Difference between revisions of "Naturalism (Philosophy)" - New World Encyclopedia

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For '''Naturalism''' in literature and art, see [[Naturalism (literature)]].
  
'''Naturalism''' is any of several philosophical stances, typically those descended from [[materialism]] and [[pragmatism]], that do not distinguish the [[supernatural]] (including strange entities like non-natural values, and universals as they are commonly conceived) from [[nature]]. Naturalism does not necessarily claim that phenomena or hypotheses commonly labeled as [[supernatural]] do not exist or are wrong, but insists that all phenomena and hypotheses can be studied by the same methods and therefore anything considered supernatural is either nonexistent, unknowable, or not inherently different from natural phenomena or hypotheses.  
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'''Naturalism''' designates any of several philosophical stances that make the assumption that nature is governed by objective laws, which can be understood through observation and experimentation without recourse to super-natural or extra-natural reality. Any method of inquiry or investigation or any procedure for gaining [[knowledge]] that limits itself to natural, physical, and material approaches and explanations can be described as naturalistic.
  
Any method of inquiry or investigation or any procedure for gaining [[knowledge]] that limits itself to natural, physical, and material approaches and explanations can be described as naturalistic.
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Naturalism does not distinguish the supernatural (including entities like non-natural values, and [[universals]]) from [[nature]]. It equates nature with reality, insisting that all phenomena and hypotheses can be studied using the same methods. Naturalism implies that all knowledge of the universe can be arrived at through scientific investigation, and that “supernatural” phenomena can be studied through their detectable influence on natural phenomena. Anything labeled “supernatural” is either nonexistent, unknowable, or not inherently different from natural phenomena or hypotheses. Naturalistic philosophy is typically associated with [[materialism]] and [[pragmatism]], and does not give much consideration to [[metaphysics]].
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Naturalism also designates a [[Meta-ethics|meta-ethical]] position in [[ethics]], which holds that ethics can be derived from and are reducible to non-ethical, natural, descriptive facts, and that ethical terms can be defined by non-ethical, natural terms. (See [[Meta-ethics]])
  
Many modern [[Philosophy of science|philosophers of science]]<ref>[http://www.butterfliesandwheels.com/articleprint.php?num=158 Butterflies and wheels article] by [[Raymond Bradley]], Emeritus Professor of Philosophy in New Zealand, [http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/product-description/026216180X The Tower of Babel] by [[Robert T. Pennock]], [http://www.freeinquiry.com/naturalism.html Naturalism is an Essential Part of Science and Critical Inquiry] by [[Steven D. Schafersman]], [http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/001072.html The Leiter Reports], [http://www.arn.org/docs/odesign/od182/ntse182.htm Report on "Naturalism, Theism and the Scientific Enterprise" conference], [http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0195138090/acprof-0195138090-chapter-12.html The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, 11: GOD, SCIENCE, AND NATURALISM] by [[Paul R. Draper]], [http://www.philosophynow.org/issue46/46pigliucci.htm Philosophy Now: The Alleged Fallacies of Evolutionary Theory], [http://www.biology.uiowa.edu/ID.html Statement on Intelligent Design], [http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v6/n12/full/7400589.html Science and fundamentalism] by [[Massimo Pigliucci]], [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/naturalism.html Justifying Methodological Naturalism] by [[Michael Martin (philosopher)]]</ref><ref name=plantinga>[http://www.stnews.org/Commentary-2690.htm Whether ID is science isn't semantics] By [[Alvin Plantinga]] (March 7, 2006)</ref> use the terms ''methodological naturalism'' or ''scientific naturalism'' to refer to the long standing convention in [[science]] of the [[scientific method]], which makes the [[methodology|methodological]] assumption that [[observation|observable]] effects in [[nature]] are best explainable only by similarly natural causes, and with irrelevance to the assumption of the existence or non-existence of supernatural elements, and so considers supernatural explanations for such events to be outside of science. They contrast this with the approach known as ''ontological naturalism'' or ''[[metaphysical naturalism]]'', which refers to the [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] [[belief]] that the natural world (including the universe) is all that exists, and therefore nothing [[supernatural]] exists.
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== History ==
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The ideas and assumptions of philosophical naturalism were first seen in the works of the [[Ionian School|Ionian]] [[Pre-Socratic philosophy|pre-Socratic philosophers]]. [[Thales]], often regarded as the founder of science, was the first to give explanations of natural events without resorting to supernatural causes such as the actions of the Greek gods. Jonathan Barnes's introduction to ''Early Greek Philosophy'' (Penguin) describes these early philosophers as subscribing to principles of empirical investigation that strikingly anticipate naturalism.
  
This distinction between approaches to the philosophy of naturalism is made by philosophers supporting science and [[evolution]] in the [[Creation-evolution controversy|creation&ndash;evolution controversy]] to counter the tendency of some proponents of [[Creationism]] or [[intelligent design]] to refer to ''methodological naturalism'' as ''scientific materialism'' or as ''methodological materialism'' and conflate it with ''metaphysical naturalism'' to support their claim that modern science is [[atheist]]ic. They contrast this with their preferred approach of a revived [[natural philosophy]] which welcomes supernatural explanations for natural phenomena and supports "[[Theistic realism|theistic science]]" or [[pseudoscience]].
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During the twelfth century, after the works of [[Aristotle]] became available to European scholars in [[Latin]], [[scholasticism|scholastic]] thinkers began to formulate a rational explanation of the universe.
  
