
  
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Why have some contemporary thinkers held that virtue ethics provides a promising and in many cases superior ethical theory to the traditional utilitarian and Kantian accounts? The first main criticism which virtue ethicists tend to make of Kantianism and [[utilitarianism]], is that they neglect the importance of moral motivation, or provide a distorted conception of moral motivation. Traditional theories of right action neglect or provide a distorted picture of the moral character of the actor. This charge is expressed by Kupperman as follows:
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Firstly, virtues are states of a person's character. Judging someone to be [[courage]]ous or [[wisdom|wise]], for example, is to make a [[judgment]] targeted at the character of a person rather than specific actions. One calls actions right and wrong, but when one says that a person is generous, one is making a claim about the moral worth of the person concerned. One is saying that he or she possesses a certain virtuous trait of character.
  
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“It is easy to get the picture of an essentially faceless ethical agent who is equipped to make moral choices that lack connection with either the agent’s past or future” (Kupperman, cited in Pence 1990, p. 252).
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Secondly, a virtue is a disposition of a person's character. A disposition is a tendency to have certain responses in particular situations: Responses such as emotions, [[perception]]s, and [[action (philosophy)|action]]s. It is important to notice that the idea of a disposition is made out in terms of the situations in which certain characteristics would be displayed. To say that a person is a generous man is to say more than he has behaved generously in the past. If he has the virtue of generosity, then he will very likely behave generously in situations in which generosity is called for. This, then, has something to do with enduring patterns of response, which characterize a person when he or she is in situations of a given type.  
  
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To understand the idea expressed here, consider that for the classical utilitarian, what really matters is that one does an action bringing increasing aggregate happiness. The Principle of Utility is a criterion of rightness. One’s motive in acting has absolutely nothing to do with the rightness of an action. “It is theoretically possible that a person could, robot-like, always act so as to maximise utility” (Pence 1990). According to the virtue ethicist, in ignoring the importance of the agent who acts, the nature of the agent who is doing the act, classical utilitarianism gives an incomplete account of moral life.  
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Thirdly, the possession of a virtue entails a wide range of responses including actions, perceptions, attitudes and emotions. In this vein, Rosalind Hursthouse helpfully characterizes virtues as multi-track dispositions. She says: "A virtue is not merely a tendency to do what is morally desirable or required. Rather, it is to have a complex mindset. This includes emotions, choices, desires, attitudes, interests, and sensibilities."<ref>Rosalind Hursthouse, ''On Virtue Ethics'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).</ref> A person who fully possesses a virtue is effortlessly moved by the range of considerations pertinent to the situation in which he or she acts, and displays the emotions particular to the virtue in question. This is to recognize a distinction drawn by Aristotle between the virtuous person and the strong-willed person who acts correctly but has to control his desires and emotions, which are not properly tuned to the display of the virtue in question. The main point is that a full virtue requires a [[harmony]] between one's actions and emotions and attitudes. Someone who does not possess this harmony may act correctly but will nonetheless fail to be (fully) virtuous.
  
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In contrast with utilitarianism which divorces an agent’s motivation from right action, [[Kant]] does give motivation a central place in his theory of morality. In his view, the morally virtuous person is someone who is disposed to act from the motive of duty (see categorical imperative; Kant). But is this idea, of someone who always does the right thing, from the desire to do the right thing, an adequate and desirable picture of the moral agent? In this regard, Michael Stocker presents the following example:
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====Main differences from Aristotle's conception====
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But, the contemporary account diverges from [[Aristotle]]'s conception in a number of ways. Firstly, the scope of virtue in the contemporary account is not as broad as that in Aristotle's conception. The Greek word ''arête'' is usually translated into English as "virtue." One problem with this translation is that we are inclined to understand virtue in a moral sense, which is not always what the ancients had in mind. For the Greeks, ''arête'' pertains to all sorts of qualities we would not regard as relevant to [[ethics]], such as the physical [[beauty]] of a woman and the high speed of a [[horse]]. So it is important to bear in mind that the sense of virtue operative in ancient ethics is not exclusively moral and includes more than moral states such as [[wisdom]] and [[courage]].
  
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But, now, suppose you are in a hospital … when Smith comes in once again. You are convinced more than over that he is a fine fellow and a real friend… But he says that he always tries to do what he thinks is his duty… And he is telling the literal truth: that it is not essentially because of you that he came… but because he thought it was his duty… [Stocker 1976]
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Secondly, the contemporary conception is not as [[teleology|teleological]] as Aristotelian ethics. According to Aristotle, virtuous activity is to achieve well-being or happiness ''([[eudaimonism|eudaimonia]])'' in our life, and for that purpose we have to have our virtue in the sense of ''arête'' function excellently. For example, rationality is peculiar to human beings, and the function ''(ergon)'' of a human being will involve the exercise of his rational capacities to the highest degree to attain well-being. The contemporary account, by contrast, is not necessarily a [[teleological ethics]].
  
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Stocker says about Smith’s behaviour: “Surely there is something lacking here– and lacking in moral merit or value” (cited in Rachels 2003, p. 185). None of us wants to be treated by a friend the way Smith’s friend is treated by Smith. Now although Stocker is right that there is something ‘lacking’ in Smith’s behaviour, it doesn’t seem to have much to do with a moral deficiency. Smith’s deficiency resides in the broader sphere of personal merit, of knowing how to be, and being a good friend. But now consider other occasions where one ought naturally to be moved by sympathy, fellow-feeling, or affection for a particular person. Consider the following example:
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Thirdly, contemporary virtue theory seems to take account of the fact that what counts as a virtue is influenced by [[history|historical]] factors. So, it does not necessarily agree with Aristotle's list of the virtues. A particularly conspicuous example of this is ''megalopsuchia'' ("greatness of soul") Aristotle regards as a virtue. Contemporary theory would not accept it as a virtue. Another example is the virtue of kindness, which Aristotle does not have on his list of virtues, but which contemporary virtue theory accepts from the Christian tradition.
  
