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'''Existence of God''' arguments have been proposed by philosophers, theologians, and other thinkers. In [[Philosophy|philosophical]] terminology, existence of God arguments concern schools of thought on the [[epistemology]] of the [[ontology]] of [[God]].
 
  
==Philosophical issues==
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Arguments or proofs for the '''Existence of God''' have been proposed by philosophers, theologians, and other thinkers. These arguments have an [[epistemology|epistemological]] dimension (how can one know that God exists?) and an [[ontology|ontological]] dimension (what is the nature of God’s being?).
=== What is God? (Definition of God's existence) ===
 
{{main|Definition|God|Deity|Ontology}}
 
  
A fundamental way to assess the validity of any argument for the existence of God is to examine the characteristics of that God. That is, we might ask "What is God?"
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If God is conceived as the Supreme Being, Being-itself, the source and Creator of all beings, or in other similar ways, the question of his existence is of primordial importance. It is indeed paradoxical that there would be a need to prove the existence of this Being of all beings, yet that is precisely the situation philosophers and theologians find themselves in, since God cannot be perceived by human senses. The overall theistic explanation is that God transcends finite forms of being and thus cannot be reached directly by finite human minds, although indirect rational proofs may be possible. The opposite position concludes that God cannot be perceived because he simply does not exist. This leads to the essential question of the meaning of "existence" when the notion is applied to God. Thus, one’s understanding of God—rational, intuitive, religious, or other—affects one’s approach to the question of his existence.
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{{toc}}
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Given the variety of approaches, it has been rightly suggested by people such as [[Ninian Smart]] that if the existence of God is to be taken seriously, rational or philosophical insights about it need to be combined with the various other aspects of religious revelation, such as the experiential dimension, the moral dimension, and the mythical dimension.
  
One approach to this problem, following the works of [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] would be to attempt to extract a definition of "God" from the way that particular word is used. How do we use the word "God"? What do we mean by "God" or "gods"? However this line of questioning runs immediately into trouble if it tries to give a universal notion of "God", since that word (and its equivalent in other languages) have been used in very different ways throughout human history.
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==Context of the arguments==
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===The three traditional proofs of God’s existence===
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The attempt to provide proofs or arguments for the existence of [[God]] is known as [[natural theology]]. This undertaking has traditionally consisted of three key arguments: The ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments. Such proofs may seem futile in the contemporary context. However, one must understand that in the middle ages, when the famous proofs of God first appeared, the issue was ''not'' to find out logically if God exists or not. God's existence was a given, based on [[faith]]. Thinkers like [[Anselm of Canterbury]] and [[Thomas Aquinas]] in [[Christianity]], [[Maimonides]] in [[Judaism]], and [[Avicenna]] or [[Averroes]] in [[Islam]] mostly questioned whether God's existence could be known only through faith, or whether it was also possible to prove it by using the philosophical (rational) method and, if so, how. These arguments were meant to buttress the arguments of faith and to defend that faith from those who would challenge it.
  
Today in the West, the term "[[God]]" typically refers to a [[monotheism|monotheistic]] concept of a Supreme Being, that is being unlike any other being. Classical [[theism]] asserts that God possesses every possible perfection, including such qualities as [[omniscience]], [[omnipotence]], and perfect [[omnibenevolence|benevolence]]. Of course this definition is not the only possible definition of "god".
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===The contemporary approach===
  
In the [[Advaita Vedanta]] school of Hinduism, reality is ultimately seen as being a single, qualityless, changeless being called nirguna Brahman. However, nirguna Brahman is understood to be beyond "ordinary" human comprehension. What we ordinarily perceive, that is a world of many things, is brought on by consequences of our actions, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of nirguna Brahman. Thus, Advaitin philosophy introduces the concept of saguna Brahman or Ishvara as a way of talking about Brahman to people. Ishvara, in turn, is ascribed such qualities as omniscience, omnipotence, and benevolence.
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The contemporary mind looks at the question very differently. First, the existence of God no longer appears to be an indisputable reality, even to those who believe in him. Second, the very idea that it is possible to prove the existence of God seems questionable at best. The scientific mindset is used to considering that only measurable objects of scientific inquiry can be known for certain, and even this certainty is being shaken in a postmodern context. Spiritual, transcendent, and invisible entities such as God can only be the object of opinion or conjecture, never of certain knowledge. Next comes a trend that has had its representatives throughout the centuries: God, [[afterlife]], and similar issues can only be known through intuitive insight or spiritual revelation. Some just know that it is so—rational proofs are not only powerless, they are inappropriate to begin with.  
  
[[Polytheism|Polytheistic]] religions use the word "[[deity|god]]" for multiple beings with varying degrees of power and abilities. Some [[stories]] such as those of [[Homer]] and [[Ovid]] portray gods arguing with, tricking and fighting with one another. The length of time that these conflicts take place over (for example: the ten years of the [[Trojan War]]) implies that none of these deities are omnipotent nor absolutely benevolent.
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The problem is that different people come to different conclusions, intuitively or otherwise. The quintessentially philosophical question, here, is how can one know? This affects one's entire attitude towards what he considers reality, not only the question of God.
  
====The problem of the supernatural====
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The focus of the proofs of God's existence has thus shifted over the centuries. Today, their main purpose would be to show that it is ''likely'' that a supreme being exists, i.e., more likely than not. Discussion of the [[anthropic principle]], for example, highlights the fact that science cannot be used to prove that God does ''not'' exist. At most, it is a draw.
One problem immediately posed by the question of the existence of a God is that traditional beliefs usually grant God various [[supernatural]] powers. Supernatural beings may be able to conceal and reveal themselves for their own purposes, as for example in the tale of [[Baucis and Philemon]].
 
  
Religious apologists offer the supernatural abilities of God as explanation of the inability of [[scientific method|empirical methods]] to prove God's existence. In [[Karl Popper|Karl Popper's]] [[philosophy of science]], the assertion of the existence of a supernatural God would be a [[falsifiability|non-falsifiable hypothesis]], not amenable to scientific investigation.
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==Philosophical and religious Issues==
  
Proponents of [[intelligent design]] (I.D.) believe there is empirical evidence pointing to the existence of an intelligent creator, though their claims are challenged by the scientific community. The counterargument is that I.D. typically relies on a shrinking pool of arguments related to the [[Fine-tuning]] problem, which have not yet been resolved by natural explanations, so that the creator implied by I.D. equates to the pejorative [[God of the gaps]].
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===Philosophical issues===
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====What is God? (Definition of God's existence)====
  
[[logical positivism|Logical positivists]], such as [[Rudolph Carnap]] and [[A. J. Ayer]] view any talk of gods as literally [[nonsense]]. For the logical positivists and adherents of similar schools of thought, statements about religious or other transcendent experiences could not have a truth value, and were deemed to be without meaning.
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What is [[God]]? One approach to this problem, following the works of [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], would be to attempt to extract a definition of "God" from the way that particular word is used. What is meant when one says, "God" or "gods"? However, this line of questioning runs immediately into trouble if it tries to give a universal notion of "God," since that word and its equivalents have been used in very different ways throughout history.
  
===Epistemology===
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Today in the West, the term "[[God]]" typically refers to a [[monotheism|monotheistic]] concept of a Supreme Being that is unlike any other being. Classical [[theism]] asserts that God possesses every possible perfection, including such qualities as [[omniscience]], [[omnipotence]], and perfect [[omnibenevolence|benevolence]].
{{main|Epistemology|Sociology of knowledge}}
 
  
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy which studies the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge. One can not be said to "know" something just because one believes it. [[Knowledge]] is, from an epistemological standpoint, distinguished from [[belief]] by [[justification]].
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In the [[Advaita Vedanta]] school of [[Hinduism]], reality is ultimately seen as being a single, qualityless, changeless being called ''nirguna'' [[Brahman]], understood to be beyond "ordinary" human comprehension. Advaitin philosophy introduces the concept of ''saguna'' Brahman or [[Ishvara]] as a way of talking about Brahman to people. Ishvara, in turn, is ascribed such qualities as omniscience, omnipotence, and benevolence.
  
[[Knowledge]] in the sense of "[[understanding]] of a [[fact]] or [[truth]]" can be divided in ''[[a posteriori]]'' knowledge, based on [[experience]] or [[deduction]] (see [[methodology]]), and ''[[a priori]]'' knowledge from [[introspection]], [[axiom]]s or [[self-evidence]]. Knowledge can also be described as a [[psychological]] state, since in a strict sense there can never be ''a posteriori'' knowledge proper (see [[relativism]]). Much of the disagreement about "proofs" of God's existence is due to different conceptions not only of the term "God" but also the terms "proof", "truth" and "knowledge". Religious [[belief]] from [[revelation]] or [[enlightenment (concept)|enlightenment]] ([[satori]]) falls in the second, ''a priori'' class of "knowledge".
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[[Polytheism|Polytheistic]] religions use the word "god" for multiple beings with varying degrees of power and abilities. Such deities are thus neither perceived to be all-powerful nor always benevolent. The myths of polytheism often cover a deeper layer of philosophical reflection that hints at a united being that takes precedence even over the gods.
  
Different conclusions as to the existence of God often rest on different criteria for deciding what methods are appropriate for deciding if something is true or not; some examples include
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====The issue of existence====
*whether logic counts as evidence concerning the quality of existence
 
*whether subjective experience count as evidence for objective reality
 
*whether either logic or evidence can rule in or out the supernatural.
 
  
<!-- commented out, questioning POV - not sure what relevance this has; if it is to remain then at least other views should be added.
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The seemingly innocuous question about the exact meaning of the word “existence” cannot be avoided in the context of the proofs for God’s existence. What does it mean to exist when the term is applied to God? This, of course, leads back to an understanding of God. At least since [[Aristotle]], there has been an unending debate over the difference between “[[existence]],” “[[being]],” and “[[essence]].” In general terms, to exist simply means to be there&mdash;to be real. It also implies that one is talking about a specific entity, generally perceived by the senses. However, one can also say that goodness or evil exist in this world. What is meant by that statement is immediately clear, though it is hard to pinpoint what their being really is.
== Religious Perspective ==
 
  
=== Sikhism ===
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The problem with stating that God exists is that by doing so one seems to imply that he is an entity, albeit an elusive one. In this way, he is reduced to the level of a particular being, though perhaps the highest or most perfect one. Many have perceived that, if God is to have any reality, it must be of an entirely different order that cannot be qualified as existence. Twentieth century theologian [[Paul Tillich]] is one of them. For him, “God does not exist.” It is even a sign of [[atheism]] to say that he does, as it implies a denial of God’s real being, Being-itself, the ground of all being. Similarly, twentieth century philosopher [[Martin Heidegger]] has decried the use of what he called "onto-theology," where God is objectified as if he were a particular being. In [[Middle Ages|medieval]] theology and philosophy already, [[Thomas Aquinas]] had stated that God is beyond [[essence]] and [[existence]].
  
The fundamental belief of [[Sikhism]] is that God exists, not merely as an idea or concept, but as a '''Real Entity''', indescribable yet knowable and perceivable to anyone who is prepare to dedicate the time and energy to become perceptive to His persona. The [[Sikh Gurus]] never spoke about proofs of the existence of God: For them He is too real and obvious to need any logical proof.
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This distinction between existence and being is proper to the western philosophical landscape. It does not appear, for instance, in the thought systems of the [[Far East]]. This is no accident: The notion of a personal, theistic God is proper to the religions of the west. The issue of God’s existence does not arise in [[Buddhism]] or [[Confucianism]] for instance.
  
[[Guru Arjan]] says: "'God is beyond colour and form, yet His presence is clearly visible"' (GG, 74), and again, '"Nanak's Lord transcends the world as well as the scriptures of the east and the west, and yet he is clearly manifest'" (GG, 397).
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====The problem of the supernatural====
  
In any case, knowledge of the ultimate Reality is not a matter for reason; it comes by revelation of Himself through "nadir" or grace and by "anubhava" or mystical experience. Says [[Guru Nanak]], "He is not accessible through intellect, or through mere scholarship or cleverness at argument; He is met, when it pleases Him, through devotion" (GG, 436).
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Another problem immediately posed by the question of the existence of a God is that traditional beliefs usually grant God various [[supernatural]] powers. Religious [[apologetics|apologists]] offer the supernatural abilities of God as explanation of the inability of [[scientific method|empirical methods]] to prove God's existence. In [[Karl Popper|Karl Popper's]] [[philosophy of science]], the assertion of the existence of a supernatural God would be a [[falsifiability|non-falsifiable hypothesis]], not amenable to scientific investigation.  
—>
 
  
== Arguments for the existence of God ==
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Thus, [[logical positivism|logical positivists]], such as [[Rudolph Carnap]] and [[A. J. Ayer]], view any talk of gods as literally [[nonsense]]. For the logical positivists and adherents of similar schools of thought, statements about religious or other transcendent experiences could not have a truth-value, and were deemed to be without meaning. Even for other schools of thought, the question of God appears at the same time as the culmination of philosophical inquiry (since it deals with the ultimate question) and the point where that inquiry must stop due to its own limitations.
A dispute arose as to whether there are a number of proofs of the existence of God or whether all are not merely parts of one and the same proof <ref>(''cf.'' [[Dr. C. Braig]], ''Gottesbeweis oder Gottesbeweise?'', Stuttgart, 1889)</ref>. While all such proofs would end in the same way, by asserting the existence of God, they do not all start at the same place.  [[Thomas Aquinas|St. Thomas]] calls them aptly ''Viæ'': roads to the apprehension of God which all open on the same highway. <ref>(Summ. theol., I, Q. ii, a.3)</ref>
 
  
=== Metaphysical arguments (for) ===
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====[[Epistemology]]====
Metaphysical arguments for the existence of God are arguments that seek to prove the logical necessity of a being with at least one attribute that only God could have.
 
  
* The [[Cosmological argument]], which argues that God must have been around at the start of things in order to be the "first cause".
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One cannot be said to "know" something just because one believes it. [[Knowledge]] is, from an epistemological standpoint, distinguished from [[belief]] by [[justification]] through [[proof]]s or [[argument]]s. Much of the disagreement about "proofs" of God's existence is due to different conceptions not only of the term "God" but also the terms "proof," "truth," and "knowledge." Religious belief from [[revelation]] or [[enlightenment (concept)|enlightenment]] is fundamentally different.  
* The [[Ontological argument]], based on arguments about the "being which nothing greater-than can be conceived".
 
{{not verified}}
 
In [[theology]] and the [[philosophy of religion]], an '''ontological argument''' for the existence of God is an [[Arguments for the existence of God|argument that God's existence can be proved]] [[a priori]], that is, by intuition and reason alone. In the context of the [[Abrahamic religion]]s, it was first proposed by the medieval philosopher [[Anselm of Canterbury]] in his ''[[Proslogion]]'', and important variations have been developed by philosophers such as [[René Descartes]], [[Gottfried Leibniz]], [[Norman Malcolm]], [[Charles Hartshorne]], and [[Alvin Plantinga]]. A [[modal logic]] version of the argument was devised by mathematician [[Kurt Gödel]]. The ontological argument has been controversial in philosophy and many philosophers have famously criticized or opposed it, including Anselm's contemporary [[Gaunilo of Marmoutiers]], as well as [[David Hume]], [[Immanuel Kant]], and [[Gottlob Frege]]. Some of these opponents have preferred to rely on [[cosmological argument]]s for the existence of God instead.
 
  
The argument works by examining the concept of God, and arguing that it implies the actual existence of God; that is, if we can conceive of God, then God exists &mdash; it is thus self-contradictory to state that God does not exist. This is obviously a controversial position, and the ontological argument has a long history of detractors and defenders.
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Different conclusions as to the existence of God often rest on different criteria for deciding what methods are appropriate for deciding if something is true or not. Some examples include:
  
The argument's different versions arise mainly from using different concepts of God as the starting point. For example, Anselm starts with the notion of God as a being than which no greater can be conceived, while Descartes starts with the notion of God as being maximally perfect (as having all perfections).
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*Whether logic counts as evidence concerning the quality of existence
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*Whether subjective experience count as evidence for objective reality
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*Whether either logic or evidence can rule in or out the supernatural
  
== Ontological argument==
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===Religious perspective===
=== Anselm's argument ===
 
  
The ontological argument was first proposed by [[Anselm of Canterbury]] ([[1033]]–[[1109]]) in Chapter 2 of the ''Proslogion''.  While Anselm did not propose an [[Ontology|ontological]] system, he was very much concerned with the nature of being. He argued that there are necessary beings &ndash; things that cannot ''not'' exist &ndash; and contingent beings &ndash; things that may or may not exist, but whose existence is not necessary.
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The religious perspective is almost always linked to some sort of philosophical explanation. However, its emphasis is on God as a living reality, accessible through revelation or introspection, rather than rational discussion. Early Christian thinkers like [[Augustine of Hippo]] believed that [[human being|humans]] had a natural ability to perceive the reality of God. In such a perspective, arguments or proofs do not occupy an important position: It is not necessary to prove the existence of something obvious; what is needed is only an explanation.
  
Anselm presents the ontological argument as part of a prayer directed to God. He starts with a definition of God, or a necessary assumption about the nature of God, or perhaps both.
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Much later thinkers, including eighteenth century [[Germany|German]] philosopher [[David Friedrich Fries]], thought that human reason culminated in a direct apprehension of the divine reality, something akin to ''intellectual intuition,'' a faculty [[Immanuel Kant]] insisted humans do not have. The problem with this perspective is that of intersubjectivity: How can one communicate her certainty to another person and ascertain that it is identical, other than by assuming ''[[a priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' that it is so?
  
:"Now we believe that [the Lord] is '''something than which nothing greater can be imagined'''."
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The [[India]]n religion of [[Sikhism]] offers an elaborate version of that position. The fundamental belief of Sikhism is that God exists, not merely as an idea or concept, but as a "Real Entity," indescribable yet knowable and perceivable to anyone who is prepared to dedicate the time and energy to become perceptive to God’s persona. The Sikh [[guru]]s never spoke about proofs of the existence of God; for them, God is too real and obvious to need any logical proof.
  
Then Anselm asks: does God exist?
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Guru Arjan says: "God is beyond color and form, yet His presence is clearly visible" (GG, 74), and again, "Nanak's Lord transcends the world as well as the scriptures of the east and the west, and yet he is clearly manifest" (GG, 397).
  
:"Then is there no such nature, since the fool has said in his heart: God is not?"
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==Types of arguments==
  
To answer this, first he tries to show that God exists 'in the understanding':
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Different types of classification have been suggested. Some arguments are ''[[a priori and a posteriori|a priori]],'' that is, independent from experience. First and foremost, this is the case of the [[God%2C_Arguments_for_the_Existence_of#The_Ontological_Argument|ontological argument]], which seeks to show the necessity of God from the very notion of God. Most arguments are ''a posteriori,'' that is, they try to show evidence for the presence of a God from certain features of reality. For example, the [[God%2C_Arguments_for_the_Existence_of#The_Cosmological_Argument|cosmological argument]] intends to show that there must be an ultimate, uncaused cause (God) to the existing universe. The [[God%2C_Arguments_for_the_Existence_of#The_Teleological_Argument|teleological argument]] assumes that the harmony and purposefulness evident throughout nature represents an evidence of [[intelligent design]], thus of a supreme designer (God). Still another well-known ''a posteriori'' argument is the argument from the degrees of perfection, developed by [[Thomas Aquinas|Aquinas]], which argues that the various degrees of goodness, beauty, truth, etc. in the world resemble something which is the maximum (best, most beautiful, truest, etc.), and that this something is God. These ''a posteriori'' arguments are [[empiricism|empirical]], because they are based on observation, while the ontological argument is strictly [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]], because it only involves reflection that transcends sense data.
  
:"But certainly this same fool, when he hears this very thing that I am saying &ndash; something than which nothing greater can be imagined &ndash; understands what he hears; and what he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it is. For it is one thing for a thing to be in the understanding and another to understand that a thing is."
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But there are so many arguments that their richness defies classification. Since the very notion of God has a universal (or even trans-universal) dimension, it is normal that evidence for God’s existence has been searched for by using nearly every approach and every faculty. Besides logic and rational deduction, [[ethics]], [[science]], spiritual intuition, and even the authority of scripture and tradition are some of the dimensions that have been explored to that end.
  
Anselm goes on to justify his assumption, using the analogy of a painter:
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Given these many arguments, it is debatable whether they are all different or whether they are all not merely parts of one and the same argument. While all such proofs would end in the same way, by asserting the existence of God, they do not all start at the same place. Aquinas calls them aptly ''Viæ:'' roads to the apprehension of God which all open on the same highway.<ref>''Summ. theol.'', I, Q. ii, a.3.</ref>
  
:"For when a painter imagines beforehand what he is going to make, he has in his understanding what he has not yet made but he does not yet understand that it is. But when he has already painted it, he both has in his understanding what he has already painted and understands that it is.
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Also, any argument for or against the existence of God must be considered in context. Few people, if any, will be swayed by the persuasiveness of one single argument if they are not previously so inclined. Neither is the use of arguments by philosophers generally meant to persuade in this way. There is often a synergy between complementary arguments. This clearly results from a careful examination of the three main historical arguments.
:"Therefore even the fool is bound to agree that there is at least in the understanding something than which nothing greater can be imagined, because when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding."
 
  
Now Anselm introduces another assumption:
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==The ontological argument==
  
:"And certainly that than which a greater cannot be imagined cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is at least in the understanding alone, it can be imagined to be in reality too, which is greater."
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According to this argument, God, as the Supreme Being, must exist by definition. It is an ''a priori'' argument. Saint [[Anselm of Canterbury]] and [[Rene Descartes]] have used this argument, but [[Immanuel Kant]] dismissed it, as he did the other two arguments. The common-sense approach finds it much less obvious than the cosmological and teleological arguments. The notion that the mere idea of God implies God’s existence may even seem strange, yet contemporary philosophers find it fascinating. Attempts are regularly being made to prove its validity by using formal [[logic]]. [[Paul Tillich]]’s attempt to show that the ''unconditioned'' is a necessary function of the mind can be seen as another contemporary form of the argument, though Tillich never made that claim.  
  
(For example, most people would prefer a real £100 rather than an imaginary £100.)
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The argument works by examining the concept of God, and arguing that it implies the actual existence of God; that is, if one can conceive of God, then God exists&mdash;it is thus self-contradictory to state that God does not exist. This is obviously a controversial position, and the ontological argument has a long history of detractors and defenders. The argument's different versions arise mainly from using different concepts of God as the starting point.  
  
:"Therefore if that than which a greater cannot be imagined is in the understanding alone, that very thing than which a greater cannot be imagined is something than which a greater can be imagined. But certainly this cannot be."
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=== Anselm's argument ===
  
Anselm has thus found a contradiction, and from that contradiction, he draws his conclusion:
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The ontological argument was first proposed by [[Anselm of Canterbury]] (1033–1109) in chapter 2 of the ''Proslogion,'' even though he did not directly use the expression. He argued that there are necessary beings&mdash;things that cannot ''not'' exist&mdash;and contingent beings&mdash;things that may or may not exist, but whose existence is not necessary. He starts with his famous definition, or necessary assumption about the nature of God: "Now we believe that [the Lord] is '''something than which nothing greater can be imagined'''."
  
:"There exists, therefore, beyond doubt '''something than which a greater cannot be imagined''', both in the understanding and in reality."
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Then Anselm asks: does God exist? In sum, he concludes that, whether one believes in God or not, she cannot avoid at least having the notion of that greatest possible being in her mind. Now Anselm introduces another assumption: "And certainly that than which a greater cannot be imagined cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is at least in the understanding alone, it can be imagined to be in reality too, which is greater."
  
===Philosophical assumptions underlying the argument===
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It would therefore be contradictory to assume that the greatest possible being exists in the understanding alone, because then, it would always be possible to imagine an even greater being&mdash;that which actually exists.
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From that contradiction, Anselm draws his conclusion: "There exists, therefore, beyond doubt '''something than which a greater cannot be imagined,''',both in the understanding and in reality."
  
In order to understand the place this argument has in the history of philosophy, it is important to understand the essence of the argument in the context of the [[Influence of Hellenic philosophy on Christianity]].
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In his Proslogon 3, Anselm made another ''a priori'' argument for God, this time based on the idea of necessary existence. He claimed that if God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, it is better to be necessary than contingent. Therefore God must be necessary.
  
First, it is important to realize that Anselm's argument stemmed from the philosophical school of [[Realism]]. [[Realism]] was the dominant philosophical school of Anselm's day. According to Realism, and in contrast to Nominalism, things such as "greenness" and "bigness" were known as [[universals]], which had a real existence outside the human imagination, in an abstract realm, as described by [[Plato]].  Accordingly, if a concept could be formed in the human mind (as was his concept of God), then it had a real existence in the abstract realm of the universals, apart from his imagination.  In essence, if he could imagine God, God existed.
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====Philosophical assumptions underlying the argument====
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In order to understand the place this argument has in the history of philosophy, it is important to understand the essence of the argument in the context of the influence of Hellenic philosophy on [[Christianity]].  
  
Secondly, it is important to understand Anselm's concept of "perfections" (and that of later writers, up to about the late seventeenth century). A perfection is a property that has been completed; thus, power is a property, but complete (absolute, unlimited) power is a perfection.  The term later came to be used almost completely evaluatively, to mean something like the absolute best, the best possible ([[Baruch Spinoza]] complains about this change in his ''Ethics''), and it has thus become an error to talk about one thing being ''more perfect'' than another.  For writers like Anselm and Descartes, however, "more perfect" simply meant 'more complete', so that perfections come in degrees.  The old meaning of 'perfect' survives in music (e.g., "[[Cadence (music)|perfect cadence]]"), grammar (the [[Perfect aspect|perfect tense]]s), and in phrases such as "a perfect stranger".
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First, Anselm's argument stemmed from the philosophical school of [[realism]]. Realism was the dominant philosophical school of Anselm's day. According to realism, and in contrast to [[nominalism]], things such as "greenness" and "bigness" were known as [[universals]], which had a real existence outside the human imagination, in an abstract realm of ideas, as described by [[Plato]]. Accordingly, if a concept could be formed in the human mind (as was his concept of God), then it had a real existence in the abstract realm of the universals. In essence, if one could imagine God, God existed.
  
