Difference between revisions of "Theodicy" - New World Encyclopedia

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'''Theodicy''' is a specific branch of [[theology]] and [[philosophy]] that attempts to solve the problem of evil, which is the problem of reconciling the observed existence of evil in the world with the assumption of the existence of a [[God]] who is fully good (or benevolent) as well as powerful. Any attempt to reconcile the co-existence of evil and God may thus be called a "theodicy".  
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'''Theodicy''' is a specific branch of [[theology]] and [[philosophy]], which attempts to solve The Problem of [[Evil]]—the problem that arises when trying to reconcile the observed existence of evil in the world with the assumption of the existence of a [[God]] who is fully good (or benevolent) and who is also all-powerful (omnipotent). A "theodicy" also refers to any attempted solution to this conundrum.  
  
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==Origin of the Term==
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Almost all traditional theodicies have attempted to [[logic|logically]] solve the contradiction amongst the three points—the omnipotence of God, the goodness of God, and the real existence of evil—by negating or qualifying one or another of them. Hence, traditional theodicies are of three types:
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The term ''theodicy'' comes from the Greek ''{{polytonic|θεός}}'' (''theós'', "god") and ''{{polytonic|δίκη}}'' (''díkē'', "justice"), meaning literally "the justice of God."  The term was coined in 1710 by the [[Germany|German]] [[philosopher]] [[Gottfried Leibniz]] in a work entitled ''Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal'' ("essay of theodicy about the benevolence of God, the free will of man, and the origin of evil"). The purpose of the essay was to show that the evil in the world does not conflict with the goodness of God, and that notwithstanding its many evils, the world is the best of all ''possible'' worlds.
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# Denying or qualifying the omnipotence of God
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# Denying or qualifying the goodness of God
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# Denying the reality of evil
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{{toc}}
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In recent years, new theodicies have appeared which take a different approach: Rather than trying to eliminate an uncomfortable contradiction, one can accept the contradiction between the reality of evil and a God who is both omnipotent and good, and view it as pointing to a path toward the actual removal of evil, or as revealing a deeper understanding of the nature of God, or both. For example, one might theorize that God, because of his love, has given humans [[Free Will|free will]] through which they could make wrong choices and create evil, but has also given them, out of his omnipotence, the ability to use their free will to overcome evil, and that this path to grow to maturity through such a life of overcoming evil is the ultimate expression of God's goodness.
  
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==The Problem of Evil==
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==Origin of the term==
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The term ''theodicy'' comes from the Greek ''{{polytonic|θεός}}'' (''theós'', "god") and ''{{polytonic|δίκη}}'' (''díkē'', "justice"), meaning literally "the justice of God."  The term was coined in 1710 by the [[Germany|German]] [[philosopher]] [[Gottfried Leibniz]] in a work entitled ''Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal'' ("Essay of theodicy about the benevolence of God, the free will of man and the origin of evil"). The purpose of the essay was to show that the evil in the world does not conflict with the goodness of God, and that notwithstanding its many evils, the world is the best of all ''possible'' worlds.
  
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==The problem of evil==
 
The problem of evil for theists consists in the existence of a contradiction amongst the following three statements or claims integral and central to them:
 
The problem of evil for theists consists in the existence of a contradiction amongst the following three statements or claims integral and central to them:
  
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* 1) that God is omnipotent;
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* 1) That [[God]] is omnipotent
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* 2) that God is fully good (or loving, or benificent); and
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* 2) That God is fully good (or loving, or beneficent)
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* 3) that evil and suffering exist in the world.
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* 3) That [[evil]] and suffering exist in the world
  
 
For how can an omnipotent and fully good God create such an evil world?  
 
For how can an omnipotent and fully good God create such an evil world?  
  
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If it can be shown that one of those statements is false, however, then the "problem" of contradiction disappears. Consequently, nearly all traditionally received theistic theodicies can be understood as attempts to reconcile those statements, arguing that at least one of those statements is false in some essential or important way. Therefore, there are three major types of traditional theodicies: 1) a first type, which denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God; 2) a second one, which denies or qualifies the goodness of God; and 3) a third type, denying or qualifying the reality of revil.
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If it can be shown that one or another of those statements is false, however, then the "problem" of contradiction disappears. Consequently, nearly all traditionally received theistic theodicies can be understood as attempts to reconcile those statements, arguing that one or another of those statements is false in some essential or important way. Therefore, there are three major types of traditional theodicies: 1) A first type, which denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God; 2) a second one, which denies or qualifies the goodness of God; and 3) a third type, denying or qualifying the reality of evil.  
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But, these received theodicies have been criticized more recently by some insightful thinkers. There are two points of criticism. Frist, these traditional theodicies are ''merely'' logical attempts to solve the contradiction of the three statements, without offering any real solution for the actual removal of evil; evil is still there. Second, when they merely attempt to logically solve the contradiction, their treatments of the omnipotence and goodness of God, whether they affirm or deny these divine attributes, are rather simplistic, external, and superficial, without being able to understand the nature of God any further. So, those who are critical towards the traditional types of theodicies go beyond the superficial level of logically addressing the contradiction of the three statementsare; without even seeing any contradiction amongst the three statements, they rather attempt to find a solution on a different horizen, and their new solutions tend to be more insightful
 
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==Antitheistic Responses==
 
  
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Before we deal with the traditional theistic theodicies, it would be useful to know [[David Hume]]'s celebrated antitheistic response in his ''Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion'' (1779) because it was basically the above-mentioned contradiction of the three theistic statements that led him to be antitheistic. According to him, the reality of evil is undeniable because in the world we can see "four circumstances" on which evil depends: 1) that pain motivates creatures to action; 2) that laws of nature cause collision, drowning, burning, etc.; 3) that man is so fragile for perseverance; and 4) that rain, wind, heat, etc. in nature are excessive. This is logically "incomaptible" with an omnipotent and fully good God. So, we have to believe that God does not exist. This is usually called the "logical argument from evil." It has been followed by philosophers such as J. L. Mackie and H. J. McCloskey, who argue that all traditional theodicies are defective.<ref>J. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," and H. J. McCloskey, "God and Evil," in ''God and Evil: Readings on the Theological Problem of Evil'', ed. Nelson Pike (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 46-84.</ref>
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But, these received theodicies have been criticized more recently by some insightful thinkers. There are two points of criticism. First, these traditional theodicies are ''merely'' [[logic|logical]] attempts to solve the contradiction of the three statements, without offering any real solution for the actual removal of evil; evil is still there. Second, when they merely attempt to logically solve the contradiction, their treatments of the omnipotence and goodness of God, whether they affirm or deny either of these divine attributes, are rather simplistic, external, and superficial, without being able to understand the nature of God any further. So, those who are critical towards the traditional types of theodicies go beyond the logical level of addressing the contradiction of the three statements; without even seeing any contradiction amongst the three statements, they rather attempt to find a solution on a different horizon, and their new solutions tend to be more insightful.
  
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A little less straightforward than the logical argument is the "evidential argument from evil," which contends that evil is evidence against the likelihood of God's existence. According to William Rowe, for example, the fact of gratuitous evil, which is more than necessary for the potential use of evil, makes it unlikely that God exists.
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==Three major traditional theodicies==
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The three major types of traditional theodicies are: 1) Finitism, which denies or qualifies the omnipotence of [[God]] in the context of dualism; 2) despotism, which denies or qualifies the goodness of God, because of its belief that God's absolute sovereignty lets him do evil things in the eyes of humans; and 3) a third kind, denying or qualifying the reality of [[evil]].
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==Three Major Traditional Theodicies==
 
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There are three major kinds of traditional theodicies: 1) finitism, which denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God in the context of dualism; 2) despotism, which denies or qualifies the goodness of God, because of its belief that God's absolute sovereignty makes him look evil to humans; and 3) a third kind, denying or qualifying the reality of evil.
 
