Falklands War
The Falklands War (Spanish: Guerra de las Malvinas) was an effective state of war in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands (also known in Spanish as the Islas Malvinas) and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The Falklands consist of two large and many small islands in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina, whose ownership had long been disputed. (See Sovereignty of the Falkland Islands for the background of that dispute.)
The war was triggered by the occupation of South Georgia by Argentine forces on 19 March 1982 followed by the occupation of the Falklands, and ended with Argentine surrender on 14 June 1982. War was not declared by either side, and there was no military activity outside the islands; the conflict was considered by Argentina as reoccupation of its own territory, and by Britain as an invasion of a British dependency.
Argentina was in the midst of a devastating economic crisis and large-scale civil unrest against the repressive military junta that was governing the country in the period leading up to the war. The Argentine military government, headed by General Leopoldo Galtieri, decided to play off long-standing feelings of nationalism by launching what it thought would be a quick and easy war to reclaim the Falkland Islands. The ongoing tension between the two countries over the islands increased on 19 March when 50 Argentines landed on the British dependency of South Georgia and raised their flag, an act that is seen as the first offensive action in the war. On 2 April, Galtieri ordered the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands, triggering the Falklands War.
Though initially taken by surprise by the Argentine attack on the South Atlantic islands, Britain launched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and air force, and retake the islands by amphibious assault. After combat resulting in 255 British and 649 Argentinian deaths, the British eventually prevailed and the islands remained under British control, although as of 2006, Argentina shows no sign of relinquishing its claim to the Falkland Islands.
The political effects of the war were strong in both countries. The Argentine loss prompted even larger protests against the military government, which hastened its downfall, while a wave of patriotic sentiment swept through the United Kingdom, bolstering the government of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and ensuring its victory in the 1983 General election which prior to the war was seen as by no means certain. The war has played an important role in the culture of both countries, and has been the subject of several books, movies, and songs, although due to the low number of casualties on both sides it is not seen as a truly major event of either military or 20th century history. The cultural and political weight of the conflict has had less effect on the British public than on that of Argentina, where the war is still a topic of discussion. Militarily, however, it remains important as the sole example of a major naval and amphibious operation between modern forces since the Korean War.
Lead up to the war
Build-up
President Galtieri, head of Proceso de Reorganización Nacional—the military government of Argentina at the time—aimed to counterbalance public concern over economic and human rights issues with a speedy victory over the Falklands which would appeal to popular nationalistic sentiment. Argentina exerted pressure in the United Nations by raising subtle hints of a possible invasion, but the British either missed or ignored this threat and did not react. The Argentines interpreted the lack of British reaction as disengagement from the Falklands, and assumed that the British would not use force if the islands were invaded. This viewpoint was encouraged by the planned withdrawal as part of a general reduction of the Royal Navy in 1981 of the last of the Antarctic Supply vessels, the icebreaker HMS Endurance, and by the British Nationality Act of 1981, which replaced the full British citizenship of Falkland Islanders with a more limited version.
It is not known when serious plans to invade the Falklands were first considered, but following the failure of diplomatic talks in January 1982, the invasion plans were updated. Although it is often thought that the Falklands invasion was a long-planned action, it became clear after the war that it had been largely improvised. The isles were not fortified, sea mines were not deployed at strategic landing spots, and a large part of the infantry forces sent to the Falklands consisted of young recruits doing military service. Arguments that the War was a last minute decision are bolstered by the fact that the Argentine Navy would have received, at the end of the year, additional Exocet anti-ship missiles, Super Étendards and new ships being built in West Germany.
The Argentine military knew they were hardly a match for their British counterparts, and the Argentine Air Force (FAA) had realized, in training attacks made during April after the landings against the modern Argentine Navy British-type vessels Type 42, that they could lose more than half of their units in the process of destroying only a few British warships. However, the actual course of the war surprised many observers, since Argentina's losses had been expected to be far worse, given their level of preparedness.
This lack of readiness is probably due to the invasion being a last-minute decision taken as a consequence of the South Georgia crisis. Furthermore, for several years Argentina had been close to war with Chile. Consequently a significant part of Argentina's limited forces and equipment were kept on the mainland, as Argentina's military strategists feared that Chile would take advantage of the Falklands Crisis and attempt to seize a portion of the Patagonia region. Indeed, Chile deployed forces along the borders in what looked like a possible invasion; it is unclear whether this was their true intention or merely a diversion prompted by their British allies.
Argentina's original intention was to mount a quick symbolic occupation, quickly followed by a withdrawal, and only a small garrison was left to support the new military governor. All Argentine assault units were withdrawn to the mainland on the following days, but strong popular support and the rapid British reaction encouraged the Junta to change their objectives and reinforce the islands. They misjudged the political climate in Britain, believing that democracies were weak, indecisive, and averse to risk, and did not anticipate that the British would move their fleet halfway across the globe.
On March 19, a group of Argentine scrap metal merchants established a camp on South Georgia, where they allegedly raised a flag of Argentina. It was later reported that firearm shots were also heard, but it is most likely they were only hunting. The British governor at Grytviken asked them to have their passports stamped, which they refused to allow since it would acknowledge British sovereignty over the isles.
Actually, there was a diplomatic agreement between Argentina and Great Britain that let Argentine visitors stamp a "white card" instead of their passport, a sort of intermediate diplomatic solution to accommodate the sovereignty dispute. The request that the Argentines have their passports stamped despite the "white card" arrangement has led some to accuse the British of deliberately escalating the conflict.
The Royal Navy Antarctic patrol vessel HMS Endurance was dispatched to remove the camp on March 25, but was prevented from doing so and forced to retreat by the Argentine Navy corvette ARA Guerrico. However, despite further evidence that the Argentine Navy had begun to assemble troops in Puerto Belgrano, the UK Joint Intelligence Committee's Latin American group stated on 30 March that "invasion was not imminent".
Failed diplomacy
During the conflict, there were no formal diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina, so negotiations were carried out in a rather indirect way, and via third parties who spoke with one then with the other belligerent ("shuttle diplomacy"). The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Peruvian Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, announced that his efforts in favour of peace were futile. Although Peru (which represented Argentina's diplomatic interests in Britain) and Switzerland (which represented Britain's diplomatic interests in Argentina) exerted great diplomatic pressure to avoid war, they were unable to resolve the conflict, and a peace plan proposed by Peruvian president Fernando Belaúnde Terry was rejected by both sides.
Invasion
- Main article: 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands
The British Government warned Rex Masterman Hunt, the then Governor of the Falkland Islands, of a possible Argentine invasion on 31 March. Hunt then organised a defence, and gave military command to Major Mike Norman RM who managed to muster a small force of British Royal Marines. The Argentine Lieutenant-Commander in charge of the invasion, Guillermo Sanchez-Sabarots, landed his squadron of special forces at Mullet Creek. He proceeded to attack the Moody Brook Barracks, the Government House, and Stanley, until the British Falkland Islands government located at the Government House surrendered on 4 April. One British Royal Marine was wounded, and one Argentine killed in the main invasion, a further three Argentines were killed in fighting to take control of South Georgia.