Thirdly, it is important to understand Anselm's concept of "necessary existence". Anselm held that there were two types of existence: necessary existence and contingent existence. Contingent existence is a state of existence which depends on something else &mdash; that is, if something else were not the case, the object in question would not exist. Necessary existence, by contrast, depends on nothing. Something that necessarily exists will exist no matter what. It can't not exist.
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Anselm also held that there were two types of existence: Necessary existence and contingent existence. Contingent existence is a state of existence which depends on something else&mdash;that is, if something else were not the case, the object in question would not exist. Necessary existence, by contrast, depends on nothing. Something that necessarily exists will exist no matter what. It cannot not exist.
  
===A modern description of the argument===
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====Criticisms and objections====
  
Here's a short, and very general description of the ontological argument:
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One of the earliest recorded objections to Anselm's argument was raised by his contemporary, [[Gaunilo of Marmoutiers]]. Gaunilo invited his readers to think of the greatest, or most perfect, conceivable [[island]]. As a matter of fact, it is likely that no such island ''actually exists,'' even though it can be conceived. In short, to conclude that something exists because existence would make it more perfect makes no sense.
  
# God is the greatest possible being and thus possesses all perfections.
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Such objections always depend upon the accuracy of the analogy. In the case of Gaunilo’s island, there ''is'' no single concept of a perfect island, because perfection here can only mean what is perfect for one particular person, rather than perfect in itself. The notion of the perfect being, however, isn't relative to any individual; it's the notion of a being that is maximally great&mdash;not for an individual, but great universally.
# Existence is a perfection.
 
# God exists.
 
  
This is a shorter modern version of the argument. Anselm framed the argument as a [[reductio ad absurdum]] wherein he tried to show that the assumption that God does not exist leads to a logical contradiction. The following steps more closely follow Anselm's line of reasoning:
+
====Necessary nonexistence====
 +
Another rationale is attributed to Douglas Gasking<ref>W. Grey, Gasking's Proof. ''Analysis'' 60:4 (2000): 368-370.</ref> (1911&ndash;1994). Gasking makes a paradoxical statement to show that one could just as well use the argument to prove that God does not exist: Greatness depends on one’s merit in accomplishing something. For God to create the world even though he doesn’t exist would imply the greatest merit (overcoming the greatest handicap). Hence, for God to be the greatest, he must not exist.  
  
# God is the entity than which no greater entity can be conceived.
+
Defenders of Anselm would reject the thesis that disability and handicap are things that make a creator greater. The merit of that particular objection is that it highlights the problematic nature of the word “exist” and that it challenges the traditional view of God as a Supreme, detached Being who created the world with no effort at all.
# The concept of God exists in human understanding.
 
# God does not exist in reality (assumed in order to refute).
 
# The concept of God existing in reality exists in human understanding.
 
# If an entity exists in reality and in human understanding, this entity is greater than it would have been if it existed only in human understanding (a statement of existence as a perfection).
 
# from 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 An entity can be conceived which is greater than God, the entity than which no greater entity can be conceived (logical self-contradiction).
 
# Assumption 3 is wrong, therefore God exists in reality (assuming 1, 2, 4, and 5 are accepted as true).
 
  
Anselm in his Proslogon 3 made another a priori argument for God this time based on the idea of necessary existence. He claimed that if God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, it is better to be necessary than contingent. Therefore God must be necessary, to sum it up:
+
====Revisions====
  
# God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
+
Obviously, Anselm thought this argument was valid and persuasive, and it still has occasional defenders, but many, perhaps most, contemporary philosophers believe that the ontological argument, at least as Anselm articulated it, does not stand up to strict logical scrutiny. Others, like [[Gottfried Leibniz]], [[Norman Malcolm]], [[Charles Hartshorne]], [[Kurt Gödel]], and [[Alvin Plantinga]] have reformulated the argument in an attempt to revive it.
# It is greater to be necessary than not.
 
# God must be necessary.
 
# God exists
 
  
===Criticisms and Objections===
+
===Descartes' ontological arguments===
 
 
===Gaunilo's island===
 
 
 
One of the earliest recorded objections to Anselm's argument was raised by one of Anselm's contemporaries, [[Gaunilo]].  Gaunilo invited his readers to think of the greatest, or most perfect, conceivable island.  As a matter of fact, it is likely that no such island ''actually exists''. However, his argument would then say that we aren't thinking of the ''greatest'' conceivable island, because the ''greatest'' conceivable island would ''exist'', as well as having all those other desirable properties.  Since we can conceive of this greatest or most perfect conceivable island, then it must exist. While this argument seems absurd, Gaunilo claims that it is no more so than Anselm's. 
 
 
 
Such objections are known as "Overload Objections"; they don't claim to show where or how the ontological argument goes wrong, they simply argue that if it is sound, then so are many other arguments of the same logical form which we don't want to accept, arguments which would overload the world with an indefinitely large number of things like perfect islands, perfect pizzas, perfect pencils, etc.
 
 
 
Such objections always depend upon the accuracy of the analogy.  That is, we must be able to show that the objector's argument is sufficiently like the ontological argument for us to be able to conclude that if one works so must the other.  There are at least two problems with Gaunilo's version, though.  First, what exactly is the concept of the perfect island &mdash; the island than which no greater can be conceived?  In any group of people, there will be disagreements as to what makes an island perfect; there will be different preferences concerning size, climate, inhabitants, food-availability, etc.  There ''is'' no single concept of a perfect island, because perfection here can only mean what is perfect for us, rather than perfect in itself.  The notion of the perfect being, however, isn't relativised to any individual; it's the notion of a being that is maximally great &mdash; not for me or for you, but great, full stop.
 
 
 
It might be objected that "perfection" is also a culturally relative notion, so that Anselm's argument faces exactly the same problem as Gaunilo's.  As we have seen, however, Anselm and Descartes use "perfection" not (primarily) evaluatively, but to refer to God's having ''complete'' or ''total'' properties.  Moreover, it isn't necessary to say what the properties are in order for the argument to go through; we only need to consider the concept of a being that has all perfections (whatever they may be). Then again, some properties might lead to contradictions in the same object. For example, it is not impossible to think of utter malice as evil's perfection, which one would be hard-pressed to combine with superlative goodness. Or consider the case of "sober-minded" and "poetically-minded." Both are presumably good qualities, yet incompatible even outside of superlatives.
 
 
 
Gaunilo might have added that he means to refer to an island that is perfect in itself, without reference to us.  Now, what is an island?  It's a body of land surrounded by water.  But every island is a body of land surrounded by water (if it weren't, it wouldn't be an island); so every island is a perfect island (every island is perfectly an island).  Here, the disanalogy arises because whatever example Gaunilo chooses, it will be a being of a particular type &ndash; such a pizza, a pencil, or a Prime Minister &ndash; and so its perfection will be relative to that type.  In the case of Anselm's premise, though, we're not concerned with a being of this type or that type, but just with a being &mdash; a being than which no greater can be conceived.
 
 
 
On the other hand, what is a being that has no specific properties? And is it more conceivable than the perfect island? [[Bishop Berkeley]] insisted five centuries later that an abstract triangle, a triangle of no specific proportions and angles is a non-entity, unimaginable, an empty sound. Now "a being" is conceivable, though not picturable, in that we understand the word and its use. But any attempt to endow the concept with content leads to particular properties and particular beings. We may wonder, then, whether "perfect being" is more than a by-product of grammar.
 
 
 
<!-- tidied to here; much more needs doing —>
 
 
 
===Necessary nonexistence=== 
 
 
 
Another rationale is attributed to Melbourne philosopher [[Douglas Gasking]] <ref>''[http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/gasking.pdf W.Grey, "Gasking's Proof", ''Analysis'' 60:4 (2000), pp 368&ndash;70.]''</ref> (1911&ndash;1994), one component of his proof of the nonexistence of God:
 
#The creation of the world is the most marvelous achievement imaginable.
 
#The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.
 
#The greater the disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.
 
#The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence.
 
#Therefore if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator we can conceive a greater being &mdash; namely, one who created everything while not existing.
 
#Therefore God does not exist.
 
 
 
Gasking was apparently thinking of the "world" or "universe" as the same as "everything."  The proof is strengthened if "everything" is substituted. However, defenders of Anselm would reject the thesis that disability and handicap are things that make a creator greater.
 
 
 
===Existence as a property===
 
 
 
Another traditional criticism of the argument (first found in [[Gassendi]]'s Objections to [[Descartes]]' [[Meditations on First Philosophy|Meditations]], and later modified by Kant) is that existence is not a perfection, because existence is not a ''property'' as such, and that referring to it as a property confuses the distinction between a concept of something and the thing itself. The argument is that anything which has the property of being non-existent could not possibly have any other properties, being non-existent, and thus not having color, location, or any other property. One cannot, the argument says, speak meaningfully of the non-existent apple that one is holding, saying that it is red, crisp, weighs a certain amount, is in one's right hand, and does not exist. Another way of phrasing this is that, if existence is a property, then there exist a number of things that have the property of not existing.
 
 
 
===Miscellaneous===
 
 
 
A fourth criticism of Anselm's argument rests on the claim that, even if existence is a property, it is ''still not a perfection'' because existence is either true or false while degree of perfection is a continuous scale.  Defenders of the ontological argument have replied to this objection that its conclusion does not follow from its premise.
 
 
 
A fifth criticism is that the choice of "God" as the term for the perfect being is misleading, and invites the reader to substitute a particular culturally-determined deity for the perfect being used in the argument. This criticism does not directly contradict the validity of the argument but instead suggests that using the ontological argument to demonstrate the existence of a particular deity involves a [[Equivocation|fallacy of equivocation]].
 
 
 
A sixth criticism is that Anselm's "fool" does ''not'' necessarily understand ''some object'' when he hears the words "a thing greater than which nothing can be imagined". He might understand the meaning of the words, but it does not follow from this that even a single mental object exists, even if purely in his mind, of which these words are true. According to this criticism, "I understand some given description" does not imply "I can imagine something that fits the given description". For example if one were to hear the words "a thing that is at the same time [[Invisible_Pink_Unicorn|pink and invisible]]" it does not follow from understanding the words that one then has a mental concept of such a thing.
 
 
 
A seventh criticism comes from analyses, and is related to the idea that existence is not a property. Anselm's argument could be put as "there is x, such that x is all perfections; existence is a perfection, therefore x must exist". We can call this simply C(x) (a proposition in which x is a constituent). But, the fool could ask, for what value of x will C(x) be true?
 
 
 
An eighth criticism of Anselm's argument attacks the premise which implies that one must conceive of the greatest conceivable being ([[God]].)  The criticism is that the greatest conceivable being is in fact inconceivable, as it lacks a required property of the GCB, existence outside of the mind.  To give a parallel, if a person could not conceive of [[dragons]], and wanted to conceive of a three-headed dragon, it would not be possible for him to do so as a requirement for conceiving of a three-headed dragon is to be able to conceive of the inconceivable dragon.  Thus, the argument that the greatest conceivable being must exist in order to achieve its greatest potential is defeated in its premise on the fact that this object is not conceivable.  This criticism also concludes that all conceived objects are inconceivable (or at least not at their greatest conceivability) as in [[a priori]] the required property of existence is absent.
 
 
 
===Hume===
 
 
 
Hume claimed that nothing could ever be proven to exist through an a priori, rational argument by arguing as follows:
 
  
# The only way to prove anything a priori is through an opposite contradiction. For example, I am a married bachelor.
+
[[René Descartes]] (1596-1650) composed a number of ontological arguments which differed from Anselm's formulation in important ways. Generally speaking, it is less a formal argument than a natural intuition.
# The resulting contradiction makes something inconceivable. Obviously it is impossible to have a married bachelor.
 
# It is possible to comprehend anything not existing. Thus it is not inconceivable to imagine anything not existing.
 
# Nothing can be proven to exist a priori. Including God.
 
 
 
==Revisionists==
 
 
 
Obviously Anselm thought this argument was valid and persuasive, and it still has occasional defenders, but many, perhaps most, contemporary philosophers believe that the ontological argument, at least as Anselm articulated it, does not stand up to strict logical scrutiny.  Others, like [[Gottfried Leibniz]], [[Norman Malcolm]], [[Charles Hartshorne]], [[Kurt Gödel]] and [[Alvin Plantinga]] have reformulated the argument in an attempt to revive it.
 
 
 
===Descartes' ontological arguments===
 
  
[[René Descartes]] ([[1596]]-[[1650]]) composed a number of ontological arguments which differed from Anselm's formulation in important ways.  Generally speaking, it is less a formal argument than a natural intuition.
+
Descartes wrote in the ''Fifth Meditation on First Philosophy:''
  
Descartes wrote in the [[Meditations on First Philosophy|Fifth Meditation]]: <ref>''[http://www.classicallibrary.org/descartes/meditations/8.htm René Descartes. Meditations on First Philosophy: 5th Meditation.]''</ref>
+
<blockquote>But if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of something entails that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature (AT 7:65; CSM 2:45).</blockquote>
:But if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of something entails that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature (AT 7:65; CSM 2:45).
 
  
 
The intuition above can be formally described as follows:
 
The intuition above can be formally described as follows:
# Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.  
+
# Whatever one clearly and distinctly perceives to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.  
# I clearly and distinctly perceive that necessary existence is contained in the idea of God.  
+
# One clearly and distinctly perceives that necessary existence is contained in the idea of God.  
 
# Therefore, God exists.
 
# Therefore, God exists.
  
The key premise to the argument is the first premise, which is, in essence, a statement of faith in his intuition.
+
The key to the argument is the first premise, which is, in essence, a statement of faith in his intuition.
 
 
Another formulation of his argument is as follows:
 
# I exist
 
# I have an idea of a supremely perfect being, i.e. a being having all perfections.
 
# As an imperfect being I would be unable to create such a concept.
 
# The concept must have come from God.
 
# To be a perfect being God must exist.
 
# God exists.
 
  
In another, less formal statement of his argument, he draws an analogy between belief in the existence of God and the geometric demonstration:
+
In another, less formal statement of his [[argument]], he draws an [[analogy]] between belief in the existence of God and the geometric demonstration. Mathematical demonstrations can lead to absolute certainty through complicated demonstrations that cannot be immediately evident. In the case of God, things are much simpler: “For what is more manifest than the fact that the supreme being exists, or that God, to whose essence alone existence belongs, exists” (AT 7:68-69; CSM 2:47).
:Whatever method of proof I use, I am always brought back to the fact that it is only what I clearly and distinctly perceive that completely convinces me. Some of the things I clearly and distinctly perceive are obvious to everyone, while others are discovered only by those who look more closely and investigate more carefully; but once they have been discovered, the latter are judged to be just as certain as the former. In the case of a right-angled triangle, for example, the fact that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the square on the other two sides is not so readily apparent as the fact that the hypotenuse subtends the largest angle; but once one has seen it, one believes it just as strongly. But as regards God, if I were not overwhelmed by philosophical prejudices, and if the images of things perceived by the senses did not besiege my thought on every side, I would certainly acknowledge him sooner and more easily than anything else. For what is more manifest than the fact that the supreme being exists, or that God, to whose essence alone existence belongs, exists? (AT 7:68-69; CSM 2:47)
 
  
 
===Plantinga's modal form and contemporary discussion===
 
===Plantinga's modal form and contemporary discussion===
  
[[Alvin Plantinga]] has given us another version of the argument, one where the conclusion follows from the premises, assuming [[axiom S5]] of modal logic. A version of his argument is as follows:
+
Contemporary American philosopher [[Alvin Plantinga]] has created another version of the argument, one where the conclusion follows from the premises, assuming ''axiom S5'' of modal logic. The [[axiom S5]] says that if a proposition is possibly necessarily true, then it is necessarily true. If, then, a maximally great being possibly exists, it exists. [[Richard M. Gale]] has argued that the "possibility premise" begs the question, because here "possibly necessarily" is basically the same as "necessarily."
#By definition a maximally great being is one that exists necessarily and necessarily is omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good. (Premise)
 
#Possibly a maximally great being exists. (Premise)
 
#Therefore, possibly it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists (By 1 and 2)
 
#Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists. (By 3 and S5)
 
#Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists. (By 4 and since necessarily true propositions are true.)
 
 
 
The [[axiom S5]] says that if a proposition is possibly necessarily true, then it is necessarily true.
 
 
 
Plantinga's ontological argument has two controversial premises: The [[axiom S5]] and the "possibility premise" that a maximally great being is possible.  Given these, the conclusion indisputably follows. The more controversial of these two is the "possibility premise" since S5 is widely (though not universally) accepted.  Some critics (e.g., [[Richard M. Gale]]) have even argued that the "possibility premise" begs the question, because one only has the epistemic right to accept it if one understands the nested modal operators, and if one understands them then one understands that "possibly necessarily" is basically the same as "necessarily".
 
 
 
The crucial question is whether the possibility premise can be justified.  The problem is a thorny one, since none of the more reliable of our ways of showing something to be possible appear applicable:
 
#We might show a proposition to be possible by showing that it is true.  Thus, we know that consciousness is possible because we know that we have consciousness.
 
#We can show a [[state of affairs]] to be possible by exhibiting how the state of affairs might arise by the laws of nature from other possible states of affairs.  That is how we know that horse-like mammals with one horn are possible, since we can sketch an evolutionary story whereby they physically could evolve.
 
#We might provide a mathematical or other ''model'' of the situation to be shown to be possible, a model that mirrors all the relevant logical structure of the situation, and show the model to be possible. This is how we know that it is possible to have three people where there are two fathers and two sons—we construct a model in our minds in which there is a grandfather, his son and his son's son.
 
 
 
However, it does not appear that any of these approaches has any hope in the case of the ontological argument's possibility premise.  The first option would be blatant question-begging.  The second is inapplicable since at least as far as we know a maximally great being cannot arise from anything else.  And the third option would require us to have a full grasp of the logical structure of a maximally great being.
 
 
 
There are, however, some less reliable ways of showing something to be possible.  We might simply have a modal "intuition" about the possibility of something.  Such intuitions are highly fallible, but may carry some epistemic weight.  The disadvantage of this method is that it may not be possible for someone who shares the intuition to convince another.
 
  
Or one might do this on a social and not individual level and argue (this follows ideas of Richard M. Gale, though it does not appear likely that he would endorse this application) that when a concept has been in play for centuries in a well-developed [[language game]], such as the concept of a maximally great being in the religious language game, that the concept has some likelihood of being coherent and hence possible. Again, the weight that such a historical claim carries is not very great since we can make mistakes about it.  Thus, before [[Georg Cantor|Cantor]], people may have thought that the idea of a collection than which a greater collection is impossible was coherent, while [[Cantor's diagonal argument]] suggests otherwise).  Still, the history of a concept's use may provide some evidence in favor of the possibility of that which the concept purports to be of.
+
A very different approach has recently been attempted by A. R. Pruss,<ref>A. R. Pruss, [http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/Samkara.html "Samkara’s Principle and Two Ontomystical Arguments,"] ''International Journal for Philosophy of Religion'' 49 (2001): 111–120. Retrieved October 19, 2007.</ref> who starts with the eighth/ninth century C.E. Indian philosopher [[Samkara]]'s dictum that if something is impossible, then one cannot have a perception (even a non-veridical one) that it is the case. If mystics perceive the existence of a maximally great being, it follows that the existence of a maximally great being is at least possible. One difficulty in this argument is that one might misinterpret the content of one's experience, and hence the mystic might be incorrect even in a cautious description of an experience as an experience "''as of'' a maximally great being."
  
There are, nonetheless, yet other approaches to the possibility premise.  Leibniz thought that the possibility premise followed from the claim that "positive qualities" could not logically conflict with one another, and hence the notion of a being that had all the positive qualities had to be coherent.  [[Gödel's ontological proof]] uses similar ideas.
+
==The cosmological argument==
  
A very different approach has recently been attempted by [http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/Samkara.html Pruss] <ref>''[http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/Samkara.html A.R.Pruss, "Samkara’s Principle and Two Ontomystical Arguments", International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (2001), 111–120]''</ref> who starts with the 8th-9th century AD Indian philosopher [[Samkara]]'s dictum that if something is impossible, then we cannot have a perception (even a non-veridical one) that it is the case.  Contraposing, it follows that if we have a perception that ''p'', then even though it might not be the case that ''p'', it is at least the case that ''possibly p''.  If mystics in fact perceive the existence of a maximally great being, it follows that the existence of a maximally great being is at least possible.  And that is all that is needed to get the modal ontological argument off the ground. One difficulty in this argument is that one might misinterpret the content of one's experience, and hence the mystic might be incorrect even in a cautious description of an experience as an experience "''as of'' a maximally great being."
+
The premise of the cosmological argument is that all existing beings are dependent beings (they cannot exist by themselves, they did not create themselves), therefore, there must be a self-existent being, i.e., a being whose existence is accounted for by its own nature. The problem is to define such a being. Either there is an ultimate cause that is fundamentally different from humanity, or people have ''infinite regress.'' That ultimate being would have to be of a different nature, and would have to be a different type of cause. This argument assumes the ''Principle of Sufficient Reason:'' there must be an explanation for the existence of every being, thing, or quality. But [[Buddhism]], [[Aristotle]], and [[Jean-Paul Sartre]], to name a few, feel that there is no problem with the assumption that the universe has always existed. It is simply there.  
  
Interestingly, Plantinga himself does not think the modal ontological argument is always a good proof of the existence of God.  It depends on what his interlocutor thinks of the possibility premise.  Nonetheless, Plantinga has suggested that because we do not have any evidence against the possibility premise, it might be reasonable to suppose it has probability 1/2.  It follows from this that the existence of God can at the outset be held to have probability 1/2, though further evidence may increase or decrease this.
+
There are three basic variants of this argument in its classic form: The argument from causation ''in esse,'' the argument from causation ''in fieri,'' and the argument from contingency. The cosmological argument does not attempt to prove anything about the first cause or about God, except to argue that such a cause must exist.  
 
 
 
 
==Cosmological argument==
 
 
 
The '''cosmological argument''' is an [[Existence of God|argument for the existence of God]], also traditionally known as an "'''argument from universal causation'''," an "'''argument from first cause'''," and also as the "'''uncaused cause'''" argument. Whichever term is used, there are three basic variants of this argument, each with subtle but important distinctions: the argument from causation ''[[in esse]]'', the argument from causation ''[[in fieri]]'', and the argument from contingency. The cosmological argument does not attempt to prove anything about the first cause or about God, except to argue that such a cause must exist.
 
  
 
===Origins of the argument===
 
===Origins of the argument===
  
[[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]] both posited ''first cause'' arguments, though each with certain notable [[caveat]]s. Plato (c. 427–c. 347 BCE) posited a "[[demiurge]]" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the [[cosmos]] in his work ''[[Timaeus (dialogue)|Timaeus]]''. For Plato, the demiurge lacked the supernatural ability to create ''ex nihilo'' or out of nothing. The demiurge was only able to organize the "anake." The anake was the only other co-existent element or presence in Plato's [[cosmogony]].  
+
[[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]] both posited first cause arguments, though each with certain notable caveats. Plato (c. 427–c. 347 B.C.E.) believed that a "[[demiurge]]" was the creator of the [[cosmos]]. For Plato, the demiurge lacked the supernatural ability to create ''ex nihilo'' or out of nothing. The demiurge was only able to organize the pre-existent chaos, itself subjected to the purely physical laws of necessity ''(Ananke)''. Ultimately, for Plato, all is derived from the Soul, or Self-Mover, a non-material entity.
  
[[Aristotle]] (c. 384–322 BCE) also put forth the idea of a creator of the cosmos, often referred to as the "Prime Mover" in his work ''Metaphysics''. For Aristotle too, as for Plato, the underlying "stuff" of the universe always was in existence and always would be (which in turn follows [[Parmenides]]' famous statement that "nothing can come from nothing"). Aristotle posited an underlying [[ousia]] (an essence or substance) of which the universe is composed, and it is the ''ousia'' which the Prime Mover organized and set into motion.
+
[[Aristotle]] (c. 384–322 B.C.E.) also put forth the idea of a creator of the cosmos, often referred to as the "Unmoved Prime Mover" in his work ''Metaphysics.'' For Aristotle, as for Plato, the underlying "stuff" of the universe always was in existence and always would be (which in turn follows [[Parmenides]]' famous statement that "nothing can come from nothing"). Aristotle posited an underlying ''[[ousia]]'' (an essence or substance) of which the universe is composed. It is the ''ousia'' which the Prime Mover organized and set into motion, not by acting, but by being the center of attraction, hence the [[Unmoved Mover]].  
  
[[Thomas Aquinas]] (c. 1225 – 1274 C.E.), probably the best known [[theologian]] of the [[Middle Ages]], adapted the argument he found in his reading of [[Aristotle]] to form one of the earliest and the most influential versions of the cosmological argument. His conception of ''first cause'' is the idea that the universe must have been caused by something which was itself uncaused, which he asserted was God
+
[[Thomas Aquinas]] (c. 1225–1274 C.E.), the best known theologian of the [[Middle Ages]], adapted the argument to form one of the earliest and the most influential versions of the cosmological argument. His conception of ''first cause'' is the idea that the universe must have been caused by something which was itself uncaused, which he asserted was God.
 
 
Countless other philosophers and theologians have posited first-cause arguments both before and since Aquinas.  The versions sampled in the following sections are representative of the most common derivations of the argument.
 
  
 
===The argument===
 
===The argument===
Line 268: Line 159:
 
# Nothing can cause itself.
 
# Nothing can cause itself.
 
# A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.
 
# A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.
# Therefore, there must be a first cause; or, there must be something which is not an effect.
+
# Therefore, there must be a first cause&mdash;something which is not an effect.
  
The cosmological argument can only speculate about the existence of God from claims about ''the entire universe'', unless the "first cause" is taken to mean the same thing as "[[God]]."  Thus, the argument is based on the claim that God must exist due to the fact that the universe needs a cause. In other words, the existence of the universe requires an explanation, and an active creation of the universe by a being outside of the universe&mdash;generally assumed to be God&mdash;is that explanation.
+
The cosmological argument can only speculate about the existence of God from claims about the entire universe. The argument is based on the claim that God must exist due to the fact that the universe needs a cause. The existence of the universe requires an explanation, and an active creation of the universe by a being outside of the universe&mdash;generally assumed to be God&mdash;is that explanation.
  
