G.E.M. Anscombe

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Western philosophy
twentieth century
Name: Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe
Birth: March 18, 1919
Death: January 5, 2001
School/tradition: Analytic philosophy
Main interests
Philosophy of action, Philosophy of mind, philosophical logic
Notable ideas
consequentialism, brute facts, 'under a description'
Influences Influenced
Ludwig Wittgenstein Philippa Foot, Michael Dummett, Cora Diamond, Rosalind Hursthouse, Paul Feyerabend, Jenny Teichman

G. E. M. Anscombe (March 18, 1919 – January 5, 2001) (born Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, also known as Elizabeth Anscombe) was a British analytic philosopher. A student of Ludwig Wittgenstein, she became an authority on his work, and edited and translated many books drawn from his writings, above all his Philosophical Investigations. She wrote on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and ethics. Her 1958 article "Modern Moral Philosophy" introduced the term "consequentialism" into the language of analytic philosophy; this and subsequent articles had a seminal influence on contemporary virtue ethics. Her monograph Intention is generally recognized as her greatest and most influential work, and the continuing philosophical interest in the concepts of intention, action and practical reasoning can be said to have taken its main impetus from this work.


G. E. M. Anscombe was born to Gertrude Elizabeth Anscombe and Alan Wells Anscombe, on arch 18, 1919, in Limerick, Ireland, where her father had been posted as an officer in the British army.

She graduated from Sydenham High School in 1937, and went on to read "Mods & Greats" (a course of study in classics, ancient history, and philosophy) at St Hugh's College of the University of Oxford, graduating with a First in 1941. During her first undergraduate year she converted to Roman Catholicism, and remained a lifelong devout Catholic. She garnered controversy when she publicly opposed Britain's entry into World War II, although her father had been a soldier, and her brother was to serve during World War II.

She married Peter Geach, like her a Roman Catholic convert, a student of Wittgenstein, and a distinguished British academic philosopher. Together they reared three sons and four daughters.

After graduating from Oxford, Anscombe was awarded a research fellowship for postgraduate study at Newnham College, Cambridge from 1942 to 1945. Her purpose was to attend Ludwig Wittgenstein's lectures. Her interest in Wittgenstein's philosophy arose from reading the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as an undergraduate: she claimed to have conceived the idea of studying with Wittgenstein as soon as she opened the book in Blackwell's and read section 5.53, "Identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of signs." She became an enthusiastic student, and his close friend and advocate, even adopting his mannerisms: holding her head in anguish, furrowing her brow, and holding long silences. She was so attracted to Wittgenstein's work because she thought that his therapeutic method helped to free her from philosophical difficulties in ways that her training in traditional systematic philosophy could not. As she wrote (in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, vii-ix, quoted in Monk, 1990, 497):

For years, I would spend time, in cafés, for example, staring at objects saying to myself: "I see a packet. But what do I really see? How can I say that I see here anything more than a yellow expanse?" …I always hated phenomenalism and felt trapped by it. I couldn't see my way out of it but I didn't believe it. It was no good pointing to difficulties about it, things which Russell found wrong with it, for example. The strength, the central nerve of it remained alive and raged achingly. It was only in Wittgenstein's classes in 1944 that I saw the nerve being extracted, the central thought I have got this, and I define "yellow" (say) as this being effectively attacked.

After her fellowship at Cambridge ended, she was awarded a research fellowship at Somerville College, Oxford, but during the academic year of 1946 - 1947, she continued to travel to Cambridge once a week, together with her fellow student W. A. Hijab, to attend tutorials with Wittgenstein on the philosophy of religion. She became one of Wittgenstein's favorite students and one of his closest friends [1]. His confidence in Anscombe's understanding of his perspective is shown by his choice of her as translator of his Philosophical Investigations before she had learned German, for the purpose for which he arranged a stay in Vienna.

Her translation of the Investigations is marvelous—lucid, intuitive, compelling in style—so much so that it is read all over the world as if it were the work of Wittgenstein himself. Indeed, the most important work and legacy of Anscombe was that, more than anyone else, she was responsible for bringing Wittgenstein and his work to the attention of the world.