It is actually believed that during the initial Argentine invasion the RM may have killed an estimated 20-30 Argientines on the main islands, not including those on South Georgia or the 2 helecopters they downed. On South Georgia 20 or so Royal Marines holding off a force that included a destroyer, helecopters and a huge amount of troops. They also used an 84mm anti-tank gun to hole the destroyer on the water line, and again to take out its main gun rendering it useless, then straffing it with 66mm missiles, rifles and machine guns, forcing the destroyer to retreat out of the bay. Source:[1]
Life under the occupation
Argentina enforced several unwelcome changes to the culture of the Falkland Islands, in spite of earlier assurances that the Islanders' way of life and cultural identity would be maintained. Argentina changed Port Stanley's name to Puerto Argentino, made Spanish the official language of the Islands, and commanded traffic to drive on the right by painting arrows on the road indicating the direction of traffic and changing the location of street and traffic signs. [citation needed] Despite these arrows, the islanders defiantly continued to drive on the left, demonstrating their determination to remain British.
Task force
The British were quick to organise diplomatic pressure against Argentina. Because of the long distance to the Falklands, Britain had to rely on a naval task force for military action. The force was commanded by Rear Admiral John "Sandy" Woodward and centred around the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and the newly-commissioned HMS Invincible carrying only 20 Fleet Air Arm (FAA) Sea Harriers between them for defence against the combined Argentintian air force and naval air arm. The task force would have to be self-reliant and able to project its force across the littoral area of the Islands.
A second component was the amphibious group commanded by Commodore M.C. Clapp RN. Contrary to common belief, Admiral Woodward did not command Commodore Clapp's ships3. The embarked force comprised 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, (including units from the Parachute Regiment) under the command of Brigadier J. Thompson RM to bring it up to its wartime strength. Most of this force was aboard the hastily commandeered cruise liner Canberra. Both Clapp and Woodward reported directly to the Commander in Chief Fleet (CINCFLEET), Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, in Britain, who was the overall commander of the operation. The UK declared a 'total exclusion zone' of 200 nautical miles (370 km) around the Falklands before commencing operation, excluding all neutral and Argentine vessels.
Throughout the operation 43 British merchant ships (ships taken up from trade, or STUFT) served with or supplied the task force. Cargo vessels and tankers for fuel and water formed an 8000-mile logistics chain between Britain and the South Atlantic. [2]
During the journey and up to the War beginning on May 1st, the Task Force was shadowed by Boeing 707 aircraft of the Argentine Air Force. One of these flights was intercepted outside the exclusion zone by a Sea Harrier; the unarmed 707 was not attacked.
Prince Andrew, then second in line to the British throne, served as a Sea King helicopter pilot in HMS Invincible during the war, flying anti-submarine patrols. His helicopter was equipped with a Marconi Searchwater radar and acted as an improvised Airborne Early Warning platform, making it a valuable target. He revealed in an apparently inadvertent admission shortly after the war that he also flew missions as an Exocet missile decoy. The British called their counter-invasion Operation Corporate. When the task force sailed from Britain, the American news magazine Newsweek cover headline proclaimed "The Empire Strikes Back", the name of a recent Star Wars movie, in humorous reference to the old British Empire.
The public mood in the UK was in support of an attempt to reclaim the islands. International opinion was divided. To some, Britain was a former colonial power, seeking to reclaim a colony from a local power, and this was a message that the Argentines initially used to garner support. Others supported Britain as a stable democracy invaded by a military dictatorship. Most European countries and the United States supported Britain; most Latin American countries supported Argentina. British diplomacy centred on arguing that the Falkland Islanders were entitled to use the UN principle of self-determination, and showing willingness to compromise. The UN Secretary-General said that he was favourable to the compromise that the UK had offered. Nevertheless, Argentina rejected it, basing their arguments on rights to territory based on actions before 1945 and the creation of the UN. Many UN members realised that if territorial claims this old could be resurrected, and invasions of territory allowed unchallenged, then their own borders were not safe. On April 3 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 502, calling for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands and the cessation of hostilities. On April 10 the EEC approved trade sanctions against Argentina. President Ronald Reagan and the U.S. administration did not issue direct diplomatic condemnations, instead providing intelligence support to the British military.
Shuttle diplomacy and U.S. involvement
At first glance, it appeared that the U.S. had military treaty obligations to both parties in the war, bound to the UK as a member of NATO and to Argentina by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the "Rio Pact"). However, the North Atlantic Treaty only obliges the signatories to support if the attack occurs in Europe or North America north of Tropic of Cancer. The Rio Pact only obliges the U.S. to intervene if one of the adherents to the treaty is attacked—the UK never attacked Argentina, only Argentine forces on British territory. In March, Secretary of State Alexander Haig directed the U.S. Ambassador to Argentina to warn the Argentine government away from any invasion. President Ronald Reagan requested assurances from Galtieri against an invasion and offered the services of his Vice President, George H. W. Bush, as mediator, but was refused.
In fact, the Reagan Administration was sharply divided on the issue. Meeting on 5 April, Haig and Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger favoured decisive backing of Britain, concerned that equivocation would undermine the NATO alliance. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders, however, feared that supporting Britain would undermine U.S. anti-communist efforts in Latin America. He received the firm backing of U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Haig's nominal subordinate and political rival.
The White House continued its neutrality; Reagan famously declared at the time that he could not understand why two allies were arguing over "That little ice-cold bunch of land down there". But he assented to Haig and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's position. Haig briefly (April 8–April 30) headed a "shuttle diplomacy" mission between London and Buenos Aires, but at the end of the month Reagan blamed Argentina for the failure of the mediation, declared U.S. support for Britain, and announced the imposition of economic sanctions against Argentina.
In an infamous episode in June, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick cast a second veto of a UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, then announced minutes later that she had received instructions to abstain. The situation was blamed on a delay in communications, but perceived by many as part of an ongoing power struggle between Haig and Kirkpatrick.
Galtieri, and a great part of his government, did not think that the UK would react. This would have astonished British people at the time, already familiar with Margaret Thatcher's uncompromising style of government. She declared that the democratic rights of the Falkland Islanders had been assaulted, and would not surrender the islands to the Argentine jackboot. This stance was aided, at least domestically, by the staunchly loyalist British press, especially The Sun, which ran such headlines as 'GOTCHA' (following the sinking of General Belgrano). The Daily Mirror, on the other hand, vehemently opposed the war, attacking their tabloid rival The Sun, and claiming it would "damage your mind".
Another base in the Argentine dictatorship thought, was that the US, in the worst case not supporting them, would remain neutral, based upon the support Argentina had given to the Reagan administration in Central America, training Contras, showing a clear blindness to the reality of US-UK relations.