== Definition of Methodological Naturalism==
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:“By the late Middle Ages the search for natural causes had come to typify the work of [[Christianity|Christian]] natural philosophers. Although characteristically leaving the door open for the possibility of direct divine intervention, they frequently expressed contempt for soft-minded contemporaries who invoked miracles rather than searching for natural explanations. The University of Paris cleric [[Jean Buridan]] (ca. 1295-ca. 1358), described as "perhaps the most brilliant arts master of the Middle Ages," contrasted the philosopher’s search for "appropriate natural causes" with the common folk’s erroneous habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural. In the fourteenth century the natural philosopher [[Nicole Oresme]] (ca. 1320-1382), who went on to become a [[Roman Catholicism|Roman Catholic]] bishop, admonished that, in discussing various marvels of nature, "there is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us."
=== Methodological naturalism contrasted with metaphysical naturalism ===
 
[[Metaphysical naturalism]], which is often called "philosophical naturalism" or "ontological naturalism", takes an [[ontological]] approach to naturalism. Ontology is a matter of whether something exists, and so this is the view that the [[supernatural]] does not exist, thus entailing [[strong atheism]].
 
  
In contrast, [[methodology|methodological]] naturalism is "the adoption or assumption of philosophical naturalism within [[scientific method]] with or without fully accepting or believing it … science is not metaphysical and does not depend on the ultimate truth of any metaphysics for its success (although science does have metaphysical implications), but methodological naturalism must be adopted as a strategy or working hypothesis for science to succeed. We may therefore be agnostic about the ultimate truth of naturalism, but must nevertheless adopt it and investigate nature as if nature is all that there is."<ref name=neps>[http://www.freeinquiry.com/naturalism.html Naturalism is an Essential Part of Science]</ref>
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:Enthusiasm for the naturalistic study of nature picked up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as more and more Christians turned their attention to discovering the so-called secondary causes that God employed in operating the world. The Italian Catholic [[Galileo Galilei]] (1564-1642), one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature "never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her." <ref>Ronald L. Numbers (2003). "Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs." ''When Science and Christianity Meet,'' edited by David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press), 267.</ref>
  
=== Relationship to the supernatural ===
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During the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], a number of [[philosophy|philosophers]] including [[Francis Bacon]] and [[Voltaire]] outlined the philosophical justifications for removing appeal to supernatural forces from investigation of the natural world. Scientific investigation culminated in the development of modern [[biology]] and [[geology]], which rejected a literal interpretation of the prevailing origin beliefs of the revealed religions.
This definition rules out recourse to the [[supernatural]]. Pennock contends<ref name=lettuce>[[Robert T. Pennock]], [http://www.msu.edu/~pennock5/research/papers/Pennock_SupNatExpl.html Supernaturalist Explanations and the Prospects for a Theistic Science or "How do you know it was the lettuce?"]</ref> that as supernatural agents and powers "are above and beyond the natural world and its agents and powers" and "are not constrained by natural laws", only logical impossibilities constrain what a supernatural agent could not do, and "If we could apply natural knowledge to understand supernatural powers, then, by definition, they would not be supernatural". As the supernatural is necessarily a mystery to us, it can provide no grounds on which to judge scientific models. "Experimentation requires observation and control of the variables … But by definition we have no control over supernatural entities or forces." Allowing science to appeal to untestable supernatural powers would make the scientist's task just too easy, undermining the discipline that allows science to make progress, and "would be as profoundly unsatisfying as the ancient Greek playwright's reliance upon the [[deus ex machina]] to extract his hero from a difficult predicament."
 
  
Naturalism of this sort says nothing about the existence or nonexistence of the [[supernatural]] which by this definition is beyond natural testing. Other philosophers of science hold that some supernatural explanations might be testable in principle, but are so unlikely, given past results, that resources should not be wasted exploring them. Either way, their rejection is only a practical matter, so it is possible to be a methodological naturalist and an ontological supernaturalist at the same time. For example, while natural scientists follow methodological naturalism in their scientific work, they may also believe in God ([[ontological supernaturalism]]), or they may be [[metaphysical naturalism|metaphysical naturalists]] and therefore atheists. This position does not preclude knowledge that derives from the study of what is hitherto considered supernatural, but considers that if such a phenomenon can be scientifically examined and explained naturally, it then ceases to be supernatural.  
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In the 1930s and 1940s, naturalism enjoyed a resurgence in the United States among philosophers such as F. J. E. Woodbridge, [[Morris R. Cohen]], [[John Dewey]], [[Ernest Nagel]], and Sidney Hook.  
  
=== Supporting statements ===
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==Methodological Naturalism==
Supporters of the [[scientific method]] describe methodological naturalism as "effective, powerful"[http://www.freeinquiry.com/naturalism.html], "promoting successful investigation"[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/naturalism/index.html], and "an essential aspect of … the study of the natural universe"[http://chem.tufts.edu/AnswersInScience/MethodologicalNaturalism.htm]. They also view the history of science as showing "a progression from supernaturalism to naturalism"[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/ntse.html]. These supporters consider [[creationism|creationist]] alternatives to be "positively ineffective and counter-productive … in attempts to understand the natural world"[http://www.freeinquiry.com/naturalism.html].
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=== Naturalism as epistemology ===
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During the last half of the twentieth century, philosophers began to seek continuity with science, using scientific methods and knowledge as criteria for judging the validity of philosophical inquiry. "Methodological naturalism" holds that philosophers should use the empirical methods of scientific inquiry to conduct philosophical inquiry. Some methodological naturalists accept other types of philosophical speculation, but contend that only empirical examination can determine whether a particular speculation is truly applicable to human life. Substantive naturalists believe that any legitimate philosophical inquiry must be able to be substantiated by a scientific empirical investigation.  
  