In light of the [[Big Bang theory]], a stylized version of cosmological argument for the existence of God has emerged (sometimes called the [[Kalam cosmological argument]], the following form of which was put forth by [[William Lane Craig]]):
+
===The argument from contingency===
 +
Aquinas follows Aristotle in claiming that there must be something which explains why the universe exists. Since the universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably not exist&mdash;that is to say, since it is [[contingent]]&mdash;its existence must have a cause. And that cause cannot simply be another contingent thing, it must be something which exists by necessity.
  
# Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
+
The German philosopher [[Gottfried Leibniz]] made a somewhat similar argument with his ''Principle of Sufficient Reason,'' in 1714. He wrote: "There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases." He formulated the cosmological argument succinctly: "Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason…is found in a substance which…is a necessary Being bearing the reason for its existence within itself."
# The universe began to exist.
 
# Therefore, the universe had a cause.
 
  
===A more detailed discussion of the argument===
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===''In esse'' and ''in fieri''===
A basic explanation might go something like this:  Consider some event in the universe. Whatever event you choose, it will be the result of some ''cause'', or more likely a very complex set of causes. Each of those causes would be the result of some other set of causes, which are in turn a result of yet other causes. Thus there is an enormous chain of events in the universe, with the earlier events causing the later events. And either this chain of events has a beginning, or it does not. 
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''"In esse"'' and ''"in fieri"'' are Latin expressions from [[Middle Ages|medieval]] [[scholasticism]]. They make an important distinction. God can be seen as a remote first cause who starts everything and then is no longer needed (''in fieri,'' i.e., “in becoming”). That is the position of [[deism]], where God is merely a logical assumption to explain how everything started. Once the universe is set into motion, according to that view, things pretty much proceed mechanically&mdash;God is no longer needed. But God can also be seen as the Creator and permanent sustainer of the universe (''in esse,'' i.e., “in existence”). In that case, God is not only the first cause who started everything, but God also maintains the existence of everything all the time. Creation then is a permanent event. This second view is less mechanistic, but also more mysterious: How is God’s action invisibly present in every moment?
  
Currently, the theory of the cosmological history of the universe most widely accepted by [[astronomy|astronomers]] and [[astrophysics|astrophysicists]] includes an apparent first event&mdash;the [[Big Bang]]&mdash;the expansion of all known matter and energy from a superdense, [[singularity|singular point]] at some finite time in the past.  Though contemporary versions of the cosmological argument most typically assume that there was a beginning to the cosmic chain of physical, or natural causes, the early formulations of the argument did not have the benefit of this degree of theoretical insight into the apparent origins of the cosmos.
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As a general trend, the modern slants on the cosmological argument tend to lean very strongly towards an ''in fieri'' argument to the extent that they are trying to explain how it all started. The question, there, is: What brought the whole of existence into motion? On the other hand, based on the biological sciences, some have insisted on the necessity of an original life force working in organic processes. For instance, scientists know ''how'' wounds heal, but they don’t have the slightest idea ''why'' the healing process is set into motion. In everyday language, an answer would be that God is permanently working through the organism.
  
Plato's ''[[demiurge]]'' and Aristotle's ''Prime Mover'' each referred to a being who, they speculated, set in motion an already existing "stuff" of the cosmos.  A millennium and a half later, Aquinas went on to argue that there is an ''Uncaused Cause'' which is just another name for God.  And to Aquinas, it remained logically possible that the universe has already existed for an infinite amount of time, and will continue to exist for an infinite amount of time.  In his classic ''Summa Theologiae'', he posited that even if the universe has always existed, (a notion which he rejected on other grounds), there is still the question of cause, or even of "first cause."
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===Counterarguments and objections===
  
===The argument from contingency===
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Several objections to the cosmological argument have been raised. The most obvious one runs as follows: "If God created the universe, who created God?" If everything needs a cause (the basic assumption of the cosmological argument), then why doesn’t God? Skeptics have thus spoken of a “trilemma” (a triple dilemma) that is not solved by the argument: Either one has infinite regress (every entity is caused by another entity, which is caused by yet another, and so on indefinitely); or one dogmatically asserts that there is a God as First Cause (without even trying to explain why this should be the case); or one has circular reasoning: God explains the existence of the world, but this brings it back to the starting point, the fact that there is a world means that there must be a God, which is circular reasoning. The implication of this position is that it is useless to try to find an ultimate cause of things.  
Aquinas follows Aristotle in claiming that there must be something which explains ''why'' the universe exists.  Since the universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably not exist—that is to say, since it is [[contingent]]—its existence must have a cause. And that cause cannot simply be another contingent thing, it must be something which exists by necessity, that is, it must be something which must exist. In other words, even if the universe has always existed, it still owes that existence to Aristotle's ''Uncaused Cause.'' 
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Another objection is that even if one accepts the argument as a proof of a First Cause, it does not identify this first cause with "God." The argument simply names the First Cause as "God" without proving that it has the characteristics that that name implies. It is also troublesome to use the title "creator," as this would imply assuming that the "creator" has some sort of intelligence. At best, one may be able to call this first cause a "supernatural" first cause.
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Opponents also point out that the cosmological argument applies temporal concepts to situations where time does not exist. If God created the universe, he also created time. The nonsensical question “what was there before God created time?” would ensue.
  
So Aquinas arrives at his conclusion, that God exists, whether there was a first event in the universe or not. Since either the universe has always existed, or it had a first event, Aquinas says that this argument definitively proves the existence of God.  Aquinas actually was using at least two arguments, an argument from contingency and an argument from first cause that was a combination of the two types introduced in the next section.  It should be carefully noted that Aquinas' overlapping 13th Century argument(s) would not have held up to the scrutiny of a strict logical analysis in the 20th or 21st Century.
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And some, including German philosopher [[Immanuel Kant]], have contended that applying the category of causality to a hypothetical First Cause is entirely inappropriate. Cause and effect apply to finite events within this universe. How such a relationship could exist between an unknowable First Cause and the universe is beyond the human grasp.
  
The German philosopher [[Gottfried Leibniz]] made a somewhat similar argument with his [[Principle of sufficient reason]] in 1714.  He wrote: "There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases."  He formulated the cosmological argument succinctly: "Why is there something rather than nothing?  The sufficient reason...is found in a substance which...is a necessary Being bearing the reason for its existence within itself."
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===Criticisms of counterarguments===
  
===''"In esse"'' and ''"in fieri"''===
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A response to criticism will naturally incorporate some of the very elements that make up that criticism. First and foremost, it must be admitted that the argument cannot yield much information, if any, on the nature of the First Cause, or God, other than that there must be a Being that is such a cause. The argument cannot be a substitute for [[faith]] or spiritual insights, much less church [[dogma]].  
The difference between the arguments from causation ''in fieri'' and ''in esse'' is a fairly important one.  ''In fieri'' is generally translated as "becoming," while ''in esse'' is generally translated as "in existence."  ''In fieri'', the process of becoming, is similar to building a house.  Once it is built, the builder walks away and it stands of its own accord.  (It may require occasional maintenance, but that is beyond the scope of the "first cause" argument.)
 
  
''In esse'' (in existence) is more akin to the light from a candle or the liquid in a vessel.  George Hayward Joyce, SJ,  explains that "...where the light of the candle is dependent on the candle's continued existence, not only does a candle produce light in a room in the first instance, but its continued presence is necessary if the illumination is to continue. If it is removed, the light ceases. Again, a liquid receives its shape from the vessel in which it is contained; but were the pressure of the containing sides withdrawn, it would not retain its form for an instant."  This form of the argument is far more difficult to separate from a purely "first-cause" argument than is the example of the house's maintenance above, because here the "first cause" is insufficient without the candle's or vessel's continued existence.
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The objection that this First Cause must have a cause itself, resulting in circular reasoning, can be answered by stating the following: The very argument assumes that there must be a Being that is of a fundamentally different nature from all existing entities in that it can be its own cause. Thus, the argument cannot go beyond suggesting the reality of such a Being, without making any further statements on its nature. It can also hint to the fact that denying it means accepting a meaningless and unexplained universe without a cause. In other words, assuming the reality of such a Prime Being does not offer a full answer, but it does clarify the nature of the issue and its possible implications.
  
Thus, Aristotle's argument is ''in fieri'', while Aquinas' argument is both '' in fieri'' and ''in esse'' (plus an additional argument from contingency). The distinction is an excellent example of the difference between a [[Deism|deistic]] view (Aristotle) and a [[theism|theistic]] view (Aquinas).  Leibnitz, who wrote more than two centuries before the "big bang" was taken as granted, is arguing ''in esse''. As a general trend, the modern slants on the cosmological argument including the [[Kalam cosmological argument|Kalam argument]], tend to lean very strongly towards an ''in fieri'' argument.
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Thus, almost all physical cosmologists subscribe to a theory of universal origin that is effectively dualistic in nature. On careful consideration of the [[Big Bang]], for example, some sort of "cause," itself not caused by "natural" forces of the universe (''causa sui,'' i.e., its own cause), appears to be inescapable.  
  
===Counterarguments and objections===
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That includes time. Time is understood as "natural" in substance, while the uncaused cause is '''not natural''' and therefore not operable in time. Aquinas understood the Divine as outside of time, viewing all of time, indeed being present in all of time, simultaneously.
  
Several objections to the cosmological argument have been raised. One very simple objection is that, in the formulation above, the conclusion (5) ''There must be a first cause'' (which itself does not have a cause) is explicitly forbidden by assumption (1) ''Everything has a cause.'' Therefore adherents of the First Cause argument must necessarily be able to conceive of something that does not have a cause. If God does not need a cause, then why, opponents ask, would the material universe? This objection is related to the question "If God created the universe, who created God?"
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When one looks for the origin of the universe he effectively postulate "substances," forces or circumstances that are "pre-natural." Understanding that time itself is part of the natural order, one cannot say "before" time, but that at the instant of the Big Bang, conditions that cannot exist under natural physical laws caused an inflationary expansion of matter and energy.
  
Another objection is that even if one accepts the argument as a proof of a First Cause, it does not identify this first cause with "God."  The argument does not even attempt to ascribe this First Cause with attributes necessary to call it "God," not even with extremely basic prerequisites such as [[self-awareness]] and [[will (philosophy)|will]] (though there are some theists who actually do make such attempts when using this argument [http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-smith1.html]). It simply names the First Cause as "God" without proving that it has the characteristics that that name implies. It is also troublesome to use the title "creator," as this would imply assuming that the "creator" has some sort of intelligence. At best, one may be able to call this first cause a "super natural" first cause; as this wouldn't make any more assumptions that have already been made. Furthermore, the argument only requires God as a first cause, but fails to prove that God continued to exist after serving that purpose. Some [[Deism|deists]] agree that the argument proves that God created the universe, but nevertheless maintain that God then ceased to exist, or ceased to interact with the material universe.
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===Scientific positions===
  
Opponents also point out that the cosmological argument applies temporal concepts to situations where time does not exist. For example, "cause" is a temporal concept - by definition, it requires time; things which exist outside of time do not have to be caused. (Indeed, this is the excuse given for God's assumed lack of a requirement to be caused.) However, time is merely a property of the universe, and so the laws of time (ie. cause) cannot be logically applied to the universe itself as a whole. Similarly, time can begin, but not require a cause, since all human concepts of a caused beginning have something before that beginning (including the cause); this is not true of time itself.
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Currently, the theory of the cosmological history of the universe most widely accepted by [[astronomy|astronomers]] and [[astrophysics|astrophysicists]] includes an apparent first event&mdash;the [[Big Bang]]&mdash;the expansion of all known matter and energy from a superdense, singular point at some finite time in the past.  
  
Defenders of cosmological arguments that do not assume the finite age of the universe insist that eternal existence, the "always there" assumption, does not eliminate the problem of origin. On a similar note, one could also claim that the universe has always existed and its "creation" is thus not causal in nature, so no "first cause" is necessary. If one believes that time is infinite, then indeed there is no need for a "first cause" and therefore no need for God. However, it is not yet certain whether science agrees or disagrees with this - some scientific models continue to suggest a [[cosmic inflation#Slow-roll inflation|eternal]], [[cyclic model|cyclical]], or [[oscillatory universe|oscillatory]] universe rather than a one-time event, for example. What can be said is that science is presently still learning the nature of time, and how the visible universe originated, therefore to an extent certain questions are partially unanswered.
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The cosmological argument as elaborated in antiquity and in the [[Middle Ages]] was purely based on logical philosophical reflection: There is a need for a First Cause. There was not the slightest notion of how that Original Being might have caused the world to exist. In trying to explain the emergence of the world, theologians generally relied on ''Creatio ex nihilo,'' the belief that God created the world out of nothing. How a spiritual God could have caused our material world to exist remained a mystery. The modality of creation was understood in terms of the seven days of creation of the Genesis narrative. Thus, the cosmological argument consisted of a mixture of philosophical speculation and religious [[dogma]].
  
[[Gottfried Leibniz]] stated the problem in his conclusion, although his terminology included some assumptions.  If his [[principle of sufficient reason]] is indeed universally applicable, then the First Thing must either (1) be its own cause or (2) have a non-causal explanation. The non-causal explanation would either (a) make the First Thing's existence be in some way self-explanatory or (b) make it follow in an explanatory way from self-explanatory truths, such as the truths of logic.
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This situation changed dramatically with the advent of twentieth century science, in particular [[physics]] and [[astronomy]]. A “how” began to emerge, at least on the level of [[hypothesis]]. By extrapolating based on actual scientific measurements, scientists were able to offer a somewhat clear picture of the very first moments of existence of our universe, which led them to suggest various ways in which this beginning may have been set into motion. Though the Big Bang itself is still nothing but a hypothesis in need of revision, it thus offers a concrete framework in which to visualize, as much as possible, what may have happened.  
  
All three options have had defenders.  Thus, option (1), the ''causa sui'' option, is defended by [[Descartes]].  Option (2a) is held by some of those like [[Aquinas]] who think that God's essence is identical with God's existence, or by those who hold, more weakly, that God's existence follows from his essence.  Option (2b) essentially holds that there is a sound [[ontological argument]] for the existence of God, albeit we may not have discovered it yet. It follows from the principle of sufficient reason that one of the three options holds, but a defender of the Principle does not need to give an independent proof of any one of these options. It is, after all, the ''conclusion'' of the argument that one of these holds.  In fact, this conclusion might be the starting point for responding to the problem of identifying the First Thing with God—that is how it is in [[Aquinas]], for instance.  Thus, if one could show the premises of the cosmological argument to be true and show that options (1) and (2a) were not tenable, then the cosmological argument would turn into an argument for the existence of an ontological argument.  We would then know that there ''is'' a sound ontological argument, even if we did not know ''what'' it is.
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Other twentieth century scientific theories, such as [[quantum physics]] and the [[theory of relativity]] can and have been used to argue either way in issues relating to a First Cause. It would be naïve to expect any scientific theory to offer a definitive response to a philosophical question; what such theories do offer is, again, a framework for understanding the issue more realistically, especially as far as the nature of time and space is concerned.  
  
Alternately, the defender of the cosmological argument can restrict the principle of sufficient reason in such a way that it does not require us to give an explanation of the existence of the First Thing. One such restriction would be to restrict the Principle only to require the explanation of ''contingent'' facts.  Another is to restrict the Principle only to require the explanation of ''explainable'' facts. These restrictions would require arguments, respectively, that the universe is contingent or that the universe's existence is explicable.
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In his famous ''Antinomies'' of pure reason, [[Immanuel Kant]] had argued against the cosmological argument because saying that the cosmos has a beginning makes as much or as little sense as saying that it does not. If there was a beginning, the question is, what was there before? If not, there is no end to the causal chain, which the mind equally cannot accept. Hence, Kant says, people have to admit that [[God]], as thing in itself, is wholly beyond the phenomenal world that humanity can understand. Contemporary [[astrophysics]] shows that the everyday notion of time and space does not fully apply to the extreme conditions of a hypothetical starting point. This in itself represents a formidable argument against common-sense objections of the type used by Kant.
  
If the principle of sufficient reason does not hold, then the "selection" among potential alternatives must be random or a "brute fact". Defenders of the Principle will insist that neither option really makes sense.
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A commonly stated workaround for the cosmological argument is the nature of [[time]]. The [[Big Bang]] is said to be the start of both [[space]] and ''time,'' so the question "What was there before the universe?" makes no sense; the concept of "before" becomes meaningless when considering a situation without time. This has been put forward by [[Stephen Hawking]], who said that asking what occurred before the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the [[North Pole]]. Science is presently still learning the nature of time, and how the visible universe originated, therefore to an extent certain questions are partially unanswered.
  
===Criticisms of counterarguments===
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===The other look at the question===
To evaluate arguments/objections, it is necessary to consider the following: 
 
  
1.  The cosmological argument as held by Aristotle, Aquinas, Maimonides and Averroes '''does not''' concern itself with a "first cause" that starts at the beginning of time.
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The three proofs have been developed in the Western world and primarily apply to a theistic view: There is one God, transcendent ''creator'' of the universe. People are used to considering that everything must have a cause, so the universe must have a prime cause. But what if there is something wrong with the assumption that the universe must have a cause, like every individual entity?
  
2. The cosmological argument is posited on the assumption that everything in the experience of our five physical senses is natural and that everything natural is caused, contingent and dependent - subject to cause by the uncaused cause.
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In East Asia, including [[India]] and [[China]], the notion of a creator is not entirely absent. It appears in various ''[[creation myth]]s'' (mythical stories on how the universe came into being), just like it does in other parts of the world. But there is also a strong tendency not to look at things in this way. There is little focus on this question in religious traditions and thought systems such as [[Buddhism]]. The focus is more on attitudes towards the human condition, rather than on speculation on the origin of the universe. This resonates with many in the West as well.
  
That ''includes'' time.  Time is understood as "natural" in substance, while the uncaused cause is '''not natural''' and therefore not operable in time.  i.e.: Aristotle, who first formulated the argument, believed the natural, caused universe was infinite, without beginning.  Aquinas, who re-formulated the argument as a proof for monotheism, understood the Divine as outside of time, viewing all of time, indeed being present in all of time, simultaneously like a vast simulcrum
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==The teleological argument==
  
3. Criticisms of this argument should be divided into those that criticize the essence of the dualistic argument: that the universe has a cause that is different in substance from the natural universe, versus those that criticize the monotheistic extension of the argument that the cause of the universe is God (as asserted by [[Maimonides]], [[Aquinas]] and [[Averroes]])
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The teleological argument (argument from design) is essentially an inductive and intuitive argument. It states that there must be an intelligent designer (God) who is responsible for order, harmony, and beauty in the world. It is an argument for the existence of God based on perceived evidence of order, purpose, design and/or direction in nature. The word "teleological" is derived from the Greek word ''telos,'' meaning ''end'' or ''purpose.'' [[Teleology]] is the supposition that there is purpose or directive principle in the works and processes of nature. But there are objections: The universe is far from perfect ([[David Hume]]), and what if it is the product of trial and error ([[Charles Darwin]])?
  
The [[Aristotlean]] formulation of the argument held that the universe is of an essence or substance such that all things in the universe are caused: dependent and contingent.  He postulated an alternative essence or substance that does not have the qualities of dependency or contingency and which, therefore, does not require a cause, but which itself may be the source upon which our natural, caused universe, is dependent, or contingent.
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===The argument===
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The basic argument can be stated as follows:
  
Laying aside that [[Aristotle]] believed the universe to be infinite in nature, stated in its original formulation as such, this is not saying a very different thing from modern, naturalistic [[cosmology]].  When we look for the origin of the universe we effectively postulate "substances", forces or circumstances that are "pre-natural". Consider some of the varieties of physical, cosmological expanations for the origin of the universe: (a) understanding that time itself is part of the natural order, we cannot say "before" time, but we say that at the instant of the big bang, conditions that cannot exist under natural physical laws caused an inflationary expansion of matter and energy or (b) "[[branes]]", moving through imperceptible dimensions stretch in opposing directions until they turn back on themselves, eventually colliding and causing new universes to come into being.
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# ''X'' is too (complex, orderly, adaptive, apparently purposeful, and/or beautiful) to have occurred randomly or accidentally.
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# Therefore, ''X'' must have been created by a (sentient, intelligent, wise, and/or purposeful) being.
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# God is that (sentient, intelligent, wise, and/or purposeful) being.
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# Therefore, God exists.  
  
In either case, though the "cause" is not supernatural as the monotheistic form of the cosmological argument suggests, it is, nonetheless, "specialized" and yields to a form of naturalistic [[dualism]]. Monotheistic innovations of the argument distinguish themselves by postulating that the dualism is supernatural and that whatever the "uncaused cause", it is the Divine. 
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''X'' usually stands for the universe; the [[evolution]] process; humankind; a given animal [[species]]; or a particular organ like the eye or capability like language in humans. ''X'' may also stand for the fundamental constants of the universe like physical constants and [[physical law]]. A very concise and whimsical teleological argument, for instance, was offered by [[G. K. Chesterton]] in 1908: "So one elephant having a trunk was odd; but all elephants having trunks looked like a plot."
  
Almost all physical cosmologists subscribe to a theory of universal origin that is effectively dualistic in nature and basically reflective of the Aristotlean reasoning underlying the original cosmological argument - they simply do so without making the jump to assume any spiritually supernatural qualities of a universe's dual source.  This is not [[special pleading]] as some have said, as special pleading applies to the same claiming to be different, not to the different, in fact, being different. On careful consideration of the big bang, for example, some sort of dualistic "cause", itself presumably not caused, or at least not caused by "natural" forces of our universe, appears prima facie to be inescapable.  
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===History of the argument===
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[[Plato]] posited a "[[demiurge]]" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the cosmos in his work ''Timaeus.'' Plato's teleological perspective is also built upon the analysis of ''[[a priori]]'' order and structure in the world which he had already presented in ''The Republic.''
  
Understood as such, where the inherent dualism of the cosmological argument forces neither a naturalist (uncaused cause was not Divine) or supernaturalist (uncaused cause was Divine) conclusion, it is possible to formulate versions of the cosmological argument that lend to an atheistic conclusion. <ref>For an example see Smith, Quentin.  "A Big Bang Cosmological Argument For God's Nonexistence" FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY in April 1992 (Volume 9, No. 2, pp. 217-237).</ref>
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[[Aristotle]]'s views also have very strong aspects of a teleological argument, specifically that of a Prime Mover who, so to speak, looks ahead in setting the cosmos into motion. Indeed, Aristotle argued that all nature reflects inherent purposiveness and direction (his so-called ''final cause)''.  
  
===Scientific positions===
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[[Cicero]] (c. 106&ndash;c. 43 B.C.E.) also made one of the earliest known teleological arguments. In ''de Natura Deorum'' ''(On the Nature of the Gods)'' Cicero stated, "The divine power is to be found in a principle of reason which pervades the whole of nature." He was writing from the cultural background of the Roman religion. In [[Roman mythology]] the creator [[goddess]], [[Gaia]] was borrowed from [[Greek mythology]]. "When you see a sundial or a water-clock, you see that it tells the time by design and not by chance. How then can you imagine that the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and intelligence, when it embraces everything, including these artifacts themselves and their artificers" (Cicero, ''De Natura Deorum'', ii. 34).
  
Modern [[quantum physics]] is sometimes interpreted to deny the validity of the first premise of this argument (that everything has a cause), showing that subatomic particles such as [[electron]]s, [[positron]]s, and [[photon]]s, can come into existence, and perish, by virtue of spontaneous energy [[Vacuum fluctuations|fluctuations in a vacuum]]. Though such occurrences do not violate the [[Conservation of energy|Law of Conservation of Mass and Energy]], [[Bell's theorem]] shows that these are impossible to predict.  
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[[Augustine of Hippo]] (354&ndash;430 C.E.) presented a classic teleological perspective in his work, ''City of God.'' He did not, however, make a formal argument for the existence of God; rather, God's existence is already presumed and Augustine is giving a proposed view of God's teleology.
  
Modern [[cosmology]] is sometimes taken to be neutral on the second premise, asserting that while [[spacetime]] as observed tends toward a singularity giving the universe an observed [[Age of the universe|finite age]], this does not discount the possibility that the stochastic processes that govern the early evolution of the universe actually cause the universe to be eternal. In particular, the lack of a consistent theory of [[quantum gravity]] has meant that there is no physical theory and no meaningful prediction can be made about what character the universe had before the [[Planck time]]. Indeed the supposed [[singularity]] from which the universe is said to have originated in the classic [[Big Bang]] picture is actually a [[physical paradox]] - an indication that current theory is not an adequate description. This era of the universe and its associated energy regime remains one of the [[unsolved problems in physics]] and as such does not lend itself either to the existence of a "first cause" or lack thereof.
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==== Aquinas and the scholastics ====
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The most notable [[Scholasticism|scholastics]] (c. 1100-1500 C.E..) who put forth teleological arguments were [[Averroes]] (Ibn-Rushd) and [[Thomas Aquinas]]. Averroes was writing in Spain from an Islamic perspective in the latter half of the twelfth century. Averroes argues based mainly upon Aristotle's ''Physics,'' in essence that the combination of order and continual motion in the universe cannot be accidental, and requires a Prime Mover, a Supreme Principle, which is in itself pure intelligence.
  
<!-- Commented out pending verification/sources
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This would set the stage for [[Thomas Aquinas|Aquinas]] in the thirteenth century. Aquinas makes a specific, compact, and famous version of the teleological argument, the fifth of his five proofs for the existence of God in his ''Summa Theologiae:''
Some proponents of [[String Theory]] state that there are more dimensions than the ones we experience. In this argument, two universes existed outside of [[time]], our fourth dimension. They collided with each other and dropped down into the lower four dimensions, x, y, z, and time. The universes in the other dimensions both existed forever and never existed, as they are not fettered by time and thus require no "first cause."
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<blockquote>The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore, some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.<ref>That Religious Studies Website, [http://www.thatreligiousstudieswebsite.com/Articles/Philosophy_of_religion/God/five_ways.html Thomas Aquinas' Five Ways]. Retrieved September 20, 2007.</ref></blockquote>
—>
 
Recently, newer, speculative theories have been offered by a number of theorists, but there is no scientific consensus as of yet on whether the universe necessarily began to exist or whether it is eternal (for example, "big bang," expansion of cosmos, then contraction, then "big crunch," then a "big bang" again, once every 30 or 40 billion years ''[[ad infinitum]]'').
 