To some extent, the Argentine military dictatorship was misled by its own opinion of democracies as being weak, inefficient talking-shops, afraid of taking risks. Indeed, in Britain there was much debate about the rights and wrongs of war. However, regardless of their own policies and opinions, opposition parties firmly backed the government in this time of crisis in order to present a single united front.
A U.S. fear of the perceived threat of the Soviet Union and the spread of communism, along with the certainty that Britain could handle the matter on its own, may have influenced the U.S. to take a position of non-interference. During the Cold War, with the performance of forces being watched closely by the Soviet Union, it was considered preferable for the UK to handle without assistance, a conflict within its capabilities.
American non-interference was vital to the American-British relationship. Ascension Island, a UK possession, was vital in the long term supply of the Task Force South: however the airbase stationed on it was run and operated by the U.S. The American commander of the base was ordered to assist the British in any way, and soon there was more air traffic in and out of Ascension Air Field—than the busiest international airport for a brief period. The most decisive American contribution was spy satellite and intelligence information, and the rescheduled supply of AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles (which were much more efficient than older models of the Sidewinder, due to their all-aspect targeting capability), allowing the UK to ship its NATO inventory south. Margaret Thatcher stated that "without the Harrier jets and their immense manoeuvrability, equipped as they were with the latest version of the Sidewinder missile, supplied to us by U.S. Defence Minister Caspar Weinberger, we could never have got back the Falklands". Most of the Sidewinder air to air engagements however, proved to be from the rear.
In early May, Casper Weinburger jokingly offered the use of an American aircraft carrier2. This seemingly extremely generous offer was seen by some as vital, as it was noted by Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward that the loss of Invincible would have been a severe setback, but the loss of Hermes would have meant an end to the whole operation. Weinberger admits[3] there would have been many problems if a request had ever been made, not least it would have meant U.S. personnel becoming directly involved in the conflict, as training British forces to crew the vessel would have taken years.
Both Weinberger and Reagan were later awarded the British honour of Knight Commander of the British Empire (KBE). American critics of the U.S. role claimed that, by failing to side with Argentina, the U.S. violated its own Monroe Doctrine.
In September 2001, Mexican president Vicente Fox cited the conflict as proof of the failure of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, since the treaty provides for mutual defence.
French involvement
French president François Mitterrand gave full support to the UK in the Falklands war. As a large part of Argentina's military equipment was French-made, French support was crucial. France provided aircraft, identical to the ones it supplied to Argentina, for British pilots to train against. France provided intelligence to help sabotage the Exocet missiles it sold to Argentina. In her memoirs, Margaret Thatcher says of Mitterrand that "I never forgot the debt we owed him for his personal support...throughout the Falklands Crisis". Sir John Nott, who was Secretary of State for Defence during the conflict later acknowledged: "In so many ways Mitterrand and the French were our greatest allies". [4]
As France had recently sold Super Etendard aircraft and Exocet missiles to the Argentine Navy, when war broke out there was still a French team in Argentina helping to fit out the Exocets and aircraft for Argentine use. Argentina claims that the team left for France soon after the April 2 invasion, but according to Dr. James S. Corum the French team apparently continued to assist the Argentines throughout the war, in spite of the NATO embargo and official French government policy.
In 2005, a book written by President Mitterrand's psychoanalyst, Ali Magoudi, gave a different account of French co-operation, quoting him as saying: "I had a difference to settle with the Iron Lady. That Thatcher, what an impossible woman! With her four nuclear submarines in the South Atlantic, she's threatening to unleash an atomic weapon against Argentina if I don't provide her with the secret codes that will make the missiles we sold the Argentinians deaf and blind." [5]
It is not clear how the Argentines were able to launch all of their available missiles.
Latin American support
Despite receiving cursory support from the Organisation of American States in a resolution supporting Argentina's sovereignty and deploring EEC sanctions (with Chile, Colombia, Trinidad & Tobago and the United States attending but abstaining), Argentina received military assistance only from Peru (Peruvian president Belaunde announced that his country was "ready to support Argentina with all the resources it needed.") and Venezuela. This came in the form of aircraft supplies like long range air fuel tanks and spare parts. With the War over, Argentina received Mirage 5P fighter planes from the Peruvian Air Force whilst the Argentine Navy received Aermacchi MB-326 and Embraer Bandeirantes from the Brazilian Air Force.
Cuba and Bolivia offered ground troops, but their offers were seen as political posturing and not accepted.
Neighbouring Chile, under Pinochet's regime, became the only major Latin American country to support Britain (and then only indirectly) by providing a military and naval diversion. Chile and Argentina had almost gone to war over the possession of islands south of Tierra del Fuego in 1978 (the dispute ended peacefully with the 1984 Argentina and Chile Peace and Friendship Treaty mediated by Pope John Paul II). The relationship between these two countries was still very tense. The Chilean government was possibly concerned that, if Argentina succeeded in taking the Falklands, General Galtieri's government would invade or attack Chile. The Chilean Connection is described in detail by Sir Lawrence Freedman in his book The Official History of the Falklands Campaign.
War
By mid-April the Royal Air Force had set up an airbase at Wideawake on the mid-Atlantic island of Ascension, including a sizable force of Vulcan bombers, Victor refuelling aircraft, and F-4 Phantom fighters to protect them. Meanwhile the main British naval task force arrived at Ascension to prepare for war. A small force had already been sent south to re-capture South Georgia.
Recapture of South Georgia
The South Georgia force, Operation Paraquet, under the command of Major Guy Sheridan RM, consisted of Marines from 42 Commando, a troop of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by the Royal Marines; embarked on RFA Tidespring. First to arrive was the Churchill class submarine HMS Conqueror on the 19th, and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping Handley Page Victor on the 20th. The first landings of SAS troops took place on the 21st, but the weather was so bad that their landings and others made the next day were all withdrawn after several helicopters crashed in fog on Fortuna Glacier.
On the 23rd a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with the Tidespring being withdrawn to deeper water to avoid interception. On the 24th the British forces regrouped and headed in to attack the submarine, the ARA Santa Fe, locating it on the 25th and damaging it enough that the crew decided to abandon it. With the Tidespring now far out to sea and an additional defending force of the submarine's crew now landed, Major Sheridan decided to gather the 75 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After a short forced march by the British force, the Argentine forces surrendered without resistance. The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, broke the news to the media telling them to "Just rejoice at that news!"1.
The Black Buck Raids
On May 1, operations against the Falklands opened with the Black Buck 1 attack by RAF Avro Vulcan V bombers on the airfield at Stanley from Wideawake airbase on Ascension. The Vulcan had originally been designed for medium-range stand-off nuclear missions in Europe and did not have the range to fly to the Falklands, requiring several in-flight refuellings. The RAF's tanker planes were mostly converted Victors with similar range, so they too had to be refuelled in the air. Thus a total force of 11 tankers were required for only two Vulcans, a massive logistical effort, given both tankers and bombers had to use the same airfield. In the end only a single bomb from all the Black Buck raids hit the runway at Stanley.
