Land value tax

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Land value taxation (LVT) (or site value taxation) is an ad valorem tax where only the value of land itself is taxed. This ignores buildings, improvements, and personal property. Because of this, LVT is different from other property taxes on real estate—the combination of land, buildings, and improvements to land. Every jurisdiction that has a real estate property tax has an element of land value tax, because land value contributes to overall property value.

Pre-modern

Land value taxation has ancient roots, tracing back to after the introduction of agriculture. One of the oldest forms of taxation, it was originally based on crop yield. This early version of the tax required simply sharing the yield at the time of the harvest, akin to paying a yearly rent.

Physiocrats

The physiocrats were a group of economists who believed that the wealth of nations was derived solely from the value of land agriculture or land development. Physiocracy is considered one of the "early modern" schools of economics. Physiocrats called for the abolition of all existing taxes, completely free trade, and a single tax on land; they did not distinguish, however, between intrinsic value of land and ground rent.

Their theories originated in France and were most popular during the second half of the 18th century. The movement was particularly dominated by Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727–1781) and François Quesnay (1694–1774). (Steiner 2003: p.62. ) It immediately preceded the first modern school, classical economics, which began with the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations in 1776.

Quesnay (founder of the Physiocratic school) claimed in his Fourth Maxim:

That the ownership of the landed properties and the mobile wealth be assured to those who are their legitimate possessors; for the of property is the essential fundamentals of the economic order of society (Oncken 1888, 331).

When Quesnay argued that “the security of property is the fundamental essential of the economic order of society,” the reason he advanced for its necessity is that:

Without the certainty of ownership, the territory would rest uncultivated. There would be neither proprietors nor tenants responsible for making the necessary expenditures to develop and cultivate it, if the preservation of the land and produce were not assured to those who advance these expenditures. It is the security of permanent possession which induces the work and the employment of wealth to the improvement and to the cultivation of land and to the enterprises of commerce and industry (Oncken 1888, 331-332).

In the context of property (land) taxes the Physiocrats were not unduly hostile to taxation per se; rather they attribute to taxation (and government) considerable positive social significance. In short, taxation becomes less of a nemesis and more of an instrument of social utility. Indeed, a principle of

Physiocratic tax theory was that:

Tax, if kept within its rational limits, is not a burden at all. On the contrary, is a condition toward the maximization of the national dividend…, and …..., taxation for the Physiocrats was …a problem not of a burden laid on individual producer’s shoulders for the sake of keeping the consumptive governmental machine going, but... a problem of distribution between productive agents—the State being counted among them according to his (its) proper nature—of a total national dividend produced by the same agents (Einaudi 1933, 131-135).

Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, one of the leading physiocrats.

The Physiocrats were also highly influential in the early history of land value taxation in the United States.

Physiocrat influence in the United States came by Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson as Ambassadors to France, and Jefferson brought his friend Pierre du Pont to the United States to promote the idea. A statement in the 36th Federalist Paper reflects that influence, "A small land tax will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource."

Thomas Paine contended in his Agrarian Justice pamphlet that all citizens should be paid 15 pounds at age 21 "as a compensation in part for the loss of his or her natural inheritance by the introduction of the system of landed property." This proposal was the origin of the citizen's dividend advocated by Geolibertarianism.

Henry George’s alternative suggestion of single rent-of-land tax

Henry George in 1865.

Henry George (September 2, 1839 – October 29, 1897) was an American Journalist and political economist who advocated a "Single Tax" on land. In 1879 he authored Progress and Poverty, which significantly influenced land taxation in the United States.

His solution lay in the taxation of the rent of land and natural opportunities — that is, the recapture of rent for public use, rather than the taxation of labor and capital. George said:

"......We have reached the deplorable circumstance where in large measure a very powerful few are in possession of the earth's resources, the land and its riches and all the franchises and other privileges that yield a return. These positions are maintained virtually without taxation; they are immune to the demands made on others ….The very poor, who have nothing, are the object of compulsory charity. And the rest — the workers, the middle-class, the backbone of the country — are made to support the lot by their labor……We are taxed at every point of our lives, on everything we earn, on everything we save, on much that we inherit, on much that we buy at every stage of the manufacture and on the final purchase. The taxes are punishing, crippling, demoralizing. Also they are, to a great extent, unnecessary......"( George, 1879.)