  
A commonly stated workaround for the cosmological argument is the nature of [[time]].  The [[Big Bang]] is said to be the start of both [[space]] and ''[[time]]'', so the question "What was there before the universe?" makes no sense; the concept of "before" becomes meaningless when considering a situation without time. This has been put forward by [[Stephen Hawking]], who said that asking what occurred before the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the [[North Pole]] (however, this comment was made in reference to cosmology and not theology).
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==== The British empiricists ====
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Starting with [[John Locke]], seventeenth and eighteenth century British [[Empiricism|empiricists]] opened the way to a scientific perspective based on experience that left little room for assumptions about an ''a priori'' divine purpose. Locke’s successor, [[George Berkeley]], would try to counterbalance that tendency. As part of this approach, Berkeley included in his text, ''Alciphron,'' a variant of the teleological argument which held that the order one sees in nature is the language or handwriting of God. [[David Hume]], in the mid-eighteenth century, attempted a number of interesting refutations, including one that arguably foreshadows [[Charles Darwin|Darwin]]'s theory, but he reaches no conclusion.
  
===Notes and references===
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==== The watchmaker analogy ====
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The “watchmaker analogy” framing the argument with reference to a timepiece dates back to [[Cicero]], as quoted above. It was also used by [[Voltaire]], who remarked: "If a watch proves the existence of a watchmaker but the universe does not prove the existence of a great Architect, then I consent to be called a fool." Today the analogy is usually associated with the theologian [[William Paley]], who presented the argument in his book ''Natural Theology,'' published in 1802. As a theology student, [[Charles Darwin]] found Paley's arguments compelling, then later developed his theory in the ''Origin of Species,'' which puts forward an alternative explanation for complexity in nature.
  
<references/>
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Many others have countered the watch argument, such as by showing that highly complex systems can be produced by a series of very small randomly-generated steps. [[Richard Dawkins]]' book ''The Blind Watchmaker'' (1986) is one of the best-known examples of this approach outside philosophy and theology.
  
==Teleological Argument==
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More recently, proponents of [[intelligent design]] have reframed the argument as the concept of irreducible complexity. This argument asserts that each substructure of an organism confers no benefit on its own, and therefore cannot have been selected by an evolutionary mechanism. The argument then posits that the probability of all the substructures being created in a single mutation is too low to be considered possible. Critics describe this as an argument from ignorance which assumes that substructures have not changed in function, and give illustrations of how gradual replacement by a series of advantageous variations can lead to the [[evolution]] of structures claimed as being irreducibly complex.
A '''teleological argument''' (or a '''design argument''') is an [[arguments for the existence of God|argument for the existence of God]] or a creator based on perceived evidence of order, purpose, design and/or direction in nature. The word "teleological" is derived from the Greek word ''telos'', meaning ''end'' or ''purpose''. [[Teleology]] is the supposition that there is purpose or directive principle in the works and processes of nature.
 
  
===The argument===
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===The anthropic principle and fine-tuned universe arguments===
Although there are variations, the basic argument can be stated as follows:
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A well-known contemporary variation of the argument is the so-called [[anthropic principle]], which says that the seemingly arbitrary and unrelated constants in physics have one strange thing in common&mdash;these are precisely the values needed to have a universe capable of producing human life (hence, “anthropic,” from the Greek word for human). Even a tiny difference would have made the appearance of our universe impossible. The universe gives the appearance that it was designed to support life on earth, another example of Paley’s watch.
  
# ''X'' is too (complex, orderly, adaptive, apparently purposeful, and/or beautiful) to have occurred randomly or accidentally.
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In this line of reasoning, speculation about the vast, perhaps infinite, range of possible conditions in which life could not exist is compared to the speculated improbability of achieving conditions in which life does exist, and then interpreted as indicating a fine-tuned universe specifically designed so human life is possible. This view is well articulated by John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler in ''The Anthropic Cosmological Principle'' (1986).  
# Therefore, ''X'' must have been created by a (sentient, intelligent, wise, and/or purposeful) being.
 
# God is that (sentient, intelligent, wise, and/or purposeful) being.
 
# Therefore, God exists.
 
Alternatively, for 2, 3, and 4, more than one (sentient, intelligent, wise, and/or purposeful) being must have created ''X''; therefore more than one creator, (ie. gods and goddesses) exist. ''see: [[Polytheism]]''.
 
  
''X'' usually stands for the universe; the [[evolution]] process; [[human]]kind; a given animal [[species]]; or a particular organ like the [[eye]] or capability like [[language]] in humans. ''X'' may also stand for the fundamental constants of the [[universe]] like [[physical constants]] and [[physical law]]. Sometimes this argument is also based on the [[anthropic principle]] that these constants seem [[Fine-tuned universe|tuned]] specifically to allow intelligent life to evolve.
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Some of the estimated proportions involved in cosmic "fine-tuning" are remarkable. John Polkinghorne, for instance, pointed out in 1985 that just one factor among many in the cosmos, the difference between expansive and contractive forces in the expanding cosmos according to then-currently accepted theory, depends upon an extremely fine balance of the total energy involved to within one in 10<sup>60</sup>, a 61-digit number; equivalent to taking aim from Earth and hitting an inch-wide target at the farthest reaches of the observable universe. George Wald, also in 1985, wrote that the conditions for something as fundamental as the [[atom]] depend on a balance of forces to within one in 10<sup>18</sup>. All this, they argue, hints at the existence of a designer.
  
Some versions of the argument may substitute for [[God]] a lesser [[demiurge]], multiple Gods or [[Polytheism|Gods and Goddesses]], or perhaps [[extraterrestrial]]s as cause for natural phenomena, although reapplication of the argument might still imply an [[Cosmological argument|ultimate cause]]. However, most of the classic forms of this argument are linked to [[monotheism]]. And, some forms of teleological argument choose to leave the question of the attributes of a hypothesized "Designer" completely open. A very concise and whimsical teleological argument, for instance, was offered by [[G.K. Chesterton]] in 1908: "So one elephant having a trunk was odd; but all elephants having trunks looked like a plot."
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Many highly regarded thinkers have weighed in on both sides the debate. A counter-argument to the anthropic principle is that one could manipulate statistics to define any number of natural situations that are extremely improbable, but that have happened nevertheless. By the critics' view a key problem in terms of being able to verify whether the hypothesized probabilities are correct, is that the improbable conditions were identified after the event, so they cannot be checked by experiment. And, there is no ability to sample a large enough set of alternatives. An analogy from common experience where the odds ''can'' be readily calculated is given by John Allen Paulos in ''Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and its Consequences'' (1989). Paulos calculates that the probability of a particular hand in a card game is approximately one in 600 billion. It would be absurd to examine the hand carefully, calculate the odds, and then assert that it must not have been randomly dealt. This perspective on the issue of improbability appears to bolster the position that characteristics of Earth that allow it to sustain life could be just a fortunate and/or accidental "hit," so to speak. However, this does not take into account the difference between a set of particular cards&mdash;a very unlikely combination, but of no particular complexity&mdash;and a complex organic or physical combination.
  
===History of the argument===
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===Objections===
[[Plato]] (c. 427&ndash;c. 347 B.C.E.) posited a "[[demiurge]]" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the cosmos in his work ''[[Timaeus (dialogue)|Timaeus]]''.  For Plato, the ''demiurge'' lacked the supernatural ability to create "ex nihilo" or out of nothing. The demiurge was able only to organize the "anake." The anake was the only other co-existent element or presence in Plato's cosmogony.  Plato's teleological perspective is also built upon the analysis of ''[[a priori]]'' order and structure in the world which he had already presented in [[Republic (dialogue)|''The Republic'']].
 
  
[[Aristotle]] (c. 384&ndash;322 B.C.E.) also developed the idea of a creator of the cosmos, often referred to as the "[[Cosmological argument|Prime Mover]]" in his work ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]''. Aristotle's views have very strong aspects of a teleological argument, specifically that of a prime mover who, so to speak, looks ahead in setting the cosmos into motion.   Indeed, Aristotle argued that all nature reflects inherent purposiveness and direction.
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As for the cosmological argument, the teleological argument has inherent limitations that need to be acknowledged even by its proponents. First of all, the argument says nothing about the nature of the designer, or God, other than that he must be of a nature able to originate design without being in need of it himself (an “undersigned” designer). The reality of such a Being is posited, rather than explained.
  
[[Cicero]] (c. 106&ndash;c. 43 B.C.E.) also made one of the earliest known teleological arguments. In ''de Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods)'' Cicero stated, "The divine power is to be found in a principle of reason which pervades the whole of nature".  He was writing from  the cultural background of the [[Roman religion]]. In [[Roman mythology]] the creator goddess, [[Gaia (mythology)|Gaia]] was borrowed from [[Greek mythology]].  The Romans called her [[Terra (mythology)|Tellus or Terra]].
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Also, even if the argument from design proves the existence of a powerful intelligent designer, it does not prove that the designer is a theistic God. [[Voltaire]] noted this from his deistic perspective. Voltaire observed,  
:"When you see a sundial or a water-clock, you see that it tells the time by design and not by chance. How then can you imagine that the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and intelligence, when it embraces everything, including these artifacts themselves and their artificers?" (Cicero, ''De Natura Deorum'', ii. 34)
 
  
[[Augustine of Hippo]] (354&ndash;430 C.E.) presented a classic teleological perspective in his work, ''City of God''.  He describes the "city of man" and essentially posits that God's plan is to  replace the city of man with the city of God (at some as-yet-unknown point in the future).  Whether this is to happen gradually or suddenly is not made clear in Augustine's work. He did not, however, make a formal argument for the existence of God; rather, God's existence is already presumed and Augustine is giving a proposed view of God's teleology.  Augustine's perspective follows from and is built upon the ''[[neo-Platonic]]'' views of his era, which in turn have their original roots in Plato's cosmogony.
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<blockquote>[F]rom this one argument, I cannot conclude anything more, except that it is probable that an intelligent and superior being has prepared and shaped matter with dexterity; I cannot conclude from this argument alone that this being has made the matter out of nothing or that he is infinite in any sense [i.e. that he is God].</blockquote>
  
=== Aquinas and the scholastics ===
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In his ''Critique of Judgment'' and elsewhere, [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] put considerable emphasis on the apparent evidence of design in nature and the mind’s need to conclude from it that there must be a designer. This, he nevertheless concluded, cannot be taken as a theoretical proof of the reality of such a designer or God. It merely shows that the world looks “as if” it had been created by such a designer, thus leaving the possible reality of that designer as an open question that will never be answered.
The most notable [[scholastics]] (circa 1100-1500 C.E.) who put forth teleological arguments were [[Averroes]] ([[Ibn-Rushd]]) and [[Thomas Aquinas]].  Averroes was writing in Spain from an Islamic perspective in the latter half of the 12th Century, and his influence was very considerable in interpreting many of Aristotle's ideas for the first time in Latin, thereby directly helping to make Aristotle available to Aquinas. Averroes was a transitional philosopher, partly ''[[a priori]]'' [[neo-Platonic]], and partly ''[[a posteriori]]'' [[Aristotlean]].  As a result of his overlapping of the two modes in interpreting Aristotle, and also as a result of what would be known today as a strong disagreement between a [[deism|deistic]] and [[theistic]] viewpoint in religious circles of that era, Averroes' work was highly controversial and fairly quickly became officially banned in both the Christian and Islamic world.  Despite the lingering Platonic influence, Averroes' teleological arguments can be characterized as primarily Aristotlean and presuming one God. He argues based mainly upon Aristotle's ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'', in essence that the combination of order and continual motion in the universe cannot be accidental, and requires a Prime Mover, a Supreme Principle, which is in itself pure Intelligence.
 
  
This would set the stage for [[Thomas Aquinas|Aquinas]] in the 13th Century, who was much more thoroughly Aristotlean, ''a posteriori'' and [[empirical|empirically]] based than his predecessors. Aquinas makes a specific, compact and famous version of the teleological argument, the fifth of his five proofs for the existence of God in his ''[[Summa Theologiae]]'':
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Kant’s follower [[Jakob Friedrich Fries]] (1773-1843) interestingly tried to separate the notion of design from its verifiable manifestations. As a man of the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], Fries had a mechanical view of the universe. He considered that the material world consisted of a network of causes and effects that needed no further explanation. If it weren’t for its extreme complexity, future outcomes of that system could be predicted in their minutest detail. Seeing purpose in it would be a mere projection based on the existing outcome. However, Fries also considered that the human mind has the inherent capacity to perceive the reality of purpose through [[intuition]], or ''Ahndung.'' He thus rejected the traditional application of the teleological argument in favor of an intuitive one. Actual purpose can be perceived through the intuition of beauty in creation and human beings, thus allowing humanity to reach the realm of the infinite, which is that of God.  
:"The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore, some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God." [http://www.faithnet.org.uk/AS%20Subjects/Philosophyofreligion/fiveways.htm]
 
  
=== The British empiricists ===
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The premises of the argument assume that because life is complex, it must have been designed. However, the design claim is often attacked as a simple argument from ignorance.  
The empiricist philosopher [[John Locke]], writing in the late 17th century, proposed a new and very influential view wherein the ''only'' knowledge humans can have is ''a posteriori'' (i.e., based upon sense experience) and that there can be no ''[[a priori]]'' knowledge whatsoever.  In the early 18th century, the Catholic Bishop [[George Berkeley]] determined that Locke's view immediately opened a door that would lead to eventual [[atheism]]. In response to Locke, he put forth  a form of "radical empiricism" in which things ''only'' exist as a ''result'' of their being perceived (and God fills in for humans by doing the perceiving whenever humans are not around to do it). As part of this approach Berkeley included in his text ''Alciphron'' a variant of the teleological argument which held that the order we see in nature is the language or handwriting of God.
 
  
[[David Hume]], in the mid-18th Century, presented arguments both for and against the teleological argument in his ''[[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]].'' The character Philo, summarizing the teleological argument, uses the example of a watch.  Philo is not satisfied with the teleological argument, however. He attempts a number of interesting refutations, including one that arguably foreshadows Darwin's theory. In the end, however, Philo agrees that the teleological argument is valid. [[Daniel Dennett]] maintains that, although Hume was ultimately dissatisfied with the teleological argument, his cultural context prevented him from taking any of the alternatives seriously.
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A designed organism would also be a contradiction to [[evolutionary theory]]. As most biologists support the theory of biological evolution by means of [[natural selection]], they reject the first premise of the argument, arguing that evolution is not only an alternative explanation for the complexity of life but a better explanation with more supporting evidence. A range of [[chemical reaction]]s could take place in living organisms, forming chemicals with increasingly complex properties and ways of interacting. Over very long periods of time self-replicating structures could arise and later form [[DNA]]. Thus biologists commonly view the design argument as an unimpressive argument for the existence of a god. The argument from design is thus a major element in the debate between [[creationism]] and [[evolution]].
  
=== The watchmaker analogy ===
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===Argument from poor design===
The [[Watchmaker analogy]] framing the argument with reference to a timepiece dates back to [[Cicero]], whose illustration was quoted above. It was also used by, among others, [[Robert Hooke]] and [[Voltaire]], the latter of which remarked: "If a watch proves the existence of a watchmaker but the universe does not prove the existence of a great Architect, then I consent to be called a fool." Today the analogy is usually associated with the theologian [[William Paley]], who presented the argument in his book ''Natural Theology'' published in [[1802]]. As a theology student [[Charles Darwin]] found Paley's arguments compelling, then later developed his theory of [[The Origin of Species|the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection]] which puts forward an alternative explanation for complexity in nature.
 
  
Many others have countered the watch argument, such as by showing that highly complex systems can be produced by a series of very small randomly-generated steps. [[Richard Dawkins]]' book ''[[The Blind Watchmaker]]'' (1986) is one of the best-known examples of this approach outside philosophy and theology.  
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The '''argument from poor design''' is based on the premise that a creator [[God]] would [[creation (theology)|create]] [[organism]]s that have optimal [[design]], but that many organisms have significant defects. This point was already made by eighteenth century philosopher [[David Hume]]. The term ''incompetent design'' has been coined by [[Donald Wise]] to describe aspects of nature that are flawed in design.  
  
More recently, proponents of [[intelligent design]] have reframed the argument as the concept of [[irreducible complexity]], the premise that certain biological structures can function only if all their substructures are present. This argument asserts that each substructure confers no benefit on its own, and therefore cannot have been selected by an evolutionary mechanism.  The argument then posits that the probability of all the substructures being created in a single mutation is too low to be considered possible. Critics describe this as an [[argument from ignorance]] which assumes that substructures have not changed in function, and give illustrations of how [[Irreducible complexity#Gradual replacement|gradual replacement]] by a series of advantageous variations can lead to the [[evolution]] of structures claimed as being irreducibly complex.
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One well-know examples of "poor design" would be the existence of the appendix in the human body. That small part of the intestine is apparently useless and is often the source of trouble. Many other observations of the same type, applying to the human body or other entities, have been made.
  
===The anthropic principle and fine-tuned universe arguments===
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"Poor design" is consistent with the predictions of the scientific theory of evolution by means of [[natural selection]]. This predicts that features that were evolved for certain uses, are then reused or co-opted for different uses, or abandoned altogether. The argument from poor design is one of the arguments used by [[Charles Darwin]]; modern proponents have included [[Stephen Jay Gould]] and [[Richard Dawkins]], who argue that such features can be explained as a consequence of the gradual, cumulative nature of the evolutionary process.
A modern variation of the teleological argument is built upon the [[anthropic principle]]. The anthropic principle is derived from the apparent delicate balance of conditions necessary for human life.  In this line of reasoning, speculation about the vast, perhaps infinite, range of possible conditions in which life ''could not'' exist is compared to the speculated ''improbability'' of achieving conditions in which life ''does'' exist, and then interpreted as indicating a [[fine-tuned universe]] specifically designed so human life is possible.  This view is well articulated by [[John D. Barrow]] and [[Frank J. Tipler]] in ''The Anthropic Cosmological Principle'' (1986).
 
  
Some of the estimated proportions involved in cosmic "fine-tuning" are remarkable.  [[John Polkinghorne]], for instance, pointed out in 1985 that just one factor among many in the cosmos, the difference between expansive and contractive forces in the expanding cosmos according to then-currently accepted theory, depends upon an extremely fine balance of the total energy involved to within one in 10<sup>60</sup> , a sixty-one digit number equivalent to taking aim from Earth and hitting an inch-wide target at the farthest reaches of the observable universe. [[George Wald]], also in 1985, wrote in the same context that the conditions for something as fundamental as the atom depend on a balance of forces to within one in 10<sup>18</sup>. Proponents of the fine-tuned universe form of teleological argument typically argue that taken together, the various fine-tuned balances appear quite improbable, and hint strongly at something designed rather than accidental.  And, of course, "designed" implies a "designer" of some kind.
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=== Counterarguments ===
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The argument from poor design is generally criticized by showing how an apparently poor design or useless feature actually has a purpose that has simply been ignored or undetected. Even where the existence of useless features cannot be explained away, it can be argued that these are leftovers of a trial-and-error process by the designer. What this line of arguing does in the process is to present a view of the designer that is different from the traditional notion of a God who is in total control. If design and creation happens, it appears more realistically as a long, painstaking process towards an ultimate goal&mdash;a process in which many blind alleys have to be avoided.
  
Many highly regarded scientists, mathematicians, philosophers and a few theologians have weighed in on both sides in an interesting debate.  A counter-argument to the anthropic principle is that one could manipulate statistics to define any number of natural situations that are extremely improbable, but that have happened nevertheless.  By the critics' view a key problem in terms of being able to verify whether the hypothesized probabilities are correct, is that the improbable conditions were identified after the event, so they cannot be checked by experiment. And very importantly, there is no ability to sample a large enough set of alternatives (indeed we know of no other cosmos to sample) in order to be able to properly attach any odds or probabilities to these natural situations in the cosmos. Moreover, observations of the cosmos to date indicate that the conditions on Earth are but one of widely varying conditions on many, many planets in many, many solar systems, all of which to date do not appear to have met the conditions necessary for life. An analogy from common experience where the odds ''can'' be readily calculated is given by [[John Allen Paulos]] in ''Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and its Consequences'' (1989), that the probability of a very mundane event such as that of getting any particular hand of thirteen cards in a game of [[Contract bridge|bridge]] is approximately one in 600 billion. It would be absurd to examine the hand carefully, calculate the odds, and then assert that it must not have been randomly dealt. This perspective on the issue of improbability appears to bolster the position that characteristics of Earth that allow it to sustain life could be just a fortunate and/or accidental "hit", so to speak.  
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Thus, the argument from poor design is sometimes interpreted as an argument against characteristics commonly attributed to [[God]], such as omnipotence, omniscience, or personality. Or, it is used as an argument for the incompetence of God. Finally, certain features of life that seem to contradict the existence of a perfect designer, such as various forms of suffering, can be explained by the [[Human Fall]] away from God. The notion of a human fall, found in most religions, has in turn been used to show that the existence of a good God is self-contradictory.
  
In the wake of the "fine-tuned universe" observations and arguments published in the 1980s, the [[intelligent design]] [[Intelligent design movement|movement]] picked up some of the above concepts, added some additional ones such as ''[[irreducible complexity]]'' (a variant of the watchmaker analogy) and ''[[specified complexity]]'' (closely resembling a fine-tuning argument) and attempted to cast the resulting combined form of the teleological argument as scientific rather than speculative. The vast majority of scientists have disagreed with the assertion that it is scientific, as have the findings of a federal court in the United States in a [[Kitzmiller v. Dover|2005 decision]], which ruled that the "intelligent design" arguments are essentially religious in nature.
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====Other issues====
{{seealso|Teleological argument#Other issues}}
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Some have argued that there is no inherent contradiction between intelligent design and evolution. Certain religious perspectives may find nothing illogical about believing in a creator-deity who purposed evolution to propagate the emergence of life on earth. This position is becoming increasingly accepted today&mdash;indeed, [[Pope John Paul II]] put forward a position of exactly this kind.
  
===Formal objections and counterarguments===
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==The argument from the degrees of perfection==
====Complexity does not imply design====
 
  
The first (and therefore second) premise assumes that one can infer the existence of intelligent design merely by examining an object. The teleological argument assumes that because life is complex, it must have been designed. It is argued that this is [[Non sequitur (logic)|non-sequitur logic]]. Life or objects are described as "orderly" or "ordered", which implies that an intelligent designer has ordered them. However, in reality, there are examples of [[system]]s which are non-random or ordered simply because it is following natural physical processes, for example [[diamond]]s or [[snow]]flakes.
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===The argument===
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This argument was somewhat touched upon by Augustine and Anselm but developed later by Aquinas as the fourth of his five ways ''(Quinque Viae)''. All things in nature have various degrees of perfections such as goodness, truth, and nobility. If anything comes in degrees, it must be comparable to a maximum. The maximum in a genus is the cause of all in that genus. So, there must be a maximum of perfections such as goodness, truth, and nobility, i.e., the best, the truest, the noblest, etc. The maximum of perfections is God. This is sometimes called the Platonic argument because it talks about the existence of the Platonic "forms" along with the existence of God. One strength of this argument is that it can speak of many more attributes of God than the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments.
  
The design claim is often attacked as an [[argument from ignorance]], since it is often unexplained or unsupported, or explained by unscientific conjecture, such as [[irreducible complexity]]. Supporters of intelligent design assume that natural objects and man-made objects have similar properties, therefore both must be designed.  However, different objects can have similar properties for different reasons, such as [[star]]s and [[light bulbs]]. Proponents must therefore demonstrate that ''only'' intelligent design can cause orderly systems or the argument is invalid.
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===Objection===
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David Hume critiqued this argument by saying that since there is much evil and suffering in this world, a God of the maximum of perfections cannot exist.
  
A designed organism would, on the face of it, be in contradiction to [[evolution]]ary theory. As most professional biologists support the theory of biological evolution by means of [[natural selection]], they reject the first premise, arguing that evolution is not only an alternative explanation for the complexity of life but a better explanation with more supporting evidence. Living organisms obey the same physical laws as inanimate objects. A range of chemical reactions could take place, forming other chemicals with complex properties and ways of interacting.  Over [[Geologic time scale|very long periods of time]] self-replicating structures could arise and later form [[DNA]].  Thus biologists commonly view the design argument as an unimpressive argument for the existence of a god.
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==The moral argument==
  
{{seealso|Argument from poor design}}
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Among all the proofs for [[God]]’s existence that have been attempted besides the main three proofs described above, the moral argument is the best known. This argument comes in different forms, all aiming to prove God’s existence from the evidence of [[morality]] in the world.
  
Advocates of design have responded to this objection by pointing out that information theory demonstrates that DNA is a "code," and is therefore not analogous structurally to a snowflake or crystal as the written pages of a book or this article would not be. They also claim that no natural process has ever created a code, and that explanations put forward of the origins of DNA or gradual change are often couched in vague terms such as, for example simply "arising" or "forming" without offering any explanation as to how the thing arose or formed, and that this is unscientific.{{fact}}  This argument, however, takes liberties with the definition of "code" and as such, is often considered to be an example of the logical error of [[equivocation]]. It may also be the error of reification; i.e., of treating a linguistic metaphor or analogy such as "code" as a real object or state.
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===Kant’s moral argument===
  
====Contradictory premises lead to an infinite regress====
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[[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] introduced his famous formulation of the proof as a replacement for the three classic proofs, which he felt were hopeless attempts to derive certainty about God through theoretical knowledge. In his ''Critique of Practical Reason,'' Kant sought to replace theoretical certainty with the moral certainty of practical reason.  
Some argue that even if the first and second premises are accepted, the implied designer (''Y'') might be an unknown force or mere [[demiurge]], not God as God is commonly understood. It is argued in defence that the outside force through which ''Y'' came into being might then be explained as a more powerful being resulting in either an omnipotent being or [[infinite regression]].
 
  
Critics often argue that the teleological argument would apply to the designer, arguing any designer must be at least as complex and purposeful as the designed object. This, they say, would create the [[reductio ad absurdum|absurdity]] of an [[infinite regression|infinite series]] of designers. However, the counter-argument of an "undesigned designer," akin to [[Aristotle]]'s uncaused causer, is common. This argument, however, is incomplete as it does not indicate why the designer can be undesigned but the universe cannot.
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That certainty exists, Kant insisted, because of the following:
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# The highest good is where moral virtue and happiness coincide.
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# People are rationally obliged to attain the highest good.
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# What people are obliged to attain, it must be possible for them to attain.
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# If there is no God or [[afterlife]], it is not possible to attain the highest good ''(summum bonum)''.  
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# God (or the afterlife) must exist.  
  