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Roger is trundling down road perusing the newspaper when an old lady walking across the street close by, trips, drops her packages, and falls to the ground. When Roger walks by, he helps her, but the only motive he has is the belief that morality requires the action of him. He thinks: “I suppose it is my duty to help this old lady”…
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Fourthly, contemporary theory is more hesitant about [[Socrates]]' doctrine of the unity of the virtues than Aristotle. Of course, Aristotle diverges from Socrates in that he recognizes the real difference of the virtues; but, he at least endorses the Socratic idea that one cannot have one virtue without having them all, based on the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (''phronêsis'') he emphasizes. Aristotle thus maintains that one cannot properly possess any of the virtues unless one has developed practical wisdom. Conversely, if one has practical wisdom, then one has all the virtues. Most contemporary thinkers will not recognize the strong sort of dependency between practical wisdom and courage, for example.<ref>Sarah Broadie, ''Ethics with Aristotle'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).</ref>
  
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The virtue ethicist will take this sort of argument as encapsulating the following argument against Kantian ethics. (1) If an ethical theory holds that someone who is so dependent on the motive of duty could still qualify as perfectly moral person, then this ethical theory is seriously flawed or incomplete. (2) Kantian Ethics maintains this. A person could be entirely lacking in every human feeling, always be motivated by duty, and be regarded as a morally laudable person. (3) Therefore, Kantian ethics is seriously flawed or incomplete. There are many occasions when someone should be moved to kindness, sympathy, or compassion. If someone is not moved to compassion or sympathy when encountered with great suffering, the person does not seem to be a fully worthy moral agent.
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==Assessment==
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Virtues have been talked about and encouraged to be practiced in almost all places and [[culture]]s, although they may have been treated in a variety of ways because of the diversity of cultures and places. Virtues have not been seen as something accidental but rather something purposeful. Major world [[religion]]s have derived human virtues from some ultimate existence that provides a purpose. Indian religions such as [[Hinduism]] and [[Buddhism]] attribute virtues to ''[[dharma]]'' (the path of righteousness), which in case of Hinduism is apparently the projection of divine order from ''[[Brahman]]''. [[Chinese Religions|Chinese religions]] find virtues to be originated ultimately from ''[[Dao]]'' ([[Daoism]]) or Heaven ([[Confucianism]]). The [[monotheism|monotheistic]] religions of [[Judaism]], [[Islam]], and [[Christianity]] see human virtues as coming from [[God]]. All religions seem to teach that practicing virtues leads to liberation or [[salvation]].  
  
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Virtue Ethics is concerned with the development of good character traits, such as loyalty, compassion and kindness.  By focussing on traits of character that morally good people possess, Virtue Ethics aims to provide a more accurate account of the moral person. The Virtue theorist maintains that a morally good person is someone who is moved by the appropriate inclinations at the appropriate times, e.g. kindness when it is needed, courage when it is needed, and so on.
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According to [[Ancient Greek philosophy|ancient Greek philosophers]] such as [[Socrates]], [[Plato]], and [[Aristotle]], virtues are character states of the [[soul]] in its harmony and are related to [[happiness]] or well-being ([[eudaimonism|''eudaimonia'']]) as their goal, which is derived from eternal [[truth]] in the [[form and matter|Form]]s. Contemporary [[virtue ethics]], which is a revival of this Greek virtue ethics after its interruption by [[Kantianism]] and [[utilitarianism]] since the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], is basically in agreement with this point. Various virtues developed in ordinary human life and community, such as the Roman virtues, the virtues of [[martial arts]], and the virtues listed by [[Benjamin Franklin]], also tend to point to something meaningful.
  
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==Two conceptions of virtue ethics==
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This kind of universal assessment of virtues, which says that they can be attributed to something ultimate, meaningful, and liberating, is unacceptable to critics such as the [[nihilism|nihilist]] [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] who, rejecting conventional universal standards for virtues, believe that virtues should be invented by humans themselves. But, Alasdair MacIntyre in his highly regarded book, ''After Virtue,'' refutes this Nietzchean criticism among others.<ref>Alasdair MacIntyre, ''After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory'' (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).</ref>
  
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===Moderate virtue ethics===
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==Notes==
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<references/>
  
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One way of understanding the relevance of virtue ethics is in terms of the deficiencies in other normative theories. The virtue theorist may be interpreted as arguing that Utilitarian and Kantian theories neglect or distort the notion of morally admirable motivation.  They give an inadequate account of the morally good (or virtuous) person. This raises a question as to whether virtue ethics should be understood as supplementing the other normative theories of right action, or whether it competes directly with them. I shall call a virtue theory which aims at a supplementary role, moderate virtue ethics, and that which bills itself as a competitor to (e.g.) Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, as radical virtue ethics. (This distinction is drawn from Rachels (2003)).
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==References ==
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*Anscombe, G.E.M. [http://www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/mmp.pdf "Modern Moral Philosophy."] Retrieved August 25, 2016.  
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On the moderate conception, the importance of virtue theory is to provide an account of moral motivation, of moral character, that will complement other normative theories of right action. Moderate virtue ethics does not try to tell us what to do. It plays a complementary role. Principles of right action are still understood as justified by Kantian or Utilitarian theories. For example, a prohibition on slavery may be justified by Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative. Act always so that you treat persons … as ends-in-themselves and not as means only. The moderate view of virtue ethics does not to justify moral principles. Rather, the moderate virtue ethicist may be understood as saying that a person with the virtue of (e.g.) sensitivity is more likely to recognise when someone is being treated only as a means and not as an end. The theory of right and theory of virtue are complementary.
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*Aquinas, Thomas. [http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3.htm ''Summa Theologica,'' Second Part of the Second Part.] Retrieved October 16, 2008.  
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*Aristotle. ''Nicomachean Ethics''. Translated by Sir David Ross. Pomona Press, 2006. ISBN 1406790524; [http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/ari/nico/index.htm Online.] Retrieved November 11, 2008.
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===Radical virtue ethics===
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*Broadie, Sarah. ''Ethics with Aristotle.'' New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. ISBN 0195085604
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*Crisp, Roger, and Michael Slote (eds.). ''Virtue Ethics.'' Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. ISBN 978-0198751885
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Some virtue theorists have maintained that virtue ethics is able to provide principled guidance about what we should do. This is to say the virtue ethics can also function as a theory of right action.  If this were so, then Virtue Ethics would then be a complete moral theory. It could help us ascertain what we ought to do, and describe the valuable states of character which we want to develop. A virtue theory of this type will be termed radical virtue ethics.
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*Foot, Philippa. ''Virtues and Vices.'' Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2003. ISBN 978-0199252862
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+
*Foot, Philippa. ''Natural Goodness.'' Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2003. ISBN  978-0199265473
−
Radical virtue ethicists argue that right actions may be defined in terms of virtuous states of character. For example, an action is morally right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. The idea here would be that it is right do x because that would be honest. Or it is right to do x because that would be courageous. So according to the radical virtue theorist, principles of right action may be generated and explained in terms of virtuous states of character.
+
*Hume, David. ''An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals''. Echo Library, 2007. ISBN 1406813664 
−
 
+
*Hursthouse, Rosalind. ''On Virtue Ethics.'' Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 978-0199247998
−
===Objections to radical  virtue ethics===
+
*Lin, Yu-sheng. "The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of Jen and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy." ''Monumenta Serica'' 31 (1974- 1975): 172-204.
−
 
+
*MacIntyre, Alasdair. ''After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory''. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0268035044
−
One objection commonly made against radical virtue Ethics is that it is not able to properly explain why a state is a virtue without invoking moral rules. James Rachels (2003, p. 189) asks us to “…consider an occasion where a person is tempted to lie, perhaps because lying offers some advantage in a situation”. According to radical virtue ethics, this person ought not to lie because doing so would be dishonest.  But, Rachels asks, “what does it mean to be dishonest?” (Rachels 2003, p. 189) “Isn’t an honest person just someone who follows rules such as “Do not lie?” (Rachels). Rachels point here seems to be that there is no way of making sense of a virtue of honesty without appealing of moral principles. If this were so, then moral principles are more  fundamental than virtuous states of character, and cannot be explained in terms of them.
+
*McDowell, John. "Virtue and Reason." ''Monist'' 62 ( 1979): 331-350.
−
 