Anscombe visited with Wittgenstein many times after he left Cambridge in 1947, and traveled to Cambridge in April 1951 to visit him on his deathbed. Wittgenstein named her, along with Rush Rhees and Georg Henrik von Wright, as his literary executor, and after his death in 1951, she was responsible for editing, translating, and publishing many of Wittgenstein's manuscripts and notebooks.

Anscombe was unlike nearly all of her Oxford and Cambridge colleagues in being a staunch Roman Catholic Christian, and she scandalized liberal colleagues, such as Bernard Williams, with articles defending the Roman Catholic Church's opposition to contraception in the 1960s and early 1970s. She also wrote against homosexuality. Later in life, she was arrested twice while protesting outside an abortion clinic in Britain, after abortion had been legalized (albeit with restrictions).

Anscombe remained at Somerville College from 1946 to 1970. She was also known for her willingness to face fierce public controversy in the name of her Catholic faith. In 1956, while a research fellow at Oxford University, she protested against Oxford's decision to grant an honorary degree to Harry S. Truman, whom she denounced as a mass murderer for his use of atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Anscombe was elected Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge University in 1970, where she served until her retirement in 1986.

Anscombe was known for her outspokenness and often rudeness. Some called her "Dragon Lady." She sometimes wore a monocle. She was completely impatient with pretension and pompousness, but she devoted a great deal of time and effort to students who she regarded as being serious. Her tutorials went on for hours and left everyone exhausted. She allowed students to drop in at her house to discuss philosophy at any time, among the dirty diapers. Although married to Geach, she was always known formally as "Miss Anscombe." Although strongly Roman Catholic she was not straightlaiced and could be quite foulmouthed. It is reported that whe was once threatened by a mugger in Chicago, and she replied to him that that was no way to treat a visitor, whereupon they fell into a conversation and he accompanied her to her destination, telling her that she should not be in such a dangerous neighborhood. For some years whe was a chain smoker, but when her second son fell seriously ill she bargained with God that if her son recovered, she would give up smoking cigarettes. But the following year, under the strain of not smoking, she reasoned that her bargain with God had not included cigars or pipes, so she took to smoking those. She always wore trousers—even pink stretch pants!—often under a tunic, except when she was pregnant, and in those days that too often met with disapproval.

In her later years, Anscombe suffered from heart disease, and was nearly killed by an automobile accident in 1996. She spent her last years in the care of her family in Cambridge. She died, aged 81, with her husband and four of their seven children at her bedside, on January 5, 2001.

Youthful dispute with C. S. Lewis

As a young philosophy don, Anscombe acquired a reputation as a formidable debater. In 1948 she won a debate against C. S. Lewis at Oxford's Socratic Club over Lewis's argument that naturalism was self-refuting (found in the third chapter of original publication of his book Miracles). Admirers of Lewis have made much of this event - some associates (primarily George Sayer and Derek Brewer) remarked that this loss was so humiliating for Lewis that he abandoned theological argument and turned entirely to devotional writing and children's literature. As a result of the weaknesses pointed out in the contest, Lewis substantially rewrote the chapter for future editions of the book. Anscombe's own comments on the matter were thus:

The fact that Lewis rewrote that chapter, and rewrote it so that it now has those qualities [to meet Anscombe's objections], shows his honesty and seriousness. The meeting of the Socratic Club at which I read my paper has been described by several of his friends as a horrible and shocking experience which upset him very much. Neither Dr Harvard (who had Lewis and me to dinner a few weeks later) nor Professor Jack Bennet remembered any such feelings on Lewis's part […] My own recollection is that it was an occasion of sober discussion of certain quite definite criticisms, which Lewis's rethinking and rewriting showed he thought was accurate. I am inclined to construe the odd accounts of the matter by some of his friends—who seem not to have been interested in the actual arguments of the subject-matter—as an interesting example of the phenomenon called projection.—from the introduction to her Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, 1981. [2]


Some of Anscombe's most frequently cited works are translations or expositions of the work of her teacher Ludwig Wittgenstein. She wrote an introduction (1959) to Wittgenstein's 1921 book, the Tractatus Logico-Philisophicus, which brought to the fore the importance of Gottlob Frege for Wittgenstein's thought and, partly on that basis, attacked "positivist" interpretations of the work. She edited his posthumous second book, Philosophical Investigations (1953). Her English translation of it appeared simultaneously and remains standard. She also edited or co-edited several volumes of selections from his notebooks, translating some of them, for example the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956).