Only minutes after the RAF's Black Buck 1, nine Royal Navy Sea Harriers from Hermes followed up the raid by dropping cluster bombs on Stanley and the smaller grass airstrip at Goose Green. Both missions scored aircraft kills on the ground, as well as causing some damage to the airfield infrastructure. The aircraft had taken off from the deck of HMS Invincible, and although attached BBC reporter Brian Hanrahan was forbidden to divulge the number of planes involved, he came up with the memorable phrase "I counted them all out and I counted them all back".
The raids, at almost 8,000 miles and 16 hours for the return journey were the longest ranged bombing raids in history at that time (surpassed in 1991 by US B-52Gs flying from the continental US but using forward-positioned tankers[1]). They are credited with the strategic success of causing the Argentine Air Force (FAA) to withdraw all their Mirage III aircraft to protect against the possibility of similar bombing raids on Argentina but the real fact was that their lack of aerial refueling capability prevent them to effectively used them over the islands so the FAA Grupo 8 Mirages were deployed to Comodoro Rivadavia and Rio Gallegos in April (before the raids) and they remained there until June to protect against the Chilean threat and as reserve for the strike units.
The escalation of the air war
The Falklands had only three airfields. The longest runway, and the only one paved, was at the capital, Port Stanley.
Stanley's runway was too short to support fast jets, so the Argentine Air Force (FAA) had to launch its major strikes from the mainland. This severely hampered Argentine efforts at forward staging, combat air patrols and close air support over the islands. The effective loiter time of incoming Argentine aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly British forces in any attempt to attack the islands.
The first major strike force comprised 36 aircraft (Skyhawks, Daggers, Canberras and Mirage escorts), and was sent on 1st May, in the belief that the British invasion was imminent or landings had already taken place. Only a section of Grupo 6 (flying IAI Dagger Aircraft) found ships, which were firing at Argentine defences, near the islands. The Daggers managed to attack the ships and return safely. This was a great stimulus for the Argentine pilots, for they now knew that they could survive an attack against a modern warship, protected by radar ground clutter from the islands and a late pop-up profile.
Meanwhile, some of the other Argentine aircraft were intercepted by Sea Harriers operating from Invincible, and a Dagger and a Canberra were shot down.
Combat broke out between other Harriers and Mirage fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides refused to fight at the other's best altitude, until two Mirages finally descended to engage. One was shot down by an AIM-9L Sidewinder, while the other escaped but without enough fuel to return to its mainland airfield. The plane made for Stanley, where it fell victim to friendly fire from the Argentine defenders.
As a result of this experience, Argentine Air Force staff decided to employ Skyhawks and Daggers only as strike units, the Canberras only during the night, and Mirages (without air refuelling capability or any capable air-to-air missile) as decoys to lure away the British Sea Harriers. The decoying was be later extended with the formation of the Escuadron Fenix, a squadron of civilian jets flying 24 hours a day simulating strike aircraft preparing to attack the fleet. On one of these flights, an Air Force Learjet was shot down killing the squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La Colina, who became the highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the War.
Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the conflict. Despite there being no fast jets stationed at the airfield, the Black Buck and Harrier raids, and ongoing overnight shelling by detached ships, it was never out of action entirely. Hercules C-130 transport night flights brought supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel and airlifted out the wounded right until the end of the conflict. Only one was intercepted by chance by RN Sea Harriers. The few British Sea Harriers were considered too valuable by day to risk in nighttime blockade operations.
Sinking of the Belgrano
On May 2 the World War II-vintage Argentine light cruiser ARA General Belgrano — formerly the USS Phoenix (CL-46), a survivor of the 1941 Pearl Harbor attacks — was sunk by the nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror, captained by Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, using WWII vintage design Mk 8 mod 4 torpedoes. 321 lives were lost, although initial casualty reports were confused. The Murdoch-owned British tabloid newspaper The Sun infamously greeted the initial reports of the attack (and the sinking of a small gunboat) with the headline GOTCHA. This first edition was published before news that the Belgrano had actually sunk was known and carried no reports of actual Argentine deaths. The headline was replaced in later editions by the more temperate "Did 1,200 Argies drown?".
In all, 323 Argentines died, half of all their War losses.
The gunboat was the ARA Alferez Sobral, an ocean/patrol tug sent to search for the crew of an Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra shot down on May 1st. Two Sea Lynxs fired 4 Sea Skua against her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead, the Sobral managed to return to Puerto Deseado two days later, but the Canberra's crew was never found.
The loss of General Belgrano hardened the stance of the Argentine government and also became a cause celebre for anti-war campaigners (such as Labour MP Tam Dalyell), who declared that the ship had been sailing away from the Falklands at the time. The vessel was inarguably outside the exclusion zone, and sailing away from the area of conflict. However, during war, under international law, the heading of a belligerent naval vessel has no bearing on its status and the captain of the Belgrano, Hector Bonzo, has testified that the attack was legitimate.[citation needed] In later years it has been claimed that the information on the position of the ARA General Belgrano came from a Soviet spy satellite which was tapped by the Norwegian intelligence service station at Fauske in Norway, and then handed over to the British.[citation needed] As of 2006 the Belgrano remains the only warship sunk by a nuclear-powered submarine in time of war.
The sinking occurred 14 hours after Constitutional President of the Republic of Peru Fernando Belaúnde Terry, had proposed a comprehensive peace plan. At the time, and in response to Chile's support of Britain, Belaúnde called for regional unity.
Regardless of controversies over the sinking, it had an important strategic effect. After the loss of General Belgrano, the entire Argentine fleet returned to port and did not leave again for the duration of hostilities. The two destroyers supporting General Belgrano and the task force built around the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the direct threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented. The attack on General Belgrano was the second time since the end of World War II that a submarine had fired torpedoes in wartime and the only time that a nuclear powered submarine has done so.
The British historian Sir Lawrence Freedman stated in the second volume of his Official History of the Falklands that intelligence about the Belgrano did not reach senior British commanders and politicians until it was too late[6]. Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, commanding officer of HMS Conqueror, informed the Admiralty four hours before his attack that the Argentine cruiser had changed course, but this information was not passed to the MoD or Rear-Admiral John "Sandy" Woodward (commander of the RN task force). Thus it appears that neither Margaret Thatcher nor the Cabinet were aware of the Belgrano's change of course before the cruiser was sunk.