+
*McDowell, John. "The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics." Reprinted in ''Essays on Aristotle's Ethics.'' Edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, 359-76, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
−
==Virtue and vice==
+
*McDowell, John. "Two Sorts of Naturalism." In ''Virtues and Reasons.'' Edited by R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence and W. Quinn, 149-179, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
−
The opposite of a virtue is a [[vice]]. One way of organizing the vices is as the corruption of the virtues. Thus the cardinal vices would be [[folly]], [[venality]], [[cowardice]] and [[lust]]. The Christian theological vices would be [[blasphemy]], [[despair]], and [[hatred]]. 
+
*Nietzsche, Friedrich. ''On the Genealogy of Morality'' ''(Zur Genealogie der Moral)''. Translated by C. Diethe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
−
 
+
*Plato. ''Gorgias''. Translated by D.J. Zeyl. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987.
−
However, as [[Aristotle]] noted, the virtues can have several opposites. Virtues can be considered the mean between two extremes. For instance, both cowardice and rashness are opposites of courage; contrary to prudence are both over-caution and insufficient caution. A more "modern" virtue, [[tolerance]], can be considered the mean between the two extremes of narrow-mindedness on the one hand and soft-headedness on the other.  Vices can therefore be identified as the opposites of virtues, but with the caveat that each virtue could have many different opposites, all distinct from each other.
+
*Plato. ''Republic''. Translated by G.M.A. Grube, revised by C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.  
−
 
+
*Rachels, James, and Stuart Rachels. ''The Elements of Moral Philosophy''. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011. ISBN 978-0078038242
−
== Capital Vices and Virtues ==
+
*Stocker, Michael. "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." ''Journal of Philosophy'' 14 (1976): 453-66.
−
 
+
*Trianosky, Gregory Velazco y. "What is Virtue ethics All About?" ''American Philosophical Quarterly'' 27 (1990): 335-44.
−
The seven capital vices or [[seven deadly sins]] suggest a classification of vices and were enumerated by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. The Catechism of the Catholic Church mentions them as "capital sins which Christian experience has distinguished, following St. John Cassian and St. Gregory the Great."[1] "Capital" here means that these sins stand at the head (Latin caput) of the other sins which proceed from them, e.g., theft proceeding from avarice and adultery from lust. 
+
*Williams, Bernard. ''Morality: An Introduction to Ethics.'' Cambridge University Press, 2012. ISBN 978-1107604766
−
 
 
−
These vices are pride, envy, avarice, anger, lust, gluttony, and sloth. The opposite of these vices are the following virtues: meekness, humility,  generosity, tolerance, chastity,  moderation, and zeal (meaning enthusiastic devotion to a good cause or an ideal). These virtues are not exactly equivalent to the Seven Cardinal or Theological Virtues mentioned above. Instead these capital vices and virtues can be considered the "building blocks" that rule human behaviour. Both are acquired and reinforced by practice and the exercise of one induces or facilitates the others.
 
−
 
 
−
Ranked in order of severity as per [[Dante]]'s [[Divine Comedy]] (in the Purgatorio), the seven deadly vices are:
 
−
 
 
−
#[[Pride]] or [[Vanity]] — an excessive love of self (holding self out of proper position toward God or fellows; Dante's definition was "love of self perverted to hatred and contempt for one's neighbor"). In the Latin lists of the [[Seven Deadly Sins]], pride is referred to as superbia.
 
−
#[[Avarice]] (covetousness, [[Greed]]) — a desire to possess more than one has need or use for (or, according to Dante, "excessive love of money and power"). In the Latin lists of the Seven Deadly Sins, avarice is referred to as avaritia.
 
−
#[[Lust]] — excessive sexual desire. Dante's criterion was "lust detracts from true love". In the Latin lists of the Seven Deadly Sins, lust is referred to as luxuria.
 
−
#[[Wrath]] or [[Anger]] —  feelings of hatred, revenge or even denial, as well as punitive desires outside of justice (Dante's description was "love of justice perverted to revenge and spite"). In the Latin lists of the Seven Deadly Sins, wrath is referred to as ira.
 
−
#[[Gluttony]] —  overindulgence in food, drink or intoxicants, or misplaced desire of food as a pleasure for its sensuality ("excessive love of pleasure" was Dante's rendering). In the Latin lists of the Seven Deadly Sins, gluttony is referred to as gula.
 
−
#[[Envy]] or [[jealousy]]; resentment of others for their possessions (Dante: "Love of one's own good perverted to a desire to deprive other men of theirs"). In the Latin lists of the Seven Deadly Sins, envy is referred to as invidia.
 
−
#[[Sloth]] or [[Laziness]]; idleness and wastefulness of time allotted. Laziness is condemned because others have to work harder and useful work can not get done. (also accidie, acedia)
 
−
 
 
−
Several of these vices interlink, and various attempts at causal hierarchy have been made. For example, pride (love of self out of proportion) is implied in gluttony (the over-consumption or waste of food), as well as sloth, envy, and most of the others. Each sin is a particular way of failing to love God with all one's resources and to love fellows as much as self. The Scholastic theologians developed schema of attribute and substance of will to explain these sins.
 
−
 
 
−
The 4th century Egyptian monk Evagrius Ponticus defined the sins as deadly "passions," and in Eastern Orthodoxy, still these impulses are characterized as being "Deadly Passions" rather than sins. Instead, the sins are considered to invite or entertain these passions. In the official [[Catechism of the Catholic Church]]  published in 1992 by [[Pope John Paul II]], these seven vices are considered moral transgression for Christians and the virtues should complement the Ten Commandments and the Beatitudes as the basis for any true Morality.
 
−
 
 
−
 
 
−
==References and further reading==
 
−
 
 
−
 
 
−
*Aquinas, Thomas.  
 
−
*ScG Summa contra Gentiles (A Treatise against the Unbelievers)
 
−
*ST Summa Theologiae (A Treatise on Theology), Parts I [1265-8], I-II [1271-2], II-II [c.1271], III [1272-3]
 
−
*Aristotle (c. mid 4th century B.C.E.) Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross,
 
−
*revised by J. Urmson, ed. and revised by J. Barnes in The Complete Works
 
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*of Aristotle, vol. 2, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
 
−
*Broadie, S. (1991) Ethics with Aristotle, New York: Oxford University Press.
 
−
*Crisp, Roger and Michael Slote (eds.), 1997, Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford *University Press.  
 
−
*Foot, Philippa 1978, Virtues and Vices, Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
−
*Foot, Philippa 2001, Natural Goodness, Oxford, Clarendon Press
 
−
*Hume, D. (1751) An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in
 
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*Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the
 
−
*Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch,
 
−
*Oxford: Clarendon Press, 3rd edn, 1975.
 
