Difference between revisions of "Paradigm" - New World Encyclopedia

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'''Paradigm,''' ([[Greek]]:παράδειγμα (paradigma), composite from para- and the verb δείχνυμι "to show," as a whole -roughly- meaning "example") ({{IPAEng|ˈpærədaɪm}}) designates a cluster of concepts such as [[assumption]]s, [[value]]s, practices, and [[methodology|methodologies]] shared by a community of researchers in a given discipline. The original Greek term "paradeigma" was used in Greek texts such as [[Plato]]'s Timaeus (28A) as the model or the pattern [[Demiurge]] (god) used to create the [[cosmos]]. The modern usage of the term, however, began when [[Thomas Kuhn]] used it in his ''Structure of Scientific Discovery'' (1962).  
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'''Paradigm,''' ([[Greek]]:παράδειγμα (paradigma), composite from para- and the verb δείχνυμι "to show," as a whole -roughly- meaning "example") ({{IPAEng|ˈpærədaɪm}}) designates a cluster of concepts such as [[assumption]]s, [[value]]s, practices, and [[methodology|methodologies]] shared by a community of researchers in a given discipline. The original Greek term "paradeigma" was used in Greek texts such as [[Plato]]'s Timaeus (28A) as the model or the pattern [[Demiurge]] (god) used to create the [[cosmos]]. The modern usage of the term, however, began when [[Thomas Kuhn]] used it in his ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1962).  
  
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Kuhn initially used the term "paradigm" in the contexts of history and [[philosophy of science]]. The term, however, was widely used in [[social sciences]] and [[human sciences]] and became a popular term in almost all disciplines. Upon receiving a number of criticism for the ambiguity of the concept, Kuhn proposed to rephrase it as "disciplinary matrix."  
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Kuhn initially used the term "paradigm" in the contexts of history and [[philosophy of science]]. The term, however, was widely used in [[social sciences]] and [[human sciences]] and became a popular term in almost all disciplines. Upon receiving a number of criticisms for the ambiguity of the concept, Kuhn proposed to rephrase it as "disciplinary matrix."  
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In pre-Kuhnian philosophy of science, [[natural science]] was believed to be a-historical, a-social, and interpretation-free discipline. Kuhn, however, pointed out that scientific theories were constructed within a certain paradigm shared by a scientific community, and that the paradigm is shaped by social, historical, and other extra-scientific factors. Kuhn's argument for the social, historical dimension of theories of natural science made a turn in the history of philosophy of science. [[Imre Lakatos]], [[Paul Feyerabend]], and others further pointed out the [[Confirmation holism|theory-ladenness]] or theory dependency of scientific data and [[hermeneutics|hermeneutic]] dimension of natural sciences. When Kuhn presented the concept of paradigm, he qualified its application to natural science alone in sharp distinction from its use in the social and human sciences. After 1970s, however, Kuhn extended his studies to hermeneutics and found an affinity between his view on natural science and the hermeneutics perspective on social and human sciences. In his later essay ''The Natural and the Human Sciences'', Kuhn rephrased the term paradigm as "hermeneutic core." Paradigm became thus one of the most influential concepts in the history of human thoughts in the twentieth century.
  
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In pre-Kuhnian philosophy of science, [[natural science]] was believed to be a-historical, a-social discipline. Kuhn, however, pointed out that scientific theories were constructed within certain paradigm shared by a scientific community, and the paradigm is shaped by social, historical, and other extra-scientific factors. Kuhn's argument for the social, historical dimension of theories of natural science made a turn in the history of philosophy of science. [[Imre Lakatos]], [[Paul Feyerabend]], and others further pointed out the [[Confirmation holism|theory-ladenness]] or theory dependency of scientific data and [[hermeneutics|hermeneutic]] dimension of natural sciences. When Kuhn presented the concept of paradigm, he qualified its application to natural science. After 1970s, however, Kuhn extended his studies to hermeneutics and found the affinity between his view on natural science and hermeneutics' perspective on social and human sciences. In his later essay ''The Natural and the Human Sciences'', Kuhn rephrased the term paradim as "hermeneutic core." Paradigm became thus one of the most influential concepts in the history of human thoughts in the twentieth century.
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==[[Plato]]'s ''Timaeus''==
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==[[Plato]]'s ''Timaeus''==
 
 
The term "paradigm" is originally a Greek term. Plato, in his ''Timaeus'' (28A) for example, used it as a pattern or model which [[Demiurge]] (a craftsman god) used to make the cosmos:  
 
The term "paradigm" is originally a Greek term. Plato, in his ''Timaeus'' (28A) for example, used it as a pattern or model which [[Demiurge]] (a craftsman god) used to make the cosmos:  
  
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<blockquote>The work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect, but when he looks to the created only and uses a created pattern, it is not fair or perfect.<ref>Plato, ''The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters,'' ed. Hamilton, Edith and Huntington Cairns, New York: Pantheon Books, 1961. p. 1161</ref></blockquote>
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<blockquote>The work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect, but when he looks to the created only and uses a created pattern, it is not fair or perfect.<ref>Plato, ''The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters,'' Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (eds.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961), 1161.</ref></blockquote>
  
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In Plato's view, the pattern or the model of creation exist as [[Ideas]] in the eternal world which is [[transcendence|transcending]] a sensible, physical world people live in. The pre-exsiting Ideas serve as the model are "paradigm." Plato, however, did not develop this concept in any of his philosophical works beyond this usage. It was [[Thomas Kuhn]] who explored the concept and made it a contemporary term.
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In Plato's view, the pattern or the model of creation exist as [[Ideas]] in the eternal world which is [[transcendence|transcending]] a sensible, physical world people live in. The pre-existing Ideas serve as the model "paradigm." Plato, however, did not develop this concept in any of his philosophical works beyond this usage. It was [[Thomas Kuhn]] who explored the concept and made it a contemporary term.
 