  
 
===Finitism: God is not omnipotent===
 
===Finitism: God is not omnipotent===
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Finitism denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God and says that the finite God cannot avoid evil. It takes various forms of [[dualism]]. Some religions, such as [[Zoroastrianism]], [[Gnosticism]], and [[Manichaeism]] presented the cosmic dualism of God and Satan. [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]] were of the [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] dualism of God (or Demiurge) and prime [[matter]] (or Receptacle), where God is finite because he must have recourse to prime matter for the constitution of the world. [[Nikolai Berdyaev]] and [[Alfred North Whitehead]] suggested the mystical dualism of God and Uncreated Freedom (or [[Creativity]]), where God is finite because of the pre-existent principle of Uncreated Freedom. The American [[Methodism|Methodist]] [[philosophy|philosopher]] Edgar Brightman suggested a unique kind of finitism with his internal dualism of form and matter within God, where his power is restrained because of form. Finitism sometimes entails the so-called "[[Free Will|free will]] defense" of God (as in Berdyaev and Whitehead) because it gives free will to humans in the context of God's finitude. But this free will defense based on finitism is not the same as the more insightful free will defense proposed by the American philosopher Alvin Plantinga to be treated below.
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Finitism denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God and says that the finite God cannot avoid evil. It takes various forms of dualism. Some religions such as [[Zoroastrianism]], [[Gnosticism]], and [[Manichaeism]] presented the cosmic dualism of God and Satan. [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]] were of the metaphysical dualism of God (or Demiurge) and prime matter (or Receptacle), where God is finite because he must have recorse to prime matter for the constitution of the world. [[Nikolai Berdyaev]] and [[Alfred North Whitehead]] suggested the mystical dualism of God and Uncreated Freedom (or Creativity), where God is finite because of the pre-existent principle of Uncreated Freedom. The American Methodist philosopher Edgar Brightman suggested a unique kind of finitism with his internal dualism of form and matter within God, where his power is restrained because of form.
 
  
 
===Despotism: God is not fully good===
 
===Despotism: God is not fully good===
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This type of theodicy can be seen in staunch [[Calvinism]], and it presupposes the absolute sovereignty of God. God is so sovereign that although he may be a good God in principle, he does not look fully good in actuality. For God is the active creator and instigator of all sin and evil, including the fall, using these as instruments to accomplish his plan. Satan, thus, is considered to have no power of his own but is merely God's puppet. An important part of staunch Calvinism is the belief in the absolute predestination of all things by God, that is, that nothing happens unless God actively makes something happen. Whatever is is right, as long as God wills it. So, there can be no such thing as a problem of evil. In this view, humans have no free will. But, they will still be held responsible for whatever sins they commit because God has decided to judge them by his laws.
  
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This type of theodicy can be seen in staunch Calvinism, and it presupposes the absolute sovereignty of God. God is so sovereign that, although he may be a good God, he is not wholly good. God is also the active creator and instigator of all sin and evil, including the fall, using these as instruments to accomplish his plan. Satan, thus, is considered to have no power of his own but is merely God's puppet. An important part of staunch Calvinism is the belief in the absolute predestination of all things by God, i.e., nothing happens unless God actively makes something happen. Whatever is is right, as long as God wills it. So, there can be no such thing as a problem of evil. In this view, humans have no free will. But, they will still be held responsible for whatever sins they commit because God has decided to judge them by his laws.
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Besides this Calvinist despotism, so-called "maltheism," the view that God is evil, also solves the problem of evil by attributing evil to God. But, maltheism is quite different from Calvinism because it says that God is simply evil himself without being necessarily despotic.
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Besides this Calvinist despotism, so-called "maltheism," the view that God is evil, also solves the problem of evil by attributing evil to God. But, maltheism is quite diffrent from Calvinism because it says that God is simply evil himself without being necessarily despotic.
 
  
 
===Evil is not real===  
 
===Evil is not real===  
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*'''Evil as "non-being"'''
 
*'''Evil as "non-being"'''
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The non-being theme of evil started from [[Augustine of Hippo|St. Augustine]], who as a [[Neoplatonism|Neoplatonic]] Christian regarded all being as good, thus referring to evil as non-being. Critiquing the [[Manicheanism|Manichean]] dualism, which he used to adhere to, he asserted that the universe, including matter and its unique creator, God, are unambiguously good. Evil, therefore, is non-being ''(non esse)''. It is the privation, corruption, or perversion of something that was previously or otherwise good. Evil has no substantial being in itself, but is always parasitic upon good. Evil entered the universe through the culpable free actions of otherwise good beings—[[angel|angels]] and humans. [[Sin]] consisted not in choosing evil (because there was no evil to choose) but in turning away from the higher good of God to a lower good. Natural evils were held by Augustine to be consequences of the fall too, and thus also consequences of human or angelic [[free Will|free will]]. When one asks what ''caused'' man to fall, Augustine answers through his doctrine of "deficient" causation. In his view, there is no positive cause of evil will, but rather a negation of deficiency. Augustine seems to mean by this that free volitions are, in principle, inexplicable—free willing is itself an originating cause, with no prior cause or explanation.
  
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The non-being theme of evil started from [[Augustine of Hippo|St. Augustine]], who as a [[Neoplatonism|Neoplatonic]] Christian regarded all being as good, thus referring to evil as non-being. Critiquing the [[Manicheanism|Manichean]] dualism, which he used to adhere to, he asserted that the universe, including matter, and its unique Creator God are unambiguously good. Evil, therefore, is non-being (''non esse''). It is the privation, corruption, or perversion of something that was previously or otherwise good. Evil has no substantial being in itself, but is always parasitic upon good. Evil entered the universe through the culpable free actions of otherwise good beings — [[angel|angels]] and humans. [[Sin]] consisted not in choosing evil (because there was no evil to choose) but in turning away from the higher good of God to a lower good. Natural evils (see below) were held by Augustine to be consequences of the fall too, and thus also consequences of human or angelic [[free will]]. When we ask what ''caused'' man to fall, Augustine answers through his doctrine of deficient causation. In his view, there is no positive cause of evil will, but rather a negation of deficiency. Augustine seems to mean by this that free volitions are, in principle, inexplicable — free willing is itself an originating cause, with no prior cause or explanation.  
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This Augustinian definition of evil as the privation of good ''(privatio boni)'' can be seen also in [[Thomas Aquinas|St. Thomas Aquinas]]. It constitutes much of the Christian tradition on the subject of evil.  
  
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This Augustinian definition of evil as the privation of good (''privatio boni'') can be seen also in [[Thomas Aquinas|St. Thoams Aquinas]]. It constites much of the Christian tradition on the subject of evil.
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There are other ways of saying that evil is non-existent. According to [[Spinoza]]'s pantheism, there is no evil in the world which is divine. [[Mary Baker Eddy]], founder of [[Christian Science]], regarded evil simply as illusion, echoing [[Hinduism]] and [[Buddhism]]. Using relational [[logic]] and not [[theology]], [[Canada|Canadian]] [[Bahai|Baha’i]] [[mathematics|mathematician]] William Hatcher has argued that evil is not absolute but simply "less good" than good.  
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There are other ways of saying that evil is non-existent. According to [[Spinoza]]'s pantheism, there is no evil in the world which is divine. [[Mary Baker Eddy]], founder of [[Christian Science]], regarded evil simply as illusion, echoing the [[Hinduism|Hindu]] and [[Buddhism|Buddhist]] views. Using relational logic and not theology, [[Canada|Canadian]] [[Bahai|Baha’i]] mathematician William Hatcher has argued that evil is bot absolute but simply "less good" than good.  
 