−
*Hursthouse, Rosalind, 1999, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 
−
*MacIntyre, A. (1981) After Virtue, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
 
−
Press.
 
−
*McDowell, John, 1979, "Virtue and Reason", Monist 62: 331-50
 
−
*McDowell, John, 1980, "The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics", reprinted in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Berkeley, University of *California Press, 1980, 359-76
 
−
*McDowell, John,1995, "Two Sorts of Naturalism", in Virtues and Reasons, R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence and W.Quinn (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 149-79
 
−
*Nietzsche, F. (1887) Zur Genealogie der Moral, trans. C. Diethe, On the
 
−
*Genealogy of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
 
−
*Plato (c.395-387 B.C.E.) Gorgias, trans. D.J. Zeyl, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
 
−
*Publishing Company, 1987.
 
−
*Plato (c.380-367 B.C.E.) Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube, revised by C.D.C. Reeve,
 
−
*Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.(His fullest account,
 
−
*political as well as ethical, of the nature and value of the virtues.)
 
−
*Rachels, J. (2003) The Elements of Moral Philosophy, McGraw-Hill.  
 
−
*Stocker, Michael, 1976, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories", Journal of Philosophy 14:453-66
 
−
*Trianosky, Gregory Velazco y., 1990, "What is Virtue ethics All About?", American Philosophical Quarterly, 27: 335-44, reprinted in Statman, 1997a
 
−
*Williams, B. (1972) Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, New York: Harper & Row.
 
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==See also==
 
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*[[Aretaic turn]]
 
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*[[Bushido]]
 
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*[[Chivalry]]
 
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*[[Consequentialism]]
 
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*[[Epistemic virtue]]
 
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*[[Ethics]]
 
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*[[Goodness]]
 
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*[[Intellectual virtues]]
 
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*[[Knightly Virtues]]
 
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*[[Morality]]
 
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*[[Paideia]]
 
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*[[Seven Deadly Sins]]
 
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*[[Sin]]
 
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*[[Social justice]]
 
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*[[Three theological virtues]].
 
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*[[Value theory]]
 
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*[[Vice]]
 
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*[[Virtue ethics]]
 
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*[[Virtues of Ultima]]
 
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<!-- *[[piety]] sole single virtue listed, too subjective! -->
 
  
 
==External links==
 
==External links==
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{{wikiquote}}
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All links retrieved May 3, 2023.
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* [http://www.deadlysins.com/virtues.html Cardinal, Contrary, Heavenly and other Virtues]
 
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* [http://www.thefourvirtues.com The Four Virtues]
 
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* [http://www.metamind.us/virtues The Virtues Project]
 
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* [http://www.virtuesproject.com/ Virtues Project International]
 
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* [http://www.VirtueScience.com VirtueScience.com]
 
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* [http://www.virtuemag.org Virtue Magazine]
 
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* [http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03343a.htm  ''Catholic Encyclopedia'' "Cardinal Virtues"]
 
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* [http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3.htm ''Summa Theologica'' "Second Part of the Second Part"]
 
  
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{{Philosophy navigation}}
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* [https://www.ftrain.com/franklin_improving_self Benjamin Franklin on Moral Perfection]
 +
* [https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03343a.htm Cardinal Virtues] ''Catholic Encyclopedia''.
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* [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-virtue/ Justice as a Virtue] ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.
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* [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/ Virtue Epistemology] ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.
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* [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ Virtue Ethics] ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.
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* [https://thefourvirtues.com/ The Four Virtues]
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* [http://www.virtuesproject.com/ The Virtues Project]
  
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Latest revision as of 20:37, 3 May 2023

Personification of virtue (Greek ἀρετή) in Celsus Library in Ephesos, Turkey

A virtue is a trait or disposition of character that leads to good behavior, for example, wisdom, courage, modesty, generosity, and self-control. There are also public virtues that characterize the spirit of a nation, such as justice, honor, and peace. Every culture has its lists of virtues, such as the biblical "fruits of the Spirit:" Love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control (Galatians 5:22-23), or the Japanese bushidō code: Gi (義; rectitude), yū (勇; courage), jin (仁; benevolence), rei (礼; respect), makoto (誠; honesty), meiyo (名誉; honor), and chū (忠; loyalty). These define what people regard as most valuable in a human being.

Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle dealt with virtues in terms of character traits of the soul. They held that virtues are conducive to personal and social happiness (eudaimonia), while lack of virtue leads to suffering and downfall. The world's religions universally encourage people to cultivate virtues, and attribute their source to ultimate reality (dharma, Brahman, Dao, Heaven, or God). Plato likewise rooted virtue in a higher reality, the Forms. Every culture on earth is grounded in teachings and practices that cultivate personal virtue in order to promote social and moral responsibility, so that people may be able to live peacefully on earth and beyond.

In philosophy, the notion of virtue played a central role in ethical theory up until the Enlightenment. However, virtues took something of a back seat after the emergence of Kantianism and utilitarianism, as philosophers focused less on dispositions of character and more on the rightness or wrongness of actions. Recent years have seen a revival of what is called virtue ethics, following the Greek tradition of Plato and Aristotle.

Virtues in world religions

All religions in the world recognize the importance of morality in our lives, and all cultivate a self-discipline and social and moral responsibility, for the sake of happiness and peaceful living on earth and beyond.

Hinduism

Hinduism regards dharma (the path of righteousness) as the first chief aim of human life, encouraging us to cultivate virtues and do good deeds in order for us to be liberated from the chain of karma. So, the Bhagavad Gita teaches: "O Arjuna there never exists destruction for one in this life nor in the next life; since dear friend anyone who is engaged in virtuous acts never comes to evil."[1] Although the actions of humans are usually caused by mixtures of the three different qualities of sattva (purity), rajas (vitality), and tamas (darkness), one is encouraged to increase the quality of sattva by cultivating virtues and doing good deeds. Virtues are modes of sattva, and they include altruism, moderation, honesty, cleanliness, protection of the earth, universality, peace, non-violence, and reverence for elders.