According to George, the nation is no longer comprised of the thirteen original states, nor of the thirty-seven younger sister states, but of the real powers: the cartels, the corporations. Owning the bulk of our productive resources, they are the issue of that concentration of ownership that George saw evolving, and warned against. He saw nothing wrong with private corporations owning the means of producing wealth. Georgists believe in private enterprise, and in its virtues and incentives to produce at maximum efficiency. It is the insidious linking together of special privilege, the unjust outright private ownership of natural or public resources, monopolies, franchises, that produce unfair domination and autocracy.

The means of producing wealth differ at the root: some is thieved from the people and some is honestly earned. George differentiated; Marx did not. The consequences of our failure to discern lie at the heart of our trouble.

However, shortly after George's death, it dropped out of the political field. Once a badge of honor, the title, "Single Taxer," came into general disuse. Except in Australia and New Zealand, Taiwan and Hong Kong and scattered cities around the world, his plan of social action has been neglected while those of Marx, Keynes, Galbraith and Friedman have won great attention, and Marx's has been given partial implementation, for a time, at least, in large areas of the globe.

Arguments for Land Value Taxation

There are both equity and efficiency arguments for land value taxation:

• The equity argument is that land is given by nature and the value of the land was not created by human effort. Furthermore, increases in the value of land are caused by public services and economic development in the neighborhood, not by the effort of the landowner. For example, the construction of an interstate highway will increase the value of land near a highway interchange as this becomes a more desirable site for business development. Therefore, it is argued, because the landowner has done nothing to deserve the gain from his ownership of land, the government should capture this gain through taxation and use it for the benefit of all members of society. However, as discussed in section IV below, there are also equity arguments against replacing the current system of property taxation with a tax only on land values ( Beck 2004.)

• The efficiency argument for land value taxation is that, unlike almost all other taxes, it does not discourage productive activity or distort choices among consumer goods. A tax on wages discourages work effort. The property tax on improvments discourages construction and other improvements. Tariffs on imported goods discourage international trade. But the supply of land is fixed, given by nature. A tax on the value of land (based on its potential use), will not discourage the landowner from making the land available. The owner must pay the same tax regardless of what he does or does not do with the land. It should be noted that the method of assessing land values is crucial; changes in the market value of land attributable to permanent improvements to a site should not be included in the taxable land value ( Beck 2004.)

A supply and demand diagram showing the effects of land value taxation. Note that the burden of the tax falls entirely on the land owner, and there is no deadweight loss.

Most taxes distort economic decisions ( Coughlin 1999: p.263-4 .) If labor, buildings or machinery and plants are taxed, people are dissuaded from constructive and beneficial activities, and enterprise and efficiency are penalized due to the excess burden of taxation. This does not apply to LVT, which is payable regardless of whether or how well the land is actually used, because the supply of land is inelastic, market land rents depend on what tenants are prepared to pay rather than on the expenses of landlords, and so LVT cannot be passed on to tenants.

The only alleged direct effect of LVT on prices is to lower the market price of land. Put another way, LVT is often said to be justified for economic reasons because if it is implemented properly, it will not deter production, distort market mechanisms or otherwise create deadweight losses the way other taxes do.

Economic Notion

In the strictly economic sense, land is not a unique asset in two main ways:

• ( 1 ) in the nature of “rent” and

• ( 2 ) in its being capitalized on the market.

Rent, as Frank A. Fetter ( Fetter 1977) pointed out, is the hire-price of a unit of a durable asset. ( Actually, we might even go further and say that rent is any unit-price of a good.) The selling-price of an asset on the market will be the capitalized value of its expected future rents: the capitalization to take place at the going rate of interest. The rate of interest is the price of “time,” and hence future earnings are discounted back to the present at this rate. A piece of land sells now at the discounted sum of its future rents. Similarly, any asset will sell at the capitalized value of its future earnings; and where these earnings accrue from hiring out, the rent selling-price relation will be the same.