  
 
*'''Aesthetic conception of evil'''
 
*'''Aesthetic conception of evil'''
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Augustine additionally held to what we can call the [[aesthetics|aesthetic]] conception of evil, and it can be still another important way of saying that evil is not real. It is a view derived from the principle of plenitude in [[Plato]]'s ''Timaeus'' 41 b-c. That principle holds that a universe in which all possibilities are being realized—a universe containing lower and lesser, as well as higher and greater things—is greater than a universe that contains only the highest type(s) of things. Lower beings thus are not evil as such, but merely different and lesser goods. According to that view, what appears to be evil is such only when seen in an isolated or limited context, but when viewed in the context of the totality of the universe it is good because it is a necessary element in that good universe.
  
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Augustine additionally held to what we can call the aesthetic conception of evil, and it can be still another important way of saying that evil is not real. It is a view derived from the principle of plenitude in [[Plato]]'s ''Timaeus'' 41 b-c. That principle holds that a universe in which all possibilities are being realized — a universe containing lower and lesser, as well as higher and greater things — is greater than a universe that contains only the highest type(s) of things. Lower beings thus are not evil as such, but merely different and lesser goods.  According to that view, what appears to be evil is such only when seen in an isolated or limited context, but when viewed in the context of the totality of the universe it is good because it is a necessary element in that good universe.
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This was held less [[philosophy|philosophically]] by many believers and theologians, such as [[John Calvin]], who asserted that all events are part of God's righteous plan, and therefore although they may involve evil in themselves, they are intended by God for morally justified purposes.
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This was held less philosophically by many believers and theologians such as [[John Calvin]] who asserted that all events are part of God's righteous plan, and therefore although they may involve evil in themselves, they are intended by God for morally justified purposes.
 
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==Theodicies on a Different Horizen==
 
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The above three types of received theodicies are merely logical attempts to solve the contradiction amongst the three statements of the omnipotence of God, the goodness of God, and the reality of evil, by denying or qualifying one of them. But these theodicies cannot offer any real solution for the actual removal of evil; evil is still there. Also, they seem to treat God's attributes such as divine omnipotence and goodness rather simplistically and superficially, without being able to have any deeper insights into God's nature. All this is due to the logical nature of these theodicies. (The antitheistic arguments against God's existence from evil cannot eradicate evil, either. Nor can they perhaps have any deeper insights into the naturer of God, either; so, they end up rejecting God's existence.)
 
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So, more profound theodicists do not want to stay with the logical level of removing the contradiction of the three basic statements. To them, the logical contradiction does not matter. They do not even see it. They rather attempt to find a solution at a different level with the result that they increasingly see the possibility of knowing the true nature of God and the possibility of eventual eradication of evil.
 
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===The Book of Job: evil as a mystery of faith===
 
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The theodicy of the Book of Job is a good start because it suggests that the apparent contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God should not be handled logically but faithfully. In spite of his initial complaint to the Lord and to his "comforters" that his sufferings have been inflicted on him unjustly, Job finally accepted the difficult situation by repentance and faith, when he was confronted by the overwhelming greatness and wisdom of God. This attitude of faithfully accepting it and not logically explaining it away can at least help open a new possibility of knowing the nature of God deeply. Also, evil somehow disappears: "And the Lord restored the fortune of Job, when he had prayed for his friends; and the Lord gave Job twice as much as he had before" (Job 42:10). 
 
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===John Hick: the world as vale of "soul-making"===
 
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John Hick is not interested in any logical solution of the contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God, which involves the denial or qualification of any of the three. Instead, his starting point is his deeper understanding and conviction of God's love of agape expressed in the life and work of Jesus Christ. This love of God, says Hick, is supposed to be completely realized in our personal relationships with him eventually. The reality of evil should be interpreted in view of this eschatological realization of God's love. If so, the world in which we really experience moral and natural evil can help us to grow to reach a point at which we enjoy our personal relationships with God. Thus, the worl is vale for "soul-making."
 
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In the process, moral evil might be seen because humans are imperfect. But from its undesirable outcomes they can learn about becoming better through their more responsible decisions. They can eventually become perfect creatures without moral evil only by going through "a hazardous adventure in individual freedom."<ref>John Hick, ''Evil and the God of Love'' (London: Macmillan, 1966), 201-3, 290-95.</ref> And this freedom was given them because of God's love. Even the natural harshness of our environment apart from human sin was given to humans out of the love of God, so that they may be able to to grow by going through hunting, agriculture, and construction of shelter. This way, natural evil will be overcome. What is interesting is Hick's suggestion that if our eschatological goal of experiencing our personal relationships with God is not realized on earth, then it should be realized in the other world eventually.
 
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According to Hick, his theodicy is of the "Irenaean" type, given the view of St. [[Irenaeus]] (c. 125-202 C.E.) that the pre-fall Adam was more like a child than a mature and responsible adult, i.e., that Adam stood at the beginning of a long process of development because although he had been created in the "image" of God, he had to develop into the "likeness" of God.
 
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===Alvin Plantinga: the free will defense===
 
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According to the American philosopher Alvin Plantinga, it has never been shown logically impossible that God allows evil for a good purpose. So, there is no contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God. Plantinga thus admits of the omnipotence of God in his treatment of the problem of evil. Therefore, his free will defense defends the omnipotence of God, while at the same time defending him from being held responsible for the evil choices of humans. So, Plantinga's position is to be distinguished from some versions of finitism (such as Whitehead's and [[open theism]]'s finitism) which give free will to humans to the neglect of divine omnipotence. What is important is his belief that there may conceivably be a good long-term purpose of God for which evil is temporarily permitted. This attitude of faith on the part of Plantinga is clear. 
 
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Again, Plantinga's free will defense maintains that the omnipotent and good God is not responsible for the wrong choices of humans, although he has endowed them with free will, which makes them free to choose good or evil. But, this free will defense has been criticized by Antony Flew and J. L. Mackie, who argue that such a God is responsible because he has not created the world in which free human beings always in fact freely make right choices. To this, Plantinga has responded that although there ''may'' be such a fantastic world, there also ''may not'' be any such world. For what happens in this world in terms of choosing evil would happen in any other possible world.
 
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====Response to the free will defense====
 
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The claim that both God and man possess ultimate [[free will]] certainly entails the possibility of evil acts, making the free will theodicy plausible [[prima facie]].  However, freedom may make evil possible, but it does not cause evil. In other words, the free will defense is based on confusing the possibility of evil with the cause of evil. Thus, this view does not address the causation problem and the problem of the emergence of evil despite the claim that God is good.
 
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One explanation is that free will necessarily leads to evil because humans are corrupt at heart, which would assume a will that is evil rather than free. It would also mean that God created evil because God created human nature.  A simpler explanation is that it may merely be a contingent fact that humans ''happen to'' choose evil by their exercise of freedom. And evil, having once arisen even by chance, plausibly led to more evil.
 
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Others attack free will theodicy on other grounds. Some deny the existence of free will altogether, and so have no need for the proposal in the first place. [[Compatibilism|Compatibilists]] sometimes attack the essential premise that God cannot influence our choices without thereby cancelling our freedom, for compatibilists believe that [[determinism]] is consistent with human freedom. And if determinism can allow for freedom, perhaps so can appropriate divine meddling with our decisions. Thus the question of exactly how God's intervention would undermine free moral agency is crucial. We need a reason to think that there are at least some, perhaps many, ways that God really couldn't override our choices without cancelling our freedom. The customary appeal is to a strong construal of free will.
 