Buddhism

The Eightfold Path of Buddhism, consisting of right understanding, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration, is a course on virtuous living on the path of righteousness, which would lead to the cessation of dukkha (suffering) and the achievement of bodhi (enlightenment). Buddhism has a few other ways of classifying virtues. It has the four Brahmavihāras (abodes of Brahma), known also as the four "immeasurables" (apramāṇa in Sanskrit), which are maitrī/mettā (loving-kindness or benevolence), karuṇā (compassion), mudita (sympathetic joy), and upekṣā/upekkhā (equanimity); and they may be more properly regarded as virtues in the European sense. Theravada Buddhism has developed the Ten Perfections (dasapāramiyo in Pāli; singular: Pāramī in Pāli; pāramitā in Sanskrit), shown in the second chapter of the Buddhavamsa, part of its Pali Canon, and they are dāna pāramī (generosity), sīla pāramī (good conduct), nekkhamma pāramī (renunciation), paññā pāramī (wisdom), vīrya pāramī (diligence), khanti pāramī (patience), sacca pāramī (truthfulness), adhiṭṭhāna pāramī (determination), mettā pāramī (loving-kindness or benevolence), and upekkhā pāramī (equanimity). A stress on the importance of such virtues can be seen in the following passage in the Dhammapada, part of the Pali Canon: "Sandal-wood or Tagara, a lotus-flower, or a Vassikî, among these sorts of perfumes, the perfume of virtue is unsurpassed."[2] Mahayana Buddhism lists the Six Perfections (şaţpāramitā in Sanskrit) in the Lotus Sutra, and they are dāna pāramitā (generosity), śīla pāramitā (good conduct), kṣanti pāramitā (patience), vīrya pāramitā (diligence), dhyāna pāramitā (one-pointed concentration), and prajñā pāramitā (wisdom). Four more Perfections are listed in Mahayana Buddhism's Dasabhumika Sutra: Upaya pāramitā (skillful means), praṇidhāna pāramitā (determination), bala pāramitā (spiritual power), and jñāna pāramitā (knowledge).

Chinese religions

"Virtue," translated from Chinese de (德), is an important concept in Chinese religions, particularly Daoism and Confucianism. De originally meant normative "virtue" in the sense of "personal character, inner strength, or integrity," but semantically changed to moral "virtue, kindness, or morality." Note the semantic parallel for English "virtue," with an archaic meaning of "inner potency or divine power" (as in "by virtue of") and a modern one of "moral excellence or goodness." In Daoism, the concept of de is rather subtle, referring to the lifestyle of wu-wei (無為; non-action) that an individual is expected to realize, in order that he may return to nature and allow the Dao ("The Way") to unfold in the manner that it is meant to unfold. This non-action is reflected in the three basic virtues called sanbao (三寶; three jewels) in the 67th chapter of Dao De Jing: ci (慈; compassion), jian (儉; frugality), and bugan wei tianxia xian (不敢為天下先; not daring to be ahead of all under heaven, or humility in a concise form).

Confucianism played a key role by presenting its teaching of virtues to Far Eastern countries such as Korea and Japan beside China as they built their social systems. Confucian moral manifestations of virtue include ren (仁; humaneness or benevolence), xiao (孝; filial piety), and zhong (忠; loyalty). Originally, ren had the archaic meaning of "virility" in the Confucian Book of Poems and then progressively took on shades of ethical meaning.[3] In any case, Confucius considers these virtues to be connected with the ming (命; "ordinances of Heaven"), without whose knowledge one cannot become a superior man. One important normative value in much of Chinese thinking is that one's social status should result from the amount of virtue that one demonstrates rather than from one's birth.

Judaism

The Hebrew Bible contains 613 commandments including the Ten Commandments. But, Judaism is not simply about following rules. When teaching these commandments, it actually aims at fostering moral virtues in the hearts of people, so that human relationships may become more harmonious for the betterment of the world. So, one striking virtue taught in Judaism is compassion, resembling the compassionate God. It is indicated in the repeated injunctions in the Hebrew Bible that the widow, the orphan, and the stranger shall be protected. Kindness to the poor is another example, and it is considered to be repaid by God (Proverbs 19:17). In the teaching that "you shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Leviticus 19:18), "neighbor" can be a stranger and does not mean an Israelite exclusively (Leviticus 19:34). Justice and impartiality are stressed (Leviticus 19:15, 36; Exodus 23:3). Jewish family ethics involves virtues such as reverence for parents (Exodus 20:12) and chastity (Leviticus 18:18-20).

A classic articulation of the Golden Rule came from the first century Rabbi Hillel the Elder. Renowned in the Jewish tradition as a sage and a scholar, he is associated with the development of the Mishnah and the Talmud and, as such, one of the most important figures in Jewish history. Asked for a summary of the Jewish religion in the most concise terms, Hillel replied (reputedly while standing on one leg): "What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor: That is the whole Torah, while the rest is the commentary thereof; go and learn it."[4]

Islam

In the Islamic tradition, the Qur'an is, as the word of God, the great repository of all virtues in earthly form, and the Prophet, particularly via his hadith or reported sayings, is the exemplar of virtue in human form. The very name of Islam, meaning "acceptance," proclaims the virtue of submission to the will of God, the acceptance of the way things are. Foremost among God's attributes are mercy and compassion or, in the canonical language of Arabic, rahman and rahim. Each of the 114 chapters of the Qur'an, with one exception, begins with the verse, "In the name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful." A good Muslim is to commence each day, each prayer, and each significant action by invoking God the Merciful and Compassionate, that is, by reciting Bi Ism-i-Allah al-Rahman al-Rahim. The Muslim scriptures urge compassion towards captives as well as to widows, orphans and the poor. Traditionally, zakat, a toll tax to help the poor and needy, was obligatory upon all Muslims (Qur'an 9:60). One of the practical purposes of fasting or sawm during the month of Ramadan is to help one empathize with the hunger pangs of those less fortunate, to enhance sensitivity to the suffering of others and develop compassion for the poor and destitute. The list of Muslim virtues is a long one: prayer, repentance, honesty, loyalty, sincerity, frugality, prudence, moderation, self-restraint, discipline, perseverance, patience, hope, dignity, courage, justice, tolerance, wisdom, good speech, respect, purity, courtesy, kindness, gratitude, generosity, and contentment.

Christianity

In Christianity, there are three theological virtues: faith, hope, and love/charity, among which the greatest is love (1 Corinthians 13:13). The "theological" virtues are so named because their immediate object is God. The Bible also lists several virtues as the "fruit" of the Holy Spirit: Love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control (Galatians 5:22-23).

These biblical lists of virtues are accepted to all Christians. Catholic theology calls them "supernatural" virtues, and additionally comes up with what it calls "natural" virtues, which include the four Platonic virtues of prudence (wisdom), justice, fortitude (courage), and temperance, as adopted by theologians such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. These four virtues from Plato are called "cardinal" virtues (cardo in Latin, "hinge"). The three theological virtues and the four cardinal virtues together constitute the so-called "seven virtues" of Catholic theology. These seven virtues, however, are to be distinguished from the seven holy virtues (chastity, abstinence, generosity, diligence, patience, kindness, and humility), which the poet Prudentius (348-c.410 C.E.) in his descriptions of battles between the virtues and vices contrasted with the corresponding seven deadly sins (lust, gluttony, avarice, sloth, wrath, envy, and pride).

According to Catholic theology, the supernatural virtues differ from all other virtues, that is, natural virtues, in that they can be obtained only by being supernaturally "infused" through divine grace and not by human effort. According to Thomas Aquinas, non-Christian people can not display the supernatural virtues, although they can manifest the other, natural virtues such as fortitude. However, Aquinas seems to hold that all the natural virtues are subordinate and grounded in the virtue called charity, which is the supernatural queen of the virtues.