An argument can be made that if Rembrandts are habitually rented out to museums, they will earn, say, per monthly rents; tuxedos will earn nightly rents, and so on. Admittedly, land differs from improvable capital because land is not replaceable, and therefore land earns ultimate rents. Or, to phrase it differently, a machine may earn rents (usually in self-imputed earnings, but sometimes as being “hired out”) but they are gross rents, since it in turn must be produced by land and labor. Over the whole economy, then, the prices of capital goods are imputed backward to land and labor, until finally, the net incomes are earned by: land, time, labor (including entrepreneurship). However, land is also capitalized on the market and any increase in its prospective earnings raises its capital value. Hence, land’s net rents are also capitalized, and we have as ultimate net incomes only: (a) labor (earning wages), (b) time (earning interest) and (c) profits (for entrepreneurial foresight) minus losses due to poor entrepreneurial judgment ( Rothbard 1997.)

Noted Irish nationalist Dawitt thinks along the same lines:

“…I would abolish land monopoly by simply taxing all land, exclusive of improvements, up to its full value...In other words, I would recognize private property in the results of labour, and not in land. ….”( Dawitt 1902-4)

Ethics

In religious terms, it has been claimed that land is a common gift to all of mankind. For example, the Catholic Church as part of its "Universal Destination" principle asserts:

Everyone knows that the Fathers of the Church laid down the duty of the rich toward the poor in no uncertain terms. As St. Ambrose put it: "You are not making a gift of what is yours to the poor man, but you are giving him back what is his. You have been appropriating things that are meant to be for the common use of everyone. The earth belongs to everyone, not to the rich."

Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio

LVT is also purported to act as value capture tax (Coughlin 1999: p.263. ) A new public works project may make adjacent land go up considerably in value, and thus, with a tax on land values, the tax on adjacent land goes up. Thus, the new public improvements would be paid for by those most benefited by the new public improvements - those whose land value went up most.

Real estate values

The selling price of land titles is proportional to the expected profits from rent or investment after taxes in the Rothbard sence ( Rothbard 1997), so LVT would reduce the capital value of all real estate owners' holdings.

Critics warn that a rapid reduction of real estate values could have profoundly negative effects on banks and other financial institutions whose asset portfolios are dominated by real estate mortgage debt, and could thus threaten the stability of the whole financial system. However, the lending of money for real estate purchase and the use of land titles as collateral is itself a cause of instability in the financial system and was the primary factor in the rapid increase in real estate prices in the years from 2000 to 2007, and the subsequent collapse.^{[citation needed]}

If the value to landowners were reduced to zero or near zero by recovering effectively all its rent, total privately held asset values could decline as the land value element was stripped out, representing a shift in apparent private sector wealth but which is in fact a paper value only. Most LVT advocates support a gradual shift to avoid disrupting the economy, and argue that the reduction in private rent collection would result in increased net wages received from employment and asset growth from entrepreneurial activity.

Well-being of Inhabitants

The current structure of our property tax system actually encourages sprawl. Since municipalities currently calculate property taxes based on the value of the land plus the value of the buildings on the site, landowners who improve buildings or use land more efficiently face tax hikes. This creates a disincentive to re-development into more people-friendly communities. The current system is a tax on smart growth. And that's not smart. This tax structure helps fuel the land speculation that drives sprawl. On the outskirts of cities, land gets snapped up by speculators who then wait for land values to rise as the suburbs move closer. When that happens, the speculator sells the land to a developer, who puts up buildings quickly and cheaply to maximize profit. This creates unimaginative and inefficient suburbs, rather than more walkable, self-contained communities where people can live, work, shop and play. At the city core, speculation works the other way. Speculators buy run-down properties and deliberately keep them in poor condition until they can negotiate tax breaks on the improvements. If speculators don't receive lower assessments from the city for their neglected buildings, they demolish them. These vacant lots and abandoned buildings deprive cities of much-needed tax revenue, reduce property values and detract from the vibrancy and livability of the city ( De Jong, 2008 .)