The subject was given detailed attention during the ''[[Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District]]'' trial in 2005, and in his memorandum of findings<ref name=kitz>[[wikisource:Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District 4: whether ID is science#4. Whether ID is Science|Kitzmiller v. Dover: Whether ID is Science]]</ref> United States federal court judge [[John E. Jones III]] concluded that "Methodological naturalism is a 'ground rule' of science today". This ruling sets a federal district judicial precedent in the context of legal restrictions on the teaching of religion in U.S. schools, and more broadly the memorandum sets out an impartial assessment of the evidence and arguments relating to the use in science of methodological naturalism as against supernatural explanations.
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[[W. V. Quine]] describes naturalism as the position that there is no higher tribunal for truth than natural science itself. There is no better method than the scientific method for judging the claims of science, and there is neither any need nor any place for a "first philosophy," such as (abstract) [[metaphysics]] or [[epistemology]], that could stand behind and justify science or the scientific method.
  
== History ==
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Therefore, philosophy should feel free to make use of the findings of scientists in its own pursuit, for example, using scientific studies of the brain to investigate the nature of cognition. Philosophy should also feel free to offer criticism when scientific claims are ungrounded, confused, or inconsistent. In this way philosophy becomes "continuous with" science. Naturalism is not a dogmatic belief that the modern view of science is entirely correct. Instead, it simply holds that the processes of the universe have a scientific explanation, and those processes are what modern science is striving to understand.
The ideas and assumptions of philosophical naturalism were first seen in the work's of the [[ionia|Ionian]] [[Pre-Socratic philosophy|pre-Socratic philosophers]]. Particularly [[Thales]], the man considered to be the father of science, as he was the first to give explanations of natural events without the use of supernatural causes. [[Jonathan Barnes]]'s introduction to Early Greek Philosophy (Penguin) describes these early philosophers as subscribing to principles of empirical investigation that strikingly anticipate naturalism.
 
  
But the modern emphasis in methodological naturalism can be traced back more directly to the ideas of medieval [[scholastic]] thinkers during the [[Renaissance of the 12th century]]:
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===Methodological Naturalism and Science===
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If objective laws and processes of nature did not exist, the pursuit of scientific knowledge would become meaningless. The fact that man continually searches for knowledge of objective truth is considered a confirmation of the naturalistic methodology. Even when one scientific theory is found to be flawed, and is replaced with another, mankind never doubts that the truth will eventually be understood. Theories change, but the method for evolving them does not.
  
:By the late Middle Ages the search for [[natural causes]] had come to typify the work of [[Christian]] [[natural philosopher]]s. Although characteristically leaving the door open for the possibility of direct divine intervention, they frequently expressed contempt for soft-minded contemporaries who invoked miracles rather than searching for natural explanations. The University of Paris cleric [[Jean Buridan]] (a. 1295-ca. 1358), described as "perhaps the most brilliant arts master of the Middle Ages," contrasted the philosopher’s search for "appropriate natural causes" with the common folk’s erroneous habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural. In the fourteenth century the natural philosopher [[Nicole Oresme]] (ca. 1320-82), who went on to become a Roman Catholic [[bishop]], admonished that, in discussing various marvels of nature, "there is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us."
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According to Ronald Numbers, the term "methodological naturalism" was coined in 1983 by Paul de Vries, at Wheaton College, Illinois, to distinguish between what he called "methodological naturalism," a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism," which "denies the existence of a transcendent God." <ref>Nick Matzke [http://www.pandasthumb.org/archives/2006/03/on_the_origins.html On the Origins of Methodological Naturalism]. ''The Pandas Thumb'' (March 20, 2006). Retrieved July 11, 2007.</ref> The term "methodological naturalism" had been used in 1937 by Edgar Sheffield Brightman in an article in ''The Philosophical Review'' as a contrast to "naturalism" in general, but there the idea was not really developed to its more recent distinctions.<ref>Keith Miller [http://www.calvin.edu/archive/asa/200603/0501.html ASA March 2006 - Re: Methodological Naturalism]. Retrieved July 11, 2007.</ref>
  
:Enthusiasm for the naturalistic study of nature picked up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as more and more Christians turned their attention to discovering the so-called [[secondary cause]]s that God employed in operating the world. The Italian Catholic [[Galileo Galilei]] (1564-1642), one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature "never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her." <ref>Ronald L. Numbers (2003). "Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs." In: When Science and Christianity Meet, edited by David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, p. 267.</ref>
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In a series of articles and books from 1996 onwards, Robert T. Pennock wrote using the term “methodological naturalism” to clarify that the [[scientific method]] confines itself to natural explanations without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural. Pennock's testimony as an expert witness<ref>[http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/dover/day3am2.html Kitzmiller trial: testimony of Robert T. Pennock]. Retrieved July 11, 2007.</ref> at the ''Kitzmiller vs. Dover Area School District'' trial in 2005 was cited by United States federal court Judge John E. Jones III  in his ''Memorandum Opinion'' concluding that "Methodological naturalism is a "ground rule" of science today." This ruling set a federal district judicial precedent in the context of legal restrictions on the teaching of religion in U.S. schools, and more broadly the memorandum set out an impartial assessment of the evidence and arguments relating to the use in science of methodological naturalism as against supernatural explanations.
  
During the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], a number of [[philosophers]] including [[Francis Bacon]] and [[Voltaire]] outlined the philosophical justifications for removing appeal to supernatural forces from investigation of the natural world. Subsequent [[scientific revolution]]s would remove much of the remaining theistic baggage from scientific investigation culminating in the development of modern [[biology]] and [[geology]] which rejected a literal interpretation of the prevailing [[origin beliefs]] of the wider society's religion.
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The historical support of methodological naturalism by Christians is noted by Numbers:
  