==Kuhn's formulation of paradigm in the ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions''==
 
==Kuhn's formulation of paradigm in the ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions''==
 
===Scientific paradigm===
 
===Scientific paradigm===
 
{{main|Paradigm shift|Sociology of knowledge|Systemics|Commensurability (philosophy of science)|Confirmation holism}}
 
{{main|Paradigm shift|Sociology of knowledge|Systemics|Commensurability (philosophy of science)|Confirmation holism}}
  
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A historian and a [[philosophy of science|philosopher of science]] [[Thomas Kuhn]] gave this word its contemporary meaning when he adopted it to refer to the set of practices that define a scientific discipline. In his monumental work ''[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]'' Kuhn defines a scientific paradigm as:
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The historian and [[philosophy of science|philosopher of science]] [[Thomas Kuhn]] gave this word its contemporary meaning when he adopted it to refer to the set of practices that define a scientific discipline. In his monumental work ''[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]'' Kuhn defines a scientific paradigm as:
  
 
*''what'' is to be observed and scrutinized
 
*''what'' is to be observed and scrutinized
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*''how'' is an experiment to be conducted, and ''what'' equipment is available to conduct the experiment.
 
*''how'' is an experiment to be conducted, and ''what'' equipment is available to conduct the experiment.
  
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Thus, within [[normal science]], the paradigm is the set of exemplary experiments that are likely to be copied or emulated. The prevailing paradigm often represents a more specific way of viewing reality, or limitations on acceptable ''programs'' for future research, than the much more general [[scientific method]].  
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Thus, within [[normal science]], paradigm is the set of exemplary experiments that are likely to be copied or emulated. The prevailing paradigm often represents a more specific way of viewing reality, or limitations on acceptable ''programs'' for future research, than the much more general [[scientific method]].  
  
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An example of a currently accepted paradigm would be the [[standard model]] of physics. The scientific method would allow for orthodox scientific investigations of many phenomena which might contradict or disprove the standard model. The presence of the standard model has [[sociology|sociological]] implications. For example, grant funding would be more difficult to obtain for such experiments, in proportion to the amount of departure from accepted standard model theory which the experiment would test for. An experiment to test for the [[mass]] of the [[neutrino]] or decay of the [[proton]] (small departures from the model), for example, would be more likely to receive money than experiments to look for the violation of the [[conservation of momentum]], or ways to engineer reverse time travel.  
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An example of a currently accepted paradigm would be the [[standard model]] of physics. The scientific method would allow for orthodox scientific investigations of many phenomena which might contradict or disprove the standard model. The presence of the standard model has [[sociology|sociological]] implications. For example, grant funding would be more difficult to obtain for such experiments, in proportion to the amount of departure from accepted standard model theory which the experiment would test for. An experiment to test for the [[mass]] of the [[neutrino]] or decay of the [[proton]] (small departures from the model), for example, would be more likely to receive money than experiments to look for the violation of the [[conservation of momentum]], or ways to engineer reverse time travel.  
  
 
One important aspect of Kuhn's paradigms is that the paradigms are [[Commensurability_%28philosophy_of_science%29 | incommensurable]], which means that two paradigms do not have a common standard by which one can directly compare, measure or assess competing paradigms. A new paradigm which replaces an old paradigm is not necessarily better, because the criteria of judgment depend on the paradigm.
 
One important aspect of Kuhn's paradigms is that the paradigms are [[Commensurability_%28philosophy_of_science%29 | incommensurable]], which means that two paradigms do not have a common standard by which one can directly compare, measure or assess competing paradigms. A new paradigm which replaces an old paradigm is not necessarily better, because the criteria of judgment depend on the paradigm.
  
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==Paradigm shifts==
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===Paradigm shifts===
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{{main|Paradigm shift}}
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[[Image:Duck-Rabbit illusion.jpg|right|200px|thumb|Kuhn used the duck-rabbit [[optical illusion]] to demonstrate the way in which a paradigm shift could cause one to see the same information in an entirely different way.]]
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Paradigm shifts tend to be most dramatic in sciences that appear to be stable and mature, as in [[physics]] at the end of the 19th century. At that time, physics seemed to be a discipline filling in the last few details of a largely worked-out system. In 1900, [[William Thomson, 1st Baron Kelvin|Lord Kelvin]] famously stated, "There is nothing new to be discovered in physics now. All that remains is more and more precise measurement." Five years later, [[Albert Einstein]] published his paper on [[special relativity]], which challenged the very simple set of rules laid down by [[Newtonian mechanics]], which had been used to describe force and motion for over two hundred years. In this case, the new paradigm reduces the old to a special case. In the sense that Newtonian mechanics is still a good model for approximation for speeds that are slow compared to the [[speed of light]].
 
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Philosophers and historians of science, including Kuhn himself, ultimately accepted a modified version of Kuhn's model, which synthesizes his original view with the gradualist model that preceded it. Kuhn's original model is now generally seen as too limited.
 