Her most important work is indisputably the monograph Intention (1957). Three volumes of collected papers were published in 1981: From Parmenides to Wittgenstein; Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind; and Ethics, Religion and Politics. Another collection, "Human Life, Action and Ethics" appeared posthumously in 2005.

The aim of Intention (1957) was to make plain the character of human action and will. Anscombe approaches the matter through the concept of intention, which, as she famously notes, has three modes of appearance in our language:

She is X'ing intentionally intentional action
She is X'ing with the intention of doing Y
or …She is X'ing in order to Y
intention with which
or further intention in acting
She intends to Y
or… She has expressed the intention to do Y
expression of intention for the future;
(what is expressed is what Davidson later called a pure intending)

She suggests that a true account must somehow connect these three uses of the concept, though later students of intention have sometimes denied this, and disputed some of the things she presupposes under the first and third headings. It is clear though that it is the second that is for her crucial to her main purpose, which is to comprehend the way in which human thought and understanding and conceptualization relate to the "events in a man's history," or the goings on of which he is subject.

Rather than attempt to define intentions in abstraction from actions, thus taking the third heading first, Anscombe begins with the concept of an intentional action. This soon connected with the second heading. She says that what is up with a human being is an intentional action if the question 'Why,' taken in a certain sense (and evidently conceived as addressed to him), has application (Intention, par. 5-8). An agent can answer the 'why' question by giving a reason or purpose for her action. "To do Y" or "because I want to do Y" would be typical answers to this sort of "why?"; though they are not the only ones, they are crucial to the constitution of the phenomenon as a typical phenomenon of human life (sections 18-21). The agent's answer helps supply the descriptions under which the action is intentional. Anscombe was the first to clearly spell out that actions are intentional under some descriptions and not others. In her famous example, a man's action (which we might observe as consisting in moving an arm up and down while holding a handle) may be intentional under the description 'pumping water' but not under other descriptions such as 'contracting these muscles', 'tapping out this rhythm', and so on. This approach to action influenced Donald Davidson's theory, despite the fact that Davidson went on to argue for a causal theory of action that Anscombe never accepted (see Anscombe (1981) as well as Anscombe (1957)).

Intention (1957) is also the classic source for the idea that there is a difference in 'direction of fit' between cognitive states like beliefs and conative states like desire. (This theme is later taken up and discussed by Searle in Intentionality (1983)). Cognitive states describe the world and are causally derived from the facts or objects they depict. Conative states do not describe the world, but aim to bring something about in the world. Anscombe used the example of a shopping list to illustrate the difference (see Intention (1957), par.32). The list can be a straightforward observational report of what is actually bought (thereby acting like a cognitive state), or it can function as a conative state such as a command or desire, dictating what the agent should buy. If the agent fails to buy what is listed, we do not say that the list is untrue or incorrect; we say that the mistake is in the action, not the belief. According to Anscombe, this difference in direction of fit is a major difference between speculative knowledge (theoretical, empirical knowledge) and practical knowledge (knowledge of actions and morals). Whereas 'speculative knowledge' is 'derived from the objects known', practical knowledge is—in a phrase Anscombe lifts from Aquinas—'the cause of what it understands' (see Intention (1957), par.87).

Contributions to Ethics

Anscombe made great contributions to ethics as well as metaphysics. She is credited with having coined the term "consequentialism." She was also a strong opponent of utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialism because they have no sound way of not countenancing the executing of a guiltless person if that will lead to good consequences or large scale happiness. She said of someone who thought that way, "I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind."