The term "methodological naturalism" for this approach is much more recent. According to [[Ronald Numbers]], it was coined in 1983 by Paul de Vries, a [[Wheaton College, Illinois|Wheaton College]] philosopher. ''De Vries distinguished between what he called "methodological naturalism," a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism," which "denies the existence of a transcendent God."''<ref>[[Nick Matzke]]: [http://www.pandasthumb.org/archives/2006/03/on_the_origins.html On the Origins of Methodological Naturalism]. ''The Pandas Thumb'' (March 20, 2006)</ref> The term "methodological naturalism" had been used in 1937 by [[Edgar Sheffield Brightman]] in an article in ''The Philosophical Review'' as a contrast to "naturalism" in general, but there the idea was not really developed to its more recent distinctions.<ref>[http://www.calvin.edu/archive/asa/200603/0501.html ASA March 2006 - Re: Methodological Naturalism]</ref>
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<blockquote>Despite the occasional efforts of unbelievers to use scientific naturalism to construct a world without God, it has retained strong Christian support down to the present. And well it might, for ()<!--, as we have seen, —> scientific naturalism was largely made in Christendom by pious Christians. Although it possessed the potential to corrode religious beliefs—and sometimes did so—it flourished among Christian scientists who believe that God customarily achieved his ends through natural causes.<ref>Numbers 2003, op. cit, 284</ref>
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</blockquote>
  
In a series of articles and books from 1996 onwards, [[Robert T. Pennock]] wrote using the term methodological naturalism to clarify that the [[scientific method]] confines itself to natural explanations without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural, and is not based on dogmatic [[metaphysical naturalism]] as claimed by [[creationism|creationists]] and proponents of [[intelligent design]], in particular [[Phillip E. Johnson]]. Pennock's testimony as an expert witness<ref>[http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/dover/day3am2.html Kitzmiller trial: testimony of Robert T. Pennock]</ref> at the [[Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District]] trial was cited by the Judge in his ''Memorandum Opinion'' concluding that "Methodological naturalism is a "ground rule" of science today"<ref name=kitz/>
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== Naturalism and [[Philosophy of Mind]] ==
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There is currently some dispute over whether naturalism altogether rules out certain areas of philosophy which are constructs of the human mind, such as [[semantics]], [[ethics]], [[aesthetics]], or excludes the use of the mentalistic vocabulary ("believes," "thinks") employed in philosophy of mind. Some recent thinkers have argued that even though mentalistic descriptions and value judgments cannot be systematically translated into physicalistic descriptions, they also do not need to presuppose the existence of anything other than physical phenomena.
  
Apart from the creationist claims, the historical support of methodological naturalism by Christians is noted by Numbers:
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Donald Davidson, for example, has argued that individual mental states can (must, in fact) be identical with individual states of the physical brain, even though a given kind of mental state (belief in materialism) might not be systematically identified with a given kind of brain state (a particular pattern of neural firings): the former weakly "supervenes" upon the latter. Recently developed technologies which allow the observation of human brain activity have shown that specific areas of the brain activity are associated with certain types of mental states.
  
:Despite the occasional efforts of unbelievers to use scientific naturalism to construct a world without God, it has retained strong Christian support down to the present. And well it might, for (...)<!--, as we have seen, —> scientific naturalism was largely made in Christendom by pious Christians. Although it possessed the potential to corrode religious beliefs — and sometimes did so — it flourished among Christian scientists who believe that God customarily achieved his ends through natural causes. <ref>Numbers 2003, op cit, p. 284</ref>
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The implication is that naturalism can leave non-physical vocabulary intact where the use of that vocabulary can be explained naturalistically; McDowell has dubbed this level of discourse "second nature."
  
== Naturalism as epistemology ==
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== Criticisms of Naturalism ==
[[W. V. Quine]] describes naturalism as the position that there is no higher tribunal for truth than natural science itself. There is no better method than the scientific method for judging the claims of science, and there is neither any need nor any place for a "first philosophy", such as (abstract) [[metaphysics]] or [[epistemology]], that could stand behind and justify science or the scientific method.
 
 
 
Therefore, philosophy should feel free to make use of the findings of scientists in its own pursuit, while also feeling free to offer criticism when those claims are ungrounded, confused, or inconsistent. In this way philosophy becomes "continuous with" science. Naturalism is not a dogmatic belief that the modern view of science is entirely correct. Instead, it simply holds the processes of the universe have a scientific explanation, and those processes are what modern science is striving to understand.
 
 
 
== Naturalism and philosophy of mind ==
 
There is currently some dispute over whether naturalism rules out certain areas of philosophy altogether, such as [[semantics]], [[ethics]], [[aesthetics]], or excludes the use of mentalistic vocabulary ("believes", "thinks") in philosophy of mind. Quine avoided most of these topics, but some recent thinkers have argued that even though (according to them) mentalistic descriptions and value judgements cannot be systematically translated into physicalistic descriptions, they also do not need to presuppose the existence of anything other than physical phenomena.
 
 
 
[[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]], for example, has argued that individual mental states can (must, in fact) be identical with individual brain states, even though a given kind of mental state (belief in materialism) might not be systematically identified with a given kind of brain state (a particular pattern of neural firings): the former weakly [[supervenience|"supervenes"]] upon the latter. The implication is that naturalism can leave non-physical vocabulary intact where the use of that vocabulary can be explained naturalistically; McDowell has dubbed this level of discourse "second nature".
 
 
 
== Criticism of naturalism ==
 
 
The debate over naturalism is alive and complex, because it concerns both the basis of [[science]], and how narrowly or broadly [[nature]] should be defined.  
 
The debate over naturalism is alive and complex, because it concerns both the basis of [[science]], and how narrowly or broadly [[nature]] should be defined.  
  