{{seealso|Cosmological argument}}
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Kant cites several reasons why it would not be possible to attain the highest good if there was no God. First, reality shows beyond a doubt that good people often have more miserable lives than evil people. Only the existence of an afterlife with God could explain this paradoxical situation in a satisfactory way. Next, it appears to be impossible to achieve perfection of morality in our short lifespan. Thus, Kant believed that eternal life with God is necessary for us to be able to reach that perfection eventually.
  
====Does not prove the existence of God====
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Kant himself insisted that this argument could not lead to absolute theoretical certainty, but that people were rationally obliged to assume that this was so, because this is the only way the world could make sense. Kant’s position assumes that the universe is rational. It also assumes that the certainty one reaches through his argument is the culmination or rationality, whereas others would see in it a certainty of the intuitive type. The moral argument as presented by Kant has precisely been criticized for assuming a universal rational order and universal justice.
  
Even if the argument from design proves the existence of a powerful intelligent designer, it does not prove that the designer is God. Voltaire [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watchmaker_analogy#Voltaire observed] "[F]rom this one argument, I cannot conclude anything more, except that it is probable that an intelligent and superior being has prepared and shaped matter with dexterity; I cannot conclude from this argument alone that this being has made the matter out of nothing or that he is infinite in any sense [i.e. that he is God]."
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===Other forms of the argument===
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All forms of the moral argument begin with the notion that there is a fundamental moral norm. That is, human beings are typically aware of actions as being right and wrong. This awareness seems to bind people toward certain obligations, regardless of their personal goals and ends. In this sense, moral qualities have the appearance of universality and objectivity.  
  
It has also been pointed out that the argument relies on a cultural context of monotheism when it claims to prove the existence of a single, supreme creator Being.  In the context of a polytheistic culture, however, the argument could just as easily be used to argue for the existence of gods (in the plural) — a group of intelligent supernatural designers. In [[David Hume]]'s [[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]], the character Philo argued, amidst other counterarguments to the teleological argument, that there "could have been a committee of deities."
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According to the argument, the perceived absoluteness of morally binding commands can only be justified based on an absolute origin of these commands, i.e., God. For instance, it has often been stated that, if there is no God, anything goes. There is ultimately no reason for doing good, rather than evil.  
  
==== Incoherence====
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To this, it has been objected that even in the absence of a God, humans can and often do abide by moral commands for their own sake. In addition, it is highly debatable whether there is one set of absolute moral commands. Many would insist that moral commands are conditioned culturally or otherwise.
[[George H. Smith]], in his book ''Atheism: The Case Against God'', points out what he considers to be a fatal flaw in the argument from design
 
<blockquote>Consider the idea that nature itself is the product of design. How could this be demonstrated? Nature, as we have seen, provides the basis of comparison by which we distinguish between designed objects and natural objects. We are able to infer the presence of design only to the extent that the characteristics of an object differ from natural characteristics. Therefore, to claim that nature as a whole was designed is to destroy the basis by which we differentiate between artifacts and natural objects. Evidences of design are those characteristics ''not'' found in nature, so it is impossible to produce evidence of design ''within'' the context of nature itself. Only if we first step beyond nature, and establish the existence of a supernatural designer, can we conclude that nature is the result of conscious planning. (p. 268)</blockquote>
 
  
====Other issues====
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Critics also point out this argument's appeal to a "divine command theory" of ethics. Objections to divine command theories of ethics are numerous, most stemming from forms of the [[Euthyphro dilemma]]. Is an action good because God commanded it, or did God command it because it is good? The first horn would imply that what is good is arbitrary; God decides what is right and wrong in the same way that a government decides which side of the street cars should drive on. The second horn would imply that God made his commands in accordance with transcendental facts that exist apart from God. God, then, would not be omnipotent.  
Recently, the teleological argument has become the subject of controversy because of its close relationship to the [[Intelligent Design]] movement, which uses a variant of the teleological argument while claiming [[science|scientific]] credibility. The controversy is closely related to the perennial debate between proponents of [[theism|theistic]] and "[[deism|deistic]]" conceptions of God.
 
  
For example, it is argued that [[supernatural]] events cannot be [[falsifiability|falsified]]. There is no empirical (and therefore scientific) way to test for [[Creation (theology)|creation]] per se. To illustrate this, [[Robert Todd Carroll]] said "the universe would look the same to us whether it was designed or not." This type of argument can be taken as a counterargument to the Intelligent Design version of the teleological argument.  Further in this context, natural [[scientists]] would say with virtual unanimity that to invoke supernatural explanations does not add to our understanding of the world. Since "supernatural" events are by definition above nature (super-natural), they cannot be considered a scientific alternative to any theory of natural science. (see also: [[God of the Gaps]], [[Faith and rationality]].)
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Proponents of the argument maintain that this dilemma can be adequately resolved. [[Thomas Aquinas]], for example, explains that God indeed commands something because it is good, but the reason it is good is that "good is an essential part of God's nature."
  
A common question arises which intends on making our theories on the origin of life a matter of subjectivity: "Which is more believable?" or "Which one requires more [[faith]]?"  Both sides would probably admit that whatever is more believable is not necessarily true, however, if faith is taken to mean a belief that transcends evidence against that belief, belief in evolution is not a matter of faith due to the considerable evidence in its favour. "Which is more believable?" might be considered an irrelevant question as belief is subjective - what is believable for one is unbelievable to another. The question might be rephrased: "if one objectively studies the arguments in favour of intelligent design, and one does the same for the scientific theory of evolution, which one of these theories is more useful and logical an explanation, and better supported by evidence, and therefore 'most believable'?" (see also: [[Pascal's wager]])
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==Other arguments for the existence of God==
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Countless other arguments have been proposed over the centuries. What follows is but a sampling.  
  
Some have argued that, although from some religious perspectives intelligent design is often contrasted with evolution, there is no inherent contradiction between the two. Certain religious perspectives may find nothing illogical about believing in a creator-deity who purposed evolution to propagate the emergence of life on earth. This position is becoming increasingly accepted today— indeed, to illustrate, Pope John Paul II put forward a position of exactly this kind.
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* The "Will to Believe Doctrine" was [[Pragmatism|pragmatist]] philosopher [[William James]]' attempt to prove God by showing that the adoption of [[theism]] as a hypothesis "works" in a believer's life. This doctrine depended heavily on James' pragmatic theory of truth where beliefs are proven by how they work when adopted rather than by proofs before they are believed (a form of the [[hypothetico-deductive method]]).
  
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* Richard Swinburne, one of the foremost contemporary philosophers of religion, has suggested in his ''The Existence of God'' (2004) what can be called a hypothetical argument, according to which the existence of the God of monotheistic religions as they understand him should be treated first only as an "hypothesis" and then be tested or verified by observing the world which was supposedly created by him. The verification process using scientific and experiential data about the world, according to Swinburne, would make the hypothesis on God's existence more probable than improbable. Even though he is a supporter of the teleological argument, his use of a hypothetical method has made it more acceptable to people including atheists.
  
== Empirical arguments (for) ==
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* Another class of philosophers asserts that the proofs for the existence of God present a fairly large probability, though not absolute certainty, as obscure points remain. In order to overcome these difficulties, either an act of the will, a religious experience, or the discernment of the misery of the world without God is necessary, so that finally the heart makes the decision. This view is maintained, among others, by the English statesman [[Arthur Balfour]] in his book ''The Foundations of Belief'' (1895).  
Other arguments avail themselves of data beyond definitions and axioms. For example, some of these arguments require only that one assume that a non-random universe able to support life exists. These arguments include:
 
  
* The [[Teleological argument]], which argues that the [[Fine-tuned universe|universe's order]] and complexity shows signs of purpose (''[[Telos (philosophy)|telos]]''), and that it must have been designed by an intelligent designer with properties that only a god could have.
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* Subjective arguments mainly rely on the testimony or experience of certain witnesses, or the propositions of a specific [[revelation|revealed]] [[religion]]. The ''witness argument'' gives credibility to personal witnesses, in contemporary and past ages. A variation of this is the ''argument from [[miracle]]s'' which relies on testimony of supernatural events to establish the existence of God. The "Christological argument" is specific to [[Christianity]] and asserts that [[Jesus of Nazareth|Jesus]]' life as written in the [[New Testament]] establishes his credibility, so one can believe in the truth of his statements about God. An example of this argument is presented by [[C. S. Lewis]] in ''Mere Christianity.'' The "argument from common consent" or "majority argument" argues that people in all times and in different places have believed in God, so it is unlikely that he does not exist.
* The [[Anthropic principle|Anthropic argument]] focuses on basic facts, such as our existence, to prove God.
 
* The [[argument from morality|Moral argument]] argues that objective morality exists and that therefore God exists.
 
* The [[Transcendental argument for the existence of God]], which argues that [[logic]], [[science]], [[ethics]], and other things we take seriously do not make sense if there is no God. Therefore, atheist arguments must ultimately refute themselves if pressed with rigorous consistency. By contrast, there is also a [[Transcendental Argument for the Non-existence of God]].
 
* The [[Will to Believe Doctrine]] was [[pragmatist]] philosopher [[William James]]' attempt to prove God by showing that the adoption of theism as a hypothesis "works" in a believer's life. This doctrine depended heavily on James' [[pragmatic theory of truth]] where beliefs are proven by how they work when adopted rather than by proofs before they are believed (a form of the [[hypothetico-deductive method]]).
 
  
== Inductive arguments (for) ==
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* The Scotch school, led by [[Thomas Reid]], taught that the fact of the existence of God is accepted by one without knowledge of reasons but simply by a natural impulse. That God exists, this school said, is one of the chief metaphysical principles that humans accept not because they are evident in themselves or because they can be proved, but because [[common sense]] obliges one to accept them.  
Inductive arguments argue their conclusions through [[inductive reasoning]].
 
  
* Another class of philosophers asserts that the proofs for the existence of God present a fairly large probability though not absolute certainty. A number of obscure points, they say, always remain. In order to overcome these difficulties there is necessary either an act of the will, a religious experience, or the discernment of the misery of the world without God, so that finally the heart makes the decision. This view is maintained, among others, by the [[England|English]] statesman [[Arthur Balfour]] in his book ''[[The Foundations of Belief]]'' ([[1895]]). The opinions set forth in this work were adopted in [[France]] by [[Ferdinand Brunetière]], the editor of the ''[[Revue des deux Mondes]]''. Many orthodox Protestants express themselves in the same manner, as, for instance, Dr. E. Dennert, President of the [[Kepler Society]], in his work ''Ist Gott tot?''. <ref>(Stuttgart, 1908)</ref>
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* The "Argument from a Proper Basis" argues that belief in God is "properly basic"—that is, similar to statements such as "I see a chair" or "I feel pain." Such beliefs are non-falsifiable and, thus, neither able to be proved nor disproved; they concern perceptual beliefs or indisputable mental states.
  
== Subjective arguments (for) ==
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* In Germany, the school of [[Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi]] taught that reason is able to perceive the supersensible. Jacobi distinguished three faculties: sense, [[reason]], and understanding. Just as sense has immediate perception of the material so has reason immediate perception of the immaterial, while the understanding brings these perceptions to our consciousness and unites them to one another.<ref>A. Stöckl, ''Geschichte der neueren Philosophie'', II, 82 sqq.</ref> God's existence, then, cannot be proved. Jacobi, like Kant, rejected the absolute value of the principle of causality&mdash;it must be felt by the mind. A similar position was defended by Fries.
Subjective arguments mainly rely on the testimony or experience of certain witnesses, or the propositions of a specific [[revelation|revealed]] [[religion]].
 
  
* The [[witness argument]] gives credibility to personal [[witness]]es, contemporary and throughout the ages. A variation of this is the [[argument from miracles]] which relies on testimony of supernatural events to establish the existence of God.
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* In his ''Emile: Or, On Education,'' [[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] asserted that when human understanding ponders over the existence of God it encounters nothing but contradictions; the impulses of the heart, however, are of more value than the understanding, and these proclaim clearly to one the truths of natural religion, namely, the existence of God and the immortality of the [[soul]].
* The religious or [[Christological argument]] is specific to religions such as [[Christianity]], and asserts that for example [[Jesus]]' life as written in the [[New Testament]] establishes his credibility, so we can believe in the truth of his statements about God. An example of this argument is the [[Trilemma]] presented by [[C.S. Lewis]] in [[Mere Christianity]].
 
* The [[argument from common consent|Majority argument]] argues that people in all times and in different places have believed in God, so it is unlikely that he does not exist.
 
  
=== Arguments grounded in personal experience ===
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* The same theory was advocated in Germany by [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] (d. 1834), who assumed an inner religious sense by means of which one feels religious truths. According to Schleiermacher, religion consists solely in this inner perception, and dogmatic doctrines are inessential. Many modern [[Protestantism|Protestant]] theologians follow in Schleiermacher's footsteps.
* The [[Scotch School]] led by [[Thomas Reid]] taught that the fact of the existence of God is accepted by us without knowledge of reasons but simply by a natural impulse. That God exists, this school said, is one of the chief metaphysical principles that we accept not because they are evident in themselves or because they can be proved, but because [[common sense]] obliges us to accept them.
 
* The [[Argument from a Proper Basis]] argues that belief in God is "properly basic"—that is, similar to statements such as "I see a chair" or "I feel pain."  Such beliefs are non-falsifiable and, thus, neither able to be proved nor disproved; they concern perceptual beliefs or indisputable mental states.
 
* In [[Germany]], the School of [[Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi]] taught that our reason is able to perceive the suprasensible. Jacobi distinguished three faculties: sense, [[reason]], and understanding. Just as sense has immediate perception of the material so has reason immediate perception of the immaterial, while the understanding brings these perceptions to our consciousness and unites them to one another.<ref>([[A. Stöckl]], ''Geschichte der neueren Philosophie'', II, 82 sqq.)</ref> God's existence, then, cannot be proved—Jacobi, like Kant, rejected the absolute value of the principle of causality—it must be felt by the mind.
 
* In his ''[[Emile: Or, On Education|Emile]]'', [[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] asserted that when our understanding ponders over the existence of God it encounters nothing but contradictions; the impulses of our hearts, however, are of more value than the understanding, and these proclaim clearly to us the truths of natural religion, namely, the existence of God and the immortality of the [[soul]].
 
* The same theory was advocated in Germany by [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] (died [[1834]]), who assumed an inner religious sense by means of which we feel religious truths. According to Schleiermacher, religion consists solely in this inner perception, and dogmatic doctrines are inessential.<ref>(Stöckl, loc. cit., 199 sqq.)</ref>
 
* Many modern [[Protestant]] theologians follow in Schleiermacher's footsteps, and teach that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated; certainty as to this truth is only furnished us by inner experience, feeling, and perception.
 
* [[Modernist Christianity]] also denies the demonstrability of the existence of God. According to them we can only know something of God by means of the vital immanence, that is, under favorable circumstances the need of the Divine dormant in our subconsciousness becomes conscious and arouses that religious feeling or experience in which God reveals himself to us. In condemnation of this view the oath against [[Modernism]] formulated by [[Pius X]] says: "Deum ... naturali rationis lumine per ea quae facta sunt, hoc est per visibilia creationis opera, tanquam causam per effectus certo cognosci adeoque demostrari etiam posse, profiteor." ("I declare that by the natural light of reason, God can be certainly known and therefore His existence demonstrated through the things that are made, i.e., through the visible works of [[creation (theology)|Creation]], as the cause is known through its effects.")
 
  
 
== Arguments against the existence of God ==
 
== Arguments against the existence of God ==
Each of the following arguments aims at showing that some particular conception of a god either is inherently meaningless, [[proof by contradiction|contradictory]], or contradicts known [[science|scientific]] and/or [[history|historical]] facts, and that therefore a god thus described does not exist.
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Each of the following arguments aims at showing that some particular conception of a god either is inherently meaningless, contradictory, or contradictory to known [[science|scientific]] and/or [[history|historical]] facts, and that therefore a god thus described does not exist.
  
 
=== Empirical arguments (against) ===
 
=== Empirical arguments (against) ===
  
Empirical arguments depend on [[empiricism|empirical data]] in order to prove their conclusions.
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Empirical arguments depend on [[empiricism|empirical data]] in order to prove their conclusions. In addition to those already indicated, several additional objections have been made:
  
*"Within the framework of [[scientific]] [[rationalism]] one arrives at the belief in the nonexistence of God, not because of certain knowledge, but because of a sliding scale of methods. At one extreme, we can confidently rebut the personal Gods of creationists on firm [[empirical]] grounds: science is sufficient to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that there never was a worldwide flood and that the evolutionary sequence of the Cosmos does not follow either of the two versions of Genesis. The more we move toward a deistic and fuzzily defined God, however, the more scientific rationalism reaches into its toolbox and shifts from empirical science to [[logical]] philosophy informed by science. Ultimately, the most convincing arguments against a deistic God are [[Hume's dictum]] and [[Occam's razor]]. These are philosophical arguments, but they also constitute the bedrock of all of science, and cannot therefore be dismissed as non-scientific. The reason we put our trust in these two principles is because their application in the empirical sciences has led to such spectacular successes throughout the last three centuries." <ref>[http://psy.ucsd.edu/~eebbesen/Psych110/SciRelig.htm ucsd.edu/~eebbesen]</ref>
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*The pejorative expression ''God of the Gaps'' expresses one fundamental objection of many scientists against the notion of a divinity. It means that God is used as an explanation for as-of-yet unexplainable phenomena, even though there is no rational ground for such a belief. The mysterious word “God” simply covers up temporary ignorance. In history, church [[dogma]] was also used to counter scientific evidence in ways that defied reason, in order to avoid facing conclusions uncomfortable to the church.  
  
* The [[argument from inconsistent revelations]] contests the existence of the Middle Eastern, Biblical deity called God as described in holy scriptures, such as the [[Judaism|Jewish]] [[Tanakh]], the [[Christianity|Christian]] [[Bible]], or the [[Islam|Muslim]] [[Qur'an]], by identifying contradictions between different scriptures, contradictions within a single scripture, or contradictions between scripture and known facts.
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* The argument from inconsistent revelations contests the existence of the deity called God as described in holy scriptures of [[monotheism]], by identifying contradictions between different scriptures, contradictions within a single scripture, or contradictions between scripture and known facts.
  
* The [[problem of evil]] in general, and the logical and evidential arguments from evil in particular contest the existence of a god who is both [[omnipotence|omnipotent]] and [[omnibenevolence|omnibenevolent]] by arguing that such a god would not permit the existence of perceivable [[evil]] or [[suffering]], which can easily be shown to exist. Already [[Epicure]] pointed out the contradiction, stating that if an omnipotent God existed, the evil in the world should be impossible. As there ''is'' evil in the world, the god must either not be omnipotent or he must not be [[omnibenevolence|omnibenevolent]]. If he is not omnipotent, he is not God; if he is not omnibenevolent, he is not God the Allmercyful, but an evil creature. Similar arguments have been performed by [[Schopenhauer]].
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* The [[problem of evil]] in general has been seen as evidence against the existence of an all-powerful and benevolent God (see article on [[theodicy]]).
  
* The [[argument from poor design]] contests the idea that a god created life, on the basis that lifeforms exhibit poor or malevolent design, which can be easily explained using [[evolution]] and naturalism.
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* The argument from nonbelief contests the existence of an omnipotent god who wants humans to believe in him by arguing that such a god would do a better job of gathering believers. This argument is contested by the claim that God wants to test humans to see who has the most faith.
 
 
* The [[argument from nonbelief]] contests the existence of an omnipotent god who wants humans to believe in him by arguing that such a god would do a better job of gathering believers. This argument is contested by the claim that God wants to test humans to see who has the most faith. However, this assertion is dismissed by the argument surrounding [[the problem of evil]].
 
  
 
=== Deductive arguments (against) ===
 
=== Deductive arguments (against) ===
 
Deductive arguments attempt to prove their conclusions by [[deductive reasoning]] from true premises.
 
Deductive arguments attempt to prove their conclusions by [[deductive reasoning]] from true premises.
  
* The [[omnipotence paradox]] is one of many arguments which argue that the definitions or descriptions of a god are logically contradictory, demonstrating his non-existence. This paradox can be shown through questions such as: "Can God create a rock so big that He Himself could not lift it?" Some may argue that this paradox is resolved by the argument that such a rock is an impossibility of our reality rather than the result of an imperfect God.
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* The omnipotence paradox is one of many arguments which argue that the definitions or descriptions of a god are logically contradictory, demonstrating his non-existence. This paradox can be shown through questions such as: "Can God create a rock so big that [God] could not lift it?" Some may argue that this paradox is resolved by the argument that such a rock is an impossibility of human reality rather than the result of an imperfect God.
  
* One simple argument that the existence of a god is self-contradictory goes as follows: If God is defined as [[omniscience|omniscient]] and [[omnipotence|omnipotent]], then God has absolute knowledge of all events that will occur in the future, including all of his future actions, due to his omniscience. However, his omnipotence implies he has the power to act in a different manner than he predicted, thus implying that God's predictions about the future are fallible. This implies that God is not really omniscient, at least when it comes to knowledge about future events. So a God defined as omniscient and omnipotent cannot exist. Theists may counter that God exists out of time and the premises for this argument are wrong.  Few accept the aforementioned argument of omnipotence, and therefore the argument is based on a very weak assumption.
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* One simple argument that the existence of a god is self-contradictory goes as follows: If God is defined as [[omniscience|omniscient]] and [[omnipotence|omnipotent]], then God has absolute knowledge of all events that will occur in the future, including all of his future actions, due to his omniscience. However, his omnipotence implies he has the power to act in a different manner than he predicted, thus implying that God's predictions about the future are fallible.  
  
* The [[argument from free will]] contests the existence of an [[omniscience|omniscient]] god who has [[free will]] by arguing that the two properties are contradictory. If god has already planned the future, then humanity is destined to follow that plan and we do not have true free will to deviate from it. Therefore our freewill contradicts an omniscient god.
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* The argument from free will contests the existence of an [[omniscience|omniscient]] god who has [[free will]] by arguing that the two properties are contradictory
  
* The [[Transcendental Argument for the Non-existence of God]] contests the existence of an intelligent creator by demonstrating that such a being would make logic and morality contingent, which is incompatible with the presuppositionalist assertion that they are necessary, and contradicts the efficacy of science. A more general line of argument based on TANG, <ref>[http://www.strongatheism.net/atheology/materialist.html materialist apologetics]</ref>, seeks to generalize this argument to all necessary features of the universe and all god-concepts.
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* It is alleged that there is a logical impossibility in theism: God is defined as an extra-temporal being, but also as an active creator. The argument suggests that the very act of creation is inconceivable and absurd beyond the restraints of time.
 
 
* The counter-argument against the [[Cosmological argument]] (''"chicken or the egg"'') states that if the Universe had to be created by God because it must have a creator, then God, in turn would have had to be created by some other God, and so on. This attacks the premise that the Universe is the second cause, (after God, who is claimed to be the first cause). A common response to this is that God exists outside of time and hence needs no cause. However, such arguments can also be applied to the universe itself - that since time began when the universe did, it is non-sensical to talk about a state "before" the universe which could have caused it, since cause requires time. 
 
 
 
* [[Theological noncognitivism]], as used in literature, usually seeks to disprove the god-concept by showing that it is unverifiable and meaningless.
 
 
 
* It is alleged that there is a logical impossibility in theism: God is defined as an extra-temporal being, but also as an active creator. The argument suggests that the very act of creation is inconceivable and absurd beyond the restraints of time.
 
  
 
=== Inductive arguments (against) ===
 
=== Inductive arguments (against) ===
Inductive arguments argue their conclusions through [[inductive reasoning]].
 
  
* The [[atheist]]-[[existentialist]] argument for the non-existence of a perfect sentient being states that since existence precedes essence, it follows from the meaning of the term ''sentient'' that a sentient being cannot be complete or perfect. It is touched upon by [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] in [[Being and Nothingness]]. [[Sartre]]'s phrasing is that God would be a ''pour-soi'' [a being-for-itself; a ''consciousness''] who is also an ''en-soi'' [a being-in-itself; a ''thing'']: which is a contradiction in terms. The argument is echoed thus in [[Salman Rushdie]]'s novel [[Grimus]]: "''That which is complete is also dead.''"
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* The "no reason" argument tries to show that an omnipotent or perfect being would not have any reason to act in any way, specifically creating the universe, because it would have no desires since the very concept of desire is subjectively human. This raises the essential question of God’s nature and the purpose of creation.
 
 
* The "no reason" argument tries to show that an omnipotent or perfect being would not have any reason to act in any way, specifically creating the universe, because it would have no desires since the very concept of desire is subjectively human. As the universe exists, there is a contradiction, and therefore, an omnipotent god cannot exist. This argument is espoused by [[Scott Adams]] in the book ''[[God's Debris]]''.
 
  
 
* God is perfect. God also created man in his image. Man is imperfect, however. Therefore, God is imperfect and thus disproves himself.
 
* God is perfect. God also created man in his image. Man is imperfect, however. Therefore, God is imperfect and thus disproves himself.
  
==Conclusions==
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==Summary of views on God's existence==
Conclusions on the existence of God can be roughly divided into three camps: ''theist'', ''atheist'' and ''agnostic''. The ''theist'' and ''atheist'' camps can be further divided into two groups each, based on the belief of whether or not their position has been conclusively proven by the arguments.
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As a summary, views on the existence of God can be roughly divided into three camps: ''theist,'' ''atheist,'' and ''agnostic.'' The ''theist'' and ''atheist'' camps can be further divided into two groups each, based on the belief of whether or not their position has been conclusively proven by the arguments.
  
=== Theism ===
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===Theism===
The [[Theism|theistic]] conclusion is that the arguments indicate there are sufficient reasons to believe in the existence of God or gods.
 
  
====God exists and this can be proven====
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====God exists and this can be proved====
The ''[[Catechism of the Catholic Church]]'', following the [[Thomism|Thomist]] tradition and the dogmatic definition of the [[First Vatican Council]], affirms that it is a doctrine of the [[Roman Catholic Church]] that God's existence has been rationally demonstrated. Some other Christians in different denominations hold similar views. On this view, a distinction is to be drawn between:
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The [[Thomism|Thomist]] tradition and the [[dogma]]tic definition of the [[First Vatican Council]] affirm that it is a doctrine of the [[Roman Catholic Church]] that God's existence has been rationally demonstrated. Some other Christians in different denominations hold similar views.  
#doctrines that belong ''essentially'' to faith and cannot be proved, such as the doctrine of the [[Trinity]] or the [[Incarnation]], and
 
#doctrines that can be accepted by faith but can also be known by reason; that is, truths revealed by [[special revelation]] and by [[general revelation]]. 
 