Arguments against the LVT

In theory, levying a Land Value Tax is straightforward, requiring only a valuation of the land and a register of the identities of the landholders. There is no need for the tax payers to deal with complicated forms or to give up personal information as with an income tax. Because land cannot be hidden, removed to a tax haven or concealed in an electronic data system, the tax can not be evaded.

However, critics point out that determining the value of land can be difficult in practice. In a 1796 United States Supreme Court opinion, Justice William Paterson noted that leaving the valuation process up to assessors would cause numerous bureaucratic complexities, as well as non-uniform assessments due to imperfect policies and their interpretations. Austrian School economist Murray Rothbard later raised similar concerns, stating that no government can fairly assess value, which can only be determined by a free market.

When compared to modern-day property tax evaluations, valuations of land involve fewer variables and have smoother gradients than valuations that include improvements. This is due to variation of building style, quality and size between lots. Modern computerization and statistical techniques have eased the process; in the 1960s and 1970s, multivariate analysis was introduced as a method of assessing land.

Political Considerations

Advocates of any tax reform proposal need to consider likely sources of opposition and support and to devise strategies to minimize opposition and build a coalition of supporters. Opponents of land value taxation have often charged that this would shift the burden of taxation to farmers, who own large areas of land (Peirce 2003, 6). Although in fact family farmers might benefit from an increase in the tax rate on land value offset by a reduction in the tax on improvements (Wenzer 1999, 239-268), a reform strategy assuaging farmers' fears would have greater chance of success. Limiting land value taxation to urban areas rather than adopting it as the "single tax" for all state and local government revenues would eliminate opposition from farmers. Environmentalists are not often allies of libertarians, but land value taxation is one issue which both might support. Environmentalists support replacing the property tax on improvements with land value taxation in urban areas because it would encourage more development in urban centers and discourage sprawl (Durning and Bauman 1998, 57-65; Wenzer 1999, 205-223).

Implementation Issues

"An old tax is a good tax." This adage does not merely reflect the fact that people prefer the taxes to which they have grown accustomed to new, unfamiliar taxes. The implementation of any tax reform affecting the taxation of durable assets raises serious equity issues, and land is the most durable of assets. This is due to the phenomenon of "tax capitalization." The value of an asset reflects the present value of the expected future income to be derived from that asset. Anticipated future taxes reduce the expected future income and thus are "capitalized" in the value of the asset ( Beck,2004) To understand how tax capitalization may create inequities when unexpected tax reforms are implemented, consider an unanticipated shift from a property tax applied at the same rate to land and improvements to a tax on only land value that yields the same total revenue. Compare the effects of this change on the values of two properties, a parking lot and a parcel with a ten-story office building. Almost all of the value of the parking lot is the land value, but most of the value of the parcel with the office building consists of "improvements." The market value of the office building will increase as the anticipated future taxes fall, and the value of the parking lot will fall as the tax rate on the land value increases. When the current owners of these properties purchased them, they each paid a price that reflected the expectation that the old property tax system would continue into the future. The unanticipated tax reform causes a "windfall gain" to the owner of the office building and a "windfall loss" to the owner of the parking lot. Many people consider such windfalls "unfair" ( Beck, 2004.) One method to ameliorate such windfalls is to implement tax reforms gradually. For example, rather than immediately abolishing the property tax on improvements and imposing a tax on land values sufficient to raise all the desired revenue, a "split-rate" property tax might be adopted. Under this system the land component of property values is taxed at a higher rate than the tax rate on improvements.