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Another challenge focuses on different ways to interfere with freedom. One way is to "jump in" and take control of the agent, dictating its every movement and thought. This is the kind of [[coercion]] we envision in mad scientist stories. But it might also be the kind of coercion that motivates our above intuition that if God got involved, we'd all be 'robots'. But there are other, softer kinds of coercion. Look to policemen and jailers. They don't directly take control of an agent's decisions. They just threaten the agent with physical force and restraint, and carry out their threats if necessary. Policemen and jailers restrict our freedom, but not in the same way. If God were to get involved as a Divine Policeman, making threats and enforcing them, then would we be robots? Perhaps not, or at least not in the same way. Instead, we'd be citizens of a divine nation-state, and a very safe and reliable nation-state at that. But then the moral claim that God ''should'' hold back must be more refined: To just what extent could God (consistently) intervene, without abridging free will?
 
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Other challenges attack the idea that evil-eliminating divine interventions must cancel human freedom. These challenges suggest different ways for God to eliminate evil, all the while leaving our free will untouched&mdash;"innocent interventions". One proposal is for God to fortify humans as to render us less vulnerable to the sins of our fellows. We could be bullet-proof, invulnerable to poison, etc. That way, humans would retain the capacity for evil choices and activities; it's just that such evil behavior would be harmless to the 'victims' and futile for the evildoers. On the other hand, it is not obvious that such a system could be constructed. If people cannot do harm, then they are not free moral agents, though they may be free agents in some very restricted sense.
 
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Most supporters of a free will theodicy would argue that it is moral free agency, not a vacuous freedom that has no moral consequences, which is essential to making us truly different from automata.
 
  
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A very similar proposal is that God could allow sinful acts, but stop their evil consequences. So if I fire a rifle at your head, God allows me to make the decision, but then makes the trigger stick, or the rifle misfire, or the bullet pop out of existence. Such interventions would, happily, divorce evil choices from the subsequent suffering. One objection to this proposed solution is that it depends on a magical suspension of the laws of nature. Another objection is that without observing the evil consequences of our actions we would not truly be making moral choices at all. In other words it is not only important for us to have freedom to choose our actions but also to have freedom with consequences. Presumably, a world where guns only fired when aimed at just targets would not truly present us the option to choose evil since it would be apparent that no harm comes from our actions; and a world where all evil choices were grossly unattractive would likewise not leave us truly free moral agents.
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==Theodicies on a different horizon==
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The above three types of received theodicies are merely logical attempts to solve the contradiction amongst the three statements of the omnipotence of [[God]], the goodness of God, and the reality of [[evil]], by denying or qualifying one or another of them. But these theodicies cannot offer any real solution for the actual removal of evil; evil is still there. Also, they seem to treat God's attributes, such as divine omnipotence and goodness, rather simplistically and superficially, without being able to have any deeper insights into God's nature. All this is due to the logical nature of these theodicies.  
  
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===Evolutionary===
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Thinkers who do not want to stay with the [[logic|logical]] level of removing the contradiction of the three basic statements, have attempted to find a solution at a different level. To them, the logical contradiction does not matter. They do not even see it. On a different horizon, they seem to be able to better understand the nature of God and seem to be able to better explain how evil is eventually removed.  
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Evolutionary theodicy, suggests that the plan that God has involves the elimination of all evil at the end of time, but that the means by which creation occurs always leads to the presence of evil in the interim. This theory is linked to the evolution of God himself as present in the cosmos.
 
  
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===The Book of Job: Evil as a mystery of faith===
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The theodicy of the [[Book of Job]] is a good start because it suggests that the apparent contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God should not be handled logically but [[faith|faithfully]]. In spite of his initial complaint to the Lord and to his "comforters" that his sufferings have been inflicted on him unjustly, Job finally accepted the difficult situation by repentance and faith, when he was confronted by the overwhelming greatness and [[wisdom]] of God. This attitude of faithfully accepting it and not logically explaining it away can at least help open a new possibility of knowing the nature of God deeply, although the nature of God may yet to be revealed in Book of Job. Also, evil somehow disappears in the end: "And the Lord restored the fortune of Job, when he had prayed for his friends; and the Lord gave Job twice as much as he had before" (Job 42:10).
  
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===Alan Richardson===
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===John Hick: The world as vale of "soul-making"===
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The British [[philosophy|philosopher]] of [[religion]] John Hick is not interested in any logical solution of the contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God. Instead, his starting point is his deeper understanding and conviction of God's [[love]] of agape expressed in the life and work of [[Jesus Christ]]. This love of God, says Hick, is supposed to be completely realized in our personal relationships with him eventually. The reality of evil should be interpreted in view of this eschatological realization of God's love. If so, the world in which people really experience moral and natural evil can help them to grow to reach a point at which the enjoy their personal relationships with God. Thus, the world is vale for "soul-making."
  
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===Kenneth Surin===
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The process of growth might involve [[morality|moral]] evil because humans are imperfect. But from its undesirable outcomes they can learn about becoming better through their more responsible decisions. They can eventually become perfect creatures without moral evil only by going through "a hazardous adventure in individual freedom."<ref>John Hick, ''Evil and the God of Love'' (London: Macmillan, 1966), 201-3, 290-95.</ref> And this [[freedom]] was given them because of God's love. Even the natural harshness of the environment apart from human sin was given to humans out of the love of God, so that they may be able to grow through hunting, [[agriculture]], construction of shelter, and so on. This way, natural evil also will be gradually overcome. What is interesting is Hick's suggestion that if the eschatological goal of experiencing a personal relationship with God is not realized on earth, then it should be realized in the other world eventually.
  
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==Other Stuff to Be Organized yet==
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According to Hick, his theodicy is of the "Irenaean" type, given the view of St. [[Irenaeus]] (c. 125-202 C.E.) that the pre-fall Adam was more like a child than a mature and responsible adult; that is, that Adam stood at the beginning of a long process of development because although he had been created in the "image" of God, he had to develop into the "likeness" of God.
  
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===Alvin Plantinga: The free will defense===
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According to the American philosopher Alvin Plantinga, it has never been shown logically impossible that God allows evil for a good purpose. So, there is no contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God. Plantinga thus accepts the omnipotence of God in his treatment of the problem of evil. Therefore, his [[Free Will|free will]] defense, which says that God has endowed humans with free will, not only defends God from being held responsible for their evil choices; it also defends the omnipotence of God. So, Plantinga's position is to be distinguished from some versions of finitism (such as [[Alfred North Whitehead|Whitehead]]'s finitism) which give free will to humans to the neglect of divine omnipotence. What is important is his belief that there may conceivably be a good long-term purpose of God for which the evil choices of free humans are temporarily permitted. The purpose of God is to have "the greater good of having created persons with free will with whom he could have relationships and who are able to love one another and do good deeds," although there may possibly be their evil choices.<ref>The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/evil-log.htm The Logical Problem of Evil.] Retrieved December 16, 2007.</ref> This seems to be a profound insight.
  
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Plantinga's free will defense has been criticized by Antony Flew and J. L. Mackie, who argue that such a God is still responsible because he has not created the world in which free human beings always in fact freely make right choices, and that such a God, therefore, is not omnipotent. To this, Plantinga has responded that although there ''may'' be such a fantastic world as a possibility, there also ''may not'' possibly be any such world. For what happens in this world in terms of choosing evil would happen in any other possible world. Thus, humans suffer from what he calls "transworld depravity." Also, God is still omnipotent, because divine omnipotence does not include the power to do what is logically impossible.
  