  
The existence of God is said to be one of the latter. As a theological defense of this view, one might cite Paul's claim that pagans were without excuse because "since the creation of the world [God's] invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made".<ref>([[Bible]], Romans 1:20)</ref>
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As a theological defense of this view, one might cite [[Paul of Tarsus|Paul]]'s claim that [[paganism|pagans]] were without excuse because "since the creation of the world [God's] invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made" (Romans 1:20).
  
Another apologetical school of thought, a sort of synthesis of various existing Dutch and American [[Reformed Churches|Reformed]] thinkers (such as, [[Abraham Kuyper]], [[Benjamin Warfield]], [[Herman Dooyeweerd]]), emerged in the late 1920's. This school was instituted by [[Cornelius Van Til]], and came to be popularly called [[Presuppositional apologetics]] (though Van Til himself felt "Transcendental" would be a more accurate title). The main distinction between this approach and the more classical evidentialist approach mentioned above is that the Presuppositionalist denies any common ground between the believer and the non-believer, except that which the non-believer denies, namely, the assumption of the truth of the theistic worldview. In other words, Presuppositionalists don't believe that the existence of God can be proven by appeal to raw, uninterpreted (or, "brute") facts, which have the same (theoretical) meaning to people with fundamentally different worldviews, because they deny that such a condition is even possible. They claim that the only possible proof for the existence of God is that the very same belief is the necessary condition to the intelligibility of all other human experience and action. In other words, they attempt to prove the existence of God by means of appeal to the alleged [[transcendence (philosophy)|transcendental]] necessity of the belief — indirectly (by appeal to the allegedly unavowed presuppositions of the non-believer's worldview) rather than directly (by appeal to some form of common factuality). In practice this school utilizes what have come to be known as [[Transcendental argument for the existence of God|Transcendental Arguments for the Existence of God]]. In these arguments they claim to demonstrate that all human experience and action (even the condition of unbelief, itself) is a proof for the existence of God, because God's existence is the necessary condition of their intelligibility.
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====God exists, but this cannot be proved or disproved====
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Others have suggested that the several logical and philosophical arguments for the existence of God miss the point. The proofs do not resolve that issue. [[Blaise Pascal]] suggested this objection in his ''Pensées,'' when he wrote, "The God of [[Abraham]], [[Isaac]], and [[Jacob]]&mdash;not the god of the philosophers!"
  
====God exists, but this cannot be proven or disproven====
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Some Christians note that the [[Christianity|Christian]] faith teaches [[salvation]] by [[faith]], and that faith has little to do with the believer's ability to comprehend. God's existence can never be demonstrated, either by empirical means or by philosophical argument. The most extreme example of this position is called [[fideism]], which holds that that if God's existence were rationally demonstrable, faith in his existence would become superfluous.
Others have suggested that the several logical and philosophical arguments for the existence of God miss the point. The word ''God'' has a meaning in human culture and history that does not correspond to the beings whose necessity is proven by such arguments, assuming they are valid proofs. The real question is not whether a "most perfect being" or an "uncaused first cause" exist; the real question is whether [[Yahweh]] or [[Vishnu]] or [[Zeus]], or some other deity of attested human religion, exists, and if so which deity. The proofs do not resolve that issue.  [[Blaise Pascal]] suggested this objection in his ''[[Pensées]]'' when he wrote "The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob  &mdash; not the god of the philosophers!", see also [[Pascal's wager]].
 
 
 
Some Christians note that the Christian faith teaches [[salvation]] is by [[faith]], and that faith is reliance upon the faithfulness of God, which has little to do with the believer's ability to comprehend that in which he trusts. In other words, if [[Christian theology]] is true, then God's existence can never be demonstrated, either by empirical means or by philosophical argument. The most extreme example of this position is called [[fideism]], which holds that faith is simply the will to believe, and argues that if God's existence were rationally demonstrable, faith in His existence would become superfluous. In ''The Justification of Knowledge'', the [[Calvinism|Calvinist]] theologian [[Robert L. Reymond]] argues that believers should not attempt to prove the existence of God. Since he believes all such proofs are fundamentally unsound, believers should not place their confidence in them, much less resort to them in discussions with non-believers; rather, they should accept the content of revelation by faith. Reymond's position is similar to that of his mentor, [[Gordon Clark]], which holds that all worldviews are based on certain unprovable first premises (or, [[axioms]]), and therefore are ultimately unprovable. The Christian theist therefore must simply choose to start with Christianity rather than anything else, by an unreasoned "leap of faith". This position is also sometimes called [[Presuppositional apologetics]], but should not be confused with the Van Tillian variety discussed above.
 
 
 
An intermediate position is that of [[Alvin Plantinga]] who holds that a specific form of [[modal logic]] and an appeal to world-indexed properties render belief in the existence of God rational and justified, even though the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. Plantinga equates knowledge of God's existence with kinds of knowledge that are rational but do not proceed through demonstration, such as sensory knowledge. <ref> [[Alvin Plantinga]]. <cite>The Nature of Necessity</cite> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974) page 63. "An object has all its world-indexed properties in every world in which it exists. So if we take an object x and a property P and worlds W and W<nowiki>*</nowiki> such that x has the properties of having-P-in-W and having-non-P-in-W<nowiki>*</nowiki>, we will find that x also has the properties of having-P-in-W-in-W<nowiki>*</nowiki> and having-non-P-in-W<nowiki>*</nowiki>-in-W."</ref>
 
  
 
=== Atheism ===
 
=== Atheism ===
The [[Atheism|atheistic]] conclusion is that the arguments indicate there are not sufficient reasons to believe in a God or gods either because they don't exist or other reasons such as the words don't refer to anything, or the concept makes no sense or it is unknowable.
+
The [[Atheism|atheistic]] conclusion has two main variants.  
  
 
==== Strong atheism ====
 
==== Strong atheism ====
The conclusion called [[strong atheism]] (or explicit atheism) is the conclusion that God or gods do not exist. The strong atheist positively asserts this explicit non-existence, and may go further and claim that the existence of some or all gods is logically impossible. For example, strong atheists commonly claim that the combination of attributes which God may be asserted to have (For example: [[omnipotence]], [[omniscience]], [[omnipresence]], [[transcendence (religion)|transcendence]], [[omnibenevolence]]) is logically contradictory, incomprehensible, or absurd, and therefore that the non-existence of such a God is ''[[a priori]]''. Similarly, explicit atheism may argue that any assertions about this are irrational and impossible.
+
The conclusion called strong, positive, or explicit atheism is the conclusion that God or gods do not exist. The strong atheist positively asserts this explicit non-existence, and may go further and claim that the existence of some or all gods is logically impossible. Similarly, explicit atheism may argue that any assertions about God are irrational and impossible. More fundamentally, a philosopher like [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] insists that the very notion of a Being whose essence determines everyone’s existence is certain to be false.
  
 
==== Weak atheism ====
 
==== Weak atheism ====
The [[weak atheism]] conclusion is that there is no reason to believe in God or gods, for reasons other than evidence of their nonexistence. Weak atheists argue that merely pointing out the flaws or lack of soundness in all arguments for the existence of God is sufficient to show that God's existence is less probable than his nonexistence; by [[Occam's Razor]] (the principle of [[parsimony]]), the [[burden of proof]] lies on the advocate of that alternative which is less probable. By this reasoning, an atheist who is able to refute any argument for the existence of God encountered is justified in taking an [[Atheism|atheist]] view; atheism is thus the "default" position. This objection is often stated in terms that relate it to the burden of proof: It is incumbent upon advocates of a God's existence to establish that fact, and they have not done so.
+
Negative or weak atheism concludes that there is no sufficient reason to believe in God. Weak atheists argue that merely pointing out the flaws or lack of soundness in all arguments for the existence of God is sufficient to show that God's existence is less probable than his nonexistence; by [[Ockham's razor]] (the principle that the most simple explanation is always to be preferred), the burden of proof lies on the advocate of that alternative which is less probable. Atheism is thus the "default" position.
 +
 
 +
[[Antony Flew]] has been a well-known supporter of such “negative” atheism. His alleged change towards a [[deism|deistic]] position would be consistent with that form of atheism: Once confronted with unexpected evidence to the contrary (there seems to be a God after all), a negative atheist is prepared to change his position.
  
 
=== Agnosticism ===
 
=== Agnosticism ===
[[Agnosticism|Agnostics]] hold that the existence of God or any [[deity]] is uncertain or unknown. Possible reasons for holding this view are a belief that the existence of any deity has not yet been sufficiently proven, that the existence of a deity cannot be proven, or, quite simply, that claims about the existence or non-existence of any deity make no sense. Agnostics may claim that it isn't possible to have absolute or certain knowledge of supernatural beings or, alternatively, that while certainty may be possible, they personally have no such knowledge. Agnostics may or may not still believe in gods based on [[Fideism|Fideilistic]] convictions.
+
[[Agnosticism|Agnostics]] hold that the existence of God is uncertain or unknown. Possible reasons for holding this view are a belief that the existence of any deity has not yet been sufficiently proven, that the existence of a deity cannot be proven, or that claims about the existence or non-existence of any deity make no sense. Agnostics may claim that it is not possible to have absolute or certain knowledge of supernatural beings or, alternatively, that while certainty may be possible, they personally have no such knowledge. Agnostics may or may not believe in gods based on personal convictions.
  
== See also ==
+
==Conclusion==
* [[Agnosticism]]
+
There exists a very large variety of historical approaches to the existence of God, whether they argue for or against it, intellectual or religious. There also exists objections to these various approaches. It seems that none of them are free from criticism. Then, is the existence of God something which is far from knowable with universally acceptable certainty, and therefore which one should be discouraged from seeking further to know? 
* [[Apologetics]]
 
* [[Atheism]]
 
* [[Babel Fish]]
 
* [[Deism]]
 
* [[Gödel's ontological proof]]
 
* [[God in Buddhism]]
 
* [[God in Sikhism]]
 
* [[Metaphysics]]
 
* [[Myth]]
 
* [[Mythology]]
 
* [[Philosophy of religion]]
 
* [[Polemic]]
 
* [[Problem of evil]]
 
* [[Quinquae viae]]
 
* [[Rationalism]]
 
* [[Strong atheism]]
 
* [[Theism]]
 
* [[Weak atheism]]
 
  
==Further reading==
+
An observation of current trends might help address this question. People now live in a culturally diverse society where absolute certainties are all but absent. So, it seems that the variety of approaches which have not necessarily been compatible with one another have softened their positions and lessened their claims. This change has been also due to the development of science; the "[[anthropic principle]]" established in science, for example, has shown at least that the existence of God is more probable than improbable. Last but not least, the general approach has become more holistic. People are more aware of dimensions other than the strictly logical, and they are aware that a purely logical approach has its own pitfalls.  
*[http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/pg1.htm The Classical Islamic Arguments for the Existence of God by Majid Fakhry]
+
 
*[http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/ Philosophy of Religion .Info] Introductory articles on philosophical arguments about the existence of God (for and against)
+
As [[Ninian Smart]] puts it, the traditional proofs have survived and they still have their use, but it is suggestive, rather than decisive. Smart rightly notes that the often discredited rational proofs do have their rightful place in the debate, even though they may not touch the heart of the life of faith. The absence of an intellectual framework that makes sense has always been detrimental to faith, thus the quest for understanding should not be abandoned. For Smart, rational or philosophical insights about the existence of God are to be combined with the various other aspects of religious revelation, such as the experiential dimension, the moral dimension, and the mythical dimension.
*[http://www.sacredfreedom.net/creator.html A Logical Argument]
 
*[http://www.apollos.ws/philosophy-of-religion-article/ A collection of arguments for the existence of God]
 
*[http://www.geocities.com/7life/Jesus.html Jesus Evidence] Arguments for the existence of God based upon the evidence for Jesus Christ.
 
*[http://biblegod.org/ Christian Bible God/Jesus Truth] A collection of Bible quotes pertaining to the flawed morality of God.
 
*[http://christiancadre.org/topics/cosarg.html Arguments for the Existence of God] from the Christian Cadre.
 
*[http://www.alislam.org/books/essence1/chap2.htm Proofs of God's Existence - Islam - Ahmadiyyat]
 
*[http://gnosos.blogspot.com/2005/12/root-of-my-agnosticism.html Gnosos] An agnostic examination of arguments for God's existence.
 
*[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/atheism/arguments.html Arguments for Atheism] from [[Infidels.org]]
 
*[http://www.strongatheism.net/library/references/ StrongAtheism.net References page] A listing of references containing atheistic arguments.
 
* [http://www.godlessgeeks.com/LINKS/GodProof.htm Over Three Hundred Proofs of God's Existence] A parody of theistic arguments.
 
*[http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608b.htm The Existence of God - Catholic Encyclopedia]
 
  
 
==Notes==
 
==Notes==
Line 596: Line 426:
  
  
==References and further reading==
 
* [[Daniel Dennett]] (1995). ''[[Darwin's Dangerous Idea]]''.
 
* [[Richard Dawkins]] (1986) ''[[The Blind Watchmaker]]'' (takes a view against the teleological argument).
 
* Derek Gjersen (1989). ''Science and Philosophy: Past and Present''. London: Penguin.
 
* Eric Sotnak, "[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/alex_matulich/why_i_believe/3_apndx.html Analysis of the Teleological Argument]"
 
* Will Crouch, "[http://www.onphilosophy.co.uk/the_teleological_argument.html Hume and Philo on the Teleological Argument]"
 
  
* The [[Pantheism|Pantheistic argument]] defines God as [[All]]; it is similar to [[monism]] and [[panentheism]].
+
== References ==
* The argument from the [[mind-body problem]] postulates that it is impossible to grasp the relation of consciousness to materiality without introducing a divinity. See [[Malebranche]].
+
'''General:'''
*Broad, C.D. [http://www.ditext.com/broad/aeg.html "Arguments for the Existence of God,"] ''Journal of Theological Studies'' 40 (1939): 16-30; 156-67.
+
*Broad, C. D. ''Journal of Theological Studies'' 40 (1939): 16-30; 156-67.  
*Jordan, Jeff. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatic-belief-god/ "Pragmatic Arguments for Belief in God"], ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition)'', Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
+
*Cell, Edward. ''Language, Existence, and God.'' New York: Abingdon Press, 1971. ISBN 0687210631
*Cohen, Morris R. [http://www.ditext.com/cohen/dsr.html "The Dark Side of Religion,"] ''Religion Today, a Challenging Enigma'', ed. Arthur L. Swift, Jr. (1933). Revised version in Morris Cohen, ''The Faith of a Liberal'' (1946).
+
*Cohen, Morris R. [http://www.ditext.com/cohen/dsr.html "The Dark Side of Religion,"] ''Religion Today, a Challenging Enigma''. Edited by Arthur L. Swift, Jr. (1933). Revised version in Morris Cohen, ''The Faith of a Liberal'' (1946). Retrieved December 19, 2022.
*Haisch, Bernard. [http://www.thegodtheory.com The God Theory: Universes, Zero-Point Fields and What's Behind It All]. Red Wheel/Weiser Books, 2006.
+
*Haisch, Bernard. [http://www.thegodtheory.com ''The God Theory: Universes, Zero-Point Fields and What's Behind It All.''] San Francisco: Red Wheel/Weiser Books, 2006. Retrieved December 19, 2022.
*Hume, David. 1779, ''Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion''. Richard Popkin (ed), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998.
+
*Hume, David. ''Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.'' Edited by Richard Popkin. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998 (original 1779).
*Mackie, J.L. ''The Miracle of Theism''. Oxford, Eng.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1982.
+
*Mackie, J. L. ''The Miracle of Theism.'' Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. ISBN 019824682X
*Nielson, Kai. ''Ethics Without God''. London: Pemberton Books, 1973.
+
*Nielson, Kai. ''Ethics Without God.'' London: Pemberton Books, 1973.  
*Oppy, Graham. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/ "Ontological Arguments"], ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2005 Edition)'', Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
+
*Paley, William. ''Natural Theology.'' Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963 (original 1802).
*Paley, William, 1802, ''Natural Theology''. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963.
+
*Plantinga, Alvin. ''Warranted Christian Belief.'' Oxford University Press, 1999. ISBN 0195131932
*Plantinga, Alvin. ''Warranted Christian Belief''. Oxford Univ. Press, 1993.
+
*Ross, Robert R. N. ''The Non-Existence of God. Linguistic Paradox in Tillich’s Thought.'' New York & Toronto: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1978. ISBN 0889469059
*Pojman, Louis P. ''Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology'', Fourth Ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003. ISBN 0-534-54364-2.
+
*Swinburne, Richard. ''The Existence of God.'' Oxford: Clarendon, 1991.  
*Ratzsch, Del. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/ "Teleological Arguments for God's Existence"], ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2005 Edition)'', Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
 
* Rouvière, Jean-Marc, ''Brèves méditations sur la création du monde'' L'Harmattan, Paris (2006), ISBN 2-7475-9922-1.
 
*Swinburne, Richard. ''The Existence of God''. New York: Clarendon, 1991.
 
  
==Notes==
+
'''Ontological Argument:'''
 +
* Hartshore, Charles. ''The Logic of Perfection.'' LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1962.
 +
* Malcolm, Norman. "Anselm's Ontological Argument," ''Philosophical Review'' 69(1) (1960): 41-62.
 +
* Plantinga, Alvin. ''The Ontological Argument from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers''. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.
 +
* Plantinga, Alvin. ''God, Freedom and Evil''. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1977.
  
<references />
+
'''Cosmological Argument:'''
 +
* Smith, Quentin. "A Big Bang Cosmological Argument for God's Nonexistence." ''Faith and Philosophy'' 9(2) (1992): 217-237.
  
==Bibliography==
+
'''Teleological Argument:'''
 +
* Crouch, Will. On Philosophy.
 +
* Dennett, Daniel. ''Darwin's Dangerous Idea''. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. ISBN 068482471X
 +
* Dawkins, Richard. ''The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design''. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1996 (original 1986). ISBN 0393315703
 +
* Gjersen, Derek. ''Science and Philosophy: Past and Present''. London: Penguin, 1989. ISBN 0140226745
 +
* Gould, Stephen J. ''The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History''. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1980. ISBN 0393300234
 +
* Gurney, Peter W.G. [http://www.answersingenesis.org/tj/v13/i1/retina.asp "Is our 'inverted' retina really 'bad design'?"] ''Creation Ex Nihilo Technical Journal/TJ'' 13(1) (1999): 37&ndash;44. Retrieved December 19, 2022.
 +
* Selim, Jocelyn. [https://notes.utk.edu/bio/greenberg.nsf/0/0765bb50d404455385256f0000680854?OpenDocument&Click= “Useless Body Parts.”] ''Discover'' 25(6) (June 2004). Retrieved December 19, 2022.
 +
* Sotnak, Eric. Internet Infidels.
 +
* Witt, Jonathan. [http://www.touchstonemag.com/archives/article.php?id=17-06-025-f "The Gods Must Be Tidy!"] ''Touchstone'' (July/August 2004). Retrieved December 19, 2022.
  
* Hartshore, Charles, The Logic of Perfection (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1962)
+
==External links==
* Malcolm, Norman, "Anselm's Ontological Argument," Philosophical Review, vol. 69, no. 1 (1960), 41-62
+
All links retrieved June 24, 2017.
* Plantinga, Alvin, The Ontological Argument from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965)
 
* Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom and Evil. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1977) pp.85-112
 
  
==See also==
+
*[http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/pg1.htm The Classical Islamic Arguments for the Existence of God] by Majid Fakhry.
 +
*[http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/theistic-proofs/ Arguments for the Existence of God] &ndash; Introductory articles on philosophical arguments about the existence of God (for and against).
 +
*[http://www.apollos.ws/philosophy-of-religion-article/ Philosophy of Religion Articles] &ndash; Last Seminary.
 +
*[http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608b.htm “The Existence of God”] — Catholic Encyclopedia.
 +
*[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/atheism/arguments.html Arguments for Atheism] &ndash; Infidels.org.
 +
*[http://www.strongatheism.net/library/references/ StrongAtheism.net].
  
* Overviews: [[Arguments for the existence of God]], [[Arguments against the existence of God]]
+
'''Ontological Argument:'''
* Other major attempted proofs: [[Cosmological argument]], [[Teleological argument]], [[Argument from morality]]
+
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/ Ontological Arguments] &ndash; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
* [[Gödel's ontological proof]] for the existence of [[God]]
+
* [http://www.iep.utm.edu/o/ont-arg.htm The Ontological Argument] &ndash; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
* [[Pascal's Wager]]
+
* [http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/anselm-gaunilo.html “In Behalf of the Fool. An Answer to the Argument of Anselm in the Proslogium” by Gaunilo, a monk of Marmoutier] &ndash; Medieval Sourcebook.
 +
* [http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/anselm-critics.html Philosophers' Criticisms of Anselm's Ontological Argument for the Being of God] &ndash; Medieval Sourcebook.
 +
* "Anselm's Ontological Argument for the Existence of God" by Gregory S. Neal (1990).
  
== External links ==
+
'''Cosmological Argument:'''
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/ Teleological Arguments for God's Existence] from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
+
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/ Cosmological Argument] &ndash; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
* [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-80 ''Dictionary of the history of Ideas'':] Design argument
+
*[http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-smith1.html “Initial Arguments: A Defense of the Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God”] by William Lane Craig.  
* [[William Paley]]: [http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/p/pd-modeng/pd-modeng-idx?type=header&id=PaleyNatur  ''Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity'' ], London: 12th edition, 1809. Online in full.
 
* [http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/design.htm Design arguments for the existence of God] from the Internet encyclopedia of philosophy.
 
* [[William Lane Craig]]: [http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/teleo.html ''The Teleological Argument and the Anthropic Principle]
 
*[http://skepdic.com/design.html The Skeptic's Dictionary on argument from design]
 
  
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/ Ontological Arguments] &mdash; from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
+
'''Teleological Argument:'''
* [http://www.iep.utm.edu/o/ont-arg.htm Kenneth Einar Himma, The Ontological Argument] &mdash; from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
+
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/ Teleological Argument] &ndash; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
* [http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/anselm-gaunilo.html Medieval Sourcebook: Gaunilo: In Behalf of the Fool, and Anselm's Reply]
+
* [http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/design.htm Design Arguments for the Existence of God] &ndash; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
* [http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/anselm-critics.html Medieval Sourcebook: Philosophers' Criticisms of Anselm's Ontological Argument for the Being of God]
+
* [http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/teleo.html ''The Teleological Argument and the Anthropic Principle”] by William Lane Craig.
* [http://mally.stanford.edu/ontological.pdf Paul E. Oppenheimer & Edward N. Zalta, "On the Logic of the Ontological Argument" from James Tomberlin ed., ''Philosophical Perspectives 5: The Philosophy of Religion'' (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991) pp. 509–529]
+
* [http://skepdic.com/design.html The Skeptic's Dictionary: Argument from Design].  
* [http://www.etext.leeds.ac.uk/peter/papers/2004OntArgMind.pdf Peter Millican, "The one fatal flaw in Anselm's argument" from ''Mind'' Vol.113, pp451ff (2004)]
 
* [http://www.revneal.org/Writings/anselms.htm Gregory S. Neal: "Anselm's Ontological Argument For the Existence of God" from ''Grace Incarnate'' (1990)]
 
{{portalpar|Philosophy|Socrates.png}}
 
  
==External links==
+
'''Moral Arguments:'''
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry]
+
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god/ Moral Arguments for the Existence of God] &ndash; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  
[[Category:Philosophical arguments]]
+
===General philosophy sources===
[[Category:Philosophy of religion]]
+
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy].
[[Category:Theology]]
+
*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy].
[[Category:Philosophy and religion]]
+
*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online].
 +
*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg].
  
 +
{{Credit6|God,_Arguments_for_the_Existence_of|72637349|Ontological_argument|73104095|Cosmological_argument|70659263|Teleological_argument|71766137| Poor_design|84668325|Moral_arguments|80469128}}
  
{{Credit4|God,_Arguments_for_the_Existence_of|72637349|Ontological_argument|73104095|Cosmological_argument|70659263|Teleological_argument|71766137}}
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[[Category:Philosophy]]
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[[Category:Religion]]

Revision as of 08:12, 24 January 2023


Arguments or proofs for the Existence of God have been proposed by philosophers, theologians, and other thinkers. These arguments have an epistemological dimension (how can one know that God exists?) and an ontological dimension (what is the nature of God’s being?).

If God is conceived as the Supreme Being, Being-itself, the source and Creator of all beings, or in other similar ways, the question of his existence is of primordial importance. It is indeed paradoxical that there would be a need to prove the existence of this Being of all beings, yet that is precisely the situation philosophers and theologians find themselves in, since God cannot be perceived by human senses. The overall theistic explanation is that God transcends finite forms of being and thus cannot be reached directly by finite human minds, although indirect rational proofs may be possible. The opposite position concludes that God cannot be perceived because he simply does not exist. This leads to the essential question of the meaning of "existence" when the notion is applied to God. Thus, one’s understanding of God—rational, intuitive, religious, or other—affects one’s approach to the question of his existence.

Given the variety of approaches, it has been rightly suggested by people such as Ninian Smart that if the existence of God is to be taken seriously, rational or philosophical insights about it need to be combined with the various other aspects of religious revelation, such as the experiential dimension, the moral dimension, and the mythical dimension.

Context of the arguments

The three traditional proofs of God’s existence

The attempt to provide proofs or arguments for the existence of God is known as natural theology. This undertaking has traditionally consisted of three key arguments: The ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments. Such proofs may seem futile in the contemporary context. However, one must understand that in the middle ages, when the famous proofs of God first appeared, the issue was not to find out logically if God exists or not. God's existence was a given, based on faith. Thinkers like Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas in Christianity, Maimonides in Judaism, and Avicenna or Averroes in Islam mostly questioned whether God's existence could be known only through faith, or whether it was also possible to prove it by using the philosophical (rational) method and, if so, how. These arguments were meant to buttress the arguments of faith and to defend that faith from those who would challenge it.

The contemporary approach

The contemporary mind looks at the question very differently. First, the existence of God no longer appears to be an indisputable reality, even to those who believe in him. Second, the very idea that it is possible to prove the existence of God seems questionable at best. The scientific mindset is used to considering that only measurable objects of scientific inquiry can be known for certain, and even this certainty is being shaken in a postmodern context. Spiritual, transcendent, and invisible entities such as God can only be the object of opinion or conjecture, never of certain knowledge. Next comes a trend that has had its representatives throughout the centuries: God, afterlife, and similar issues can only be known through intuitive insight or spiritual revelation. Some just know that it is so—rational proofs are not only powerless, they are inappropriate to begin with.

The problem is that different people come to different conclusions, intuitively or otherwise. The quintessentially philosophical question, here, is how can one know? This affects one's entire attitude towards what he considers reality, not only the question of God.

The focus of the proofs of God's existence has thus shifted over the centuries. Today, their main purpose would be to show that it is likely that a supreme being exists, i.e., more likely than not. Discussion of the anthropic principle, for example, highlights the fact that science cannot be used to prove that God does not exist. At most, it is a draw.

Philosophical and religious Issues

Philosophical issues

What is God? (Definition of God's existence)

What is God? One approach to this problem, following the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, would be to attempt to extract a definition of "God" from the way that particular word is used. What is meant when one says, "God" or "gods"? However, this line of questioning runs immediately into trouble if it tries to give a universal notion of "God," since that word and its equivalents have been used in very different ways throughout history.

Today in the West, the term "God" typically refers to a monotheistic concept of a Supreme Being that is unlike any other being. Classical theism asserts that God possesses every possible perfection, including such qualities as omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect benevolence.

In the Advaita Vedanta school of Hinduism, reality is ultimately seen as being a single, qualityless, changeless being called nirguna Brahman, understood to be beyond "ordinary" human comprehension. Advaitin philosophy introduces the concept of saguna Brahman or Ishvara as a way of talking about Brahman to people. Ishvara, in turn, is ascribed such qualities as omniscience, omnipotence, and benevolence.

Polytheistic religions use the word "god" for multiple beings with varying degrees of power and abilities. Such deities are thus neither perceived to be all-powerful nor always benevolent. The myths of polytheism often cover a deeper layer of philosophical reflection that hints at a united being that takes precedence even over the gods.

The issue of existence

The seemingly innocuous question about the exact meaning of the word “existence” cannot be avoided in the context of the proofs for God’s existence. What does it mean to exist when the term is applied to God? This, of course, leads back to an understanding of God. At least since Aristotle, there has been an unending debate over the difference between “existence,” “being,” and “essence.” In general terms, to exist simply means to be there—to be real. It also implies that one is talking about a specific entity, generally perceived by the senses. However, one can also say that goodness or evil exist in this world. What is meant by that statement is immediately clear, though it is hard to pinpoint what their being really is.

The problem with stating that God exists is that by doing so one seems to imply that he is an entity, albeit an elusive one. In this way, he is reduced to the level of a particular being, though perhaps the highest or most perfect one. Many have perceived that, if God is to have any reality, it must be of an entirely different order that cannot be qualified as existence. Twentieth century theologian Paul Tillich is one of them. For him, “God does not exist.” It is even a sign of atheism to say that he does, as it implies a denial of God’s real being, Being-itself, the ground of all being. Similarly, twentieth century philosopher Martin Heidegger has decried the use of what he called "onto-theology," where God is objectified as if he were a particular being. In medieval theology and philosophy already, Thomas Aquinas had stated that God is beyond essence and existence.

This distinction between existence and being is proper to the western philosophical landscape. It does not appear, for instance, in the thought systems of the Far East. This is no accident: The notion of a personal, theistic God is proper to the religions of the west. The issue of God’s existence does not arise in Buddhism or Confucianism for instance.

The problem of the supernatural

Another problem immediately posed by the question of the existence of a God is that traditional beliefs usually grant God various supernatural powers. Religious apologists offer the supernatural abilities of God as explanation of the inability of empirical methods to prove God's existence. In Karl Popper's philosophy of science, the assertion of the existence of a supernatural God would be a non-falsifiable hypothesis, not amenable to scientific investigation.

Thus, logical positivists, such as Rudolph Carnap and A. J. Ayer, view any talk of gods as literally nonsense. For the logical positivists and adherents of similar schools of thought, statements about religious or other transcendent experiences could not have a truth-value, and were deemed to be without meaning. Even for other schools of thought, the question of God appears at the same time as the culmination of philosophical inquiry (since it deals with the ultimate question) and the point where that inquiry must stop due to its own limitations.

Epistemology

One cannot be said to "know" something just because one believes it. Knowledge is, from an epistemological standpoint, distinguished from belief by justification through proofs or arguments. Much of the disagreement about "proofs" of God's existence is due to different conceptions not only of the term "God" but also the terms "proof," "truth," and "knowledge." Religious belief from revelation or enlightenment is fundamentally different.

Different conclusions as to the existence of God often rest on different criteria for deciding what methods are appropriate for deciding if something is true or not. Some examples include:

  • Whether logic counts as evidence concerning the quality of existence
  • Whether subjective experience count as evidence for objective reality
  • Whether either logic or evidence can rule in or out the supernatural

Religious perspective

The religious perspective is almost always linked to some sort of philosophical explanation. However, its emphasis is on God as a living reality, accessible through revelation or introspection, rather than rational discussion. Early Christian thinkers like Augustine of Hippo believed that humans had a natural ability to perceive the reality of God. In such a perspective, arguments or proofs do not occupy an important position: It is not necessary to prove the existence of something obvious; what is needed is only an explanation.

Much later thinkers, including eighteenth century German philosopher David Friedrich Fries, thought that human reason culminated in a direct apprehension of the divine reality, something akin to intellectual intuition, a faculty Immanuel Kant insisted humans do not have. The problem with this perspective is that of intersubjectivity: How can one communicate her certainty to another person and ascertain that it is identical, other than by assuming a priori that it is so?

The Indian religion of Sikhism offers an elaborate version of that position. The fundamental belief of Sikhism is that God exists, not merely as an idea or concept, but as a "Real Entity," indescribable yet knowable and perceivable to anyone who is prepared to dedicate the time and energy to become perceptive to God’s persona. The Sikh gurus never spoke about proofs of the existence of God; for them, God is too real and obvious to need any logical proof.

Guru Arjan says: "God is beyond color and form, yet His presence is clearly visible" (GG, 74), and again, "Nanak's Lord transcends the world as well as the scriptures of the east and the west, and yet he is clearly manifest" (GG, 397).

Types of arguments

Different types of classification have been suggested. Some arguments are a priori, that is, independent from experience. First and foremost, this is the case of the ontological argument, which seeks to show the necessity of God from the very notion of God. Most arguments are a posteriori, that is, they try to show evidence for the presence of a God from certain features of reality. For example, the cosmological argument intends to show that there must be an ultimate, uncaused cause (God) to the existing universe. The teleological argument assumes that the harmony and purposefulness evident throughout nature represents an evidence of intelligent design, thus of a supreme designer (God). Still another well-known a posteriori argument is the argument from the degrees of perfection, developed by Aquinas, which argues that the various degrees of goodness, beauty, truth, etc. in the world resemble something which is the maximum (best, most beautiful, truest, etc.), and that this something is God. These a posteriori arguments are empirical, because they are based on observation, while the ontological argument is strictly metaphysical, because it only involves reflection that transcends sense data.

But there are so many arguments that their richness defies classification. Since the very notion of God has a universal (or even trans-universal) dimension, it is normal that evidence for God’s existence has been searched for by using nearly every approach and every faculty. Besides logic and rational deduction, ethics, science, spiritual intuition, and even the authority of scripture and tradition are some of the dimensions that have been explored to that end.

Given these many arguments, it is debatable whether they are all different or whether they are all not merely parts of one and the same argument. While all such proofs would end in the same way, by asserting the existence of God, they do not all start at the same place. Aquinas calls them aptly Viæ: roads to the apprehension of God which all open on the same highway.[1]

Also, any argument for or against the existence of God must be considered in context. Few people, if any, will be swayed by the persuasiveness of one single argument if they are not previously so inclined. Neither is the use of arguments by philosophers generally meant to persuade in this way. There is often a synergy between complementary arguments. This clearly results from a careful examination of the three main historical arguments.

The ontological argument

According to this argument, God, as the Supreme Being, must exist by definition. It is an a priori argument. Saint Anselm of Canterbury and Rene Descartes have used this argument, but Immanuel Kant dismissed it, as he did the other two arguments. The common-sense approach finds it much less obvious than the cosmological and teleological arguments. The notion that the mere idea of God implies God’s existence may even seem strange, yet contemporary philosophers find it fascinating. Attempts are regularly being made to prove its validity by using formal logic. Paul Tillich’s attempt to show that the unconditioned is a necessary function of the mind can be seen as another contemporary form of the argument, though Tillich never made that claim.

The argument works by examining the concept of God, and arguing that it implies the actual existence of God; that is, if one can conceive of God, then God exists—it is thus self-contradictory to state that God does not exist. This is obviously a controversial position, and the ontological argument has a long history of detractors and defenders. The argument's different versions arise mainly from using different concepts of God as the starting point.

Anselm's argument

The ontological argument was first proposed by Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) in chapter 2 of the Proslogion, even though he did not directly use the expression. He argued that there are necessary beings—things that cannot not exist—and contingent beings—things that may or may not exist, but whose existence is not necessary. He starts with his famous definition, or necessary assumption about the nature of God: "Now we believe that [the Lord] is something than which nothing greater can be imagined."

Then Anselm asks: does God exist? In sum, he concludes that, whether one believes in God or not, she cannot avoid at least having the notion of that greatest possible being in her mind. Now Anselm introduces another assumption: "And certainly that than which a greater cannot be imagined cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is at least in the understanding alone, it can be imagined to be in reality too, which is greater."

It would therefore be contradictory to assume that the greatest possible being exists in the understanding alone, because then, it would always be possible to imagine an even greater being—that which actually exists.

From that contradiction, Anselm draws his conclusion: "There exists, therefore, beyond doubt something than which a greater cannot be imagined,,both in the understanding and in reality."

In his Proslogon 3, Anselm made another a priori argument for God, this time based on the idea of necessary existence. He claimed that if God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, it is better to be necessary than contingent. Therefore God must be necessary.

Philosophical assumptions underlying the argument

In order to understand the place this argument has in the history of philosophy, it is important to understand the essence of the argument in the context of the influence of Hellenic philosophy on Christianity.

First, Anselm's argument stemmed from the philosophical school of realism. Realism was the dominant philosophical school of Anselm's day. According to realism, and in contrast to nominalism, things such as "greenness" and "bigness" were known as universals, which had a real existence outside the human imagination, in an abstract realm of ideas, as described by Plato. Accordingly, if a concept could be formed in the human mind (as was his concept of God), then it had a real existence in the abstract realm of the universals. In essence, if one could imagine God, God existed.

Anselm also held that there were two types of existence: Necessary existence and contingent existence. Contingent existence is a state of existence which depends on something else—that is, if something else were not the case, the object in question would not exist. Necessary existence, by contrast, depends on nothing. Something that necessarily exists will exist no matter what. It cannot not exist.

Criticisms and objections

One of the earliest recorded objections to Anselm's argument was raised by his contemporary, Gaunilo of Marmoutiers. Gaunilo invited his readers to think of the greatest, or most perfect, conceivable island. As a matter of fact, it is likely that no such island actually exists, even though it can be conceived. In short, to conclude that something exists because existence would make it more perfect makes no sense.

Such objections always depend upon the accuracy of the analogy. In the case of Gaunilo’s island, there is no single concept of a perfect island, because perfection here can only mean what is perfect for one particular person, rather than perfect in itself. The notion of the perfect being, however, isn't relative to any individual; it's the notion of a being that is maximally great—not for an individual, but great universally.

Necessary nonexistence

Another rationale is attributed to Douglas Gasking[2] (1911–1994). Gasking makes a paradoxical statement to show that one could just as well use the argument to prove that God does not exist: Greatness depends on one’s merit in accomplishing something. For God to create the world even though he doesn’t exist would imply the greatest merit (overcoming the greatest handicap). Hence, for God to be the greatest, he must not exist.

Defenders of Anselm would reject the thesis that disability and handicap are things that make a creator greater. The merit of that particular objection is that it highlights the problematic nature of the word “exist” and that it challenges the traditional view of God as a Supreme, detached Being who created the world with no effort at all.

Revisions

Obviously, Anselm thought this argument was valid and persuasive, and it still has occasional defenders, but many, perhaps most, contemporary philosophers believe that the ontological argument, at least as Anselm articulated it, does not stand up to strict logical scrutiny. Others, like Gottfried Leibniz, Norman Malcolm, Charles Hartshorne, Kurt Gödel, and Alvin Plantinga have reformulated the argument in an attempt to revive it.

Descartes' ontological arguments

René Descartes (1596-1650) composed a number of ontological arguments which differed from Anselm's formulation in important ways. Generally speaking, it is less a formal argument than a natural intuition.

Descartes wrote in the Fifth Meditation on First Philosophy:

But if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of something entails that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature (AT 7:65; CSM 2:45).

The intuition above can be formally described as follows:

  1. Whatever one clearly and distinctly perceives to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.
  2. One clearly and distinctly perceives that necessary existence is contained in the idea of God.
  3. Therefore, God exists.

The key to the argument is the first premise, which is, in essence, a statement of faith in his intuition.

In another, less formal statement of his argument, he draws an analogy between belief in the existence of God and the geometric demonstration. Mathematical demonstrations can lead to absolute certainty through complicated demonstrations that cannot be immediately evident. In the case of God, things are much simpler: “For what is more manifest than the fact that the supreme being exists, or that God, to whose essence alone existence belongs, exists” (AT 7:68-69; CSM 2:47).

Plantinga's modal form and contemporary discussion

Contemporary American philosopher Alvin Plantinga has created another version of the argument, one where the conclusion follows from the premises, assuming axiom S5 of modal logic. The axiom S5 says that if a proposition is possibly necessarily true, then it is necessarily true. If, then, a maximally great being possibly exists, it exists. Richard M. Gale has argued that the "possibility premise" begs the question, because here "possibly necessarily" is basically the same as "necessarily."

A very different approach has recently been attempted by A. R. Pruss,[3] who starts with the eighth/ninth century C.E. Indian philosopher Samkara's dictum that if something is impossible, then one cannot have a perception (even a non-veridical one) that it is the case. If mystics perceive the existence of a maximally great being, it follows that the existence of a maximally great being is at least possible. One difficulty in this argument is that one might misinterpret the content of one's experience, and hence the mystic might be incorrect even in a cautious description of an experience as an experience "as of a maximally great being."

The cosmological argument

The premise of the cosmological argument is that all existing beings are dependent beings (they cannot exist by themselves, they did not create themselves), therefore, there must be a self-existent being, i.e., a being whose existence is accounted for by its own nature. The problem is to define such a being. Either there is an ultimate cause that is fundamentally different from humanity, or people have infinite regress. That ultimate being would have to be of a different nature, and would have to be a different type of cause. This argument assumes the Principle of Sufficient Reason: there must be an explanation for the existence of every being, thing, or quality. But Buddhism, Aristotle, and Jean-Paul Sartre, to name a few, feel that there is no problem with the assumption that the universe has always existed. It is simply there.

There are three basic variants of this argument in its classic form: The argument from causation in esse, the argument from causation in fieri, and the argument from contingency. The cosmological argument does not attempt to prove anything about the first cause or about God, except to argue that such a cause must exist.

Origins of the argument

Plato and Aristotle both posited first cause arguments, though each with certain notable caveats. Plato (c. 427–c. 347 B.C.E.) believed that a "demiurge" was the creator of the cosmos. For Plato, the demiurge lacked the supernatural ability to create ex nihilo or out of nothing. The demiurge was only able to organize the pre-existent chaos, itself subjected to the purely physical laws of necessity (Ananke). Ultimately, for Plato, all is derived from the Soul, or Self-Mover, a non-material entity.

Aristotle (c. 384–322 B.C.E.) also put forth the idea of a creator of the cosmos, often referred to as the "Unmoved Prime Mover" in his work Metaphysics. For Aristotle, as for Plato, the underlying "stuff" of the universe always was in existence and always would be (which in turn follows Parmenides' famous statement that "nothing can come from nothing"). Aristotle posited an underlying ousia (an essence or substance) of which the universe is composed. It is the ousia which the Prime Mover organized and set into motion, not by acting, but by being the center of attraction, hence the Unmoved Mover.

Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274 C.E.), the best known theologian of the Middle Ages, adapted the argument to form one of the earliest and the most influential versions of the cosmological argument. His conception of first cause is the idea that the universe must have been caused by something which was itself uncaused, which he asserted was God.

The argument

Framed as a formal proof, the first cause argument can be stated as follows:

  1. Every effect has a cause(s).
  2. Nothing can cause itself.
  3. A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.
  4. Therefore, there must be a first cause—something which is not an effect.

The cosmological argument can only speculate about the existence of God from claims about the entire universe. The argument is based on the claim that God must exist due to the fact that the universe needs a cause. The existence of the universe requires an explanation, and an active creation of the universe by a being outside of the universe—generally assumed to be God—is that explanation.

The argument from contingency

Aquinas follows Aristotle in claiming that there must be something which explains why the universe exists. Since the universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably not exist—that is to say, since it is contingent—its existence must have a cause. And that cause cannot simply be another contingent thing, it must be something which exists by necessity.

The German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz made a somewhat similar argument with his Principle of Sufficient Reason, in 1714. He wrote: "There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases." He formulated the cosmological argument succinctly: "Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason…is found in a substance which…is a necessary Being bearing the reason for its existence within itself."

In esse and in fieri

"In esse" and "in fieri" are Latin expressions from medieval scholasticism. They make an important distinction. God can be seen as a remote first cause who starts everything and then is no longer needed (in fieri, i.e., “in becoming”). That is the position of deism, where God is merely a logical assumption to explain how everything started. Once the universe is set into motion, according to that view, things pretty much proceed mechanically—God is no longer needed. But God can also be seen as the Creator and permanent sustainer of the universe (in esse, i.e., “in existence”). In that case, God is not only the first cause who started everything, but God also maintains the existence of everything all the time. Creation then is a permanent event. This second view is less mechanistic, but also more mysterious: How is God’s action invisibly present in every moment?

As a general trend, the modern slants on the cosmological argument tend to lean very strongly towards an in fieri argument to the extent that they are trying to explain how it all started. The question, there, is: What brought the whole of existence into motion? On the other hand, based on the biological sciences, some have insisted on the necessity of an original life force working in organic processes. For instance, scientists know how wounds heal, but they don’t have the slightest idea why the healing process is set into motion. In everyday language, an answer would be that God is permanently working through the organism.

Counterarguments and objections

Several objections to the cosmological argument have been raised. The most obvious one runs as follows: "If God created the universe, who created God?" If everything needs a cause (the basic assumption of the cosmological argument), then why doesn’t God? Skeptics have thus spoken of a “trilemma” (a triple dilemma) that is not solved by the argument: Either one has infinite regress (every entity is caused by another entity, which is caused by yet another, and so on indefinitely); or one dogmatically asserts that there is a God as First Cause (without even trying to explain why this should be the case); or one has circular reasoning: God explains the existence of the world, but this brings it back to the starting point, the fact that there is a world means that there must be a God, which is circular reasoning. The implication of this position is that it is useless to try to find an ultimate cause of things.

Another objection is that even if one accepts the argument as a proof of a First Cause, it does not identify this first cause with "God." The argument simply names the First Cause as "God" without proving that it has the characteristics that that name implies. It is also troublesome to use the title "creator," as this would imply assuming that the "creator" has some sort of intelligence. At best, one may be able to call this first cause a "supernatural" first cause.

Opponents also point out that the cosmological argument applies temporal concepts to situations where time does not exist. If God created the universe, he also created time. The nonsensical question “what was there before God created time?” would ensue.

And some, including German philosopher Immanuel Kant, have contended that applying the category of causality to a hypothetical First Cause is entirely inappropriate. Cause and effect apply to finite events within this universe. How such a relationship could exist between an unknowable First Cause and the universe is beyond the human grasp.

Criticisms of counterarguments

A response to criticism will naturally incorporate some of the very elements that make up that criticism. First and foremost, it must be admitted that the argument cannot yield much information, if any, on the nature of the First Cause, or God, other than that there must be a Being that is such a cause. The argument cannot be a substitute for faith or spiritual insights, much less church dogma.

The objection that this First Cause must have a cause itself, resulting in circular reasoning, can be answered by stating the following: The very argument assumes that there must be a Being that is of a fundamentally different nature from all existing entities in that it can be its own cause. Thus, the argument cannot go beyond suggesting the reality of such a Being, without making any further statements on its nature. It can also hint to the fact that denying it means accepting a meaningless and unexplained universe without a cause. In other words, assuming the reality of such a Prime Being does not offer a full answer, but it does clarify the nature of the issue and its possible implications.

Thus, almost all physical cosmologists subscribe to a theory of universal origin that is effectively dualistic in nature. On careful consideration of the Big Bang, for example, some sort of "cause," itself not caused by "natural" forces of the universe (causa sui, i.e., its own cause), appears to be inescapable.

That includes time. Time is understood as "natural" in substance, while the uncaused cause is not natural and therefore not operable in time. Aquinas understood the Divine as outside of time, viewing all of time, indeed being present in all of time, simultaneously.

When one looks for the origin of the universe he effectively postulate "substances," forces or circumstances that are "pre-natural." Understanding that time itself is part of the natural order, one cannot say "before" time, but that at the instant of the Big Bang, conditions that cannot exist under natural physical laws caused an inflationary expansion of matter and energy.

Scientific positions

Currently, the theory of the cosmological history of the universe most widely accepted by astronomers and astrophysicists includes an apparent first event—the Big Bang—the expansion of all known matter and energy from a superdense, singular point at some finite time in the past.

The cosmological argument as elaborated in antiquity and in the Middle Ages was purely based on logical philosophical reflection: There is a need for a First Cause. There was not the slightest notion of how that Original Being might have caused the world to exist. In trying to explain the emergence of the world, theologians generally relied on Creatio ex nihilo, the belief that God created the world out of nothing. How a spiritual God could have caused our material world to exist remained a mystery. The modality of creation was understood in terms of the seven days of creation of the Genesis narrative. Thus, the cosmological argument consisted of a mixture of philosophical speculation and religious dogma.

This situation changed dramatically with the advent of twentieth century science, in particular physics and astronomy. A “how” began to emerge, at least on the level of hypothesis. By extrapolating based on actual scientific measurements, scientists were able to offer a somewhat clear picture of the very first moments of existence of our universe, which led them to suggest various ways in which this beginning may have been set into motion. Though the Big Bang itself is still nothing but a hypothesis in need of revision, it thus offers a concrete framework in which to visualize, as much as possible, what may have happened.

Other twentieth century scientific theories, such as quantum physics and the theory of relativity can and have been used to argue either way in issues relating to a First Cause. It would be naïve to expect any scientific theory to offer a definitive response to a philosophical question; what such theories do offer is, again, a framework for understanding the issue more realistically, especially as far as the nature of time and space is concerned.

In his famous Antinomies of pure reason, Immanuel Kant had argued against the cosmological argument because saying that the cosmos has a beginning makes as much or as little sense as saying that it does not. If there was a beginning, the question is, what was there before? If not, there is no end to the causal chain, which the mind equally cannot accept. Hence, Kant says, people have to admit that God, as thing in itself, is wholly beyond the phenomenal world that humanity can understand. Contemporary astrophysics shows that the everyday notion of time and space does not fully apply to the extreme conditions of a hypothetical starting point. This in itself represents a formidable argument against common-sense objections of the type used by Kant.

A commonly stated workaround for the cosmological argument is the nature of time. The Big Bang is said to be the start of both space and time, so the question "What was there before the universe?" makes no sense; the concept of "before" becomes meaningless when considering a situation without time. This has been put forward by Stephen Hawking, who said that asking what occurred before the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the North Pole. Science is presently still learning the nature of time, and how the visible universe originated, therefore to an extent certain questions are partially unanswered.

The other look at the question

The three proofs have been developed in the Western world and primarily apply to a theistic view: There is one God, transcendent creator of the universe. People are used to considering that everything must have a cause, so the universe must have a prime cause. But what if there is something wrong with the assumption that the universe must have a cause, like every individual entity?

In East Asia, including India and China, the notion of a creator is not entirely absent. It appears in various creation myths (mythical stories on how the universe came into being), just like it does in other parts of the world. But there is also a strong tendency not to look at things in this way. There is little focus on this question in religious traditions and thought systems such as Buddhism. The focus is more on attitudes towards the human condition, rather than on speculation on the origin of the universe. This resonates with many in the West as well.

The teleological argument

The teleological argument (argument from design) is essentially an inductive and intuitive argument. It states that there must be an intelligent designer (God) who is responsible for order, harmony, and beauty in the world. It is an argument for the existence of God based on perceived evidence of order, purpose, design and/or direction in nature. The word "teleological" is derived from the Greek word telos, meaning end or purpose. Teleology is the supposition that there is purpose or directive principle in the works and processes of nature. But there are objections: The universe is far from perfect (David Hume), and what if it is the product of trial and error (Charles Darwin)?

The argument

The basic argument can be stated as follows:

  1. X is too (complex, orderly, adaptive, apparently purposeful, and/or beautiful) to have occurred randomly or accidentally.
  2. Therefore, X must have been created by a (sentient, intelligent, wise, and/or purposeful) being.
  3. God is that (sentient, intelligent, wise, and/or purposeful) being.
  4. Therefore, God exists.

X usually stands for the universe; the evolution process; humankind; a given animal species; or a particular organ like the eye or capability like language in humans. X may also stand for the fundamental constants of the universe like physical constants and physical law. A very concise and whimsical teleological argument, for instance, was offered by G. K. Chesterton in 1908: "So one elephant having a trunk was odd; but all elephants having trunks looked like a plot."

History of the argument

Plato posited a "demiurge" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the cosmos in his work Timaeus. Plato's teleological perspective is also built upon the analysis of a priori order and structure in the world which he had already presented in The Republic.

Aristotle's views also have very strong aspects of a teleological argument, specifically that of a Prime Mover who, so to speak, looks ahead in setting the cosmos into motion. Indeed, Aristotle argued that all nature reflects inherent purposiveness and direction (his so-called final cause).