Sinking of HMS Sheffield
Two days after the sinking of General Belgrano, on May 4, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following an Exocet missile strike. Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s in order to provide a radar and missile "picket" far from the British carriers. After the ships were detected by a COAN (Argentine Naval Aviation Command) P-2 Neptune patrol aircraft, two COAN Dassault Super Étendards were launched from their base at Rio Grande, each armed with a single Exocet missile. Refuelled by an Air Force KC-130H Hercules after launch, they went in at low altitude, popped up for a radar check and released the missiles from 20 to 30 miles (30 to 50 km) away. One missed HMS Yarmouth, due to her deployment of chaff, but the other hit the Sheffield. The weapon struck with devastating effect, hitting the centre of the ship and starting raging fires which quickly spread, killing 20 crew members and severely injuring 24 others. While fighting the fire, Yarmouth fired anti-submarine weaponry in response to a possible Argentine submarine attack. Sheffield was deaf to the tell-tale Exocet seeker radar at the time as the ESM equipment on board had been switched off to enable the use of the satellite transceiver. The two systems, due to poor design, interfered and couldn't be used simultaneously.
Sheffield was abandoned several hours later, gutted and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six more days. She finally sank outside the MEZ on May 10, whilst under tow from the Yarmouth, becoming an official war grave. Meanwhile the other Type 42s were withdrawn from their precarious position, leaving the British task force open to attack. Although the loss of life was obviously regrettable, in one sense the Sheffield served its purpose as a part of the battle group - taking the missile instead of the larger, more important aircraft carrier it protected.
The tempo of operations increased throughout the second half of May. UN attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the British, who felt that any delay would make a campaign impractical in the South Atlantic storms. The destruction of Sheffield had a profound impact on the British public, bringing home the fact that the "Falklands Crisis", as the BBC News put it, was now an actual shooting war.
Landing at San Carlos Water
During the night of May 21, the British made an amphibious landing on beaches around San Carlos Water, on the northern coast of East Falkland, putting the 4,000 men of 3 Commando Brigade, including 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Parachute Regiment (2 and 3 Para), ashore from the amphibious ships and the liner Canberra: 2 Para and 40 Commando landing at San Carlos beach; 45 Commando at Ajax bay; 3 Para at Port San Carlos. By dawn the next day they had established a secure beachhead from which to conduct offensive operations. From there Brigadier Thompson's plan was to capture Darwin and Goose Green before turning towards Stanley.
Now, with the British troops on the ground, the Argentine Air Force began the night bombing campaign against them using its English Electric Canberras until the last day June 14th.
At sea, the paucity of British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the sinking of HMS Ardent on the 21st, HMS Antelope on the 23rd, and MV Atlantic Conveyor, with a vital cargo of helicopters, runway building equipment and tents on the 25th. The loss of all but one of the Chinook helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow from a logistics perspective: the sole surviving Chinook was called Bravo November. Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry, a sister to HMS Sheffield, whilst in company with HMS Broadsword. HMS Argonaut and HMS Brilliant were badly damaged. However, many British ships escaped terminal damage due to the Argentine pilots' bombing tactics. In order to avoid the high concentration of British air defences, Argentine pilots were forced to swoop in and launch their bombs from a low altitude at the very last moment. The Argentines lost nearly twenty aircraft in these attacks, including several Pucarás on the ground.
While undoubtedly a brave effort of the air force, the late releasing of bombs meant that many never exploded, as there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. The problem was that, like many other items never used before by the Argentine's Armed Forces in such ways, there was a problem in the way the bombs were armed. Days before the war ended, the problem was solved and the iron bombs exploded regardless of the altitude from which they were dropped, as seen on the 8th June attack.
The submarine ARA San Luis had similar problems with their SST-4 torpedoes.
In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, Admiral Sandy Woodward blames the BBC World Service for the changes to the fuse system on Argentine bombs. This is due to a report on the World Service reporting the problem after receiving a briefing on the matter from an MOD official. He describes the BBC as being more concerned with being "fearless seekers after truth" than with the lives of British servicemen. Colonel H. Jones levelled similar accusations against the BBC after they disclosed the impending British attack on Goose Green by 2 Battalion The Parachute Regiment. Jones had threatened to lead the prosecution of senior BBC officials for treason but was unable to do so since he was himself killed in action around Goose Green.
Goose Green
Starting early on May 27 and through May 28, 2 Para approached and attacked Darwin and Goose Green, which was held by the Argentine 12th Inf Regt. After a tough struggle, which lasted all night and into the next day, 17 British and 55 Argentine soldiers had been killed, and 1,050 Argentine troops taken prisoner. Due to a gaffe by the BBC, the taking of Goose Green was announced on the BBC World Service before it had actually happened. It was during this attack that Lt Col H. Jones, the commanding officer of 2 Para was killed. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.
With the sizeable Argentine force at Goose Green out of the way, British forces were now able to break out of the San Carlos bridgehead. From 27 May men of 45 Cdo and 3 Para started walking across East Falkland towards the coastal settlement of Teal Inlet. Meanwhile 42 Cdo prepared to move by helicopter to Mount Kent. For the next week, the SAS and Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre (the Special Forces unit of 3 Commando Brigade) waged intense patrol battles with reconnaissance patrols of the 602nd Commando Company. An example was a patrol battle of nineteen men of the Cadre, commanded by Captain Rod Boswell, on the lower slopes of Mount Simon. Late in the afternoon of 30 May, a four-man patrol spotted thirteen Commandos approach a remote farm building, Top Malo House. The Cadre's commander, Captain Boswell, was ordered to muster his patrols and mount an assault on the farmhouse. He initially intended to fly in at night and then strike at dawn. Luck was not with the Cadre and its Sea King helicopter failed to arrive on time. An hour late, the nineteen Marines began their 45 kilometre low-level flight to the drop-off point in a gully, only some 1,000 metres from the farmhouse. At 9:00 AM the assault team comprising 12 Marines approached the house and were engaged by a sniper from the top floor. A firefight which lasted for 45 minutes ensued between the Cadre and the Commandos. With ammunition running low and two-thirds of the patrol killed or wounded, the Argentines elected to surrender. It is estimated that 40 Argentine Commandos were involved in the battle with the SAS and the Cadre. A body count revealed five Argentine dead. Seven members of the British Special Forces were wounded during the actions. One SBS Sergeant was killed as the Mount Kent ranges were secured for the arrival of the British battalion.
Bluff Cove & Fitzroy3
By June 1, with the arrival of a further 5,000 British troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade , the new British divisional commander, Major General JJ Moore RM, had sufficient force to start planning an offensive against Stanley.
During this build-up, the Argentine air assaults on the British naval forces continued, killing 48. 32 of these deaths were from the Welsh Guards on RFA Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram on June 8. Many others suffered serious burns (including, famously, Simon Weston).
The Guards were sent to support a dashing advance along the southern approach to Stanley. On 2nd June a small advance party of 2 Para moved to Swan Inlet house in a number of Army Scout helicopters. Telephoning ahead to Fitzroy, they discovered the area clear of Argentines and (exceeding their authority) commandeered the one remaining Chinook to frantically ferry another part of 2 Para ahead to Fitzroy (a settlement on Port Pleasant) and Bluff Cove (a settlement confusingly, and perhaps ultimately fatally, on Port Fitzroy).