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===Mackie and Plantinga===
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Perhaps Plantinga's position may not give much hope for the eventual removal of evil. Hence, one recent, friendly response from Daniel Howard-Snyder and John O'Leary-Hawthorne regarding this, claiming that the possibility of all persons being transworld depraved cannot be supported. After all, there is another ''prima facie'' possibility that all persons are in fact transworld sanctified (and so would do no wrong). So, Plantinga's argument should be repaired in order to incorporate this other possibility as well.<ref>Daniel Howard-Snyder and John O'Leary-Hawthorne, "Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense," ''International Journal for Philosophy of Religion'' 44 (1998): 1-21.</ref> Even so, Plantinga's original understanding of the reason why God has given humans free will in spite of possible evil can be appreciated.
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J. L. Mackie, in his now classic article "Evil and Omnipotence", argued that human freedom is consistent with human perfection, and that God should have opted for both. Mackie asserts that human misconduct is a contingent matter&mdash;we can choose to do good or evil, with both alternatives being possible. He then asks us to imagine a world in which everyone always chooses good and never chooses evil&mdash;a virtuous and sinless world. Finally, he notes that God could have chosen to bring about any possible world, from the one that is actual, to a world in which people choose more wickedly, to the good world Mackie just described.
 
  
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However, in choosing to bring about a virtuous and sinless world, God would thereby deny humans their freedom. However, Mackie makes the contention that if this claim were true, then God would have denied us ''our'' freedom by bringing about the actual world. Bringing about a world in which people make choices is not freedom-cancelling, and so God should have brought about a world in which people make better choices. This argument is the seed of contemporary discussions of the "logical argument from evil," which aims to show that theism and evil are logically incompatible.
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===Richard Kropf: Evil within an evolutionary natural order===
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Somewhat similar to Hick's position is the American [[Roman Catholic Church|Roman Catholic]] priest Richard Kropf's treatment of evil in the context of [[evolution]], although Kropf adds at least two more things in the discussion: the suffering of God during the process of growth in the world and the eventual [[redemption]] of non-human parts of the world as well as humans. Kropf specifically criticizes the traditional theodicies, by saying that they failed because they "simplified the problem" by trying to only address the logical contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God. He, therefore, maintained four "stubborn factors" that cannot be denied:
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# An omnipotent and good God
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# The reality of evil
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# Human [[freedom]] and responsibility
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# The world in growth and evolution
  
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Alvin Plantinga, in a response that has also achieved 'classic' status, answers Mackie. Plantinga's view is a version of the "free will defense." He argues that evil is consistent with God's existence, because there are some possible worlds that God cannot bring about. Plantinga reminds us that there are always trivial limits on omnipotence&mdash;God can't make 2+2=5 or create a married bachelor. Plantinga's work extends these trivial limits to very non-trivial results.
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These can all be related to one another without contradiction, if they are centered on a key notion: The process of evolution. This approach, according to him, helps to "unlock the secrets of reality, including the problem of evil, on a much broader scale."<ref>Richard W. Kropf, ''Evil and Evolution: A Theodicy'' (London: Associated University press, 1984), p. 27.</ref> It is in this context that he suggests a newer understanding of God, which is that the God of compassionate love suffers over the miseries humans go through as a result of their evil choices in their revolutionary process of growth. He also suggests to include non-human creatures as part of the eventual redemption of the whole cosmos through Christ.
  
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First, Plantinga proposes that there are logical truths&mdash;so-called "counterfactuals of freedom"&mdash;about our free choices in various possible situations, with one choice dictated for every situation. On Plantinga's example, where S is a situation in which Curley is free to take or refuse a bribe, it is either true that "If Curley were to be free in S, he would take the bribe" or "If Curley were to be free in S, he would refuse the bribe" (assume that exactly one can be true). These truths about what we would freely do in possible situations help make us what we are, and are timelessly and necessarily true&mdash;and so, crucially, out of God's hands. Consequently, if the first proposition is true (and Curley would take the bribe), then God cannot bring about the possible world in which Curley refuses the bribe. God can only bring about S and sadly watch Curley's freely chosen venality manifest itself, as timelessly reported by that unchangeable counterfactual of freedom.
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===Kenneth Surin: The "practical" approach===
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The British [[theology|theologian]] Kenneth Surin is still another thinker to stay away from the traditional theodicies that merely "theoretically" explain away evil without being able to make "practical" efforts to remove it.<ref>Kenneth Surin, ''Theology and the Problem of Evil'' (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986).</ref> The traditional theodicies are usually based on their adherence to classical theism, and they use it to theoretically justify God in face of evil. Surin, however, follows the theologies of the cross of Dorothee Soelle, Jürgen Moltmann, and so on, and believes that the suffering of the God of love is revealed through the crucifixion of Christ and experienced by those who suffer from evil, and that this God is available not as an object of theodicy discussion but rather as a real help for the removal of evil. This does not mean that God is finite, but rather that Surin is suggesting a new definition of divine omnipotence that can also explain God's accessibility for people. Through inner conversion, people are encouraged to become like Christ who shows the suffering love of God. We should accomplish the practical task of overcoming evil through our Christ-like commitment to, presence in, and solidarity with, the victim of evil. Surin's approach is so advanced in a practical direction that it even criticizes the quite innovative theodicies of John Hick and Alvin Plantinga among others of being still very theoretical; and Surin specifically makes use of Ivan Karamazov's moral frustration in [[Fyodor Dostoevsky|Dostoyevsky]]'s novel ''The Brothers Karamazov'' to criticize Hick's theodicy of theoretically justifying evil for the purpose of "soul-making," although Hick's intention has been to emphasize the love of God.
  
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Second, Plantinga argues for the possibility of a person who will sin at least once, no matter what situation God puts him in. Such a person suffers from so-called "transworld depravity". Though he ''can'' choose to do good in each situation, though it is ''possible'' that he does good in each situation, it is nevertheless true that he will choose to sin, a sad fact reported by his counterfactuals of freedom. And God can do nothing to bring about the sinless possible worlds&mdash;that's up to the sinner, who will, as a matter of fact, choose otherwise.
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==Oppositions to theodicy==
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===Antitheism: God does not exist===
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[[David Hume]] shows his celebrated antitheistic response in his ''Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion'' (1779). According to him, the reality of [[evil]] is undeniable because in the world, one can see "four circumstances" on which evil depends: 1) That pain motivates creatures to action; 2) that laws of nature cause collision, drowning, burning, and so on; 3) that humankind is so fragile for perseverance; and 4) that rain, wind, heat, and so on, in nature are excessive. This is logically "incomaptible" with an omnipotent and fully good [[God]]. So, one has to believe that God does not exist, instead of securing the justice of God. This is usually called the "logical argument from evil." It has been followed by [[philosophy|philosophers]] such as J.L. Mackie and H.J. McCloskey, who reject all traditional theodicies.<ref>J.L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," and H.J. McCloskey, "God and Evil," in ''God and Evil: Readings on the Theological Problem of Evil,'' ed. Nelson Pike (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 46-84.</ref>
  
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Thus, according to Mackie, even God cannot bring about virtuous and sinless worlds. God may be omnipotent, but he can't change people's free decisions, and he can't change the fact that they will freely choose as they do. And if people will make evil choices, then those possible worlds in which they choose good are beyond God's reach. Plantinga proposes that perhaps all persons suffer from transworld depravity, that perhaps the actual world, though not the best possible world, is the best one that God could bring about, if he is to respect the free choices of the creatures therein. Futhermore, then natural evil is also the result of sinful actions&mdash;the actions of invisible, powerful moral agents like demons.  
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A little less straightforward than the [[logic|logical]] argument is the "evidential argument from evil," which contends that evil is evidence against the likelihood of God's existence. According to [[William Rowe]], for example, the fact of gratuitous evil, which is more than the necessary level of evil which is potentially useful for a good purpose, makes it unlikely that God exists.
  
