Morality

In its everyday sense morality (from Latin moralitas "manner, character, proper behaviour") refers to a code of behaviour by which human beings regulate their lives. Theoretical interest in morality arises from the distinct sorts of questions that might be asked about this code of behaviour.

One question we may ask is what they include: what sorts of practical rules do people actually use to govern their lives? This is a descriptive question, an attempt to understand the actual practices of various people and groups of people. The results of such an attempt will constitute the meaning of ‘morality’ in a descriptive sense. Given that different groups of people adhere to different codes of conduct there can be said to be more than one morality.

A second question one may ask about the codes of behaviour to which people adhere is whether they are correct. This is the province of moral philosophy, which attempts to ascertain the rules that people ought to use in guidance of their conduct. The rules identified by moral philosophy need not coincide with actual practices and accepted moral principles. The results of this inquiry will constitute the meaning of ‘morality’ in its normative sense.

A third set of questions one may ask about these codes of behaviour is whether they are objective, or are simply expressions of our basic feelings of approval and disapproval, universal, or relative to individuals or groups, and whether or not they depend on religion. This is the province of meta-ethics, which attempts to understand the nature of codes of correct behaviour.

Descriptive morality

Morality in a descriptive sense may be defined as a code of conduct endorsed and adhered to by a society, group or—much less frequently—individual. Moral codes in this sense will therefore differ both from society to society, within societies, and amongst individuals. In its descriptive sense, morality is whatever a society, group, or individual, says it is. For example, descriptive ‘morality’ may include norms of correct behaviour according to which cannibalism and rape are morally permissible. Nor is it the case that descriptive ‘moralities’ must always be consistent in their application of moral rules (even with an culture). Historically speaking, different moral rules were held to apply to slaves and free men and women in societies in which slave owning was permitted.

In its descriptive sense, then, ‘morality’ refers to how people behave, and not at how they ought to behave. Descriptive morality is of central interest to anthropologists, historians and sociologists. It is not a primary concern of philosophical enquiry except insofar as the results of research in the social sciences bear upon questions concerning the nature of morality. (See the article on moral relativism.)

Within the sphere of descriptive morality, a distinction between moral rules, legal rules, and norms of etiquette is recognised. Firstly, there is a high degree of overlap between morality and law. Many moral rules are also legal prohibitions or requirements. For example, murder is generally held to be both immoral and illegal. However, some moral rules do not correspond to legal rules, and so violating a moral code does not necessarily lead to judicial punishment. For example, one is not legally punished for lying in one’s personal life. Conversely, some legal rules do not correspond to moral rules. For example, a system of law contains many proscriptions and requirements regulating bureaucratic procedures, which do not pertain to morality. Even more fundamentally, legal violations are not necessarily moral violations. Unintentionally parking in a designated zone will not count as a moral wrong, although one may still be liable to legal sanction, i.e., a fine.

The distinction between moral rules and norms of etiquette is somewhat sharper than the difference between law and morality. In general, it seems that norms of etiquette (or custom) are of less importance than those of morality. It is polite to arrive on time for a dinner party, but one will not have violated a rule of morality by being late. Conversely, it does violence to our language to say that one who has committed a robbery has broken the rules of etiquette. In some cases, however, this distinction is blurred. For example, in some places and cultural groups, it may be convention for women to cover their legs, and this may also be a matter of moral right and wrong.

Normative morality

In its normative sense, morality may be defined as a code of conduct that would be accepted by all rational people under certain idealised conditions. In simpler terms, ‘morality’ is the set of correct moral principles.

Morality in the normative sense refers to a system of moral principles, which, though it probably will never be universally adopted, ought to be adopted. Specifying the nature of such as system of morality is the province of moral philosophy (see also normative ethics), which seeks, firstly, to formulate a set of principles with which all rational agents ought to comply, and secondly, to explain why this system ought to be adopted. (Some philosophers agree that morality ought not to be characterised in terms of a set of principles at all. See below.)

There is considerable philosophical disagreement as to what this universal system of morality would look like. And there is a respect in which the nature of morality itself hinges on these disagreements. So, in a way, the question “what is morality?” in its normative sense, cannot be answered until moral philosophy has resolved its disagreements. In what follows, therefore, the most important attempts define morality will be outlined. The conceptions of morality that currently dominate the philosophical terrain are consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. Each of these come in various forms and will be briefly discussed.