Sufficiency of revenue

In the context of land value taxation as a single tax (replacing all other taxes), some have argued that LVT alone cannot raise large enough revenues ( Posner , Richard A. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 458-59 (3rd ed. 1986)</ref> However, this is based on the fallacious assumption that land values would not change as existing taxes were phased out. But the presence of existing taxes has the effect of depressing land values. Thus, the phasing out of these existing taxes would lead to an increase in land values, and in this way the tax base itself would grow. It has also been argued that increasing LVT at the expense of other taxes would reduce government expenditure on welfare.

In a study for the Institute of Economic Affairs, Harrison has calculated that the indirect (deadweight) cost of the UK tax system is about 12% of national wealth. Most modern LVT systems are alongside other taxes, and thus only reduce their impact without removing them completely.

In a case or event where a jurisdiction attempted to levy a land tax that was higher than the entire landowner surplus, it would result in the abandonment of property by those who would be paying and a sharp decline in tax revenue. Whilst this is obviously the case theoretically, it sets a natural ceiling on the amount of LVT that can be levied.

Legal Issues in the US

There are two legal obstacles unique to land value taxation in the United States: uniformity clauses and Dillon's Rule. At the federal level, land value taxation is legal so long as it is apportioned among the states.

• Uniformity clauses

The United States legal system includes "uniformity clauses," which require that all taxation is applied evenly within a jurisdiction. Although the federal Uniformity Clause has never been an issue, many state constitutions have their own uniformity clauses, and the wording and interpretation of these clauses varies from state to state. For example in 1898, prior to an amendment of the Maryland Declaration of Rights which now specifically allows for land value taxation, the Maryland Court of Appeals (the highest state appellate court) ruled that the use of land value taxation in Hyattsville was unconstitutional. However, the uniformity clause in Pennsylvania has been broadly construed, and land value taxation has been used since 1913.

Each state will have its own legal stance or lack of any stance on LVT; some uniformity clauses explicitly allow some types of classifications of property, some have no uniformity clause, and some do not specifically discuss land qua land at all. Except for the Maryland case of Hyattsville, no state courts have squarely ruled that land and improvements are actually "classes" of property such that uniformity clauses are applicable. As a general rule, as long as each type of property (land, improvements, personal) is taxed uniformly there is no constitutional obstacle. In addition, no court other than the 1898 case in Maryland has actually struck down an attempt to implement land value taxation on the basis of a state uniformity clause.

Even in rather strict uniformity clause states, it is unclear whether the uniformity clause actually prohibits separate land value taxation. Some states have other constitutional provisions - for example in New Jersey, which gives localities maximum home rule authority and have not adopted Dillon's Rule. While the uniformity clauses might be interpreted to prohibit state-wide action, local action may be legitimate.

• Local authorization ( Dillon Rule)

Although uniformity clauses do not seem to be a major obstacle in most jurisdictions to land value taxation, control of local authority by the state legislature remains a real obstacle, requiring the need for local enabling authority or the abrogation of Dillon's Rule. The theory of state preeminence over local governments was expressed as Dillon's Rule in a 1868 case, where it was stated that "[m]unicipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so may it destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control." As opposed to Dillon's Rule, the Cooley Doctrine expressed the theory of an inherent right to local self determination. In a concurring opinion, Michigan Supreme Court Judge Thomas Cooley in 1871 stated: "[L]ocal government is a matter of absolute right; and the state cannot take it away." In Maryland, for example, municipal corporations have the right to implement land value taxation, but the counties, including Baltimore City which is treated as a county in Maryland for certain purposes, do not.

Legal Issues in Other Countries

In some countries, LVT is nearly impossible to implement because of lack of certainty regarding land titles and clearly established land ownership and tenure. If the government can not accurately define ownership boundaries and ascertain the proper owner, it cannot know from whom to collect the tax. The phenomena of lack of clear titles is found world-wide in developing countries and is in part the subject of the work of the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto. In African countries with imperfect land registration, boundaries may be poorly surveyed, the landlord can be elusive and significantly more difficult to tax than occupants, but most governments require that tax collectors track owners down nonetheless so that the burden of the tax does not fall on the poor.