Virtues in community

Although often influenced by religion, specific lists of virtues became influential in various cultures and communities. Among the best-known:

Roman virtues

The Roman virtues,[5] were the heart of the Via Romana (the Roman Way). They gave the citizens of the Roman Empire the moral strength to conquer and civilize the world. Private virtues, aspired to by individuals, included: auctoritas (spiritual authority), comitas (humor), constantinum (perseverance), clementia (mercy), dignitas (dignity), disciplinae (discipline), firmitas (tenacity), frugalitas (frugalness), gravitas (gravity), honestas (respectability), humanitas (humanity), industria (industriousness), pietas (dutifulness), prudentia (prudence), salubritas (wholesomeness), severitas (sternness), and veritas (truthfulness). Distinguished from personal virtues were public virtues to be shared by all of society in common, and they included abundantia (abundance), aequitas (equity), concordia (concord), iustitia (justice), libertas (freedom), pax (peace), and salus (safety). Many of the public virtues were personified as deities.

Chinese martial morality

Traditional schools of Chinese martial arts, such as Shaolin Kung Fu, base martial arts on a system of ethics called wu-de (武德; martial morality), where wu (武) means martial and de (德) means virtue or morality. Wu-de has two aspects: the morality of deed, which concerns human relationships, and the morality of mind, which is meant to cultivate inner harmony within oneself, and whose ultimate goal is to reach wu-ji (無極; no extremity), closely related to the Daoist concept of wu-wei (無為; non-action). This martial morality spread to Korea and Japan. The morality of deed includes virtues such as qian-xu (謙虛; humility), zhong-cheng (忠誠; loyalty), zun-jing (尊敬; respect), zheng-yi (正義; righteousness), and xin-yong (信用; trust). The morality of mind includes yong-gan (勇敢; courage), ren-nai (忍耐; endurance), heng-xin (恆心; patience), yi-li (毅力; perseverance), and yi-zhi (意志; will).

Samurai virtues

Samurai virtues were developed as the code of the samurai in the bushidō (武士道; way of the warrier) during the feudal period of history in Japan. It stressed frugality, loyalty, mastery of martial arts, and honor to the death.

The central seven virtues of the Bushido code were: gi (義; rectitude), yū (勇; courage), jin (仁; benevolence), rei (礼; respect), makoto (誠; honesty) or shin (信; honesty), meiyo (名誉; honor), and chū (忠; loyalty). Others that were sometimes added to these were kō (孝; filial piety), chi (智; wisdom), and tei (悌; care for the aged).

Virtues according to Benjamin Franklin

Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) taught thirteen virtues, which he called "moral perfection." He kept a checklist in a notebook to measure each day how he lived up to them. They became known through his autobiography and inspired many people all around the world. Authors and speakers in the self-help movement report being influenced by him. For example, Anthony Robbins based a part of his "Date with Destiny" seminar on Franklin's concept. Franklin's list is as follows:[6]

  1. Temperance. Eat not to dullness; drink not to elevation.
  2. Silence. Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself; avoid trifling conversation.
  3. Order. Let all your things have their places; let each part of your business have its time.
  4. Resolution. Resolve to perform what you ought; perform without fail what you resolve.
  5. Frugality. Make no expense but to do good to others or yourself; i.e., waste nothing.
  6. Industry. Lose no Time; be always employ'd in something useful; cut off all unnecessary actions.
  7. Sincerity. Use no hurtful deceit; think innocently and justly, and, if you speak, speak accordingly.
  8. Justice. Wrong none by doing injuries, or omitting the benefits that are your duty.
  9. Moderation. Avoid extremes; forbear resenting injuries so much as you think they deserve.
  10. Cleanliness. Tolerate no uncleanness in body, clothes, or habitation.
  11. Tranquility. Be not disturbed at trifles, or at accidents common or unavoidable.
  12. Chastity. Rarely use venery but for health or offspring, never to dullness, weakness, or the injury of your own or another's peace or reputation.
  13. Humility. Imitate Jesus and Socrates.

The Virtues Project

In civil society, there are a number of non-governmental organizations that promote virtues for the betterment of society. For example, The Virtues Project, founded in 1991 based on the conviction that "Virtues are the very meaning and purpose of our lives, the content of our character and the truest expression of our souls"[7] is a worldwide organization with some inter-religious flavor, which has developed educational programs for religious and non-religious individuals, families, schools, health care agencies, corporations, and so on, so that they may be helped "to live authentic, purposeful lives, to raise children of compassion and idealism, and to create a culture of character in our schools and communities."[8]

Virtue as a concept in philosophical ethics

Virtue (aretê) is, along with well-being (eudaimonia), one of the two central concepts in ancient Greek ethics. In Greek ethical thinking, virtues (aretai) are character states of the soul (psyche). They include courage, temperance, etc. Each virtue ensures that its possessor acts in the correct ways pertaining to a situation that he or she might encounter over a life. Possessing the virtues ensures that one practices good (agathon) and fine (kalon) courses of action.

Socrates

Socrates as he appears in Plato's writings was the first in the Western intellectual tradition to make a serious investigation into the subject matter of virtue. What is known of Socrates' philosophy is almost entirely derived from Plato's Socratic dialogues. Scholars typically divide Plato's works into three periods: the early, middle, and late periods. They tend to agree also that Plato's earliest works quite faithfully represent the teachings of Socrates, and that Plato's own views, which go beyond those of Socrates, appear for the first time in the middle works such as Phaedo and Republic.

Socrates challenged the Sophists, professional rhetoricians who promoted moral relativism, skepticism, and secular, materialistic lifestyles. Protagoras, one of the major Sophists, argued that good and evil are a matter of interpretation. Some Sophists even held a Machiavellian view of value, arguing that good and evil are determined by a winner. Thus, the Sophists generally promoted a view of value based upon power, wealth, and honor. For Socrates, however, the foundation of morality consists in the world of eternal truth beyond the world of everyday reality. It transcends human interpretations. Eternal truth is both transcendent of and immanent in the soul at the same time because people cannot really grasp it, while they are aware of it. The soul is not some kind of ghostly substance at all but rather the the structure of personality that has the capacity for intelligence and character. The soul, which is at least aware of eternal truth, needs to be cultivated, so that it may have true knowledge of eternal truth. Virtue indeed consists in the cultivation of the soul in this sense. Therefore, virtue means knowledge of eternal truth on the part of the soul. Conversely, vice means ignorance. Ultimately, virtue relates to the form of the Good; to truly be good and not just act with "right opinion," one must come to know the unchanging Good in itself.

Socrates seems to have maintained that there is strictly only one virtue, which is knowledge of eternal truth. This is sometimes called his doctrine of the unity of the virtues. In Plato's dialogue, Protagoras, Protagoras defends the view that virtues are distinct traits so that a person can possess one virtue without possessing the others (329d-e). For example, some people are courageous without being wise, and some are wise without being courageous. Socrates argues against this, maintaining that apparently separate virtues such as wisdom, courage, self-control, and justice are in some way one and the same thing. His view seems to be that the distinction between virtues is nothing other than the distinction between different spheres of application of the same state of knowledge. Given this unity of the virtues, it follows that a person cannot possess one virtue independently of the others: If he possesses one, he must possess them all.