Consequentialism

Consequentialism is a general definition of morality in terms of the value of consequences brought about, but is independent of any account as to what consequences these may be. The most important versions of consequentialism is utilitarianism. (See also ethical egoism)

According to classical utilitarian philosophers such as John Stewart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, morality is defined in terms of actions conforming to the principle of utility, the fundamental principle of morality. According to this principle, an action is moral if and only if it produces the greatest balance of overall happiness (or well being). By utilitarian standards then, euthanasia may be considered morally right as insofar as it reduces overall suffering. This differs significantly from many religious moral codes, which maintain that actions such as taking another life (whether it be called murder, assisted suicide or euthanasia) are never permissible.

Some of the main criticisms of the utilitarian account of morality—according to which all rational agents ought to follow the utilitarian principle— include the following. Firstly, it is almost impossible in many situations to weigh up overall good; secondly, that the theory does not properly accommodate justice and punishment; thirdly, that promise keeping and act utilitarianism are in conflict.

Deontological Morality

Deontological ethics or deontology (Greek: δέον (deon) meaning obligation or duty) defines morality in terms of a system of moral rules. It is probably the closest to ordinary ways of moral thinking, or at least those adhered to by most Westerners, no doubt a result of the influence of Jewish law and Christianity on ordinary moral thought. The system of morality articlated by the Ten Commandments is, for example, deontological in character.

The best-known version of a philosophical deontology is Immanuel Kant’s theory. The fundamental principle of Kant’s deontology is the Categorical Imperative, which is said to underlie all commonly recognized moral principles. The Categorical Imperative is a principle of consistency, demanding that we act on reasons which all rational agents could endorse, i.e., universally acceptable reasons. This is often compared to the biblical Golden Rule “Do unto to others as you would have them do unto you” – although there are some important differences (See Categorical Imperative). For Kant then, a moral principal is one everyone could follow; if it were made into a universal law it would not be self-defeating.

One important feature of Kant’s conception of morality is that it is absolute. There are no exceptions to moral rules; it is always wrong to murder, tell a lie, or break a promise. (See Categorical Imperative) One criticism of this view is that sometimes telling a lie could save a life so that it would be unreasonable and even immoral to tell the truth in such a situation.

Intuitionsim

The best-known form of intuitionism is probably that presented by W.D. Ross in The Right and the Good. Ross argues that we are able to intuit a number of irreducible prima facie duties (to keep our promises, to refrain from harming the innocent, etc.), none of which take precedence over any other. In this respect, Ross accepts a form of moral pluralism, since he does not think that right action can be reduced to a single criterion. Here he sets himself up against Utilitarianism and Kantianism, which are both versions of monism because they recognize a single basic moral principle. Ross thinks that the right action (one’s duty proper) in a given situation is determined by a careful weighing of various moral principles that apply in the context. In other words, intuitionism does not claim that there is any one characteristic that all morally correct acts share. In a sense, therefore, intuitionism holds that morality does not admit of a neat definition.

Virtue ethics

Virtue ethics was the dominant ethical tradition in ancient Greek philosophy, and through the middle ages. It has once again risen to prominence in recent times to become one of the three major normative strands (along with deontology and consequentialism).

Virtue ethics downplays or even denies the existence of universal rules to which actions must conform and emphasises virtue as opposed to morality. According to virtue ethics, ethics is not fundamentally about duties or following rules (deontology) or about consequences of actions (consequentialism), but rather about cultivating virtuous dispositions of character, a moral character. A disposition is a tendency to have certain responses in particular situations: responses such as emotions, perceptions, and actions. The virtuous person is someone who acts rightly in response to requirements that are unique to the situation. He or she is someone who is able to perceive what the situation requires and act accordingly by exercising practical wisdom (phronesis). Virtuous habits and behaviour (arête) will be those that ultimately lead to the ‘good life’ (or eudaimonia).