Existing tax systems

United States

Land value taxes are used in various jurisdictions of the United States, particularly in the state of Pennsylvania. Every single state in the United States has some form of property tax on real estate and hence, in part, a tax on land value. There are several cities that use LVT to varying degrees, but LVT in its purest form is not used on state or national levels. Land value taxation was tried in the South during Reconstruction as a way to promote land reform. There have also been several attempts throughout history to introduce land value taxation on a national level. In Hylton v. United States, the Supreme Court directly acknowledged that a Land Tax was constitutional, so long as it was apportioned equally among the states. Two of the associate justices explained in their summaries, stating:

[T]he Constitution declares, ... both in theory and practice, a tax on land is deemed to be a direct tax. ... I never entertained a doubt, that the principal, I will not say, the only, objects, that the framers of the Constitution contemplated as falling within the rule of apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land.

Justice William Paterson

I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on land.

Justice Samuel Chase

There have also been attempts since then to introduce land value tax legislation, such as the Federal Property Tax Act of 1798, and HR 6026, a bill introduced to the United States House of Representatives on February 20, 1935 by Theodore L. Moritz of Pennsylvania. HR 6026 would have imposed a national 1% tax on the value of land in excess of $3,000.

• Single taxThe first city in the United States to enact land value taxation was Hyattsville, Maryland in 1898, through the efforts of Judge Jackson H. Ralston. The Maryland Courts subsequently found it to be barred by the Maryland Constitution. Judge Ralston and his supporters commenced a campaign to amend the state Constitution which culminated in the Art. 15 of the Declaration of Rights (which remains today part of the Maryland State Constitution). In addition, he helped see that enabling legislation for towns be passed in 1916, which also remains in effect today. The towns of Fairhope, Alabama and Arden, Delaware were later founded as model Georgist communities or "single tax colonies."

• Two-rate taxation

Nearly 20 Pennsylvania cities in the USA employ a two-rate or split-rate property tax: taxing the value of land at a higher rate and the value of the buildings and improvements at a lower one. This can be seen as a compromise between pure LVT and an ordinary property tax falling on real estate (land value plus improvement value). Alternatively, two-rate taxation may be seen as a form that allows gradual transformation of the traditional real estate property tax into a pure land value tax.

Nearly two dozen local Pennsylvania jurisdictions (such as Harrisburg) use two-rate property taxation in which the tax on land value is higher and the tax on improvement value is lower. Pittsburgh used the two-rate system from 1913 to 2001 when a countywide property reassessment led to a drastic increase in assessed land values during 2001 after years of underassessment, and the system was abandoned in favor of the traditional single-rate property tax. The tax on land in Pittsburgh was about 5.77 times the tax on improvements. Notwithstanding the change in 2001, the Pittsburgh Improvement District still employs a pure land value taxation as a surcharge on the regular property tax. In 2000, Florenz Plassmann and Nicolaus Tideman wrote that when comparing Pennsylvania cities using a higher tax rate on land value and a lower rate on improvements with similar sized Pennsylvania cities using the same rate on land and improvements, the higher land value taxation leads to increased construction within the jurisdiction.

Other countries

Pure LVT, apart from real estate or generic property taxation, is used in Taiwan, Singapore, and Estonia. It is currently being introduced in Namibia, and there are campaigns for its introduction to South Korea and Scotland. Many more countries have used it in the past, particularly Denmark and Japan. Hong Kong is perhaps the best modern example of the successful implementation of a high LVT. The Hong Kong government generates more than 35% of its revenue from land taxes. Because of this, they can keep their other taxes rates low or non-existent and still generate a budget surplus.

Several cities around the world also use LVT, including Sydney, Canberra, and others in Australia. An in-depth study under the Chairmanship of Sir Gordon Chalk issued a report in 1986 on the subject of local taxation for the city of Brisbane, Queensland. The report, which examined many alternative means of local finance, sets out comprehensive and concise arguments for LVT. It has also been used in Mexicali, Mexico.