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Kuhn himself did not consider the concept of paradigm as appropriate for the social sciences. He explains in his preface to "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" that he concocted the concept of paradigm precisely in order to distinguish the social from the natural sciences (p.''x''). He wrote this book at the [[Palo Alto]] Center for Scholars, surrounded by social scientists, when he observed that they were never in agreement on theories or concepts. He explains that he wrote this book precisely to show that there are no, nor can be, any paradigms in the social sciences. Mattei Dogan, a French sociologist, in his article "Paradigms in the Social Sciences," develops Kuhn's original thesis that there are no paradigms at all in the social sciences since the concepts are polysemic, the deliberate mutual ignorance between scholars and the proliferation of schools in these disciplines. Dogan provides many examples of the inexistance of paradigms in the social sciences in his essay, particularly in sociology, political science and political anthropology.
 
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In ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'', Kuhn wrote that "Successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature science." (p.12)
 
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Kuhn's idea was itself revolutionary in its time, as it caused a major change in the way that academics talk about science. Thus, it could be argued that it caused or was itself part of a "paradigm shift" in the history and sociology of science. However, Kuhn would not recognise such a paradigm shift. Being in the social sciences, people can still use earlier ideas to discuss the history of science.
 
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===Paradigm Paralysis===
 
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Perhaps the greatest barrier to a paradigm shift, in some cases, is the reality of paradigm paralysis, the inability to see beyond the current models of thinking.<ref>[http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/kuster/Infostuttering/Paradigmparalysis.html Do you suffer from paradigm paralysis ?]</ref>
 
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Examples include [[Galileo]]'s theory of a [[heliocentric]] universe, the discovery of [[electrostatic]] [[photography]], [[xerography]], and the [[quartz clock]].
 
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== Paradigm as the "Gestalt of a Weltanschauung" ==
 
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Another perspective to the concept of what a paradigm is, is that a Paradigm is the [[Gestalt]] (organized whole) of the three main branches of philosophy that forms a "[[Weltanschauung]]" (German for 'Worldview')
 
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Uses of the concept '''''paradigm''''' in the understanding of Kuhn and others, are mostly unclear and ambiguous [[Analogy|analogies]]—''[[List of Latin phrases (full)|ignotum per ignotius]]'' (the unknown explained by means of the more unknown), or ''obscurum per obscurius'' (the unclear explained by means of the more unclear)—to other concepts like [[Scientific modelling|the model]].
 
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Kuhn defines a paradigm as: “an entire constellation of beliefs, values and techniques, and so on, shared by the members of a given community”(Kuhn). This definition by Kuhn appears in the 1969 postscript to his original book, because originally the use of the term paradigm was not clearly defined. Besides this definition Kuhn mentioned another sense of use he had: a Paradigm also “denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science” [Ibid]. The term remains imprecise due to the different uses it is given.
 
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Paradigms could be described from a structural perspective. Paradigms operate on different levels; the macro, meso and micro levels of the paradigm's structure. The levels address the fundamental structure of the paradigms, rather than its chronological-historical categorization or the etymological use, as used by most disciplines. The levels of paradigms are always present and not limited to these categories. They assist in an understanding of the functioning of a paradigm.
 
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In the ''macro''' level, a cognizance of the basic assumption to the question: ‘what can be understood’ is required. The question is: "Can it in reality be assumed that the essences of ideal things could be known at all, as in Plato's and Aristotle's use of the theory of ideas? Besides the essentialistic approaches of these two philosophers, is it not possible that "the things themselves reveal themselves as they are," analysed in Heidegger's fundamental ontology? The assumption we make in answering these questions will predispose the perception that determines the way we ask the question about how we come to knowledge.
 
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In the ''meso'' level, the question is how the macro level influences and forms the resulting theory of knowledge. “Is only deductive-delimited knowledge of human perception available to man, or is man open to an inductive-comprehensive understanding of the world?.” If man is open to inductive knowledge, where does it originate? The assumption on the macro level is the basis for this assumption. All philosophical efforts since the pre-socratics are essentialistic. An ontological approach seeks to evade the essences of things, requiring the things themselves to reveal them as they are.
 
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In the ''micro'' level, the consequent perception of the two preceding levels, answering the questions of what is in the world and how the world is understood, is used in a practical way of doing. Is the praxis built on multiple ‘laws of conduct’ (ethic), or is it a fundamental and constant encounter with the open world as a different way of perception? Such a different perception is an 'affective awareness'. Previous and current understanding of perception is limited to essentialistic categories of limitation. 'Affective awareness' is by nature open and unlimited, inductive and not limited to 'sense perception'.
 
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So a paradigm is a view of reality that is a ''''Gestalt'''' resulting from the three branches of philosophy; metaphysics, epistemology and ethics (see Encyclopædia Britannica: Branches of Philosophy):
 
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(1) a '''''metaphysical''''' assumption of what could be known (refer to the pre-Socratics Parmenides and Heraclitus). It forms the basis for:
 
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(2) a conception of '''''epistemological''''' knowledge acquisition. This is the essentialistic line of thinking [[essentialism]] from [[Plato]], [[Aristotle]] and [[Popper]] vs. the ontological line of thinking ([[ontology]]) opened up by the '[[uncertainty principle]]' of [[Heisenberg]]'s quantum theories to [[Heidegger]]'s '[[Fundamental Ontology]]'. This in turn is the basis for the:
 
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(3) '''''praxis''''' in an ethic for living.
 
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It is obvious that the three branches of philosophy describe the structure of a paradigm. None of the branches of [[Metaphysics]], [[Epistemology]] and [[Ethics]] can be left out for understanding paradigms. Together they describe a 'Gestalt', akin to a spiral (not a mere circular) movement, forming '''Hermeneutical understanding'''.
 
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The result is that [[Hermeneutics]] can not be reduced to an interpretation of something in context of the text itself in a mere 'hermeneutic circle'; it is a developmental cycle that involves:
 
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(a) "'''Wahrnehmung'''" as an 'affective awareness', which is more than mere sense perception. The method toward an affective awareness is through 'ontological understanding'. It forms the principles behind a paradigm, conceived as either the Heraclitean 'flux' ([[Heraclitus]]) or the Parmenidean 'one' ([[Parmenides]]). This principle is perceived as the relation of the limited to the unlimited. Meta-ethical 'principles', like the golden ethical rule of “Do unto others as you would like them to do unto you,” are formed here.
 
  
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(b) '''"Verstehen"''' as the analysis of 'being' to reach understanding of the 'self'. Here the building of, or coming to, a theory of knowledge is achieved, determined by the assumptions in my metaphysical 'belief' of the nature of reality in (a). These assumptions necessarily tend to a predominantly inductive or mainly deductive theory of knowledge acquisition, which is reflected in my epistemology. Messo-ethical 'norms', like the sanctity of human life and freedom, are formulated at this level.
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A scientific revolution occurs, according to Kuhn, when scientists encounter anomalies which cannot be explained by the universally accepted paradigm within which scientific progress has thereto been made. The paradigm, in Kuhn's view, is not simply the current theory, but the entire [[worldview]] in which it exists and all of the implications which come with it. There are anomalies for all paradigms, Kuhn maintained, that are brushed away as acceptable levels of error, or simply ignored and not dealt with (a principal argument Kuhn uses to reject [[Karl Popper]]'s model of [[falsifiability]] as the key force involved in scientific change). Rather, according to Kuhn, anomalies have various levels of significance to the practitioners of science at the time. To put it in the context of early twentieth century physics, some scientists found the problems with calculating [[Mercury (planet)|Mercury's]] [[perihelion]] more troubling than the [[Michelson-Morley experiment]] results, and some the other way around. Kuhn's model of scientific change differs here, and in many places, from that of the [[logical positivists]] in that it puts an enhanced emphasis on the individual humans involved as scientists, rather than abstracting science into a purely logical or philosophical venture.
  
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(c) '''"Ethos"''' is the attempt to form the world we live in, by growing an 'attitude' or participation in a mutually structured reality. All those who choose to participate in this reality, do it by 'taking responsibility for personal actions' in a social environment. More concrete micro-ethical 'codes of conduct', like monogamy and what we consider to be 'true and correct behaviour', is systematised into our '[[dogma]]' at this level.
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When enough significant anomalies have accrued against a current paradigm, the scientific discipline is thrown into a state of ''crisis,'' according to Kuhn. During this crisis, new ideas, perhaps ones previously discarded, are tried. Eventually a ''new'' paradigm is formed, which gains its own new followers, and an intellectual "battle" takes place between the followers of the new paradigm and the hold-outs of the old paradigm. Again, for early twentieth-century [[physics]], the transition between the [[James Clerk Maxwell|Maxwellian]] [[Maxwell's equations|electromagnetic worldview]] and the [[Albert Einstein|Einsteinian]] [[theory of relativity|Relativistic]] worldview was not instantaneous nor calm, and instead involved a protracted set of "attacks," both with empirical data as well as rhetorical or philosophical arguments, by both sides, with the Einsteinian theory winning out in the long-run. Again, the weighing of evidence and importance of new data was fit through the human sieve: some scientists found the simplicity of Einstein's equations to be most compelling, while some found them more complicated than the notion of Maxwell's aether which they banished. Some found [[Arthur Eddington|Eddington's]] photographs of [[light]] bending around the [[sun]] to be compelling, some questioned their accuracy and meaning. Sometimes the convincing force is just time itself and the human toll it takes, Kuhn said, using a quote from [[Max Planck]]: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."
  
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(d) "'''Praxis'''" is ''doing'' the 'right' thing. It is the behaviour resulting from systematising (a), (b) and (c) into a Gestalt, where the whole is more than the sum of the parts. This behavioural level is again the basis for "Wahrnemung," repeating the cycle on a new level. Most important is to understand that this cycle does not now start from the previous position of departure. There is a 'new awareness' of the praxis due to the previous stages in the cycle. The next cycle of "Wahrnemung" is elevated from the previous level of affective awareness to a deeper understanding. This is the basis for a new understanding of development. Development is far more than a 'mechanistic' process, by definition mechanistic processes all function and are 'essentially' closed systems. Development is by definition dependent on an inductive element. Another important point is that there is no start or end point in the cycle, every stage is on an elevated level from its previous position. Contrasted to that, a circle has a start and an end, which has actually no development; it is only a reaffirmation of what was before in a stagnant fundamentalism.
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After a given discipline has changed from one paradigm to another, this is called, in Kuhn's terminology, a ''scientific revolution'' or a ''paradigm shift''. It is often this final conclusion, the result of the long process, that is meant when the term ''paradigm shift'' is used colloquially: simply the (often radical) change of worldview, without reference to the specificities of Kuhn's historical argument.
  