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Here another problem arises, related to God's claim (in many religions) that, after the end of the world, a paradise will be created where evil is defeated. The whole argument that God in his omnipotence could not create the "virtuous sinless world" described above seems to contradict God's own claim to do this very thing.  Regarding this matter, one recent, friendly response to Plantinga is from Daniel Howard-Snyder and John O'Leary-Hawthorne. They claim that, to show the compatibility of theism and evil, Plantinga needs to support the possibility of his sketched scenario &mdash; it mustn't be reasonable to doubt its possibility.  They claim that the possibility of all persons being transworld depraved is unsupported. After all, there is another "prima facie" possibility, that all persons are in fact transworld sanctified (and so would do no wrong). Both 'possibilities' seem equally possible, and since they rule each other out, only one of them can be possible. Thus it is reasonable to doubt the possibility of either, and it is reasonable to doubt that Plantinga's scenario is possible; so it is reasonable to doubt that God really is consistent with evil. The two critics take to repairing Plantinga's argument, by replacing the "it is possible that" propositions with similar "for all we reasonably believe, it is possible that" propositions. The conclusion is then not that theism and evil are compatible, but that, for all we reasonably believe, theism and evil are compatible. The compatibility is not proven, but the incompatibility isn't reasonable, either. Mackie is still rebutted.
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===Theodicy has a predetermined goal===
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Some have argued that the predetermined goal of theodicy (that of justifying the existence of God with the existence of evil) tarnishes any aspirations it might have to be a serious philosophical discipline because an intellectual pursuit having a predefined goal and pre-assumed conclusions cannot be deemed in any reasonable way to be methodical, scientific, or rational. Should one respect an inquiry whose goal is not to find out the truth, but to prove ''by any means possible'' that a particular thing ''reasonably doubted'' is true? Proceeding from the proposition to be shown to find a proof of that proposition invites confirmation bias on the part of the theorist.
  
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Another, stronger challenge comes from Richard Gale. In Plantinga's scenario, God's decisions cause human behavior and the psychological makeup whence that behavior stems; consequently, Gale maintains, human freedom gets cancelled by God's decisions. Ironically, then, Plantinga's "free will defense" story is a story without human freedom. Now, as Gale notes, Plantinga's God can't change peoples' counterfactuals of freedom; the truth of these propositions is up to the relevant people. But, by Plantinga, God ''does'' decide which possible persons get actualized, knowing full well their counterfactuals of freedom; it's up to God who gets to exist and then do their stuff. Moreover, God crafts his creatures' psychological makeup, which in turn exercises significant influence over their decisions. This is freedom-cancelling, even if our psychology doesn't ''determine'' our decisions, for it makes God like a mad scientist who implants a test subject with new dispositions and preferences to make her more agreeable. And to decide who gets instantiated is to be a sufficient cause of what decisions get made, even if the persons themselves are sufficient causes in their own right. The result is that Plantinga's God is in charge of too much, robbing humans of their freedom. Or so Gale avers.
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===Theodicy is immoral===
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One argument that has been raised against theodicy is that if theodicy were true, it would completely nullify [[morality]].<ref>Strong Atheism, [http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/immorality_of_theodicies/ The Immorality of Theodicies.] Retrieved December 17, 2007.</ref> If theodicy were true, then all evil events, including human actions, can be somehow rationalized as permitted or affected by God, and therefore there can no longer be such a thing as "evil" values, even for a murderer. Indeed, this is the basis of the "moral argument from evil" by Dean Stretton.<ref>Dean Stretton, [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/dean_stretton/mae.html The Moral Argument from Evil.] Retrieved December 16, 2007.</ref>
  
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In his book ''The Problem of Pain'' the literary critic and popular theologian [[C. S. Lewis]] called pain "God's megaphone to rouse a deaf world".
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===Ivan Karamazov: Theodicy is morally difficult===
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In [[Fyodor Dostoevsky|Fyodor Dostoyevsky]]'s novel ''The Brothers Karamazov,''<ref>Fyodor Dostoyevsky, ''The Brothers Karamazov'', trans. David Magarshack (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1958).</ref> Ivan vehemently challenges the legitimacy of theodicy by pointing out a number of cases of extreme and excessive cruelty in the world. Ivan accepts God's existence, purpose, and wisdom and understands the eternal harmony God plans to bring about eventually. But, he cannot accept the reality of too much cruelty and evil in the world: "I refuse to accept this world of God's… Please understand, it is not God that I do not accept, but the world he has created. I do not accept God's world and I refuse to accept it." One particular case of intolerable cruelty which Ivan mentions is that an army general let his hounds eat an eight-year old boy because the child had injured his favorite dog a little bit with a stone. Ivan's complaint is that if people including innocent children have to go through this kind of torturous suffering in the world so as to purchase eternal harmony in the future, it is entirely incomprehensible. Ivan concludes:
  
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===Satan as the Origin of Evil===
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<blockquote>I don't want harmony… too high a price has been placed on harmony. We cannot afford to pay so much for admission. And therefore I hasten to return my ticket of admission… It's not Go that I do not accept, Alyosha. I merely most respectfully return him the ticket.</blockquote>
  
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In some accounts of the origin of evil, [[Satan]] (or a demon or a fallen Lucifer) figures prominently as the seducer or deceiver of humans, and the primary onus or responsibility for the origin of evil is supposed to rest with that being. For some Jews and some Christians, that view comes at least partly from an interpretation of Genesis 3:1-7; in this interpretation the “serpent” of Genesis is Satan, and Satan’s seduction is the cause of the Fall of Adam and Eve, and thus of the introduction of evil into the world and human life. Some commentators – Augustine among them – even attribute natural evil to this primordial Fall.
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The devastating nature of Ivan's challenge for theodicy cannot be neglected. According to A. Boyce Gibson, "Henceforward, no justification of evil, by its outcome or its context, has been possible; Ivan Karamazov has seen to that."<ref>A. Boyce Gibson, ''The Religion of Dostoevsky'' (London: SCM, 1973), p. 176.</ref>
  
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Lloyd Eby has claimed that attributing the origin of evil to Satan does not solve the problem of theodicy, but merely pushes it back one stage to an investigation of why Satan was evil or chose evil, and doing that reintroduces all the received problems of theodicy. Eby has also claimed that Satan was a victim, in a similar way to Adam and Eve, of circumstances not of their own making, but instead set up by God.
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Ivan is not an [[atheism|atheist]] in the sense of being a person who finds it impossible to believe that there is a God. His real problem is the moral question of why people, including very cruel people, are content with the belief that God expects such an unthinkably terrible price to be paid for humanity's final salvation: "And what is so strange… is not that God actually exist, but that such an idea—the idea of the necessity of God—should have entered the head of such a savage and vicious animal as man." 
  
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Unless one rejects Statement 2 and holds to a cosmic dualism in which there were two beings – a good and an evil one, or a principle of light and a principle of darkness, or God and Satan – existing primordially from the beginning, Satan had to be a being who came originally from God or was created by God. Thus Satan is not the ultimate cause of whatever characteristics, deficiencies, desires, and impulses that were present within him and that led to his falling or seducing man into evil. If one holds that God creates only good things and not some evil ones – as nearly all devout creationist views do hold – then the conclusion must be that the being who became Satan must have been originally good, meaning that somehow the being who became Satan fell into evil or sin. Thus, in most devout views on this question, Satan was originally created good by God but fell into evil.
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In his comments, [[Albert Camus]] has noted that Ivan's rebellion goes beyond that of previous more-or-less individualistic rebels against God, goes beyond reverential blasphemy, and puts God himself on trial. Camus writes, "If evil is essential to divine creation, then creation is unacceptable. Ivan will no longer have recourse to this mysterious God, but to a higher principle—namely, justice. He launches the essential undertaking of rebellion, which is that of replacing the reign of grace by the reign of justice."<ref>Albert Camus, ''The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt'', trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Knopf, 1956).</ref>
  