Conclusion

For those who believe markets generally allocate resources efficiently, the best tax is one which creates the least distortion of market incentives. A tax on the value of land meets this criterion. Furthermore, the benefits of local government services will be reflected in the value of land within the locality. Therefore, it may be deemed fair that landowners pay taxes to finance these services in proportion to the value of the benefits they receive. Without workers, there would be no labour. Without savers, there would be no capital. So you can justify both wages and capital. But why do landowners deserve rent? Without landowners, the land and natural resources would still be available. They have existed since the planet was formed. They have not been created by human effort or ingenuity. Even land drainage or reclamation requires labour and capital applied to natural resources ( Wetzel 2004)

At the moment, however, we penalise, with higher business rates, people who improve their buildings, while we reward, with lower rates, those who let their buildings fall into disrepair. LVT would bring idle land in towns and cities into use. This would reduce costly urban sprawl. The extra supply of land would cut land prices and so cut accommodation costs for homes and business premises.

It is impossible to avoid LVT - land cannot be taken to Jersey in a suitcase. Consequently, it will be cheap to collect. It will require not only fewer tax collectors, but also fewer lawyers and accountants, employed in the private sector to advise on tax dodges - another cost that falls on both taxpayers and consumers ( Wetzel 2004). Although Henry George advocated a tax on land values as the "single tax" to replace all other taxes, a tax on land value seems especially appropriate for municipal governments. If a complete shift from the current property tax to a tax on land value alone seems too radical, municipal governments might reduce the property tax rate on improvements while imposing a higher tax rate on the value of land. Land value taxation has been under consideration in several eastern European countries. As reported by Youngman and Malme (1999), Estonia adopted a tax on the market value of land in 1992. Nations considering a tax structure fostering a market economy in the post-communist era may present one of the most promising opportunities for implementing land value taxation.

References

ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

• Beck, John. H., Libertarianism and Land Value Taxation, publ. Free State Project Inc., 21 Sep 2004

• Coughlin, J. Anthony. "Land Value Taxation and Constitutional Uniformity," Geo. Mason L. Rev., Winter 1999, Vol. 7, No. 2

• Davitt, Michael, Some Suggestions for a Final Settlement of the Land Question, Dublin: Gill & Son 1902
• De Jong, Frank, “Tax land, not homes,” Ottawa Citizen, February 12, 2008
• de Tocqueville, Alexis, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Doubleday Anchor, Garden City, 1955, p. 159
• George, H., Progress and Poverty, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1879
• Durning, Alan Thein, and Yoram Bauman, Tax Shift: How to Help the Economy, Improve the Environment, and Get the Tax Man off Our Backs, Seattle: Northwest Environment Watch, 1998.
• Einaudi, Luigi “The Physiocratic Theory of Taxation,” in: Economic Essays in Honour of Gustav Cassel, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1933, pp. 131-35
• Fetter, Frank. Capital, Interest, and Rent. Murray N. Rothbard, Ed. Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews, and McMeel, Inc. 1977. Part 2, Essay 2, para. 13.
• Oncken, Auguste (ed.), Oeuvres Economiques et Philosophiques de F. Quesnay , Joseph Baer, Paris, 1888, p. 331
• Ó Siochrú, Emer,”Land Value Tax: Unfinished business,” FEASTA, November 2004
• Posner , Richard A. ,Economic Analysis of Law, (3rd ed.), Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., pp. 458-59, 1986
• Rothbard Murray N, The Logic of Action One: Applications and Criticisms from the Austrian School, London: Edward Elgar, 1997, 305-310.
• Samuels, Warren J., The Physiocratic Theory of Property and State, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, Feb. 1961, pp. 96-111
• Steiner, Phillippe, Physiocracy and French Pre-Classical Political Economy in eds. Biddle, Jeff E, Davis, Jon B, & Samuels, Warren J. A Companion to the History of Economic Thought p.62. Blackwell Publishing, 2003
• Wenzer, Kenneth C. (ed.), Land-Value Taxation. M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
• Wetzel, D.,"The Case for Taxing Land", NEW STATESMAN, 20 sept.,2004

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