This unco-ordinated advance caused planning nightmares for the commanders of the combined operation, as they now found themselves with a 30-mile string of undefendable positions on their southern flank. Support could not be sent by air as the single remaining Chinook was already heavily oversubscribed. The soldiers could march, but their equipment and heavy supplies would need to be ferried by sea. Plans were drawn up for half the Welsh Guards to march light on the night of the 2nd, whilst the Scots Guards and the second half of the Welsh were to be ferried from San Carlos Water in the landing ship (LSL) Sir Tristram and the landing platform dock (LPD) Intrepid on the night of the 5th. Intrepid was planned to stay one day and unload itself and as much of Sir Tristram as possible leaving the next evening for the relative safety of San Carlos. Escorts would be provided for this day, whilst Sir Tristram would be left to unload using an inflatable platform known as a Mexeflote for as long as it took.
Political pressure from above to not risk the LPD forced Mike Clapp (Commander Amphibious Forces) to alter this plan. Two lower-value LSLs would be sent, but without suitable beaches to land, Intrepid's landing craft would need to accompany them to unload. A complicated operation across several nights with Intrepid and Fearless (her sister ship) sailing half-way to despatch their craft was devised. The attempted overland march by half the Welsh Guards had failed, possibly as they refused to march light and attempted to carry their equipment. They returned to San Carlos and were landed direct to Bluff Cove when Fearless despatched her landing craft. Sir Tristram sailed on the night of the 6th and was joined by Sir Galahad at dawn on the 7th.
Anchored 1200 feet apart in Port Pleasant, the landing ships were near Fitzroy, the ordered landing point. The landing craft should have been able to unload the ships to here relatively quickly, but confusion over the ordered disembarkation point (the first half of the Guards going direct to Bluff Cove) resulted in the senior Welsh Guards infantry officer aboard insisting his troops be ferried the far longer distance direct to Port Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. The intention was for the infantrymen to march via the recently repaired Bluff Cove bridge (destroyed by retreating Argentinian combat engineers) to their destination, a journey of around 7 miles.
The longer journey time of the landing craft taking the troops direct and the squabbling over how the landing was to be performed caused enormous delay in unloading. It had disastrous consequences. Without escorts, having not yet established their air defence and still almost fully laden the two LSLs in Port Pleasant were sitting targets for two waves of Argentinian-FAA A-4 Skyhawks.
The disaster at Port Pleasant (although often known as Bluff Cove) would provide the world with some of the most sobering images of the war as TV news video footage showed Navy helicopters hovering in thick smoke to winch survivors from the burning landing ships.
Battle for Stanley
On the night of 11 June, after several days of painstaking reconnaissance and logistic build-up, British forces launched a brigade-sized night attack against the heavily defended ring of high ground surrounding Stanley. Units of 3 Commando Brigade, supported by naval gunfire from several Royal Navy ships, simultaneously assaulted Mount Harriet, Two Sisters, and Mount Longdon. During this battle, thirteen were killed when HMS Glamorgan, which was providing naval gunfire support, was struck by an Exocet fired from the back of a truck, further displaying the vulnerability of ships to anti-ship missiles. On this day, Sgt Ian McKay of 4 Platoon, B Company, 3 Para died in a grenade attack on an Argentine bunker which was to earn him a posthumous Victoria Cross. After a night of fierce fighting, all objectives were secured. The night of June 13 saw the start of the second phase of attacks, in which the momentum of the initial assault was maintained. 2 Para captured Wireless Ridge, and the 2nd battalion, Scots Guards captured Mount Tumbledown.
War ended
As the fighting was coming to a close, the Falklands Islanders on the eastern edge of Stanley were in imminent danger of being shot at by a platoon of a 3rd Infantry Regiment company as the conscripts and regulars steeled themselves for the final house-to-house battle near Government House. This is revealed in the book The Battle For The Falklands by Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins.
On 14 June the commander of the Argentine garrison in Stanley, Mario Menendez, surrendered to Major General JJ Moore Royal Marines. 9,800 Argentine troops were made POWs and were repatriated to Argentina on the liner Canberra. On 20 June the British retook the South Sandwich Islands, (which involved accepting the surrender of the Southern Thule Garrison at the Corbeta Uruguay base) and declared the hostilities were at an end.
The war lasted 74 days, with 255 British and 649 Argentine soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and three civilian Falklanders killed.
The British Government decreed all classified information would be available to the public in the year 2082.
Analysis
Military
Militarily, the Falklands War was important for a number of reasons.
It was one of the few major naval battles so far to have occurred after the end of World War II. As such, this conflict illustrated the vulnerability of surface ships to anti-ship missiles and reaffirmed the effectiveness of aircraft in naval warfare. The viability of stealth (in the form of submarines) again proved its usefulness, much as it did during World War II and the Cold War.
Neither side achieved total air supremacy, but the power of air forces during a conflict like this proved invaluable, due to the isolated, rough landscape of the Falklands. Air strikes were staged against ground, sea and air targets on both sides and often with clear results. All of the UK losses at sea were achieved by aircraft or missile strikes (by both the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation). The French Exocet missile proved its lethality in air-to-surface operations, leading to retrofitting of most major ships with CIWS (close-in weapons systems).
See also main article Air forces in the Falklands War.
It vindicated the UK decision to develop the VTOL Harrier aircraft, that showed its capability of operating from forward bases with no runways. At sea, it demonstrated the domination of airpower in major engagements and the usefulness of carriers. It also proved the small but manoeuvrable jump jet as a true fighter aircraft able to take on adversaries with a much higher top speed. Royal Navy Sea Harriers shot down 23 fast jets with no air-to-air losses themselves. Six Sea Harriers were lost to ground fire and/or accidents. It should be noted that the disparity in figures, with the Argentine fighters failing to shoot down a single Sea Harrier, can arguably be attributed to a number of factors including that the Argentine planes were operating at the extent of their range with little fuel for dogfights, the inarguably superior combat air training of the British pilots, the employment by the British of the latest Sidewinder missiles, the almost unparalleled at the time Blue Fox radar, the extreme manoeuvrability of the jump-jet and the frequent provision of fighter control by warships in San Carlos Water.
The logistics capability of the UK armed forces was stretched to the absolute limit in order to mount an amphibious operation so far from a home-base, onto mountainous islands which have few roads. After the war, much work was done to improve both the logistics and amphibious capability of the Royal Navy.
The role of Special Forces units, which destroyed many Argentine aircraft (such as those destroyed during the SAS raid on Pebble Island) and carried out intelligence gathering operations, was reaffirmed.
The usefulness of helicopters in combat, logistic, and casevac operations was reaffirmed.
Nylon was shown to be a poor choice of fabric in uniforms, as it is more flammable than cotton and also melts with heat, sticking the incendiary fabric to the skin and causing avoidable casualties.