Plato

Plato's view of virtue may be understood as a development of Socrates'. In his greatest work, Republic, Plato shows his tripartite conception of the soul as having reason, spirit, and appetite, which he developed from common experience of internal confusion and conflict within the soul. Reason seeks the true goal of human life in view of eternal truth, of the Forms, and spirit is the drive that is neutral at first but responds to the direction of reason. But, appetite is the desire for the things of the body. The soul can achieve order and peace only if the rational part is in control of the irrational parts of spirit and appetite. But, after the soul enters the body, the body stimulates the irrational parts to defeat the rulership of reason. Hence disorder happens, and the soul's former knowledge of eternal truth is lost. Plato calls the regaining of this knowledge "recollection" (anamnesis) and relates it to the regaining of reason's control over spirit and appetite. So, like Socrates, Plato believes that knowledge is virtue.

Corresponding to the three parts of the soul, however, there are three distinguishable virtues: Wisdom, courage, and temperance. The virtue of wisdom is achieved, when reason remains undisturbed by the irrational parts of the soul to see eternal truth in the Forms, especially the Good. The virtue of courage is achieved, when the energy of will, coming from spirit, follows the direction of reason aggressively yet defensively even in situations of trial, avoiding headlong or rash action. The virtue of temperance is attained, when appetite is kept within limits and in its measure, avoiding excesses in pleasures and desires so that they may not dominate the other parts of the soul. Plato also talks about a fourth virtue, which is justice. The virtue of justice is attained, when each part of the soul fulfills its function. For justice means giving to each part its own due. The attainment of justice, then, means that the soul achieves not only inner harmony but also happiness or well-being (eudaimonia).

Aristotle

Aristotle's account of the virtues, as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics is by far the most influential of the ancient accounts of the virtues. The fact that many modern thinkers consider themselves to be "neo-Aristotelians" is testimony to this fact. Unlike Plato, Aristotle believed that eternal truth is embedded in human beings, not separated from them, so that it can not only be known by studying human nature but also be attained through practice. According to Aristotle, the human soul as the form of the human self has three parts: the rational (which is distinctively human), the appetitive (which is shared with animals), and the vegetative (which is shared with plants). What is pertinent to human morality is the relationship between the rational and appetitive parts of the soul. Although the appetitive part in and by itself is irrational, being shared with animals, nevertheless it is also rational as long as it is under the control of the rational, that is, as long as there is the rational ability of the soul to control appetitive desires. Indeed, moral virtues consist in various forms of the rational ability of the soul in this sense. So, "in the continent man it obeys the rational principle and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient."[9] These moral virtues are each not instinctive but learned through teaching and practice to become a habit (ethos), a slight linguistic variation of which has given rise to the word "ethics" (ethike). Unlike Plato's idea that virtue is basically knowledge alone, therefore, Aristotle's understanding is that each virtue involves the self-control of the soul in addition to rational knowledge. Aristotle considers many more moral virtues than Plato, and includes virtues such as magnificence, liberality, friendship, sincerity, and self-respect. As habits, moral virtues are character traits. Most moral virtues are to be understood as falling at the mean between two vices, that is, the two extremes of defect and excess. For example, the virtue of courage is the mean between cowardice (defect) and rashness (excess). This is called the doctrine of the mean.

Aristotle posits virtues of another kind, which consist in purely rational abilities of the soul unrelated to controlling the appetitive part. They are intellectual virtues, and they include "philosophical wisdom" of first principles (sophia) and "practical wisdom" of the good (phronêsis). While the moral virtues can lead us to happiness, the intellectual virtues constitute even higher forms of happiness.

Kantianism and utilitarianism

Since the time of the Enlightenment, moral theorizing has shifted its focus from the issue of what sort of person one should be to that of what one ought to do. Thus, the main questions to be addressed have become: What actions should one perform, and which actions are right and which ones wrong? Questions such as: Which traits of character ought one to develop? and, Which traits of character are virtues, and which ones vices?, have been ignored. For instance, according to classical utilitarians such as as Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), one ought to do actions that promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. The principle of utility is a criterion of rightness, and one's motive in acting has nothing to do with the rightness of an action. Similarly, for Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), one ought to act only on maxims that can consistently be willed as universal laws. Kant, of course, does give motivation a central place in his theory of morality, according to which the morally virtuous person is someone who is disposed to act from the motive of duty. But this idea, of someone who always does the right thing from the desire to do the right thing, may not be an accurate picture of the virtues of the moral agent's character. This trend after the Enlightenment continued until the middle of the twentieth century.

Twentieth century: Virtue ethics

Interest in the concept of virtue and ancient ethical theory more generally has enjoyed a tremendous revival in the twentieth century. This is largely as a result of Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 article, "Modern Moral Philosophy," which argues that duty-based conceptions of morality are incoherent because they are based on the idea of a law but without a lawgiver.[10] Her point is roughly that a system of morality conceived along the lines of the Ten Commandments, as a system of rules for action, depends on someone having actually made these rules. However, in the modern climate, which is unwilling to accept that morality depends on God in this way, a rule-based conception of morality is stripped of its metaphysical foundation. Anscombe recommends a return to the virtue ethical theories of the ancients, particularly Aristotle, which ground morality in eudaimonia, that is, the interests and well-being of human moral agents, and can do so without appeal to any questionable metaphysics. The primary focus of this virtue ethics is not discrete actions but rather: What sort of person should one be, try to be, or want to be? The focus is the agent's character.

Many philosophers today follow ancient ethical thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle, in situating virtue at the centre of their ethical theories. They criticize utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, by stating that both neglect the importance of moral motivation, or provide a distorted conception of moral motivation. As a result, virtue ethics has come to be recognized as a promising alternative to utilitarianism and Kantianism in the sphere of normative theory.

The nature of virtue

Contemporary virtue ethics shares much in common with Aristotle. Most modern thinkers adopt Aristotle's view that virtues are flexible traits of character, which are displayed in specific types of actions, as well as cognitive and emotional reactions. This conception of virtues may be explained by considering its various components in turn.

Firstly, virtues are states of a person's character. Judging someone to be courageous or wise, for example, is to make a judgment targeted at the character of a person rather than specific actions. One calls actions right and wrong, but when one says that a person is generous, one is making a claim about the moral worth of the person concerned. One is saying that he or she possesses a certain virtuous trait of character.

Secondly, a virtue is a disposition of a person's character. A disposition is a tendency to have certain responses in particular situations: Responses such as emotions, perceptions, and actions. It is important to notice that the idea of a disposition is made out in terms of the situations in which certain characteristics would be displayed. To say that a person is a generous man is to say more than he has behaved generously in the past. If he has the virtue of generosity, then he will very likely behave generously in situations in which generosity is called for. This, then, has something to do with enduring patterns of response, which characterize a person when he or she is in situations of a given type.