Cicero (c. 106–c. 43 B.C.E.) also made one of the earliest known teleological arguments. In de Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods) Cicero stated, "The divine power is to be found in a principle of reason which pervades the whole of nature." He was writing from the cultural background of the Roman religion. In Roman mythology the creator goddess, Gaia was borrowed from Greek mythology. "When you see a sundial or a water-clock, you see that it tells the time by design and not by chance. How then can you imagine that the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and intelligence, when it embraces everything, including these artifacts themselves and their artificers" (Cicero, De Natura Deorum, ii. 34).

Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.) presented a classic teleological perspective in his work, City of God. He did not, however, make a formal argument for the existence of God; rather, God's existence is already presumed and Augustine is giving a proposed view of God's teleology.

Aquinas and the scholastics

The most notable scholastics (c. 1100-1500 C.E.) who put forth teleological arguments were Averroes (Ibn-Rushd) and Thomas Aquinas. Averroes was writing in Spain from an Islamic perspective in the latter half of the twelfth century. Averroes argues based mainly upon Aristotle's Physics, in essence that the combination of order and continual motion in the universe cannot be accidental, and requires a Prime Mover, a Supreme Principle, which is in itself pure intelligence.

This would set the stage for Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Aquinas makes a specific, compact, and famous version of the teleological argument, the fifth of his five proofs for the existence of God in his Summa Theologiae:

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore, some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.[4]

The British empiricists

Starting with John Locke, seventeenth and eighteenth century British empiricists opened the way to a scientific perspective based on experience that left little room for assumptions about an a priori divine purpose. Locke’s successor, George Berkeley, would try to counterbalance that tendency. As part of this approach, Berkeley included in his text, Alciphron, a variant of the teleological argument which held that the order one sees in nature is the language or handwriting of God. David Hume, in the mid-eighteenth century, attempted a number of interesting refutations, including one that arguably foreshadows Darwin's theory, but he reaches no conclusion.

The watchmaker analogy

The “watchmaker analogy” framing the argument with reference to a timepiece dates back to Cicero, as quoted above. It was also used by Voltaire, who remarked: "If a watch proves the existence of a watchmaker but the universe does not prove the existence of a great Architect, then I consent to be called a fool." Today the analogy is usually associated with the theologian William Paley, who presented the argument in his book Natural Theology, published in 1802. As a theology student, Charles Darwin found Paley's arguments compelling, then later developed his theory in the Origin of Species, which puts forward an alternative explanation for complexity in nature.

Many others have countered the watch argument, such as by showing that highly complex systems can be produced by a series of very small randomly-generated steps. Richard Dawkins' book The Blind Watchmaker (1986) is one of the best-known examples of this approach outside philosophy and theology.

More recently, proponents of intelligent design have reframed the argument as the concept of irreducible complexity. This argument asserts that each substructure of an organism confers no benefit on its own, and therefore cannot have been selected by an evolutionary mechanism. The argument then posits that the probability of all the substructures being created in a single mutation is too low to be considered possible. Critics describe this as an argument from ignorance which assumes that substructures have not changed in function, and give illustrations of how gradual replacement by a series of advantageous variations can lead to the evolution of structures claimed as being irreducibly complex.

The anthropic principle and fine-tuned universe arguments

A well-known contemporary variation of the argument is the so-called anthropic principle, which says that the seemingly arbitrary and unrelated constants in physics have one strange thing in common—these are precisely the values needed to have a universe capable of producing human life (hence, “anthropic,” from the Greek word for human). Even a tiny difference would have made the appearance of our universe impossible. The universe gives the appearance that it was designed to support life on earth, another example of Paley’s watch.

In this line of reasoning, speculation about the vast, perhaps infinite, range of possible conditions in which life could not exist is compared to the speculated improbability of achieving conditions in which life does exist, and then interpreted as indicating a fine-tuned universe specifically designed so human life is possible. This view is well articulated by John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler in The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (1986).

Some of the estimated proportions involved in cosmic "fine-tuning" are remarkable. John Polkinghorne, for instance, pointed out in 1985 that just one factor among many in the cosmos, the difference between expansive and contractive forces in the expanding cosmos according to then-currently accepted theory, depends upon an extremely fine balance of the total energy involved to within one in 1060, a 61-digit number; equivalent to taking aim from Earth and hitting an inch-wide target at the farthest reaches of the observable universe. George Wald, also in 1985, wrote that the conditions for something as fundamental as the atom depend on a balance of forces to within one in 1018. All this, they argue, hints at the existence of a designer.

Many highly regarded thinkers have weighed in on both sides the debate. A counter-argument to the anthropic principle is that one could manipulate statistics to define any number of natural situations that are extremely improbable, but that have happened nevertheless. By the critics' view a key problem in terms of being able to verify whether the hypothesized probabilities are correct, is that the improbable conditions were identified after the event, so they cannot be checked by experiment. And, there is no ability to sample a large enough set of alternatives. An analogy from common experience where the odds can be readily calculated is given by John Allen Paulos in Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and its Consequences (1989). Paulos calculates that the probability of a particular hand in a card game is approximately one in 600 billion. It would be absurd to examine the hand carefully, calculate the odds, and then assert that it must not have been randomly dealt. This perspective on the issue of improbability appears to bolster the position that characteristics of Earth that allow it to sustain life could be just a fortunate and/or accidental "hit," so to speak. However, this does not take into account the difference between a set of particular cards—a very unlikely combination, but of no particular complexity—and a complex organic or physical combination.

Objections

As for the cosmological argument, the teleological argument has inherent limitations that need to be acknowledged even by its proponents. First of all, the argument says nothing about the nature of the designer, or God, other than that he must be of a nature able to originate design without being in need of it himself (an “undersigned” designer). The reality of such a Being is posited, rather than explained.

Also, even if the argument from design proves the existence of a powerful intelligent designer, it does not prove that the designer is a theistic God. Voltaire noted this from his deistic perspective. Voltaire observed,

[F]rom this one argument, I cannot conclude anything more, except that it is probable that an intelligent and superior being has prepared and shaped matter with dexterity; I cannot conclude from this argument alone that this being has made the matter out of nothing or that he is infinite in any sense [i.e. that he is God].

In his Critique of Judgment and elsewhere, Kant put considerable emphasis on the apparent evidence of design in nature and the mind’s need to conclude from it that there must be a designer. This, he nevertheless concluded, cannot be taken as a theoretical proof of the reality of such a designer or God. It merely shows that the world looks “as if” it had been created by such a designer, thus leaving the possible reality of that designer as an open question that will never be answered.

Kant’s follower Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) interestingly tried to separate the notion of design from its verifiable manifestations. As a man of the Enlightenment, Fries had a mechanical view of the universe. He considered that the material world consisted of a network of causes and effects that needed no further explanation. If it weren’t for its extreme complexity, future outcomes of that system could be predicted in their minutest detail. Seeing purpose in it would be a mere projection based on the existing outcome. However, Fries also considered that the human mind has the inherent capacity to perceive the reality of purpose through intuition, or Ahndung. He thus rejected the traditional application of the teleological argument in favor of an intuitive one. Actual purpose can be perceived through the intuition of beauty in creation and human beings, thus allowing humanity to reach the realm of the infinite, which is that of God.

The premises of the argument assume that because life is complex, it must have been designed. However, the design claim is often attacked as a simple argument from ignorance.

A designed organism would also be a contradiction to evolutionary theory. As most biologists support the theory of biological evolution by means of natural selection, they reject the first premise of the argument, arguing that evolution is not only an alternative explanation for the complexity of life but a better explanation with more supporting evidence. A range of chemical reactions could take place in living organisms, forming chemicals with increasingly complex properties and ways of interacting. Over very long periods of time self-replicating structures could arise and later form DNA. Thus biologists commonly view the design argument as an unimpressive argument for the existence of a god. The argument from design is thus a major element in the debate between creationism and evolution.

Argument from poor design

The argument from poor design is based on the premise that a creator God would create organisms that have optimal design, but that many organisms have significant defects. This point was already made by eighteenth century philosopher David Hume. The term incompetent design has been coined by Donald Wise to describe aspects of nature that are flawed in design.

One well-know examples of "poor design" would be the existence of the appendix in the human body. That small part of the intestine is apparently useless and is often the source of trouble. Many other observations of the same type, applying to the human body or other entities, have been made.

"Poor design" is consistent with the predictions of the scientific theory of evolution by means of natural selection. This predicts that features that were evolved for certain uses, are then reused or co-opted for different uses, or abandoned altogether. The argument from poor design is one of the arguments used by Charles Darwin; modern proponents have included Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins, who argue that such features can be explained as a consequence of the gradual, cumulative nature of the evolutionary process.

Counterarguments

The argument from poor design is generally criticized by showing how an apparently poor design or useless feature actually has a purpose that has simply been ignored or undetected. Even where the existence of useless features cannot be explained away, it can be argued that these are leftovers of a trial-and-error process by the designer. What this line of arguing does in the process is to present a view of the designer that is different from the traditional notion of a God who is in total control. If design and creation happens, it appears more realistically as a long, painstaking process towards an ultimate goal—a process in which many blind alleys have to be avoided.

Thus, the argument from poor design is sometimes interpreted as an argument against characteristics commonly attributed to God, such as omnipotence, omniscience, or personality. Or, it is used as an argument for the incompetence of God. Finally, certain features of life that seem to contradict the existence of a perfect designer, such as various forms of suffering, can be explained by the Human Fall away from God. The notion of a human fall, found in most religions, has in turn been used to show that the existence of a good God is self-contradictory.

Other issues

Some have argued that there is no inherent contradiction between intelligent design and evolution. Certain religious perspectives may find nothing illogical about believing in a creator-deity who purposed evolution to propagate the emergence of life on earth. This position is becoming increasingly accepted today—indeed, Pope John Paul II put forward a position of exactly this kind.

The argument from the degrees of perfection

The argument

This argument was somewhat touched upon by Augustine and Anselm but developed later by Aquinas as the fourth of his five ways (Quinque Viae). All things in nature have various degrees of perfections such as goodness, truth, and nobility. If anything comes in degrees, it must be comparable to a maximum. The maximum in a genus is the cause of all in that genus. So, there must be a maximum of perfections such as goodness, truth, and nobility, i.e., the best, the truest, the noblest, etc. The maximum of perfections is God. This is sometimes called the Platonic argument because it talks about the existence of the Platonic "forms" along with the existence of God. One strength of this argument is that it can speak of many more attributes of God than the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments.

Objection

David Hume critiqued this argument by saying that since there is much evil and suffering in this world, a God of the maximum of perfections cannot exist.

The moral argument

Among all the proofs for God’s existence that have been attempted besides the main three proofs described above, the moral argument is the best known. This argument comes in different forms, all aiming to prove God’s existence from the evidence of morality in the world.

Kant’s moral argument

Kant introduced his famous formulation of the proof as a replacement for the three classic proofs, which he felt were hopeless attempts to derive certainty about God through theoretical knowledge. In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant sought to replace theoretical certainty with the moral certainty of practical reason.

That certainty exists, Kant insisted, because of the following:

  1. The highest good is where moral virtue and happiness coincide.
  2. People are rationally obliged to attain the highest good.
  3. What people are obliged to attain, it must be possible for them to attain.
  4. If there is no God or afterlife, it is not possible to attain the highest good (summum bonum).
  5. God (or the afterlife) must exist.

Kant cites several reasons why it would not be possible to attain the highest good if there was no God. First, reality shows beyond a doubt that good people often have more miserable lives than evil people. Only the existence of an afterlife with God could explain this paradoxical situation in a satisfactory way. Next, it appears to be impossible to achieve perfection of morality in our short lifespan. Thus, Kant believed that eternal life with God is necessary for us to be able to reach that perfection eventually.

Kant himself insisted that this argument could not lead to absolute theoretical certainty, but that people were rationally obliged to assume that this was so, because this is the only way the world could make sense. Kant’s position assumes that the universe is rational. It also assumes that the certainty one reaches through his argument is the culmination or rationality, whereas others would see in it a certainty of the intuitive type. The moral argument as presented by Kant has precisely been criticized for assuming a universal rational order and universal justice.

Other forms of the argument

All forms of the moral argument begin with the notion that there is a fundamental moral norm. That is, human beings are typically aware of actions as being right and wrong. This awareness seems to bind people toward certain obligations, regardless of their personal goals and ends. In this sense, moral qualities have the appearance of universality and objectivity.

According to the argument, the perceived absoluteness of morally binding commands can only be justified based on an absolute origin of these commands, i.e., God. For instance, it has often been stated that, if there is no God, anything goes. There is ultimately no reason for doing good, rather than evil.

To this, it has been objected that even in the absence of a God, humans can and often do abide by moral commands for their own sake. In addition, it is highly debatable whether there is one set of absolute moral commands. Many would insist that moral commands are conditioned culturally or otherwise.

Critics also point out this argument's appeal to a "divine command theory" of ethics. Objections to divine command theories of ethics are numerous, most stemming from forms of the Euthyphro dilemma. Is an action good because God commanded it, or did God command it because it is good? The first horn would imply that what is good is arbitrary; God decides what is right and wrong in the same way that a government decides which side of the street cars should drive on. The second horn would imply that God made his commands in accordance with transcendental facts that exist apart from God. God, then, would not be omnipotent.

Proponents of the argument maintain that this dilemma can be adequately resolved. Thomas Aquinas, for example, explains that God indeed commands something because it is good, but the reason it is good is that "good is an essential part of God's nature."

Other arguments for the existence of God

Countless other arguments have been proposed over the centuries. What follows is but a sampling.

  • The "Will to Believe Doctrine" was pragmatist philosopher William James' attempt to prove God by showing that the adoption of theism as a hypothesis "works" in a believer's life. This doctrine depended heavily on James' pragmatic theory of truth where beliefs are proven by how they work when adopted rather than by proofs before they are believed (a form of the hypothetico-deductive method).
  • Richard Swinburne, one of the foremost contemporary philosophers of religion, has suggested in his The Existence of God (2004) what can be called a hypothetical argument, according to which the existence of the God of monotheistic religions as they understand him should be treated first only as an "hypothesis" and then be tested or verified by observing the world which was supposedly created by him. The verification process using scientific and experiential data about the world, according to Swinburne, would make the hypothesis on God's existence more probable than improbable. Even though he is a supporter of the teleological argument, his use of a hypothetical method has made it more acceptable to people including atheists.
  • Another class of philosophers asserts that the proofs for the existence of God present a fairly large probability, though not absolute certainty, as obscure points remain. In order to overcome these difficulties, either an act of the will, a religious experience, or the discernment of the misery of the world without God is necessary, so that finally the heart makes the decision. This view is maintained, among others, by the English statesman Arthur Balfour in his book The Foundations of Belief (1895).
  • Subjective arguments mainly rely on the testimony or experience of certain witnesses, or the propositions of a specific revealed religion. The witness argument gives credibility to personal witnesses, in contemporary and past ages. A variation of this is the argument from miracles which relies on testimony of supernatural events to establish the existence of God. The "Christological argument" is specific to Christianity and asserts that Jesus' life as written in the New Testament establishes his credibility, so one can believe in the truth of his statements about God. An example of this argument is presented by C. S. Lewis in Mere Christianity. The "argument from common consent" or "majority argument" argues that people in all times and in different places have believed in God, so it is unlikely that he does not exist.
  • The Scotch school, led by Thomas Reid, taught that the fact of the existence of God is accepted by one without knowledge of reasons but simply by a natural impulse. That God exists, this school said, is one of the chief metaphysical principles that humans accept not because they are evident in themselves or because they can be proved, but because common sense obliges one to accept them.
  • The "Argument from a Proper Basis" argues that belief in God is "properly basic"—that is, similar to statements such as "I see a chair" or "I feel pain." Such beliefs are non-falsifiable and, thus, neither able to be proved nor disproved; they concern perceptual beliefs or indisputable mental states.
  • In Germany, the school of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi taught that reason is able to perceive the supersensible. Jacobi distinguished three faculties: sense, reason, and understanding. Just as sense has immediate perception of the material so has reason immediate perception of the immaterial, while the understanding brings these perceptions to our consciousness and unites them to one another.[5] God's existence, then, cannot be proved. Jacobi, like Kant, rejected the absolute value of the principle of causality—it must be felt by the mind. A similar position was defended by Fries.
  • In his Emile: Or, On Education, Jean-Jacques Rousseau asserted that when human understanding ponders over the existence of God it encounters nothing but contradictions; the impulses of the heart, however, are of more value than the understanding, and these proclaim clearly to one the truths of natural religion, namely, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.
  • The same theory was advocated in Germany by Friedrich Schleiermacher (d. 1834), who assumed an inner religious sense by means of which one feels religious truths. According to Schleiermacher, religion consists solely in this inner perception, and dogmatic doctrines are inessential. Many modern Protestant theologians follow in Schleiermacher's footsteps.

Arguments against the existence of God

Each of the following arguments aims at showing that some particular conception of a god either is inherently meaningless, contradictory, or contradictory to known scientific and/or historical facts, and that therefore a god thus described does not exist.

Empirical arguments (against)

Empirical arguments depend on empirical data in order to prove their conclusions. In addition to those already indicated, several additional objections have been made:

  • The pejorative expression God of the Gaps expresses one fundamental objection of many scientists against the notion of a divinity. It means that God is used as an explanation for as-of-yet unexplainable phenomena, even though there is no rational ground for such a belief. The mysterious word “God” simply covers up temporary ignorance. In history, church dogma was also used to counter scientific evidence in ways that defied reason, in order to avoid facing conclusions uncomfortable to the church.
  • The argument from inconsistent revelations contests the existence of the deity called God as described in holy scriptures of monotheism, by identifying contradictions between different scriptures, contradictions within a single scripture, or contradictions between scripture and known facts.
  • The problem of evil in general has been seen as evidence against the existence of an all-powerful and benevolent God (see article on theodicy).
  • The argument from nonbelief contests the existence of an omnipotent god who wants humans to believe in him by arguing that such a god would do a better job of gathering believers. This argument is contested by the claim that God wants to test humans to see who has the most faith.

Deductive arguments (against)

Deductive arguments attempt to prove their conclusions by deductive reasoning from true premises.

  • The omnipotence paradox is one of many arguments which argue that the definitions or descriptions of a god are logically contradictory, demonstrating his non-existence. This paradox can be shown through questions such as: "Can God create a rock so big that [God] could not lift it?" Some may argue that this paradox is resolved by the argument that such a rock is an impossibility of human reality rather than the result of an imperfect God.
  • One simple argument that the existence of a god is self-contradictory goes as follows: If God is defined as omniscient and omnipotent, then God has absolute knowledge of all events that will occur in the future, including all of his future actions, due to his omniscience. However, his omnipotence implies he has the power to act in a different manner than he predicted, thus implying that God's predictions about the future are fallible.
  • The argument from free will contests the existence of an omniscient god who has free will by arguing that the two properties are contradictory
  • It is alleged that there is a logical impossibility in theism: God is defined as an extra-temporal being, but also as an active creator. The argument suggests that the very act of creation is inconceivable and absurd beyond the restraints of time.

Inductive arguments (against)

  • The "no reason" argument tries to show that an omnipotent or perfect being would not have any reason to act in any way, specifically creating the universe, because it would have no desires since the very concept of desire is subjectively human. This raises the essential question of God’s nature and the purpose of creation.
  • God is perfect. God also created man in his image. Man is imperfect, however. Therefore, God is imperfect and thus disproves himself.

Summary of views on God's existence

As a summary, views on the existence of God can be roughly divided into three camps: theist, atheist, and agnostic. The theist and atheist camps can be further divided into two groups each, based on the belief of whether or not their position has been conclusively proven by the arguments.

Theism

God exists and this can be proved

The Thomist tradition and the dogmatic definition of the First Vatican Council affirm that it is a doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church that God's existence has been rationally demonstrated. Some other Christians in different denominations hold similar views.

As a theological defense of this view, one might cite Paul's claim that pagans were without excuse because "since the creation of the world [God's] invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made" (Romans 1:20).

God exists, but this cannot be proved or disproved

Others have suggested that the several logical and philosophical arguments for the existence of God miss the point. The proofs do not resolve that issue. Blaise Pascal suggested this objection in his Pensées, when he wrote, "The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—not the god of the philosophers!"

Some Christians note that the Christian faith teaches salvation by faith, and that faith has little to do with the believer's ability to comprehend. God's existence can never be demonstrated, either by empirical means or by philosophical argument. The most extreme example of this position is called fideism, which holds that that if God's existence were rationally demonstrable, faith in his existence would become superfluous.

Atheism

The atheistic conclusion has two main variants.

Strong atheism

The conclusion called strong, positive, or explicit atheism is the conclusion that God or gods do not exist. The strong atheist positively asserts this explicit non-existence, and may go further and claim that the existence of some or all gods is logically impossible. Similarly, explicit atheism may argue that any assertions about God are irrational and impossible. More fundamentally, a philosopher like Jean-Paul Sartre insists that the very notion of a Being whose essence determines everyone’s existence is certain to be false.

Weak atheism

Negative or weak atheism concludes that there is no sufficient reason to believe in God. Weak atheists argue that merely pointing out the flaws or lack of soundness in all arguments for the existence of God is sufficient to show that God's existence is less probable than his nonexistence; by Ockham's razor (the principle that the most simple explanation is always to be preferred), the burden of proof lies on the advocate of that alternative which is less probable. Atheism is thus the "default" position.

Antony Flew has been a well-known supporter of such “negative” atheism. His alleged change towards a deistic position would be consistent with that form of atheism: Once confronted with unexpected evidence to the contrary (there seems to be a God after all), a negative atheist is prepared to change his position.

Agnosticism

Agnostics hold that the existence of God is uncertain or unknown. Possible reasons for holding this view are a belief that the existence of any deity has not yet been sufficiently proven, that the existence of a deity cannot be proven, or that claims about the existence or non-existence of any deity make no sense. Agnostics may claim that it is not possible to have absolute or certain knowledge of supernatural beings or, alternatively, that while certainty may be possible, they personally have no such knowledge. Agnostics may or may not believe in gods based on personal convictions.

Conclusion

There exists a very large variety of historical approaches to the existence of God, whether they argue for or against it, intellectual or religious. There also exists objections to these various approaches. It seems that none of them are free from criticism. Then, is the existence of God something which is far from knowable with universally acceptable certainty, and therefore which one should be discouraged from seeking further to know?

An observation of current trends might help address this question. People now live in a culturally diverse society where absolute certainties are all but absent. So, it seems that the variety of approaches which have not necessarily been compatible with one another have softened their positions and lessened their claims. This change has been also due to the development of science; the "anthropic principle" established in science, for example, has shown at least that the existence of God is more probable than improbable. Last but not least, the general approach has become more holistic. People are more aware of dimensions other than the strictly logical, and they are aware that a purely logical approach has its own pitfalls.

As Ninian Smart puts it, the traditional proofs have survived and they still have their use, but it is suggestive, rather than decisive. Smart rightly notes that the often discredited rational proofs do have their rightful place in the debate, even though they may not touch the heart of the life of faith. The absence of an intellectual framework that makes sense has always been detrimental to faith, thus the quest for understanding should not be abandoned. For Smart, rational or philosophical insights about the existence of God are to be combined with the various other aspects of religious revelation, such as the experiential dimension, the moral dimension, and the mythical dimension.

Notes

  1. Summ. theol., I, Q. ii, a.3.
  2. W. Grey, Gasking's Proof. Analysis 60:4 (2000): 368-370.
  3. A. R. Pruss, "Samkara’s Principle and Two Ontomystical Arguments," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (2001): 111–120. Retrieved October 19, 2007.
  4. That Religious Studies Website, Thomas Aquinas' Five Ways. Retrieved September 20, 2007.
  5. A. Stöckl, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, II, 82 sqq.


References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

General:

  • Broad, C. D. Journal of Theological Studies 40 (1939): 16-30; 156-67.
  • Cell, Edward. Language, Existence, and God. New York: Abingdon Press, 1971. ISBN 0687210631
  • Cohen, Morris R. "The Dark Side of Religion," Religion Today, a Challenging Enigma. Edited by Arthur L. Swift, Jr. (1933). Revised version in Morris Cohen, The Faith of a Liberal (1946). Retrieved December 19, 2022.
  • Haisch, Bernard. The God Theory: Universes, Zero-Point Fields and What's Behind It All. San Francisco: Red Wheel/Weiser Books, 2006. Retrieved December 19, 2022.
  • Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Edited by Richard Popkin. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998 (original 1779).
  • Mackie, J. L. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. ISBN 019824682X
  • Nielson, Kai. Ethics Without God. London: Pemberton Books, 1973.
  • Paley, William. Natural Theology. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963 (original 1802).
  • Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford University Press, 1999. ISBN 0195131932
  • Ross, Robert R. N. The Non-Existence of God. Linguistic Paradox in Tillich’s Thought. New York & Toronto: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1978. ISBN 0889469059
  • Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon, 1991.

Ontological Argument:

  • Hartshore, Charles. The Logic of Perfection. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1962.
  • Malcolm, Norman. "Anselm's Ontological Argument," Philosophical Review 69(1) (1960): 41-62.
  • Plantinga, Alvin. The Ontological Argument from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.
  • Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1977.

Cosmological Argument:

  • Smith, Quentin. "A Big Bang Cosmological Argument for God's Nonexistence." Faith and Philosophy 9(2) (1992): 217-237.

Teleological Argument:

  • Crouch, Will. On Philosophy.
  • Dennett, Daniel. Darwin's Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. ISBN 068482471X
  • Dawkins, Richard. The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1996 (original 1986). ISBN 0393315703
  • Gjersen, Derek. Science and Philosophy: Past and Present. London: Penguin, 1989. ISBN 0140226745
  • Gould, Stephen J. The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1980. ISBN 0393300234
  • Gurney, Peter W.G. "Is our 'inverted' retina really 'bad design'?" Creation Ex Nihilo Technical Journal/TJ 13(1) (1999): 37–44. Retrieved December 19, 2022.
  • Selim, Jocelyn. “Useless Body Parts.” Discover 25(6) (June 2004). Retrieved December 19, 2022.
  • Sotnak, Eric. Internet Infidels.
  • Witt, Jonathan. "The Gods Must Be Tidy!" Touchstone (July/August 2004). Retrieved December 19, 2022.

External links

All links retrieved June 24, 2017.

Ontological Argument:

Cosmological Argument:

Teleological Argument:

Moral Arguments:

General philosophy sources

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