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[[Anselm of Canterbury|Anselm]] discusses the fall of Satan and tries to account for it on the basis of a distorted will. He tries to use this as a means of putting the onus for Satan’s fall on Satan himself and not on God. Anslem discusses this problem in terms of whether Satan was given the perseverance and a will to resist evil. According to Anselm, God gave Satan a will and perseverance sufficient for him to avoid the fall, but Satan nevertheless fell. So Anslem asserts that it was Satan’s failure to receive, and not God’s failure to give, that caused the problem.
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Dostoyevsky's own response to Ivan's indictments is not a direct philosophical or theological argument, but occurs primarily in the contrast between the two priests in the novel: Father Ferapont and Father Zosima. In fact, Dostoyevsky himself saw Ivan's indictments and the accounts of the two monks as ''pro'' and ''contra'' on this issue of divine goodness or evil. Father Ferapont possesses the trappings of genuine religion and spirituality—fierce asceticism, fervent prayer, wearing chains under his robes to mortify his flesh—but nevertheless spreads discord and dissension among the monks. However, Father Zosima, although he does not exhibit those signs of spirituality of Ferapont, nevertheless spreads dignity, blessings, counsel to the ordinary people, and well-being to all. He has a strong sense of the mystery of faith, as well as good humor and good feeling for all. He recommends to Alyosha that he leave the monastery and marry, suggesting that he realizes that intimacy is one of the primary paths to good faith and true spirituality. Ivan goes mad in the end, but those who follow the way of life of Father Zosima undergo inner transformation to a higher state of consciousness and way of life.  
  
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Eby has asked whether Anselm’s answer really accomplishes the goal of removing the onus of Satan’s fall from God. Eby states that it seems false to say that Satan was given a sufficient will and perseverance to avoid falling – as Anslem tries to claim – because the fact that Satan fell seems to show that he did not have a will and a perseverance sufficient to resist falling. Eby observes that if Satan had possessed a will and perseverance sufficient to avoid falling, then he would not have fallen, and he goes on to say that since the will and perseverance Satan actually possessed were given to him by God, this must imply that God did not give him a will and perseverance sufficient to resisting the temptation to fall. Moreover, Eby adds that if, as Anselm says, God offered but Satan did not receive, this means that God did not give Satan a sufficient desire and will to receive, so the ultimate fault seems to rest with God and not Satan.
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Although Dostoyevsky himself may have felt much more comfortable with the position of Father Zozima, nevertheless he was able to successfully have Ivan show a moral rebellion.
  
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===Antitheodicy===
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The late Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder wrote an unfinished essay entitled, "Trinity Versus Theodicy: Hebraic Realism And The Temptation To Judge God" (1996).<ref>John Howard Yoder, [http://theology.nd.edu/people/research/yoder-john/documents/TRINITYVERSUSTHEODICY.pdf Trinity Versus Theodicy: Hebraic Realism And The Temptation To Judge God.] Retrieved December 17, 2007.</ref>  This can be understood as a subtle version of the ''ad hominem'' attack upon the problem of theodicy. He argues that "if God be God," then theodicy is an oxymoron and idolatry.
  
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Yoder is not opposed to attempts to reconcile the existence of a God with the existence of evil; rather, he is against a particular approach to the problem. He does not deny that "there are ways in which forms of discourse in the mode of theodicy may have a function, subject to the discipline of a wider setting." He is deeply concerned and engaged with the problem of evil; specifically, the evil of [[violence]] and [[war]] and how people resist it. Yoder's "case [is] against garden variety 'theodicy'"—in particular, theodicy as a judgment or defense of God.
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===Hindu answers to the problem of evil===
 
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Hindu philosophers, especially those from the [[Vedanta]] school, have also attempted to craft solutions to the problem of evil. The whole notions of [[karma]] and [[reincarnation]] were possible explanations - that is, bad things happen to good people because they have been reincarnated in a lesser place due to their misdeeds in previous incarnations (which they cannot remember). Shri Madhvacharya, with his beliefs of dualism, has crafted his own solutions to the problem of evil that persists in spite of an all-loving omnipotent supreme Being.
 
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===Existential Theodicy===
 
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Most theodicies have offered philosophical and theological attempts to deal directly with the problem(s). There is at least one additional approach that we might call an "existential" one. One of the best sources for such an approach occurs in [[Fyodor Dostoevsky|Dostoyevsky]]'s novel, ''The Brothers Karamazov'' and in various commentaries on that novel, especially that of [[Albert Camus]] in his book ''The Rebel''.
 
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The existential problem is whether rebellion against God may be preferable to union with God, even if this rebellion leads to damnation.
 
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The indictments against God in Dostoyevsky's novel occur primarily in Ivan's speech in a long conversation with his brother Alyosha. He gives many harrowing and heartrending stories of the mistreatment and suffering of innocent children, so that Alyosha — a novice in a religious order — agrees that he too would want the perpetrators of these injustices shot. Ivan jumps on this admission and declares that it shows that the world is absurd. Moreover, Ivan demands retribution here on earth and not in some infinite time or space — i.e. he rejects an eschatological solution to the problem. He rejects the view that there is some higher harmony that this serves, meaning that he rejects the aesthetic conception of evil. He ends by saying, "It's not God that I don't accept, Alyosha, only I most respectfully return Him the ticket." Alyosha tries to protest that Christ — because he gave his innocent blood for all and anything — is the Being on whom a foundation for the edifice of justice and forgiveness is constructed, but Ivan rejects this possibiliy in the chapter entitled "The Grand Inquisitor."
 
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In his comments, Camus noted that Ivan's rebellion goes beyond that of previous more-or-less individualistic rebels against God, goes beyond reverential blasphemy, and puts God Himself on trial. Camus wrote, "If evil is essential to divine creation, then creation is unacceptable. Ivan will no longer have recourse to this mysterious God, but to a higher principle — namely, justice. He launches the essential undertaking of rebellion, which is that of replacing the reign of grace by the reign of justice." (From ''The Rebel''. Trans. by Anthony Bower.)
 
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Dostoyevsky's response to Ivan's indictments is not a direct philosophical or theological argument, but occurs primarily in the contrast in the novel between the two priests, Father Ferapont and Father Zosima — in fact, Dostoyevsky himself saw Ivan's indictments and the accounts of the two monks as ''pro'' and ''contra'' on this issue of divine goodness or evil. (That's why we can call this an existential theodicy.)
 
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Father Ferapont possessed the trappings of genuine religion and spirituality — fierce asceticism, fervent prayer, wearing chains under his robes to mortify his flesh — but nevertheless spread discord and dissension among the monks. Father Zosima, however — although he did not exhibit those signs of spirituality of Ferapont — nevertheless spreads dignity, blessings, counsel to the ordinary people, and well-being to all. He has a strong sense of the mystery of faith, as well as good humor and good feeling for all. He recommends to Alyosha that he leave the monastery and marry — suggesting that he realized that intimacy is one of the primary paths to good faith and true spirituality. Ivan goes mad in the end, but those who follow the way of life of Father Zosima undergo inner transformation to a higher state of consciousness and way of life.
 
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Through this novel Dostoyevsky shows the consequences of rebellion against God and the divinely-created cosmos, as well as an alternative, and does it in what we could call a thought experiment in novelistic form. Thus this work can be understood as a special kind of theodicy.
 
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==The problem of evil==
 
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Some have argued that the predetermined goal of theodicy (that of justifying the existence of God with the existence of evil) tarnishes any aspirations it might have to be a serious philosophical discipline because an intellectual pursuit having a predefined goal and preassumed conclusions cannot be deemed in any reasonable way to be methodical, scientific, or rational.  Should we respect an inquiry whose goal is not to find out the truth, but to prove ''by any means possible'' that a particular thing ''reasonably doubted'' (Bayle and all who follow him) is true? Proceeding from the proposition to be shown to find a proof of that proposition invites confirmation bias on the part of the theorist.
 