 
=== Philosophy ===
 
=== Philosophy ===
[[Karl Popper]] equated naturalism with [[inductive reasoning|inductive]] theory of science. He rejected it based on his general critique of induction (see [[problem of induction]]), yet acknowledged its utility as means for inventing conjectures.
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[[Karl Popper]] equated naturalism with [[inductive reasoning|inductive]] theory of science, and rejected it based on his general critique of induction, while acknowledging its utility as a means for inventing conjectures.
{{quotation|A naturalistic methodology (sometimes called an "inductive theory of science") has its value, no doubt. […] I reject the naturalistic view: It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science, and consequently to its idea of scientific method.|Karl R. Popper| ''[[The Logic of Scientific Discovery]]'' (Routledge, 2002), p. 31, ISBN 0-415-27844-9.}}
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{{quotation|A naturalistic methodology (sometimes called an "inductive theory of science") has its value, no doubt. […] I reject the naturalistic view: It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science, and consequently to its idea of scientific method. <ref>Karl R. Popper ''The Logic of Scientific Discovery'' (London: Routledge, 2002), 31, ISBN 0415278449 </ref>
Popper instead proposed the criterion of [[falsifiability]] for [[demarcation problem|demarcation]].
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Popper instead proposed the criterion of "falsifiability" for demarcation.
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=== Creationism and intelligent design ===
  
Contemporary philosopher [[Alvin Plantinga]] has [[Alvin Plantinga#Evolutionary argument against naturalism|argued]] that evolutionary naturalism is incoherent. In ''Science and Theology News''<ref name=plantinga/> he attacks the conclusions of the Kitzmiller trial and suggests that the term "[[science]]" denotes any activity that is:
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Supporters of [[creationism]] claim that the possibility of supernatural action is unnecessarily excluded by the current practices and theories of science. Proponents of [[intelligent design]], who hold that certain features of the natural world are best explained as the results of a divine intelligence, argue that the naturalist conception of reality may restrict the ability to arrive at a correct understanding of the universe. Their general criticism is that insisting that the natural world is a closed system of inviolable laws, independent of supernatural intervention, will cause science to come to incorrect conclusions and inappropriately exclude research that claims to include such ideas. Contemporary philosopher Alvin Plantinga has argued that evolutionary naturalism is incoherent. In ''Science and Theology News'' <ref>[http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=3331 "Whether ID is Science isn't Semantics: Judge John Jones gave two arguments for his conclusion that ID is not science. Both are unsound, says Alvin Plantinga,"] ''Science & Theology News,'' March 7, 2006. Discovery Institute. Retrieved July 11, 2007.</ref> he attacks the conclusions of the Kitzmiller trial and suggests that the term "[[science]]" denotes any activity that is:
 
# a systematic and disciplined enterprise aimed at finding out truth about our world, and
 
# a systematic and disciplined enterprise aimed at finding out truth about our world, and
 
# has significant empirical involvement. Any activity that meets these vague conditions counts as science.
 
# has significant empirical involvement. Any activity that meets these vague conditions counts as science.
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He concludes "if you exclude the supernatural from science, then if the world or some phenomena within it are supernaturally caused &ndash; as most of the world's people believe &ndash; you won't be able to reach that truth scientifically."
 
He concludes "if you exclude the supernatural from science, then if the world or some phenomena within it are supernaturally caused &ndash; as most of the world's people believe &ndash; you won't be able to reach that truth scientifically."
  
=== Creationism and intelligent design ===
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==Naturalism in Ethics==
Supporters of [[creationism]] claim that the possibility of supernatural action is unnecessarily excluded by the current practices and theories of science. Currently, proponents of [[intelligent design]], who hold that certain features of the natural world are best explained as the results of intelligence, argue that the naturalist conception of reality is not needed in order to do [[science]]. Their general criticism is that insisting that the natural world is a closed system of inviolable laws independent of [[theism]] or supernatural intervention will cause science to come to incorrect conclusions and inappropriately exclude research that claims to include such ideas.
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(See [[Meta-ethics]])
  
The position that if a phenomenon can be scientifically examined and explained naturally it then ceases to be supernatural is disputed by [[supernatural|methodological supernaturalists]], who argue that the position is inherently inconsistent. They ask, how can science presuppose what is discoverable before it has been discovered? What is immeasurable is untestable, until a measuring device is invented and a new discovery process enabled. But in order to be allowed by scientific orthodoxy to discover and invent new ways of testing reality, one must be allowed to engage in scientific pursuits of what is considered unscientific (but then, as stated, the "unscientific" becomes scientific, if it's true). Otherwise, knowledge is limited not as much as by religious dogmas, but by materialistic paradigms. This position is taken by ''intelligent design'' creationists such as the [[Center for Science and Culture]], whose website claims that methodological naturalism limits science by not invoking the supernatural, and that "'methodological naturalism' cannot be justified as a normative principle for all types of science–without doing violence to science as a truth-seeking enterprise." <ref>[http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=94 CSC - Open Debate on Life’s Origins] By: [[Stephen C. Meyer]]</ref>
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Naturalism in ethics designates a position in [[meta-ethics]], which holds that ethics and its components are reducible to non-ethical, natural facts; ethical concepts and terms such as moral goodness, justice, and rightness can be defined by natural, descriptive, empirical terms; and they can be reducible to natural facts or natural events. [[Hedonism]], [[utilitarianism]], and [[pragmatism]] are examples of naturalism.
  
==== "Scientific materialism" ====
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[[G. E. Moore]] criticized naturalism by arguing that "ought" cannot be derived from "is." Moore called an attempt to derive "ought" from "is" "naturalistic fallacy." Moore's criticism had a strong impact on naturalism theorists, but after the 1960s they became active again.
''Scientific materialism'', ''methodological materialism'' or sometimes ''scientific naturalism'' are interchangeable [[dysphemisms]] for methodological naturalism.  The terms are used to imply that scientists collude to force a [[materialist]] (or [[Rationalism|rationalist]]) worldview onto people.{{Fact|date=February 2007}}
 
 
 
Usually the terms are only used by such critics of the [[scientific method]] as the proponents of [[intelligent design]] and [[creationism]], who make the [[teleology|teleological]] assumption of purpose or meaning in nature and want science to be redefined to include [[supernatural]] explanations of natural phenomena.{{Fact|date=February 2007}}
 
 
 
The terms have become somewhat more common as laymen are introduced to the [[Creation-evolution controversy|creation–evolution controversy]] through the [[Discovery Institute]]'s framing of the language. Philosophers and scientists never use the terms{{Fact|date=February 2007}}, because they are vaguely defined. They conflict with established language{{Fact|date=February 2007}} in a complex philosophical topic and thus cause confusion, and are intended to introduce the ambiguity and negative connotations which suit creationist criticisms of naturalism{{Fact|date=February 2007}}.
 