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Thus, a '''''Paradigm''''' can only be understood in the context of a '''Hermeneutical cycle''' (rather than a '''''[[Hermeneutics#Hermeneutic circle|Hermeneutical circle]]''''') within the '''''Structure of the Paradigms'''''. It supersedes mere interpretation or just bringing understanding. It implies that Paradigms are developmental by nature, moving in a hermeneutical cycle instead of a process of recurring mechanistic circles. Describing a paradigm as an era, epic, model, weltanschauung, or any other term is hardly more than merely renaming the concept of a paradigm to some other known concept, risking to be a tautological swapping of terms.
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== Paradigm in social and human sciences ==
  
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Secondary source: '"Paradigm Development in Systematic Theology"', Dissertation at the University of South Africa (UNISA) by Lando L Lehmann, Nov 2004. Description:[http://etd.unisa.ac.za/ETD-db/ETD-desc/describe?urn=etd-07222005-135945] - Direct Download when Description does not work: {{PDFlink|[http://etd.unisa.ac.za/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-07222005-135945/unrestricted/dissertation.pdf]|1.01&nbsp;[[Mebibyte|MiB]]<!-- application/pdf, 1060880 bytes —>}}
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When Kuhn presented the concept of paradigm in ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,'' he did not consider the concept as appropriate for the social sciences. He explains in his preface to ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' that he presented the concept of paradigm precisely in order to distinguish the social from the natural sciences (p.''x'').<ref>The distinction between natural sciences and human, social sciences had been discussed in the tradition of [[hermeneutics]]. [[Dilthey]] distinguished human sciences, which require interpretive understanding, whereas natural science requires non-hermeneutic, causal explanation. (see [[Dilthey]])</ref> He wrote this book at the [[Palo Alto]] Center for Scholars, surrounded by social scientists, when he observed that they were never in agreement on theories or concepts. He explains that he wrote this book precisely to show that there are no, nor can be, any paradigms in the social sciences. Mattei Dogan, a French sociologist, in his article "Paradigms in the Social Sciences," develops Kuhn's original thesis that there are no paradigms at all in the social sciences since the concepts are polysemic, the deliberate mutual ignorance and disagreement between scholars and the proliferation of schools in these disciplines. Dogan provides many examples of the inexistence of paradigms in the social sciences in his essay,<ref>Mattei Dogan, "Paradigms in the Social Sciences," in ''International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences'', Volume 16, 2001.</ref> particularly in [[sociology]], [[political science]] and [[political anthropology]].
  
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==Other uses==
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The concept of paradigm, however, influenced not only [[philosophy of science|philosophers of natural science]], but also scholars in [[social sciences]] and [[human sciences]]. In these disciplines, fundamental presuppositions or a framework of thought often determine the [[hermeneutics|hermeneutic]] horizon of scientists. The concept of paradigm appeared appropriate to describe those fundamental frameworks of thinking, if its meaning is broadly construed. In the social and human sciences, paradigms may be shared by a much narrower community of scientists who belong to the same school or share the similar perspectives. The concept of paradigm received wider acceptance and became one of the most popular terms in the late twentieth century.
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Handa, M.L. (1986) introduced the idea of "social paradigm" in the context of social sciences. He identified the basic components of a social paradigm. Like Kuhn, Handa addressed the issue of changing paradigm; the process popularly known as "[[paradigm shift]]." In this respect, he focused on social circumstances that precipitate such a shift and the effects of the shift on the social institutions, including the institution of education. This broad shift in the social arena, in turn, changes the way the individual perceives reality.  
 
  
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Another use of the word ''paradigm'' is in the sense of [[Weltanschauung]] (German for world view). For example, in social science, the term is used to describe the set of experiences, beliefs and values that affect the way an individual perceives reality and responds to that perception. Social scientists have adopted the Kuhnian phrase "paradigm shift" to denote a change in how a given society goes about organizing and understanding reality. A “dominant paradigm” refers to the values, or system of thought, in a society that are most standard and widely held at a given time. Dominant paradigms are shaped both by the community’s cultural background and by the context of the historical moment. The following are conditions that facilitate a system of thought to become an accepted dominant paradigm:
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The interpretive dimension of social and human sciences had been long discussed in the tradition of [[hermeneutics]]. [[Wilhelm Dilthey]] (1833-1911) distinguished "human sciences" or "spiritual sciences" (German: Geisteswissenschaften) from natural sciences precisely because the former is a hermeneutic discipline which requires interpretive "understanding" (German: Verstehen) while the latter give interpretation-free causal "explanation."
  
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* Professional organizations that give legitimacy to the paradigm
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Kuhn's thesis that natural sciences are built upon certain socially, historically conditioned paradigms changed the standard view of natural sciences among hermeneutics as well as philosophers of natural science. Kuhn's view of natural science suggests the existence of a hermeneutic dimension of natural sciences and triggered discussion regarding the distinction of these two types of sciences.
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* Dynamic leaders who introduce and purport the paradigm
 
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* Journals and editors who write about the system of thought. They both disseminate the information essential to the paradigm and give the paradigm legitimacy
 
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* Government agencies who give credence to the paradigm
 
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* Educators who propagate the paradigm’s ideas by teaching it to students
 
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* Conferences conducted that are devoted to discussing ideas central to the paradigm
 
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* Media coverage
 
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* Lay groups, or groups based around the concerns of lay persons, that embrace the beliefs central to the paradigm
 
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* Sources of funding to further research on the paradigm
 
  
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The word ''paradigm'' is also still used to indicate a pattern or model or an outstandingly clear or typical example or [[archetype]]. The term is frequently used in this sense in the design professions. Design Paradigms or archetypes, comprise functional precedents for design solutions. The best known references on design paradigms are ''Design Paradigms: A Sourcebook for Creative Visualization'', by Wake, and ''Design Paradigms'' by Petroski.
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After the seventies, Kuhn himself extended his research to [[hermeneutics]]. He realized a close affinity between natural sciences and social, human sciences. In the essay "The Natural and the Human Sciences," presented at a panel discussion with [[Charles Taylor]] in 1989,<ref>Kuhn presented "The Natural and the Human Sciences" at the panel discussion at LaSalle University, February 11, 1989. It was published in ''The Interpretative Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture'' (1991). The essay is also included in ''The Road Since Structure'' (2000).</ref> Kuhn pointed out the hermeneutic dimension of natural sciences and the resemblance between natural sciences and social, human sciences. He rephrased paradigm as "hermeneutic core" in the essay. Unfortunately, Kuhn did not develop the issue further.
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This term is also used in [[cybernetics]]. Here it means (in a very wide sense) a (conceptual) protoprogramme for reducing the chaotic mass to some form of order. Note the similarities to the concept of entropy in chemistry and physics. A paradigm there would be a sort of prohibition to proceed with any action that would increase the total [[entropy]] of the system. In order to create a paradigm, a [[closed system]] which would accept any changes is required. Thus a paradigm can be only applied to a system that is not in its final stage.
 
  
 
==Notes==
 
==Notes==
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==References and Links==
 
==References and Links==
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*Clarke, Thomas and Clegg, Stewart (eds). Changing Paradigms''. London: HarperCollins, 2000.ISBN 0-00-638731-4
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* Clarke, Thomas and Stewart Clegg (eds.). ''Changing Paradigms.'' London: HarperCollins, 2000.ISBN 0-00-638731-4
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* Handa, M. L.(1986) "Peace Paradigm: Transcending Liberal and Marxian Paradigms" Paper presented in "International Symposium on Science, Technology and Development, New Delhi, India, March 20-25, 1987, Mimeographed at O.I.S.E., University of Toronto, Canada (1986)
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* Dogan, Mattei. "Paradigms in the Social Sciences," in ''International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences,'' Volume 16, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes. New York: Elsevier Science, 2001.  
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* Kuhn, Thomas S. ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'', 3rd Ed. Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996. ISBN 0-226-45808-3
+
* Kuhn, Thomas S. “The Natural and the Human Sciences,” in ''The Interpretative Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture,'' edited by D. Hiley, J. Bohman, and R. Shusterman, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. (The same essay is also included in Kuhn, Thomas S., James Conant, and John Haugeland. ''The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview.'' Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2002. ISBN 9780226457994
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* Kuhn, Thomas S. “The Natural and the Human Sciences,” in ''The Interpretative Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture,'' edited by D. Hiley, J. Bohman, and R. Shusterman, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. The same essay is alse included in Kuhn, Thomas S., James Conant, and John Haugeland. ''The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview.'' Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2002. ISBN 9780226457994
+
* &mdash;&mdash;&mdash;. ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'', 3rd ed. Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996. ISBN 0-226-45808-3
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* Masterman, Margaret, "The Nature of a Paradigm," pp. 59-89 in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. ''Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge''. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970. ISBN 0-521-09623-5
+
* Masterman, Margaret. "The Nature of a Paradigm," pp. 59-89 in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, ''Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge''. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970. ISBN 0-521-09623-5
−
* Encyclopædia Britannica, Univ. of Chicago, 2003, ISBN 0-85229-961-3
+
* Plato. ''The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters,'' edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books, 1961.
−
* Dogan, Mattei., "Paradigms in the Social Sciences," in ''International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences,'' Volume 16, 2001)
+
* Von Dietze, Erich. ''Paradigms Explained: Rethinking Thomas Kuhn's Philosophy of Science.'' Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2001. ISBN 9780275969998
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* [http://www.funonthenet.in/articles/Paradigm-Presentation.html Paradigm Presentation] An interesting look at how a Paradigm is created
+
 
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* Plato, ''The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters,'' ed. Hamilton, Edith andHuntington Cairns, New York: Pantheon Books, 1961.
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==External links==
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*{{cite web |url=http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0142-5692%281992%2913%3A1%3C131%3ATPWRFT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U |title=JSTOR: British Journal of Sociology of Education: Vol. 13, No. 1 (1992), pp. 131-143 |accessdate=2007-06-18 |format= |work=}}
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All links retrieved November 18, 2022.
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* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-kuhn/ Thomas Kuhn], Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-historicist/ Historicist Theories of Rationality], Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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* Kuhn, Thomas. [http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/kuhn.htm IX. The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions], ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
 +
''
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===General Philosophy Sources===
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy].  
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*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy].  
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*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online].  
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*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg].  
  
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[[Category:Organizational studies and human resource management]]
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[[Category:philosophy and religion]]
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[[Category:Epistemology]]
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[[Category:philosophy]]
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[[category:politics and social sciences]]
  
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{{credits|Paradigm|223803435|Paradigm_shift|231793546}}

Latest revision as of 07:43, 18 November 2022

Paradigm, (Greek:παράδειγμα (paradigma), composite from para- and the verb δείχνυμι "to show," as a whole -roughly- meaning "example") (IPA: /ˈpærədaɪm/) designates a cluster of concepts such as assumptions, values, practices, and methodologies shared by a community of researchers in a given discipline. The original Greek term "paradeigma" was used in Greek texts such as Plato's Timaeus (28A) as the model or the pattern Demiurge (god) used to create the cosmos. The modern usage of the term, however, began when Thomas Kuhn used it in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962).

Kuhn initially used the term "paradigm" in the contexts of history and philosophy of science. The term, however, was widely used in social sciences and human sciences and became a popular term in almost all disciplines. Upon receiving a number of criticisms for the ambiguity of the concept, Kuhn proposed to rephrase it as "disciplinary matrix."

In pre-Kuhnian philosophy of science, natural science was believed to be a-historical, a-social, and interpretation-free discipline. Kuhn, however, pointed out that scientific theories were constructed within a certain paradigm shared by a scientific community, and that the paradigm is shaped by social, historical, and other extra-scientific factors. Kuhn's argument for the social, historical dimension of theories of natural science made a turn in the history of philosophy of science. Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, and others further pointed out the theory-ladenness or theory dependency of scientific data and hermeneutic dimension of natural sciences. When Kuhn presented the concept of paradigm, he qualified its application to natural science alone in sharp distinction from its use in the social and human sciences. After 1970s, however, Kuhn extended his studies to hermeneutics and found an affinity between his view on natural science and the hermeneutics perspective on social and human sciences. In his later essay The Natural and the Human Sciences, Kuhn rephrased the term paradigm as "hermeneutic core." Paradigm became thus one of the most influential concepts in the history of human thoughts in the twentieth century.

Plato's Timaeus

The term "paradigm" is originally a Greek term. Plato, in his Timaeus (28A) for example, used it as a pattern or model which Demiurge (a craftsman god) used to make the cosmos:

The work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect, but when he looks to the created only and uses a created pattern, it is not fair or perfect.[1]

In Plato's view, the pattern or the model of creation exist as Ideas in the eternal world which is transcending a sensible, physical world people live in. The pre-existing Ideas serve as the model "paradigm." Plato, however, did not develop this concept in any of his philosophical works beyond this usage. It was Thomas Kuhn who explored the concept and made it a contemporary term.

Kuhn's formulation of paradigm in the The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Scientific paradigm

The historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn gave this word its contemporary meaning when he adopted it to refer to the set of practices that define a scientific discipline. In his monumental work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn defines a scientific paradigm as:

  • what is to be observed and scrutinized
  • the kind of questions that are supposed to be asked and probed for answers in relation to this subject
  • how these questions are to be structured
  • how the results of scientific investigations should be interpreted
  • how is an experiment to be conducted, and what equipment is available to conduct the experiment.

Thus, within normal science, paradigm is the set of exemplary experiments that are likely to be copied or emulated. The prevailing paradigm often represents a more specific way of viewing reality, or limitations on acceptable programs for future research, than the much more general scientific method.

An example of a currently accepted paradigm would be the standard model of physics. The scientific method would allow for orthodox scientific investigations of many phenomena which might contradict or disprove the standard model. The presence of the standard model has sociological implications. For example, grant funding would be more difficult to obtain for such experiments, in proportion to the amount of departure from accepted standard model theory which the experiment would test for. An experiment to test for the mass of the neutrino or decay of the proton (small departures from the model), for example, would be more likely to receive money than experiments to look for the violation of the conservation of momentum, or ways to engineer reverse time travel.

One important aspect of Kuhn's paradigms is that the paradigms are incommensurable, which means that two paradigms do not have a common standard by which one can directly compare, measure or assess competing paradigms. A new paradigm which replaces an old paradigm is not necessarily better, because the criteria of judgment depend on the paradigm.

Paradigm shifts

Kuhn used the duck-rabbit optical illusion to demonstrate the way in which a paradigm shift could cause one to see the same information in an entirely different way.

A scientific revolution occurs, according to Kuhn, when scientists encounter anomalies which cannot be explained by the universally accepted paradigm within which scientific progress has thereto been made. The paradigm, in Kuhn's view, is not simply the current theory, but the entire worldview in which it exists and all of the implications which come with it. There are anomalies for all paradigms, Kuhn maintained, that are brushed away as acceptable levels of error, or simply ignored and not dealt with (a principal argument Kuhn uses to reject Karl Popper's model of falsifiability as the key force involved in scientific change). Rather, according to Kuhn, anomalies have various levels of significance to the practitioners of science at the time. To put it in the context of early twentieth century physics, some scientists found the problems with calculating Mercury's perihelion more troubling than the Michelson-Morley experiment results, and some the other way around. Kuhn's model of scientific change differs here, and in many places, from that of the logical positivists in that it puts an enhanced emphasis on the individual humans involved as scientists, rather than abstracting science into a purely logical or philosophical venture.

When enough significant anomalies have accrued against a current paradigm, the scientific discipline is thrown into a state of crisis, according to Kuhn. During this crisis, new ideas, perhaps ones previously discarded, are tried. Eventually a new paradigm is formed, which gains its own new followers, and an intellectual "battle" takes place between the followers of the new paradigm and the hold-outs of the old paradigm. Again, for early twentieth-century physics, the transition between the Maxwellian electromagnetic worldview and the Einsteinian Relativistic worldview was not instantaneous nor calm, and instead involved a protracted set of "attacks," both with empirical data as well as rhetorical or philosophical arguments, by both sides, with the Einsteinian theory winning out in the long-run. Again, the weighing of evidence and importance of new data was fit through the human sieve: some scientists found the simplicity of Einstein's equations to be most compelling, while some found them more complicated than the notion of Maxwell's aether which they banished. Some found Eddington's photographs of light bending around the sun to be compelling, some questioned their accuracy and meaning. Sometimes the convincing force is just time itself and the human toll it takes, Kuhn said, using a quote from Max Planck: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."

After a given discipline has changed from one paradigm to another, this is called, in Kuhn's terminology, a scientific revolution or a paradigm shift. It is often this final conclusion, the result of the long process, that is meant when the term paradigm shift is used colloquially: simply the (often radical) change of worldview, without reference to the specificities of Kuhn's historical argument.

Paradigm in social and human sciences

When Kuhn presented the concept of paradigm in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he did not consider the concept as appropriate for the social sciences. He explains in his preface to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that he presented the concept of paradigm precisely in order to distinguish the social from the natural sciences (p.x).[2] He wrote this book at the Palo Alto Center for Scholars, surrounded by social scientists, when he observed that they were never in agreement on theories or concepts. He explains that he wrote this book precisely to show that there are no, nor can be, any paradigms in the social sciences. Mattei Dogan, a French sociologist, in his article "Paradigms in the Social Sciences," develops Kuhn's original thesis that there are no paradigms at all in the social sciences since the concepts are polysemic, the deliberate mutual ignorance and disagreement between scholars and the proliferation of schools in these disciplines. Dogan provides many examples of the inexistence of paradigms in the social sciences in his essay,[3] particularly in sociology, political science and political anthropology.

The concept of paradigm, however, influenced not only philosophers of natural science, but also scholars in social sciences and human sciences. In these disciplines, fundamental presuppositions or a framework of thought often determine the hermeneutic horizon of scientists. The concept of paradigm appeared appropriate to describe those fundamental frameworks of thinking, if its meaning is broadly construed. In the social and human sciences, paradigms may be shared by a much narrower community of scientists who belong to the same school or share the similar perspectives. The concept of paradigm received wider acceptance and became one of the most popular terms in the late twentieth century.

The interpretive dimension of social and human sciences had been long discussed in the tradition of hermeneutics. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) distinguished "human sciences" or "spiritual sciences" (German: Geisteswissenschaften) from natural sciences precisely because the former is a hermeneutic discipline which requires interpretive "understanding" (German: Verstehen) while the latter give interpretation-free causal "explanation."

Kuhn's thesis that natural sciences are built upon certain socially, historically conditioned paradigms changed the standard view of natural sciences among hermeneutics as well as philosophers of natural science. Kuhn's view of natural science suggests the existence of a hermeneutic dimension of natural sciences and triggered discussion regarding the distinction of these two types of sciences.

After the seventies, Kuhn himself extended his research to hermeneutics. He realized a close affinity between natural sciences and social, human sciences. In the essay "The Natural and the Human Sciences," presented at a panel discussion with Charles Taylor in 1989,[4] Kuhn pointed out the hermeneutic dimension of natural sciences and the resemblance between natural sciences and social, human sciences. He rephrased paradigm as "hermeneutic core" in the essay. Unfortunately, Kuhn did not develop the issue further.

Notes

  1. ↑ Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (eds.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961), 1161.
  2. ↑ The distinction between natural sciences and human, social sciences had been discussed in the tradition of hermeneutics. Dilthey distinguished human sciences, which require interpretive understanding, whereas natural science requires non-hermeneutic, causal explanation. (see Dilthey)
  3. ↑ Mattei Dogan, "Paradigms in the Social Sciences," in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Volume 16, 2001.
  4. ↑ Kuhn presented "The Natural and the Human Sciences" at the panel discussion at LaSalle University, February 11, 1989. It was published in The Interpretative Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture (1991). The essay is also included in The Road Since Structure (2000).

See also

References and Links

  • Clarke, Thomas and Stewart Clegg (eds.). Changing Paradigms. London: HarperCollins, 2000.ISBN 0-00-638731-4
  • Dogan, Mattei. "Paradigms in the Social Sciences," in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Volume 16, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes. New York: Elsevier Science, 2001.
  • Kuhn, Thomas S. “The Natural and the Human Sciences,” in The Interpretative Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture, edited by D. Hiley, J. Bohman, and R. Shusterman, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. (The same essay is also included in Kuhn, Thomas S., James Conant, and John Haugeland. The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2002. ISBN 9780226457994
  • ———. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996. ISBN 0-226-45808-3
  • Masterman, Margaret. "The Nature of a Paradigm," pp. 59-89 in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970. ISBN 0-521-09623-5
  • Plato. The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books, 1961.
  • Von Dietze, Erich. Paradigms Explained: Rethinking Thomas Kuhn's Philosophy of Science. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2001. ISBN 9780275969998

External links

All links retrieved November 18, 2022.

General Philosophy Sources

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