Thirdly, the possession of a virtue entails a wide range of responses including actions, perceptions, attitudes and emotions. In this vein, Rosalind Hursthouse helpfully characterizes virtues as multi-track dispositions. She says: "A virtue is not merely a tendency to do what is morally desirable or required. Rather, it is to have a complex mindset. This includes emotions, choices, desires, attitudes, interests, and sensibilities."[11] A person who fully possesses a virtue is effortlessly moved by the range of considerations pertinent to the situation in which he or she acts, and displays the emotions particular to the virtue in question. This is to recognize a distinction drawn by Aristotle between the virtuous person and the strong-willed person who acts correctly but has to control his desires and emotions, which are not properly tuned to the display of the virtue in question. The main point is that a full virtue requires a harmony between one's actions and emotions and attitudes. Someone who does not possess this harmony may act correctly but will nonetheless fail to be (fully) virtuous.

Main differences from Aristotle's conception

But, the contemporary account diverges from Aristotle's conception in a number of ways. Firstly, the scope of virtue in the contemporary account is not as broad as that in Aristotle's conception. The Greek word arête is usually translated into English as "virtue." One problem with this translation is that we are inclined to understand virtue in a moral sense, which is not always what the ancients had in mind. For the Greeks, arête pertains to all sorts of qualities we would not regard as relevant to ethics, such as the physical beauty of a woman and the high speed of a horse. So it is important to bear in mind that the sense of virtue operative in ancient ethics is not exclusively moral and includes more than moral states such as wisdom and courage.

Secondly, the contemporary conception is not as teleological as Aristotelian ethics. According to Aristotle, virtuous activity is to achieve well-being or happiness (eudaimonia) in our life, and for that purpose we have to have our virtue in the sense of arête function excellently. For example, rationality is peculiar to human beings, and the function (ergon) of a human being will involve the exercise of his rational capacities to the highest degree to attain well-being. The contemporary account, by contrast, is not necessarily a teleological ethics.

Thirdly, contemporary virtue theory seems to take account of the fact that what counts as a virtue is influenced by historical factors. So, it does not necessarily agree with Aristotle's list of the virtues. A particularly conspicuous example of this is megalopsuchia ("greatness of soul") Aristotle regards as a virtue. Contemporary theory would not accept it as a virtue. Another example is the virtue of kindness, which Aristotle does not have on his list of virtues, but which contemporary virtue theory accepts from the Christian tradition.

Fourthly, contemporary theory is more hesitant about Socrates' doctrine of the unity of the virtues than Aristotle. Of course, Aristotle diverges from Socrates in that he recognizes the real difference of the virtues; but, he at least endorses the Socratic idea that one cannot have one virtue without having them all, based on the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (phronêsis) he emphasizes. Aristotle thus maintains that one cannot properly possess any of the virtues unless one has developed practical wisdom. Conversely, if one has practical wisdom, then one has all the virtues. Most contemporary thinkers will not recognize the strong sort of dependency between practical wisdom and courage, for example.[12]

Assessment

Virtues have been talked about and encouraged to be practiced in almost all places and cultures, although they may have been treated in a variety of ways because of the diversity of cultures and places. Virtues have not been seen as something accidental but rather something purposeful. Major world religions have derived human virtues from some ultimate existence that provides a purpose. Indian religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism attribute virtues to dharma (the path of righteousness), which in case of Hinduism is apparently the projection of divine order from Brahman. Chinese religions find virtues to be originated ultimately from Dao (Daoism) or Heaven (Confucianism). The monotheistic religions of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity see human virtues as coming from God. All religions seem to teach that practicing virtues leads to liberation or salvation.

According to ancient Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, virtues are character states of the soul in its harmony and are related to happiness or well-being (eudaimonia) as their goal, which is derived from eternal truth in the Forms. Contemporary virtue ethics, which is a revival of this Greek virtue ethics after its interruption by Kantianism and utilitarianism since the Enlightenment, is basically in agreement with this point. Various virtues developed in ordinary human life and community, such as the Roman virtues, the virtues of martial arts, and the virtues listed by Benjamin Franklin, also tend to point to something meaningful.

This kind of universal assessment of virtues, which says that they can be attributed to something ultimate, meaningful, and liberating, is unacceptable to critics such as the nihilist Friedrich Nietzsche who, rejecting conventional universal standards for virtues, believe that virtues should be invented by humans themselves. But, Alasdair MacIntyre in his highly regarded book, After Virtue, refutes this Nietzchean criticism among others.[13]

Notes

  1. ↑ Bhagavad Gita, 6:40. Retrieved January 20, 2021.
  2. ↑ Dhammapada, 4:55. Sacred Texts. Retrieved January 20, 2021.
  3. ↑ Lin Yu-sheng, "The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of Jen and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy," Monumenta Serica 31 (1974-75): 172-204.
  4. ↑ Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Shabbath, Folio 31a Retrieved January 20, 2021.
  5. ↑ Roman virtues Nova Roma. Retrieved January 20, 2021.
  6. ↑ Paul Ford, Benjamin Franklin on Moral Perfection Retrieved January 20, 2021.
  7. ↑ What are the Virtues? The Virtues Project. Retrieved January 20, 2021.
  8. ↑ What are the Five Strategies? The Virtues Project. Retrieved January 20, 2021.
  9. ↑ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 13. Retrieved January 20, 2021.
  10. ↑ G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy Retrieved January 20, 2021.
  11. ↑ Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
  12. ↑ Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
  13. ↑ Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Anscombe, G.E.M. "Modern Moral Philosophy." Retrieved August 25, 2016.
  • Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part. Retrieved October 16, 2008.
  • Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Sir David Ross. Pomona Press, 2006. ISBN 1406790524; Online. Retrieved November 11, 2008.
  • Broadie, Sarah. Ethics with Aristotle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. ISBN 0195085604
  • Crisp, Roger, and Michael Slote (eds.). Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. ISBN 978-0198751885
  • Foot, Philippa. Virtues and Vices. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2003. ISBN 978-0199252862
  • Foot, Philippa. Natural Goodness. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2003. ISBN 978-0199265473
  • Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Echo Library, 2007. ISBN 1406813664
  • Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 978-0199247998
  • Lin, Yu-sheng. "The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of Jen and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy." Monumenta Serica 31 (1974- 1975): 172-204.
  • MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0268035044
  • McDowell, John. "Virtue and Reason." Monist 62 ( 1979): 331-350.
  • McDowell, John. "The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics." Reprinted in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. Edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, 359-76, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
  • McDowell, John. "Two Sorts of Naturalism." In Virtues and Reasons. Edited by R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence and W. Quinn, 149-179, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
  • Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality (Zur Genealogie der Moral). Translated by C. Diethe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
  • Plato. Gorgias. Translated by D.J. Zeyl. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987.
  • Plato. Republic. Translated by G.M.A. Grube, revised by C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.
  • Rachels, James, and Stuart Rachels. The Elements of Moral Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011. ISBN 978-0078038242
  • Stocker, Michael. "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." Journal of Philosophy 14 (1976): 453-66.
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External links

All links retrieved May 3, 2023.

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