  
 
== See also ==
 
== See also ==
* [[Metaphysical naturalism]]
 
* [[Positivism]]
 
 
* [[Materialism]]
 
* [[Materialism]]
 
* [[Atheism]]
 
* [[Atheism]]
* [[Brights movement]]
 
* [[Unitarian Universalism]]
 
 
* [[Empiricism]]
 
* [[Empiricism]]
* [[Sociological naturalism]]
+
* [[Meta-ethics]]
* [[Supernaturalism]]
 
  
== Notes and references ==
+
== Notes ==
<div class="references-small">
 
 
<references/>
 
<references/>
</div>
 
  
== External links ==
+
==References==
=== Neutral ===
+
 
* [http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html The Craig-Taylor Debate]: Is The Basis Of Morality Natural Or Supernatural? William Lane Craig and Richard Taylor October 1993, Union College (Schenectady, New York)
+
*Barnes, Jonathan. 1987. ''Early Greek philosophy.'' Penguin classics. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books. ISBN 0140444610 ISBN 9780140444612
 +
*Caro, Mario De. and David Macarthur (eds.) 2004. ''Naturalism in Question.'' Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
 +
*DeGrood, David H., Dale Maurice Riepe, and John Somerville. 1971. ''Radical currents in contemporary philosophy.'' St. Louis: W. H. Green.
 +
*Lindberg, David C., and Ronald L. Numbers. 2003. ''When science & Christianity meet.'' Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  ISBN 0226482146 ISBN 9780226482149 
 +
*Popper, Karl Raimund. 2002. ''The logic of scientific discovery.'' London: Routledge. ISBN 0415278449
 +
*Pennock, Robert T. 2001. ''Intelligent design creationism and its critics: philosophical, theological, and scientific perspectives.'' Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.  ISBN 0262162040 ISBN 9780262162043 ISBN 0262661241 ISBN 9780262661249 
 +
*Petto, Andrew J., and Laurie R. Godfrey. 2007. ''Scientists confront intelligent design and creationism.'' New York: W. W. Norton & Company.  ISBN 9780393050905 ISBN 0393050904
 +
 
 +
== External Links ==
 +
All links retrieved November 11, 2022.
 +
 
 +
'''Stanford Encyclopedia entry:'''
 +
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/#OntNat Naturalism], Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
 +
 
 +
The following links are mostly concerning the debate between naturalists and those who regard naturalism as a denial or misrepresentation of God:
 +
 
 +
'''Neutral'''
 +
* [http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html The Craig-Taylor Debate]: Is The Basis Of Morality Natural Or Supernatural? William Lane Craig and Richard Taylor October 1993, Union College (Schenectady, New York)  
 +
 
 +
'''Supportive of Naturalism'''
  
=== Supportive ===
+
* [http://www.naturalism.org/ naturalism.org].
* [http://www.atheists.org/ atheists.org]
+
* [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/naturalism/#method Naturalism: The Naturalistic Worldview].  
* [http://www.naturalism.org/ naturalism.org]
 
* [http://www.naturalism.org/center_for_naturalism.htm Center for Naturalism]
 
* [http://www.infidels.org The Secular Web]
 
* [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/naturalism/#method Naturalism: The Naturalistic Worldview]
 
* [http://www.kwcg.humanists.net/ kwcg.humanists.net]
 
  
=== Critical ===
+
'''Critical of Naturalism'''
* [http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10713a.htm Naturalism article in the Catholic Encyclopedia]
+
* [http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10713a.htm Naturalism] Catholic Encyclopedia.  
* {{cite paper | author=Alvin Plantinga | title=Naturalism Defeated | date=1994 | url=http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/naturalism_defeated.pdf }} (pdf)
+
* [http://www.discovery.org/ Discovery Institute].  
* Victor Reppert's [http://ivpress.gospelcom.net/cgi-ivpress/book.pl/code=2732 ''C. S. LEWIS'S DANGEROUS IDEA: In Defense of the Argument from Reason'']
+
* Philip Johnson's [http://www.arn.org/docs/johnson/pjdogma1.htm Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism]  
* Philip Johnson's [http://www.arn.org/docs/johnson/pjdogma1.htm Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism] from [http://www.firstthings.com/ First Things]
 
* Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (eds) ''Naturalism in Question.'' Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004.
 
* [http://edinburghcreationgroup.org/naturalism.php Examination of the spiritual roots of naturalism.]
 
  
[[Category:Epistemology]]
+
===General Philosophy Sources===
[[Category:Philosophy of science]]
+
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy].
[[Category:Secularism]]
+
*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy].
[[Category:atheism]]
+
*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online].
 +
*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg].
 +
 +
[[category:Philosophy and religion]]
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[[Category:philosophy]]
  
[[de:Naturalismus (Philosophie)]]
 
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[[es:Naturalismo (lingüística)]]
 
[[eo:Naturismo (filozofio)]]
 
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[[zh:自然主义]]
 
 
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Latest revision as of 15:22, 11 November 2022

For Naturalism in literature and art, see Naturalism (literature).

Naturalism designates any of several philosophical stances that make the assumption that nature is governed by objective laws, which can be understood through observation and experimentation without recourse to super-natural or extra-natural reality. Any method of inquiry or investigation or any procedure for gaining knowledge that limits itself to natural, physical, and material approaches and explanations can be described as naturalistic.