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Others argue that theodicy begins with a [[hypothesis]] about God, God's nature, and the observable facts about the world, and then tests the hypothesis to see if the hypothesis can be reconciled with experience and reason. Theodicy, according to that view, is a reasonable attempt to reconcile the ''hypothesised'' existence of God, along with the characteristics this God is presumed to have (i.e. being both all good and all powerful), with the perceived existence of evil.  While theodicy cannot ''prove'' the existence of God, it can make belief in God ''reasonable'' by showing that the existence of God is not necessarily incompatible with the existence of evil. On the other hand, unlike in mathematics, in a philosophical project like a theodicy it is difficult to say what precisely constitutes a valid logical step, and though one proponent of a theodicy may be convinced of its rigour, another person may find it logically weak or reject some of its assumptions.  For this reason, theodicies tend to be controversial, even among theists.
 
−
 
 
−
==Natural Evil==
 
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Many philosophers make a distinction between what is usually called "moral evil" and what is usually called "natural evil." Moral evil is evil that results from human action and agency, and includes such things as murder, war, theft, rape, fraud, lying, and adultery. Natural evil is evil that does not involve human agency or choice, but results from what are sometimes called "acts of God." This includes natural events such as tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, hurricanes, and other natural events that kill thousands of children and other innocent people. It also includes plagues and diseases such as smallpox, typhus, malaria, polio, influenza and other sicknesses that also kill thousands of people.
 
−
 
 
−
The free will defense, if successful, works only for moral evils; it does not work at all well for natural evils, despite Augustine's claim otherwise. In addition, the existence of natural evils implies that the creation made by God cannot be wholly good, at least not in any simple way. Thus the idea of "natural evil" poses another complication in the development of theodicy.
 
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−
==Anti-Theodicy and Ad Hominem Attacks==
 
−
 
 
−
Some efforts to deal with the problem of theodicy amount to ''ad hominem'' attacks on those who attempt to raise and deal with the issue. Those attacks take some form of "Who are you, unworthy creature, to think that you have the ability or authority to challenge God and ask questions of or about Him in this way?" (Interestingly enough, the two places in the Bible where the problem of theodicy is dealt with directly, in ''Job 39 through 41'', and in ''Romans 9: 14-21'', the answers given are of that form, namely "You, human, are unworthy to question God and his ways; God is higher and more powerful than you and He can do as He pleases.")
 
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The late Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder wrote an unfinished [http://web.archive.org/web/20030517030243/www.nd.edu/~theo/jhy/writings/philsystheo/THEODICY.htm essay] entitled "Trinity Versus Theodicy: Hebraic Realism And The Temptation To Judge God" (1996). This can be understood as a subtle version of the ad hominem approach to the problem of theodicy.
 
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Yoder argues that "if God be God" then theodicy is an oxymoron and idolatry. Yoder is not opposed to attempts to reconcile the existence of a God with the existence of evil; rather, he is against a particular approach to the problem. He does not "deny that there are ways in which forms of discourse in the mode of theodicy may have a function, subject to the discipline of a wider setting."  
 
−
 
 
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Yoder was deeply concerned and engaged with the problem of evil; specifically, the evil of [[violence]] and [[war]] and how we resist it. Yoder's "case [is] against garden variety 'theodicy' "&mdash; in particular, theodicy as a judgment or defense of God.
 
  
 
Yoder asks:
 
Yoder asks:
Line 186: Line 122:
 
*c) If you think you are qualified for that business, how does the adjudication proceed? [W]hat are the lexical rules?
 
*c) If you think you are qualified for that business, how does the adjudication proceed? [W]hat are the lexical rules?
  
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Yoder's argument is against theodicy, strictly speaking. This is the narrow sense [http://www-hl.syr.edu/depts/religion/braiterman.html Zachary Braiterman] mentions in ''(God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and Change in Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought'' (1998). He writes, "Theodicy is a familiar technical term, coined by the German philosopher [[Gottfried Leibniz|Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]] to mean 'the justification of God.' " In his book, Braiterman coins the term "antitheodicy" meaning "refusing to justify, explain, or accept" the relationship between "God (or some other form of ultimate reality), evil, and suffering."
+
Yoder's argument is against theodicy, strictly speaking. This is the narrow sense Zachary Braiterman mentions in his ''(God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and Change in Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought'' (1998). In this book, Braiterman coins the term "antitheodicy" meaning "refusing to justify, explain, or accept" the relationship between "God (or some other form of ultimate reality), evil, and suffering." He uses the term "in order to account for a particular religious sensibility, based (in part) on fragments selectively culled from classical [[Judaism|Jewish]] texts, that dominates post-Holocaust Jewish thought." Braiterman asserts, "Although it often borders on blasphemy, antitheodicy does not constitute atheism; it might even express stubborn love that human persons have for God. After all, the author of a genuine antitheodic statement must believe that an actual relationship subsists between God and evil in order to reject it; and they must love God in order to be offended by that relationship."
 +
 
 +
Two of the Jewish post-Shoah thinkers that Braiterman cites as antitheodicists (Emil Fackenheim and Richard Rubinstein) are also cited by Yoder. Yoder describes their approach as "the Jewish complaint against God, dramatically updated (and philosophically unfolded) since [[Auschwitz]] … The faithful under the pogrom proceed with their prayers, after denouncing [[Jahweh|JHWH]]/Adonai for what He has let happen." Yoder sees this as a valid form of discourse in the ''mode'' of theodicy but he claims it is "the opposite of theodicy."
  
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Braiterman uses the term "in order to account for a particular religious sensibility, based (in part) on fragments selectively culled from classical Jewish texts, that dominates post-Holocaust Jewish thought." Braiterman asserts, "Although it often borders on blasphemy, antitheodicy does not constitute atheism; it might even express stubborn love that human persons have for God. After all, the author of a genuine antitheodic statement must believe that an actual relationship subsists between God and evil in order to reject it; and they must love God in order to be offended by that relationship."
+
==Assessment==
 +
Unlike the three types of traditional theodicies: 1) finitism, 2) despotism, and 3) the position that denies the reality of [[evil]], theodocies such as those of the [[Book of Job]], John Hick, Alvin Plantinga, Richard Kopf, and Kenneth Surin see no [[logic|logical]] contradiction between evil and a [[God]] of omnipotence and goodness, and shift the problem of evil to a different horizon. They still believe that God is omnipotent and good, while evil really exists. But, they seem to be able to address the problem evil more effectively because they come up with a path towards the eventual removal of evil and a more insightful understanding of the nature of God in terms of his love. Among them, however, Surin's approach is the most advanced one in the "practical" direction perhaps because Surin has taken Ivan Karamazov's [[morality|moral]] opposition to theodicy most seriously. To explain his move, Surin refers to the following comment from A. Boyce Gobson's ''The Religion of Dostoevsky'':<ref>Kenneth Surin, ''Theology and the Problem of Evil'' (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 104.</ref>
  
−
Two of the Jewish post-Shoah thinkers that Braiterman cites as antitheodicists (Emil Fackenheim and Richard Rubinstein) are also cited by Yoder. Yoder describes their approach as "the Jewish complaint against God, dramatically updated (and philosophically unfolded) since Auschwitz ... The faithful under the pogrom proceed with their prayers, after denouncing [[Jahweh|JHWH]]/Adonai for what He has let happen." Yoder sees this as a valid form of discourse in the ''mode'' of theodicy but he claims it is "the opposite of theodicy."
+
<blockquote>Theoretically, Ivan's criticisms are unanswered: Alyosha, in particular, simply agrees with him: And Dostoevsky himself held them to be "irrefutable." The answer is to go forward from theory to practice: and Dostoevsky distinguished in the end between the yearning love which does nothing and submits, and the active love which has power to save.</blockquote>
  
 +
Richard Kropf is another theodicist who takes Ivan Karamazov's moral opposition seriously. This illustrates how important it is for any theodicist to understand the agony and rebellion of opponents to theodicy. