Difference between revisions of "Naturalism (Philosophy)" - New World Encyclopedia
(New page: {{Otheruses4|methodological naturalism|metaphysical naturalism|Metaphysical naturalism}} '''Naturalism''' is any of several philosophical stances, typically those descended from [[materia...) |
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| − | '''Naturalism''' is any of several philosophical stances, | + | '''Naturalism''' is any of several philosophical stances that make the assumption that nature is, in principle, completely knowable, and that nature is an organic whole governed by objective laws which can be understood through observation and experimentation. Any method of inquiry or investigation or any procedure for gaining [[knowledge]] that limits itself to natural, physical, and material approaches and explanations can be described as naturalistic. |
| − | + | Naturalism does not distinguish the [[supernatural]] (including entities like non-natural values, and universals as they are commonly conceived) from [[nature]]. It equates nature with reality, insisting that all phenomena and hypotheses can be studied using the same methods. Naturalism implies that all knowledge of the universe can be arrived at through scientific investigation, and that “supernatural” phenomena can be studied through their detectable influence on natural phenomena. Anything labeled “supernatural” is either nonexistent, unknowable, or not inherently different from natural phenomena or hypotheses. | |
| − | + | Naturalistic philosophical systems are typically associated with [[materialism]] and [[pragmatism]], and do not give much consideration to metaphysics. | |
| − | + | == History == | |
| + | The ideas and assumptions of philosophical naturalism were first seen in the works of the [[Ionian School|Ionian]] [[Pre-Socratic philosophy|pre-Socratic philosophers]]. [[Thales]], often regarded as the founder of science, was the first to give explanations of natural events without resorting to supernatural causes such as the actions of the Greek gods. Jonathan Barnes's introduction to Early Greek Philosophy (Penguin) describes these early philosophers as subscribing to principles of empirical investigation that strikingly anticipate naturalism. | ||
| − | + | During the twelfth century, after the works of Aristotle became available to European scholars in Latin, [[scholasticism|scholastic]] thinkers began to search for a rational explanation of the universe. | |
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | + | : “By the late Middle Ages the search for [[natural causes]] had come to typify the work of [[Chistianity|Christian]] natural philosophers. Although characteristically leaving the door open for the possibility of direct divine intervention, they frequently expressed contempt for soft-minded contemporaries who invoked miracles rather than searching for natural explanations. The University of Paris cleric [[Jean Buridan]] (a. 1295-ca. 1358), described as "perhaps the most brilliant arts master of the Middle Ages," contrasted the philosopher’s search for "appropriate natural causes" with the common folk’s erroneous habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural. In the fourteenth century the natural philosopher [[Nicole Oresme]] (ca. 1320-82), who went on to become a Roman Catholic bishop, admonished that, in discussing various marvels of nature, "there is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us." | |
| − | + | :Enthusiasm for the naturalistic study of nature picked up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as more and more Christians turned their attention to discovering the so-called secondary causes that God employed in operating the world. The Italian Catholic [[Galileo Galilei]] (1564-1642), one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature "never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her." <ref>Ronald L. Numbers (2003). "Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs." In: When Science and Christianity Meet, edited by David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, p. 267.</ref> | |
| − | |||
| − | + | During the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], a number of [[philosophers]] including [[Francis Bacon]] and [[Voltaire]] outlined the philosophical justifications for removing appeal to supernatural forces from investigation of the natural world. Scientific investigation culminated in the development of modern [[biology]] and [[geology]], which rejected a literal interpretation of the prevailing origin beliefs of the revealed religions. | |
| − | + | In the 1930s and 1940s, naturalism enjoyed a resurgence in the United States among philosophers such as F.J.E. Woodbridge, Morris R. Cohen, John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, and Sidney Hook. | |
| − | |||
| − | + | ==Methodological Naturalism== | |
| + | === Naturalism as Epistemology === | ||
| + | During the last half of the twentieth century, philosophers began to seek continuity with science, using scientific methods and knowledge as criteria for judging the validity of philosophical inquiry. Methodological naturalism holds that philosophers should use the empirical methods of scientific inquiry to conduct philosophical inquiry. Some methodological naturalists accept other types of philosophical speculation, but contend that only empirical examination can determine whether a particular speculation is truly applicable to human life. Substantive naturalists believe that any legitimate philosophical inquiry must be able to be substantiated by a scientific empirical investigation. | ||
| − | + | [[W. V. Quine]] describes naturalism as the position that there is no higher tribunal for truth than natural science itself. There is no better method than the scientific method for judging the claims of science, and there is neither any need nor any place for a "first philosophy", such as (abstract) [[metaphysics]] or [[epistemology]], that could stand behind and justify science or the scientific method. | |
| − | |||
| − | + | Therefore, philosophy should feel free to make use of the findings of scientists in its own pursuit, for example, using scientific studies of the brain to investigate the nature of cognition. Philosophy should also feel free to offer criticism when scientific claims are ungrounded, confused, or inconsistent. In this way philosophy becomes "continuous with" science. Naturalism is not a dogmatic belief that the modern view of science is entirely correct. Instead, it simply holds the processes of the universe have a scientific explanation, and those processes are what modern science is striving to understand. | |
| − | + | ===Methodological Naturalism and Science=== | |
| − | + | If objective laws of nature did not exist, the pursuit of scientific knowledge would become meaningless. The fact that man continually searches for knowledge of objective truth is considered a confirmation of the naturalistic methodology. Even when one scientific theory is found to be flawed, and is replaced with another, mankind never doubts that the truth will eventually be understood. Theories change, but the method for evolving them does not. | |
| − | + | According to Ronald Numbers, the term "methodological naturalism" was coined in 1983 by Paul de Vries, at Wheaton College, Illinois to distinguish '' between what he called "methodological naturalism," a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism," which "denies the existence of a transcendent God."''<ref>[[Nick Matzke]]: [http://www.pandasthumb.org/archives/2006/03/on_the_origins.html On the Origins of Methodological Naturalism]. ''The Pandas Thumb'' (March 20, 2006)</ref> The term "methodological naturalism" had been used in 1937 by Edgar Sheffield Brightman in an article in ''The Philosophical Review'' as a contrast to "naturalism" in general, but there the idea was not really developed to its more recent distinctions.<ref>[http://www.calvin.edu/archive/asa/200603/0501.html ASA March 2006 - Re: Methodological Naturalism]</ref> | |
| − | + | In a series of articles and books from 1996 onwards, Robert T. Pennock wrote using the term “methodological naturalism” to clarify that the [[scientific method]] confines itself to natural explanations without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural.]]]. Pennock's testimony as an expert witness<ref>[http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/dover/day3am2.html Kitzmiller trial: testimony of Robert T. Pennock]</ref> at the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District trial was cited by the Judge in his ''Memorandum Opinion'' concluding that "Methodological naturalism is a "ground rule" of science today"<ref name=kitz/> | |
| + | The subject was given detailed attention during the ''[[Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District]]'' trial in 2005, and in his memorandum of findings<ref name=kitz>[[wikisource:Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District 4: whether ID is science#4. Whether ID is Science|Kitzmiller v. Dover: Whether ID is Science]]</ref> United States federal court judge John E. Jones III concluded that "Methodological naturalism is a 'ground rule' of science today". This ruling sets a federal district judicial precedent in the context of legal restrictions on the teaching of religion in U.S. schools, and more broadly the memorandum sets out an impartial assessment of the evidence and arguments relating to the use in science of methodological naturalism as against supernatural explanations. | ||
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| − | + | The historical support of methodological naturalism by Christians is noted by Numbers: | |
:Despite the occasional efforts of unbelievers to use scientific naturalism to construct a world without God, it has retained strong Christian support down to the present. And well it might, for (...)<!--, as we have seen, —> scientific naturalism was largely made in Christendom by pious Christians. Although it possessed the potential to corrode religious beliefs — and sometimes did so — it flourished among Christian scientists who believe that God customarily achieved his ends through natural causes. <ref>Numbers 2003, op cit, p. 284</ref> | :Despite the occasional efforts of unbelievers to use scientific naturalism to construct a world without God, it has retained strong Christian support down to the present. And well it might, for (...)<!--, as we have seen, —> scientific naturalism was largely made in Christendom by pious Christians. Although it possessed the potential to corrode religious beliefs — and sometimes did so — it flourished among Christian scientists who believe that God customarily achieved his ends through natural causes. <ref>Numbers 2003, op cit, p. 284</ref> | ||
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| − | + | == Naturalism and Philosophy of Mind == | |
| + | There is currently some dispute over whether naturalism altogether rules out certain areas of philosophy which are constructs of the human mind, such as [[semantics]], [[ethics]], [[aesthetics]], or excludes the use of the mentalistic vocabulary ("believes", "thinks") employed in philosophy of mind. Some recent thinkers have argued that even though mentalistic descriptions and value judgments cannot be systematically translated into physicalistic descriptions, they also do not need to presuppose the existence of anything other than physical phenomena. | ||
| − | + | Donald Davidson, for example, has argued that individual mental states can (must, in fact) be identical with individual states of the physical brain, even though a given kind of mental state (belief in materialism) might not be systematically identified with a given kind of brain state (a particular pattern of neural firings): the former weakly "supervenes" upon the latter. Recently developed technologies which allow the observation of human brain activity have shown that specific areas of the brain activity are associated with certain types of mental states. | |
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| − | + | The implication is that naturalism can leave non-physical vocabulary intact where the use of that vocabulary can be explained naturalistically; McDowell has dubbed this level of discourse "second nature." | |
| − | == | + | == Criticisms of Naturalism == |
The debate over naturalism is alive and complex, because it concerns both the basis of [[science]], and how narrowly or broadly [[nature]] should be defined. | The debate over naturalism is alive and complex, because it concerns both the basis of [[science]], and how narrowly or broadly [[nature]] should be defined. | ||
=== Philosophy === | === Philosophy === | ||
| − | [[Karl Popper]] equated naturalism with [[inductive reasoning|inductive]] theory of science | + | [[Karl Popper]] equated naturalism with [[inductive reasoning|inductive]] theory of science, and rejected it based on his general critique of induction (see [[problem of induction]]), while acknowledging its utility as means for inventing conjectures. |
| − | {{quotation|A naturalistic methodology (sometimes called an "inductive theory of science") has its value, no doubt. […] I reject the naturalistic view: It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science, and consequently to its idea of scientific method.|Karl R. Popper| '' | + | {{quotation|A naturalistic methodology (sometimes called an "inductive theory of science") has its value, no doubt. […] I reject the naturalistic view: It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science, and consequently to its idea of scientific method.|Karl R. Popper| ''The Logic of Scientific Discovery'' (Routledge, 2002), p. 31, ISBN 0-415-27844-9.}} |
Popper instead proposed the criterion of [[falsifiability]] for [[demarcation problem|demarcation]]. | Popper instead proposed the criterion of [[falsifiability]] for [[demarcation problem|demarcation]]. | ||
| − | + | === Creationism and Intelligent Design === | |
| + | Supporters of [[creationism]] claim that the possibility of supernatural action is unnecessarily excluded by the current practices and theories of science. Proponents of [[intelligent design]], who hold that certain features of the natural world are best explained as the results of a divine intelligence, argue that the naturalist conception of reality may restrict the ability to arrive at a correct understanding of the universe. Their general criticism is that insisting that the natural world is a closed system of inviolable laws, independent of supernatural intervention, will cause science to come to incorrect conclusions and inappropriately exclude research that claims to include such ideas. Contemporary philosopher Alvin Plantinga has argued that evolutionary naturalism is incoherent. In ''Science and Theology News''<ref name=plantinga/> he attacks the conclusions of the Kitzmiller trial and suggests that the term "[[science]]" denotes any activity that is: | ||
# a systematic and disciplined enterprise aimed at finding out truth about our world, and | # a systematic and disciplined enterprise aimed at finding out truth about our world, and | ||
# has significant empirical involvement. Any activity that meets these vague conditions counts as science. | # has significant empirical involvement. Any activity that meets these vague conditions counts as science. | ||
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He concludes "if you exclude the supernatural from science, then if the world or some phenomena within it are supernaturally caused – as most of the world's people believe – you won't be able to reach that truth scientifically." | He concludes "if you exclude the supernatural from science, then if the world or some phenomena within it are supernaturally caused – as most of the world's people believe – you won't be able to reach that truth scientifically." | ||
| − | == | + | ==Literary Naturalism== |
| − | + | In literature, “naturalism” refers to two related literary movements. The first occurred in France during the 1850s -1880s, when writers such as Gustav Flaubert and Emile Zola rejected the concept of human free will and attempted to document and “scientifically” demonstrate that human behavior arises from purely physical circumstances and causes, in Zola’s words, “nerves and blood.” These ideas influenced the development of a new genre of literature in the United States during the 1890s, represented by Abraham Cahan, Ellen Glasgow, Jack London, David Graham Phillips, Stephen Crane, Frank Norris, and Theodore Dreiser. In contrast to “realism,” which portrayed daily events in the lives of mostly middle-class characters and avoided themes such as sexuality and violence, naturalism depicted the lives of characters from the lower class, often ethnic minorities in industrialized cities. The behavior of these characters was a product of environment, heredity, and physical desire, but they had redeeming qualities and affirmed their dignity and uniqueness as individuals. | |
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== See also == | == See also == | ||
Revision as of 13:51, 30 June 2007
- This article is about methodological naturalism. For metaphysical naturalism, see Metaphysical naturalism.
Naturalism is any of several philosophical stances that make the assumption that nature is, in principle, completely knowable, and that nature is an organic whole governed by objective laws which can be understood through observation and experimentation. Any method of inquiry or investigation or any procedure for gaining knowledge that limits itself to natural, physical, and material approaches and explanations can be described as naturalistic.
Naturalism does not distinguish the supernatural (including entities like non-natural values, and universals as they are commonly conceived) from nature. It equates nature with reality, insisting that all phenomena and hypotheses can be studied using the same methods. Naturalism implies that all knowledge of the universe can be arrived at through scientific investigation, and that “supernatural” phenomena can be studied through their detectable influence on natural phenomena. Anything labeled “supernatural” is either nonexistent, unknowable, or not inherently different from natural phenomena or hypotheses.
Naturalistic philosophical systems are typically associated with materialism and pragmatism, and do not give much consideration to metaphysics.
History
The ideas and assumptions of philosophical naturalism were first seen in the works of the Ionian pre-Socratic philosophers. Thales, often regarded as the founder of science, was the first to give explanations of natural events without resorting to supernatural causes such as the actions of the Greek gods. Jonathan Barnes's introduction to Early Greek Philosophy (Penguin) describes these early philosophers as subscribing to principles of empirical investigation that strikingly anticipate naturalism.
During the twelfth century, after the works of Aristotle became available to European scholars in Latin, scholastic thinkers began to search for a rational explanation of the universe.
- “By the late Middle Ages the search for natural causes had come to typify the work of Christian natural philosophers. Although characteristically leaving the door open for the possibility of direct divine intervention, they frequently expressed contempt for soft-minded contemporaries who invoked miracles rather than searching for natural explanations. The University of Paris cleric Jean Buridan (a. 1295-ca. 1358), described as "perhaps the most brilliant arts master of the Middle Ages," contrasted the philosopher’s search for "appropriate natural causes" with the common folk’s erroneous habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural. In the fourteenth century the natural philosopher Nicole Oresme (ca. 1320-82), who went on to become a Roman Catholic bishop, admonished that, in discussing various marvels of nature, "there is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us."
- Enthusiasm for the naturalistic study of nature picked up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as more and more Christians turned their attention to discovering the so-called secondary causes that God employed in operating the world. The Italian Catholic Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature "never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her." [1]
During the Enlightenment, a number of philosophers including Francis Bacon and Voltaire outlined the philosophical justifications for removing appeal to supernatural forces from investigation of the natural world. Scientific investigation culminated in the development of modern biology and geology, which rejected a literal interpretation of the prevailing origin beliefs of the revealed religions.
In the 1930s and 1940s, naturalism enjoyed a resurgence in the United States among philosophers such as F.J.E. Woodbridge, Morris R. Cohen, John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, and Sidney Hook.
Methodological Naturalism
Naturalism as Epistemology
During the last half of the twentieth century, philosophers began to seek continuity with science, using scientific methods and knowledge as criteria for judging the validity of philosophical inquiry. Methodological naturalism holds that philosophers should use the empirical methods of scientific inquiry to conduct philosophical inquiry. Some methodological naturalists accept other types of philosophical speculation, but contend that only empirical examination can determine whether a particular speculation is truly applicable to human life. Substantive naturalists believe that any legitimate philosophical inquiry must be able to be substantiated by a scientific empirical investigation.
W. V. Quine describes naturalism as the position that there is no higher tribunal for truth than natural science itself. There is no better method than the scientific method for judging the claims of science, and there is neither any need nor any place for a "first philosophy", such as (abstract) metaphysics or epistemology, that could stand behind and justify science or the scientific method.
Therefore, philosophy should feel free to make use of the findings of scientists in its own pursuit, for example, using scientific studies of the brain to investigate the nature of cognition. Philosophy should also feel free to offer criticism when scientific claims are ungrounded, confused, or inconsistent. In this way philosophy becomes "continuous with" science. Naturalism is not a dogmatic belief that the modern view of science is entirely correct. Instead, it simply holds the processes of the universe have a scientific explanation, and those processes are what modern science is striving to understand.
Methodological Naturalism and Science
If objective laws of nature did not exist, the pursuit of scientific knowledge would become meaningless. The fact that man continually searches for knowledge of objective truth is considered a confirmation of the naturalistic methodology. Even when one scientific theory is found to be flawed, and is replaced with another, mankind never doubts that the truth will eventually be understood. Theories change, but the method for evolving them does not.
According to Ronald Numbers, the term "methodological naturalism" was coined in 1983 by Paul de Vries, at Wheaton College, Illinois to distinguish between what he called "methodological naturalism," a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism," which "denies the existence of a transcendent God."[2] The term "methodological naturalism" had been used in 1937 by Edgar Sheffield Brightman in an article in The Philosophical Review as a contrast to "naturalism" in general, but there the idea was not really developed to its more recent distinctions.[3]
In a series of articles and books from 1996 onwards, Robert T. Pennock wrote using the term “methodological naturalism” to clarify that the scientific method confines itself to natural explanations without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural.]]]. Pennock's testimony as an expert witness[4] at the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District trial was cited by the Judge in his Memorandum Opinion concluding that "Methodological naturalism is a "ground rule" of science today"[5] The subject was given detailed attention during the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District trial in 2005, and in his memorandum of findings[5] United States federal court judge John E. Jones III concluded that "Methodological naturalism is a 'ground rule' of science today". This ruling sets a federal district judicial precedent in the context of legal restrictions on the teaching of religion in U.S. schools, and more broadly the memorandum sets out an impartial assessment of the evidence and arguments relating to the use in science of methodological naturalism as against supernatural explanations.
The historical support of methodological naturalism by Christians is noted by Numbers:
- Despite the occasional efforts of unbelievers to use scientific naturalism to construct a world without God, it has retained strong Christian support down to the present. And well it might, for (...) scientific naturalism was largely made in Christendom by pious Christians. Although it possessed the potential to corrode religious beliefs — and sometimes did so — it flourished among Christian scientists who believe that God customarily achieved his ends through natural causes. [6]
Naturalism and Philosophy of Mind
There is currently some dispute over whether naturalism altogether rules out certain areas of philosophy which are constructs of the human mind, such as semantics, ethics, aesthetics, or excludes the use of the mentalistic vocabulary ("believes", "thinks") employed in philosophy of mind. Some recent thinkers have argued that even though mentalistic descriptions and value judgments cannot be systematically translated into physicalistic descriptions, they also do not need to presuppose the existence of anything other than physical phenomena.
Donald Davidson, for example, has argued that individual mental states can (must, in fact) be identical with individual states of the physical brain, even though a given kind of mental state (belief in materialism) might not be systematically identified with a given kind of brain state (a particular pattern of neural firings): the former weakly "supervenes" upon the latter. Recently developed technologies which allow the observation of human brain activity have shown that specific areas of the brain activity are associated with certain types of mental states.
The implication is that naturalism can leave non-physical vocabulary intact where the use of that vocabulary can be explained naturalistically; McDowell has dubbed this level of discourse "second nature."
Criticisms of Naturalism
The debate over naturalism is alive and complex, because it concerns both the basis of science, and how narrowly or broadly nature should be defined.
Philosophy
Karl Popper equated naturalism with inductive theory of science, and rejected it based on his general critique of induction (see problem of induction), while acknowledging its utility as means for inventing conjectures.
A naturalistic methodology (sometimes called an "inductive theory of science") has its value, no doubt. […] I reject the naturalistic view: It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science, and consequently to its idea of scientific method.
Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, 2002), p. 31, ISBN 0-415-27844-9.
Popper instead proposed the criterion of falsifiability for demarcation.
Creationism and Intelligent Design
Supporters of creationism claim that the possibility of supernatural action is unnecessarily excluded by the current practices and theories of science. Proponents of intelligent design, who hold that certain features of the natural world are best explained as the results of a divine intelligence, argue that the naturalist conception of reality may restrict the ability to arrive at a correct understanding of the universe. Their general criticism is that insisting that the natural world is a closed system of inviolable laws, independent of supernatural intervention, will cause science to come to incorrect conclusions and inappropriately exclude research that claims to include such ideas. Contemporary philosopher Alvin Plantinga has argued that evolutionary naturalism is incoherent. In Science and Theology News[7] he attacks the conclusions of the Kitzmiller trial and suggests that the term "science" denotes any activity that is:
- a systematic and disciplined enterprise aimed at finding out truth about our world, and
- has significant empirical involvement. Any activity that meets these vague conditions counts as science.
He concludes "if you exclude the supernatural from science, then if the world or some phenomena within it are supernaturally caused – as most of the world's people believe – you won't be able to reach that truth scientifically."
Literary Naturalism
In literature, “naturalism” refers to two related literary movements. The first occurred in France during the 1850s -1880s, when writers such as Gustav Flaubert and Emile Zola rejected the concept of human free will and attempted to document and “scientifically” demonstrate that human behavior arises from purely physical circumstances and causes, in Zola’s words, “nerves and blood.” These ideas influenced the development of a new genre of literature in the United States during the 1890s, represented by Abraham Cahan, Ellen Glasgow, Jack London, David Graham Phillips, Stephen Crane, Frank Norris, and Theodore Dreiser. In contrast to “realism,” which portrayed daily events in the lives of mostly middle-class characters and avoided themes such as sexuality and violence, naturalism depicted the lives of characters from the lower class, often ethnic minorities in industrialized cities. The behavior of these characters was a product of environment, heredity, and physical desire, but they had redeeming qualities and affirmed their dignity and uniqueness as individuals.
See also
- Metaphysical naturalism
- Positivism
- Materialism
- Atheism
- Brights movement
- Unitarian Universalism
- Empiricism
- Sociological naturalism
- Supernaturalism
Notes and references
- ↑ Ronald L. Numbers (2003). "Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs." In: When Science and Christianity Meet, edited by David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, p. 267.
- ↑ Nick Matzke: On the Origins of Methodological Naturalism. The Pandas Thumb (March 20, 2006)
- ↑ ASA March 2006 - Re: Methodological Naturalism
- ↑ Kitzmiller trial: testimony of Robert T. Pennock
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Kitzmiller v. Dover: Whether ID is Science
- ↑ Numbers 2003, op cit, p. 284
- ↑ Cite error: Invalid
<ref>tag; no text was provided for refs namedplantinga
External links
Neutral
- The Craig-Taylor Debate: Is The Basis Of Morality Natural Or Supernatural? William Lane Craig and Richard Taylor October 1993, Union College (Schenectady, New York)
Supportive
- atheists.org
- naturalism.org
- Center for Naturalism
- The Secular Web
- Naturalism: The Naturalistic Worldview
- kwcg.humanists.net
Critical
- Naturalism article in the Catholic Encyclopedia
- Alvin Plantinga (1994). "Naturalism Defeated". (pdf)
- Victor Reppert's C. S. LEWIS'S DANGEROUS IDEA: In Defense of the Argument from Reason
- Philip Johnson's Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism from First Things
- Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (eds) Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004.
- Examination of the spiritual roots of naturalism.
de:Naturalismus (Philosophie) et:Naturalism (filosoofia) es:Naturalismo (lingüística) eo:Naturismo (filozofio) fr:Naturalisme (philosophie) hr:Naturalizam it:Naturalismo (filosofia) hu:Naturalizmus (filozófia) nl:Naturalisme pl:Naturalizm (filozofia) ru:Натурализм fi:Naturalismi (filosofia) sv:Naturalism zh:自然主义
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