Naturalism does not distinguish the supernatural (including entities like non-natural values, and universals) from nature. It equates nature with reality, insisting that all phenomena and hypotheses can be studied using the same methods. Naturalism implies that all knowledge of the universe can be arrived at through scientific investigation, and that “supernatural” phenomena can be studied through their detectable influence on natural phenomena. Anything labeled “supernatural” is either nonexistent, unknowable, or not inherently different from natural phenomena or hypotheses. Naturalistic philosophy is typically associated with materialism and pragmatism, and does not give much consideration to metaphysics.

Naturalism also designates a meta-ethical position in ethics, which holds that ethics can be derived from and are reducible to non-ethical, natural, descriptive facts, and that ethical terms can be defined by non-ethical, natural terms. (See Meta-ethics)

History

The ideas and assumptions of philosophical naturalism were first seen in the works of the Ionian pre-Socratic philosophers. Thales, often regarded as the founder of science, was the first to give explanations of natural events without resorting to supernatural causes such as the actions of the Greek gods. Jonathan Barnes's introduction to Early Greek Philosophy (Penguin) describes these early philosophers as subscribing to principles of empirical investigation that strikingly anticipate naturalism.

During the twelfth century, after the works of Aristotle became available to European scholars in Latin, scholastic thinkers began to formulate a rational explanation of the universe.

“By the late Middle Ages the search for natural causes had come to typify the work of Christian natural philosophers. Although characteristically leaving the door open for the possibility of direct divine intervention, they frequently expressed contempt for soft-minded contemporaries who invoked miracles rather than searching for natural explanations. The University of Paris cleric Jean Buridan (ca. 1295-ca. 1358), described as "perhaps the most brilliant arts master of the Middle Ages," contrasted the philosopher’s search for "appropriate natural causes" with the common folk’s erroneous habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural. In the fourteenth century the natural philosopher Nicole Oresme (ca. 1320-1382), who went on to become a Roman Catholic bishop, admonished that, in discussing various marvels of nature, "there is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us."
Enthusiasm for the naturalistic study of nature picked up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as more and more Christians turned their attention to discovering the so-called secondary causes that God employed in operating the world. The Italian Catholic Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature "never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her." [1]

During the Enlightenment, a number of philosophers including Francis Bacon and Voltaire outlined the philosophical justifications for removing appeal to supernatural forces from investigation of the natural world. Scientific investigation culminated in the development of modern biology and geology, which rejected a literal interpretation of the prevailing origin beliefs of the revealed religions.

In the 1930s and 1940s, naturalism enjoyed a resurgence in the United States among philosophers such as F. J. E. Woodbridge, Morris R. Cohen, John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, and Sidney Hook.

Methodological Naturalism

Naturalism as epistemology

During the last half of the twentieth century, philosophers began to seek continuity with science, using scientific methods and knowledge as criteria for judging the validity of philosophical inquiry. "Methodological naturalism" holds that philosophers should use the empirical methods of scientific inquiry to conduct philosophical inquiry. Some methodological naturalists accept other types of philosophical speculation, but contend that only empirical examination can determine whether a particular speculation is truly applicable to human life. Substantive naturalists believe that any legitimate philosophical inquiry must be able to be substantiated by a scientific empirical investigation.

W. V. Quine describes naturalism as the position that there is no higher tribunal for truth than natural science itself. There is no better method than the scientific method for judging the claims of science, and there is neither any need nor any place for a "first philosophy," such as (abstract) metaphysics or epistemology, that could stand behind and justify science or the scientific method.

Therefore, philosophy should feel free to make use of the findings of scientists in its own pursuit, for example, using scientific studies of the brain to investigate the nature of cognition. Philosophy should also feel free to offer criticism when scientific claims are ungrounded, confused, or inconsistent. In this way philosophy becomes "continuous with" science. Naturalism is not a dogmatic belief that the modern view of science is entirely correct. Instead, it simply holds that the processes of the universe have a scientific explanation, and those processes are what modern science is striving to understand.

Methodological Naturalism and Science

If objective laws and processes of nature did not exist, the pursuit of scientific knowledge would become meaningless. The fact that man continually searches for knowledge of objective truth is considered a confirmation of the naturalistic methodology. Even when one scientific theory is found to be flawed, and is replaced with another, mankind never doubts that the truth will eventually be understood. Theories change, but the method for evolving them does not.

According to Ronald Numbers, the term "methodological naturalism" was coined in 1983 by Paul de Vries, at Wheaton College, Illinois, to distinguish between what he called "methodological naturalism," a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism," which "denies the existence of a transcendent God." [2] The term "methodological naturalism" had been used in 1937 by Edgar Sheffield Brightman in an article in The Philosophical Review as a contrast to "naturalism" in general, but there the idea was not really developed to its more recent distinctions.[3]

In a series of articles and books from 1996 onwards, Robert T. Pennock wrote using the term “methodological naturalism” to clarify that the scientific method confines itself to natural explanations without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural. Pennock's testimony as an expert witness[4] at the Kitzmiller vs. Dover Area School District trial in 2005 was cited by United States federal court Judge John E. Jones III in his Memorandum Opinion concluding that "Methodological naturalism is a "ground rule" of science today." This ruling set a federal district judicial precedent in the context of legal restrictions on the teaching of religion in U.S. schools, and more broadly the memorandum set out an impartial assessment of the evidence and arguments relating to the use in science of methodological naturalism as against supernatural explanations.