In her 1958 essay "Modern Moral Philosophy," Anscombe wrote:

The denial of any distinction between foreseen and intended consequences, as far as responsibility is concerned, was not made by Sidgwick in developing any one 'method of ethics'; he made this important move on behalf of everybody and just on its own account; and I think it plausible to suggest that this move on the part of Sidgwick explains the difference between old-fashioned Utilitarianism and the consequentialism, as I name it, which marks him and every English academic moral philosopher since him.

She argued in that paper that present-day notions such as "moral obligation," "moral duty," "morally right," and "morally wrong" are things that have been held over from the Judaeo-Christian idea of God as a lawgiver, and that these notions have now become vacuous. She said that "ought" has come to be "a word of mere mesmeric force" because we no longer thing that we ought to do things "because we are commanded by God."

Anscombe also coined the term "brute facts," as opposed to facts constituted by them in the presence of appropriate institutions. The term had a major role to play in John Searle's philosophy and speech act theory.

Her paper "The First Person" follows up remarks by Wittgenstein, coming to the now-notorious conclusion that the first-person pronoun, "I," does not refer to anything (not, e.g., to the speaker). Few people accept the conclusion - though the position was later adopted in a more radical form by David Lewis - but the paper was an important contribution to work on indexicals and self-consciousness that has been carried on by philosophers as varied as John Perry, Peter Strawson, David Kaplan, Gareth Evans, and John McDowell.


  1. Ray Monk. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 497-498
  2. About the Socratic Club 'debate' From the minutes of the Socratic Club: C. S. Lewis's Miracles Before and After Anscombe. Sonic.net.

ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Dolan, John. G.E.M. Anscombe: Living the Truth. First Things: the Journal of Religion, Culture and Public Life (2001): 11-13. an obituary or memoir by Professor John Dolan. [1]. Retrieved October 19, 2022.
  • O'Grady, Jane.

The Guardian January 11, 2001, Obituary: Elizabeth Anscombe.[2]. Retrieved October 19, 2022.

  • Monk, Ray. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. New York: Penguin Books, 1991. ISBN 0140159959.
  • Teichmann, Jenny. Biographical memoir "Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe." Proceedings of the British Academy 2001.


Selected Works by Anscombe

  • Intention. Oxford: Blackwell, 1957; 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. ISBN 0674003993
  • An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1959; 4th ed. London: Hutchinson, 1971. ISBN 0090511301 ISBN 009051131X
  • Three Philosophers with Peter Geach, on Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Gottlob Frege. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961.
  • Causality and Determination: An Inaugural Lecture. London: Cambridge University Press, 1971. ISBN 0521083044
  • Times, Beginnings and Causes. London: Oxford University Press [for the British Academy], 1975. ISBN 0197257127
  • The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe (3 vols., 1981):
    1. From Parmenides to Wittgenstein. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981. ISBN 0816610789
    2. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981. ISBN 0816610800
    3. Ethics, Religion and Politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981. ISBN 0816610827
  • Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays, Edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally. Exeter, UK; Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 2005. ISBN 1845400135

Anscombe's Publication of the Works of Wittgenstein

  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Bemerkungen uber die Farben = Remarks On Color, Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, Translated by Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schattle. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. ISBN 0520033353
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Notebooks, 1914-1916, Edited by G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe; with an English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe; index prepared by E. D. Klemke. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. ISBN 0226904296
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. On Certainty, Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright; translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1975, 2006. ISBN 0631169407
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, Trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan, 1958. 2nd. ed., Oxford, UK & Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997. ISBN 0631205691
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Eng. trans. of Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik, Edited by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe; translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978. ISBN 0262230801
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Eng. trans. of Bemerkungen über die Philosophic der Psychologie. Vol 1 edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright; translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Vol. 2 edited by G.H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman; translated by C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. ISBN 0226904334 (v. 1) ISBN 0226904342 (v. 2)
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Zettel, Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright; translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. 2nd. ed. Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1981. ISBN 0631128131

External links

All links retrieved April 15, 2024.

General Philosophy Sources


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