The importance of Airborne Early Warning was shown. The Royal Navy had effectively zero over-the-horizon radar capability. This was to be hastily rectified later as Sea King helicopters were fitted with retractable radomes containing a variant of the Nimrod ASW aircraft Searchwater radar. The first travelled south after the war on the brand new Illustrious, sister ship to Invincible.
Political
The Falklands War illustrates the role of political miscalculation and miscommunication in creating war. Both sides seriously underestimated the importance of the Falklands to the other. The Falklands War illustrates the role of chance in determining what happens in a war. Some commentators believe that the war could have ended in an Argentine victory if one of the Exocets had hit an aircraft carrier, or if the frequent unexploded bombs had detonated on striking some of the ships, or if Argentina had attacked the British artillery, using the three paratroop regiments already deployed at Comodoro Rivadavia. Equally, if the Argentines had made better preparations to hold the islands, they might have been able to do so, but they did not expect that the British would attempt to carry out a war 8,000 miles (13,000 km) from home. Either way, an Argentine victory might have been an unacceptable show of weakness on the part of the UK during an intense period of the Cold War, and as a result some have doubted that such an outcome would have been allowed to remain for long. With the UK being an integral U.S. ally and important part of NATO, to permit a loss would have been a signal to the USSR that the NATO alliance was militarily and politically weak.
The war cost the UK 255 men, six ships (10 others suffered varing degrees of battle damage), thirty-four aircraft (most of which were the helicopters stored on board the Atlantic Conveyor, as only a fraction of this number were actually shot down) and more than £1.6 billion, but the campaign was considered a great victory for the United Kingdom. The war provided a substantial boost to the popularity of Margaret Thatcher and played a role in ensuring her re-election in 1983. Several members of her government resigned, including the former Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. It has also been said by diplomats that following the British victory there was an increase in international respect for Britain, formerly regarded as a fading colonial power. As mentioned earlier, the victory was not overlooked by the USSR, which increased troop levels facing the British Army of the Rhine soon after, and was an important junction in the Cold War.
However, it is believed that with the renewed confidence gained from the victory, Margaret Thatcher suggested in her September 1982 China visit an extension of the British rule of the New Territories in Hong Kong which, legally, was to end in 1997 with the expiry of the 99-year lease (Although Beijing never formally recognized any of the 19th century treaties over Hong Kong). Thatcher was famously threatened during a meeting with then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping with comments such as "China is no Argentina," and "We can order troops into Hong Kong this afternoon." Formal discussions of British withdrawal from the territory started after this Beijing visit and Hong Kong was returned to China on 1 July 1997. On the day of the handover of Hong Kong, former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd remarked to Argentine Foreign Minister Guido di Tella; "I know what you're thinking, but you will never see this happen in Port Stanley."
The Argentine military government was ousted after mounting protests by human rights and war veterans groups. Galtieri was forced to resign, paving the way for the restoration of democracy. Elections were held on 30 October 1983 and Raúl Alfonsín, the Radical Civic Union (UCR) party candidate, took office on 10 December 1983. Alfonsín defeated Italo Luder, the candidate for the Justicialist Party (Peronist movement).
Weapon export controls
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) failed to anticipate a conflict between Argentina and the UK when approving weapon exports to Argentina.
Medical
During the operations, several wounded British soldiers had to spend hours in the cold before receiving medical aid; although, famously, no British soldiers evacuated to medical aid stations died. Many recovered beyond what medicine of the time thought possible, and subsequent theories have suggested that this was due to the extreme cold (similar anecdotal tales had originated during the bitter winter fighting of the Korean War). Britain also had medical staff familiar with high velocity gunshot wounds, due to their experiences in the Northern Ireland conflict with the IRA. One British doctor, who treated all patients according to need rather than nationality, and was hence credited with saving Argentinian lives, was the only person to be honoured by both sides.[citation needed]
Impact in Argentina
The Argentine loss of the War led to ever-larger protests against the military regime and is credited with giving the final push to drive out the military government that had overthrown Isabel Perón in 1976 and participated in the crimes of the Dirty War. Democracy returned to Argentina in 1983.
The famous writer Jorge Luis Borges, himself partly of British descent and bilingual from birth in Spanish and English, wrote in 1985 in literature|1985 a short poem (Juan López y John Ward) about two fictional soldiers (one of each side) that died in the Falklands, which he refers to as "islands that were too famous". He also said about the war: "The Falklands thing was a fight between two bald men over a comb."
Among the latest Argentine productions about the war is the 2005 in film|2005 film Iluminados por el Fuego ("Enlightened by Fire") [7], directed by Tristán Bauer and starred by Gastón Pauls, which received a San Sebastián Festival special award. The film tells about a veteran's memories, re-awakened after he learns of the suicide of a former soldier comrade.
The start of the Falklands War is commemorated as Día del Veterano de Guerra y los Caídos en Malvinas, a public holiday in Argentina, usually on the first Monday of April. It is sometimes referred to as Malvinas Day.
Cultural impact in the UK
The war provided a wealth of material for writers, and many dozens of books came from it; in the UK the definitive account became Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins' The Battle for the Falklands. Other titles focused on the Sea Harrier (Sharkey Ward's Sea Harrier over the Falklands), the land battles leading up to the Argentine surrender (Christian Jennings and Adrian Weale's Green Eyed Boys), and the general experience of battle (Ken Lukowiak's A Soldier's Song). Jack Higgins' thriller Exocet dealt with one of the war's most famous "buzz-words"; for many years afterwards, "Exocet" became synonymous with "rocket" in the UK ("Yomp" and "Task Force" also entered the language).
Very few films emerged from the conflict, one such being the 1989 BBC drama Tumbledown, which starred Colin Firth in an early role. It told the tale of a soldier in the Scots Guards, brain-damaged by a sniper's bullet, adjusting to disabled life after the war. In 1992 the BBC produced An Ungentlemanly Act, relating the story of the initial defence of the Islands during the Argentine Invasion, with Bob Peck as Mike Norman and Ian Richardson as Rex Hunt. Ian Curteis' The Falklands Play was commissioned by the BBC in 1986, but was not filmed until 2004; the BBC claimed that it would have been broadcast too close to the 1987 General Election. Curteis maintained that the generally sympathetic portrayal of Margaret Thatcher refuted a perceived BBC anti-government bias. On a lighter note, the character of Grant Mitchell from the popular, gritty soap opera EastEnders was written as a traumatised Falklands veteran, although this characterisation was swiftly abandoned.
Tottenham Hotspur's popular Argentine midfielder Ossie Ardiles had helped beat Leicester City one day after the invasion, to no ill effect, although he subsequently left the UK for a year, of his own volition. The war also created heightened passions between Argentina and England in the 1986, 1998, and 2002 FIFA World Cups, featuring memorable, and sometimes infamous, performances by Diego Maradona, Peter Shilton, and David Beckham. (See Argentina and England football rivalry).