The historical support of methodological naturalism by Christians is noted by Numbers:

Despite the occasional efforts of unbelievers to use scientific naturalism to construct a world without God, it has retained strong Christian support down to the present. And well it might, for (…) scientific naturalism was largely made in Christendom by pious Christians. Although it possessed the potential to corrode religious beliefs—and sometimes did so—it flourished among Christian scientists who believe that God customarily achieved his ends through natural causes.[5]

Naturalism and Philosophy of Mind

There is currently some dispute over whether naturalism altogether rules out certain areas of philosophy which are constructs of the human mind, such as semantics, ethics, aesthetics, or excludes the use of the mentalistic vocabulary ("believes," "thinks") employed in philosophy of mind. Some recent thinkers have argued that even though mentalistic descriptions and value judgments cannot be systematically translated into physicalistic descriptions, they also do not need to presuppose the existence of anything other than physical phenomena.

Donald Davidson, for example, has argued that individual mental states can (must, in fact) be identical with individual states of the physical brain, even though a given kind of mental state (belief in materialism) might not be systematically identified with a given kind of brain state (a particular pattern of neural firings): the former weakly "supervenes" upon the latter. Recently developed technologies which allow the observation of human brain activity have shown that specific areas of the brain activity are associated with certain types of mental states.

The implication is that naturalism can leave non-physical vocabulary intact where the use of that vocabulary can be explained naturalistically; McDowell has dubbed this level of discourse "second nature."

Criticisms of Naturalism

The debate over naturalism is alive and complex, because it concerns both the basis of science, and how narrowly or broadly nature should be defined.

Philosophy

Karl Popper equated naturalism with inductive theory of science, and rejected it based on his general critique of induction, while acknowledging its utility as a means for inventing conjectures. {{quotation|A naturalistic methodology (sometimes called an "inductive theory of science") has its value, no doubt. […] I reject the naturalistic view: It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science, and consequently to its idea of scientific method. [6] Popper instead proposed the criterion of "falsifiability" for demarcation.

Creationism and intelligent design

Supporters of creationism claim that the possibility of supernatural action is unnecessarily excluded by the current practices and theories of science. Proponents of intelligent design, who hold that certain features of the natural world are best explained as the results of a divine intelligence, argue that the naturalist conception of reality may restrict the ability to arrive at a correct understanding of the universe. Their general criticism is that insisting that the natural world is a closed system of inviolable laws, independent of supernatural intervention, will cause science to come to incorrect conclusions and inappropriately exclude research that claims to include such ideas. Contemporary philosopher Alvin Plantinga has argued that evolutionary naturalism is incoherent. In Science and Theology News [7] he attacks the conclusions of the Kitzmiller trial and suggests that the term "science" denotes any activity that is:

  1. a systematic and disciplined enterprise aimed at finding out truth about our world, and
  2. has significant empirical involvement. Any activity that meets these vague conditions counts as science.

He concludes "if you exclude the supernatural from science, then if the world or some phenomena within it are supernaturally caused – as most of the world's people believe – you won't be able to reach that truth scientifically."

Naturalism in Ethics

(See Meta-ethics)

Naturalism in ethics designates a position in meta-ethics, which holds that ethics and its components are reducible to non-ethical, natural facts; ethical concepts and terms such as moral goodness, justice, and rightness can be defined by natural, descriptive, empirical terms; and they can be reducible to natural facts or natural events. Hedonism, utilitarianism, and pragmatism are examples of naturalism.

G. E. Moore criticized naturalism by arguing that "ought" cannot be derived from "is." Moore called an attempt to derive "ought" from "is" "naturalistic fallacy." Moore's criticism had a strong impact on naturalism theorists, but after the 1960s they became active again.

See also

Notes

  1. Ronald L. Numbers (2003). "Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs." When Science and Christianity Meet, edited by David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press), 267.
  2. Nick Matzke On the Origins of Methodological Naturalism. The Pandas Thumb (March 20, 2006). Retrieved July 11, 2007.
  3. Keith Miller ASA March 2006 - Re: Methodological Naturalism. Retrieved July 11, 2007.
  4. Kitzmiller trial: testimony of Robert T. Pennock. Retrieved July 11, 2007.
  5. Numbers 2003, op. cit, 284
  6. Karl R. Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Routledge, 2002), 31, ISBN 0415278449
  7. "Whether ID is Science isn't Semantics: Judge John Jones gave two arguments for his conclusion that ID is not science. Both are unsound, says Alvin Plantinga," Science & Theology News, March 7, 2006. Discovery Institute. Retrieved July 11, 2007.

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Barnes, Jonathan. 1987. Early Greek philosophy. Penguin classics. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books. ISBN 0140444610 ISBN 9780140444612
  • Caro, Mario De. and David Macarthur (eds.) 2004. Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
  • DeGrood, David H., Dale Maurice Riepe, and John Somerville. 1971. Radical currents in contemporary philosophy. St. Louis: W. H. Green.
  • Lindberg, David C., and Ronald L. Numbers. 2003. When science & Christianity meet. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0226482146 ISBN 9780226482149
  • Popper, Karl Raimund. 2002. The logic of scientific discovery. London: Routledge. ISBN 0415278449
  • Pennock, Robert T. 2001. Intelligent design creationism and its critics: philosophical, theological, and scientific perspectives. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. ISBN 0262162040 ISBN 9780262162043 ISBN 0262661241 ISBN 9780262661249
  • Petto, Andrew J., and Laurie R. Godfrey. 2007. Scientists confront intelligent design and creationism. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 9780393050905 ISBN 0393050904

External Links

All links retrieved November 11, 2022.

Stanford Encyclopedia entry:

The following links are mostly concerning the debate between naturalists and those who regard naturalism as a denial or misrepresentation of God:

Neutral

  • The Craig-Taylor Debate: Is The Basis Of Morality Natural Or Supernatural? William Lane Craig and Richard Taylor October 1993, Union College (Schenectady, New York)

Supportive of Naturalism

Critical of Naturalism

General Philosophy Sources

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