According to Virtue Ethics, therefore, the definition of morality is not to proceed in terms of a set of principles to which all rational agents ought to comply. Insofar as virtue ethics can be understood as providing a definition of morality at all, this will be one in which the notion of states of character are primary. (See section below.)

Morality and philosophical method

If moral theories disagree is fundamental ways about the nature of morality, as they do, then how should one proceed to adjudicate between these views? This is a question of philosophical method.

The most widely held view about possibility for reaching philosophical agreement on the nature of morality depends on the notion of reflective equilibrium. In order to understand this method, consider, firstly, that there seems to be (significant) overlap in the kinds of things that most of us regard as right and wrong. For example, most people, and most societies, regard the killing of innocent people as morally wrong. Call this moral system ‘ordinary morality’ Ordinary morality is essentially a system of moral rules that sets limits to our conduct (e.g., thou shall not to murder or steal). Ordinary morality can also incorporate acts that we are not required to do but would be morally significant if we did do them, such as act of charity. Actions that are morally admirable to do but not strictly required of us are called supererogatory actions.

The conflict between the prescriptions of a moral theory and our ordinary way of thinking raises a question about how moral theories are to be evaluated. If a moral theory conflicts with our commonsense, pre-reflective morality, it could be that the theory is wrong or our moral convictions are wrong. Do we revise our practices, our morality, to accord with the theory? Or do we reject the theory, and try to find another one that fits better with our moral convictions? The most sensible approach seems to be somewhere in between: we should try to find a reflective equilibrium between our moral theories and our intuitive judgments of moral rightness and wrongness. The strategy is to anchor our moral theories in some of our most deeply rooted judgments. Intuitions regarding murder, theft and rape are perhaps so central that if a theory does not accommodate the point that (e.g.) rape is always wrong this is a deficiency of the theory. However, part of the point of moral theorizing is to gain a better understanding of the properties of actions that make them right and wrong. Once a theory is justified by a significant number of deep intuitions, we may refine our moral judgments based on insights gained from the theory. Once this has been achieved it can be said that our morality has been internalised (as opposed to being shaped from outside influences such as family and society) and that a shift has occurred from pre-‘rational’ or ‘group’ morality to ‘rational’ or ‘reflective’ morality.

Metaethics and Morality

Unlike the normative theories discussed above, metaethics does not propound any moral prinicples or goals, but is involved entirely in philosophical analysis. It is concerned with the nature of judgments of right and wrong, as well as with defining ethical terms, such as value terms such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. In other words, metaethics attempts to answer epistemological, logical and semantic questions relating to ethics. In the Anglophone world, twentieth century philosophers have focused tremendously on meta-ethics rather than normative ethics.

Moral Relativism

As discussed initially under descriptive morality, morality is specific to a society or group or individual, and is the code of conduct under which they operate. Some philosophers have concluded from this that moral rules are nothing other than social conventions of particular cultural groups. This entails that the judgment that, for example, lying is always wrong is simply an expression of the beliefs of a group of people, and it is their beliefs about the matter that make it true. This view is called moral relativism. In other words there is no objective rational and valid universal morality (as is claimed by normative theorists who maintain that while morality is obviously influenced by society, that our moral judgements would no longer differ if we were fully enlightened rational agents).

Emotivism & Prescriptivism

Emotivists such as A.J. Ayer, and C.L. Stevenson, hold that evaluations express the speaker’s feelings and attitudes: saying that kindness is good is a way of expressing one’s approval of kindness. Therefore, moral judgements are not objective and do not state any sort of morally truths; rather they are simply expressions of emotions. Similarly, R.M Hare argues that evaluations (moral judgments) are prescriptions (commands): saying that kindness is good is a way of telling people that they should be kind. Moral evaluative judgments are then understood as emotive or prescriptive, and are contrasted with descriptive judgments. Descriptive judgments are appraisable as true or false whereas evaluative judgments are not.

Moral skepticism

Moral skepticism is the view that we have no moral knowledge. Extreme moral skeptics have claimed that all moral beliefs are false, a view which is known as moral nihilism. Nihilists such as J.L. Mackie argue that moral claims are false because they implicitly presuppose objective values which do not exist, leading to what is known as “error theory”. Other skeptics take a less extreme position and take on a line of argument that builds on moral relativism by claiming that outside cultural influences are so strong that there is no way we can ever objectively assess morality, and that this inevitable bias makes moral beliefs unjustifiable. Arguing from the other direction are skeptics such as Richard Joyce, who argue that it is not outside or cultural influences that make moral claims unjustifiable, but rather the fact that our morality is so internalized that makes objective moral truths impossible. Joyce argues that mankind has evolved to hold moral beliefs and we would hold them regardless of whether they are right or wrong, this is known as the argument from evolution.

Morality and Ethics

What is the relation between morality and ethics? Some philosophers hold that there is no substantial difference between the two concepts, and understand the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ as near synonyms. On the other hand, philosophers, such as Nietzsche, Bernard Williams and Elizabeth Anscombe, may be understood as arguing that there are significant differences. Morality, or the ‘morality system’ on this view is a component—indeed pernicious component— of ethics. The contrast is drawn between morality as system of absolute rules or moral obligations, such as those issued in the Ten Commandments, and other notions pertaining to how to live maximally happy life.

Nietzsche’s criticism of ‘morality’ revolves around his notion of slave morality. Slave morality, which corresponds closely to Judeo-Christian morality with its focus on duty and self-sacrifice, says Nietzsche, originates in the resentment of the weak and oppressed. Slaves morality is a subversion of master morality—the natural states of the strong—in which noble and life affirming values have been transformed in vices, and the contrary, slavish and life-negating values, transformed in values. Slave morality is the outcome of weak people’s coming to regard the qualities of the naturally strong as evil, and transforming their own resentment into current conceptions of morality, which have greatly debilitated human life. (See Beyond Good and Evil, sects 60-8; Genealogy of morals, First essay.) Nietzsche may it seems be interpreted as saying that morality—understood as slave morality— is life negating and should be abolished.

Similarly, in an article “Modern Moral Philosophy” Elizabeth Anscombe argues that duty based conceptions of morality are conceptually incoherent for they are based on the idea of a "law without a lawgiver". The point is that a system of morality conceived along the lines of the Ten Commandments, as a system of rules for action, depends (she claims) on someone having actually made these rules. However, in a modern climate, which is unwilling to accept that morality depends on God in this way, the rule-based conception of morality is stripped of its metaphysical foundation. Anscombe recommends a return the eudaimonistic ethical theories of the ancients, particularly Aristotle, which ground morality in the interests and well being of human moral agents, and can do so without appealing to any questionable metaphysics. Again, Anscombe’s point may be understood in terms of the abolition of morality and the return to ethics.

References and further reading

Introductory works

DeMarco, Joseph P. Moral Theory: A Contemporary Overview. Jones & Bartlett Publishers, Boston. 1996. Feldman, F. Introductory Ethics. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1978. Frankena, William K. Ethics (Second Ed.). Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1973 Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (2nd Ed). Heritage Series in Philosophy. McGraw-Hill, Inc., Singapore. 1993.

See also

• Ethics
• Secular ethics
• Mores
• Ethos
• Norms
• Moral relativism
• Moral absolutism
• Consequentialism
• Deontology
• Applied ethics
• Moral particularism
• Guilt
• Criticism of Atheism
• Criticism of Religion
• Conscience
• Kohlberg's stages of moral development
• Public morality
• The ends justify the means
• Moral Zeitgeist

Bibliography

• Walker, Martin G. LIFE! Why We Exist...And What We Must Do to Survive ([1] Wiki Book Page) ([2] Web Site), Dog Ear Publishing, 2006, ISBN 1-59858-243-7
• Trompenaars, Fons. Did the Pedestrian Die? ISBN 1-84112-436-2

External links

• Fairness Judgments: Genuine Morality or Disguised Egoism? Psychological Article on Fairness (registration required)
• Morals and Conscience in Society
• The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the Definition of Morality
• Objective Morality An evolutionary approach
• Christian and Muslim debates on Morality
• Morality and Judaism chabad.org
• An article that focuses on the Biological basis of morality is available at Geeta-kavita.com
• Wiki site for discussing and taking action on shared morals (WorldMoralMovement.org)
• Morals and Ethics in Islam
• Understanding the Islam, Christianity Debate
• How Sex Was Made A Sin

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