Although the war did not have a direct impact on British civilians, it nonetheless had impacts on British pop culture. Popular music referencing the war included Elvis Costello's song "Shipbuilding", New Order's song "Blue Monday", Iron Maiden's song "Como Estais Amigos", Pink Floyd's songs "Get Your Filthy Hands Off My Desert", "The Fletcher Memorial Home", "Southampton Dock" and "Not Now John" from the album The Final Cut, Billy Bragg's song "Island of No Return", New Model Army's "Spirit of the Falklands" and The Bluebells' song "South Atlantic Way". Joe Jackson's 1986 song "Tango Atlantico" deals with a description of the end of the war and the aftermath. Several years later, in 1994, British death metal band Bolt Thrower featured a photograph of British commandos participating in the Falklands War on the cover of their release ...For Victory.
The popular computer games Harrier Attack and Yomp presented unofficial portraits of the fighting.
The aforementioned Simon Weston, a Welsh Guardsman who had suffered serious burns during the bombing of Sir Galahad, became a popular figure due to British media coverage. A series of television documentaries followed his progress and eventual recovery from his injuries (Simon's War being the first).
The film version of Whoops Apocalypse features a conflict very similar to the Falklands War between the United Kingdom and a fictional country Maguadora over the fictional Santa Maya.
At the time of the Falklands War, the BBC banned the song "Six Months In A Leaky Boat" by Split Enz because the lyrics were considered too provocative. [8]
Pope John Paul II visits
In May 1982, Pope John Paul II carried out a long scheduled visit to the UK. In view of the crisis it was decided that this should be balanced with an unscheduled trip to Argentina in June. It is contended that his presence and words spiritually prepared Argentines for a possible defeat, contrary to the propaganda issued by the Junta. He would return to Argentina in 1987 after democratisation.
Falklands veterans' afflictions
The British Ministry of Defence was accused several times of a systematic failure to prepare service personnel for the horrors of war and provide adequate care for them afterwards.
There are strong allegations that the Ministry of Defence has tried to ignore the issue of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which left many sufferers emotionally scarred and unable to work, immersed in social dislocation, alcoholism, and depression. Most veterans have suffered prolonged personality disorders, flashbacks and anxiety levels sometimes reaching pathological levels.
It was revealed that more veterans have committed suicide since the Falklands War ended than the number of servicemen killed in action [9].
SAMA82 - the South Atlantic Medal Association, which represents and helps Falklands veterans - believe some 264 veterans have now taken their own lives (2002), a number that contrasts with the 255 who died on active service.
A similar situation afflicts the veterans on the Argentine side, many of whom have similarly suffered from psychiatric disorders, drug and alcohol abuse, and social turmoil. According to an Argentine movie (Iluminados por el fuego by Tristán Bauer, 2006) about the suicide of a Malvinas veteran, the current suicide toll is 454.
Artistic treatments
NB: no critique of the arguments presented in the following is offered.
Theatre
- British playwright Steven Berkoff wrote the highly critical satirical play Sink the Belgrano! about the British decision to go to war and the sinking of Belgrano.
- An Ungentlemanly Act portrays the lives of the governor, the token garrison and everyday people of The Islands as the Argentines invade and attempt to impose their will.
- Tumbledown portrays the experiences of a British soldier who loses use of his legs during the war (specifically on Mount Tumbledown in the final push for Stanley), focusing on its effect on his post-war years.
Computer games
- Malvinas 2032 its a real-time strategy game, in which you have to command the Argentinean forces and recover the Malvinas Islands back to Argentina developed by Sabarasa Entertainment.
- Falklands War - 1982 — This scenario collection, created with the Harpoon3 naval warfare simulator, is intended to accurately recreate the real-life war from 1982.
ReferencesISBN links support NWE through referral fees
- Barnett, Anthony. Iron Britannia. London : Allison & Busby, 1982 ISBN 0850314933
- Dalyell, Tam. One Man's Falklands. London : Cecil Woolf, 1982 ISBN 0900821647
- Dalyell, Tam. Thatcher's Torpedo. London : Cecil Woolf, 1983 ISBN 0900821663 Introduction by Paul Rogers.
- Freedman, Sir L. Official History of the Falklands, Vol 2(Cabinet Office Series of Official Histories). Frank Cass, 2005 ISBN 0714652075
- Gavshon, Arthur L. and Rice, Desmond. The Sinking of the Belgrano. London : Secker & Warburg, 1984 ISBN 0436413329
- Harris, Robert. Gotcha! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis. London ; Boston : Faber and Faber, 1983 ISBN 0571130526
- Tinker, David. A Message from the Falklands, The Life and Gallant Death of David Tinker, Lieut. R.N. from his Letters and Poems. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England ; New York, N.Y., U.S.A. : Penguin, 1983, c1982 ISBN 0140067787 Compiled by Hugh Tinker.
- Underwood, Geoffrey. Our Falklands War, The Men of the Task Force Tell Their Story. Duloe, Liskeard, Cornwall : Maritime Books, 1983 ISBN 0907771084 Introduced by Sir Jeremy Moore.
- The Times article on Freedman's work June 27 2005, Evans, M. and Hamilton, A.
- Note 1: 1982: Marines land in South Georgia. BBC. Retrieved 20 June, 2005.
- Note 2: D. George Boyce, "The Falklands War", Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, p. 92.
Richardson, Louise. When Allies Differ: Anglo-American relations during the Suez and Falklands Crises. New York : St. Martin’s Press, 1996 ISBN 0312158521
- Note 3: Michael Clapp. Amphibious Assault Falklands: the Battle of San Carlos Water. Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, c1996 ISBN 1557500282
External links
- Falklandswar.org.uk
- Victoria Cross and other citations, London Gazette, 11 October 1982
- The Guardian: Julian Barnes
- Malvinas War Memorial (Buenos Aires)
- Falklands/Malvinas Forum ([English/Spanish)
- ex-7th Argentine Infantry Regiment veterans (Spanish)
- Falklands War Timeline
- Falklands War Documents
- Falklands War Articles
- Escuadron Fenix (Spanish)
- Movie Iluminados por el fuego regarding Argentine veterans suicide (German)
- MoD - 20 years anniversary
- Naval-History.Net - "Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982"
Credits
New World Encyclopedia writers and editors rewrote and completed the Wikipedia article in accordance with New World Encyclopedia standards. This article abides by terms of the Creative Commons CC-by-sa 3.0 License (CC-by-sa), which may be used and disseminated with proper attribution. Credit is due under the terms of this license that can reference both the New World Encyclopedia contributors and the selfless volunteer contributors of the Wikimedia Foundation. To cite this article click here for a list of acceptable citing formats.The history of earlier contributions by wikipedians is accessible to researchers here:
The history of this article since it was imported to New World Encyclopedia:
Note: Some restrictions may apply to use of individual images which are separately licensed.
- ↑ Paul Rogers (2000). Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-first Century. Pluto Press. ISBN 0745319092.
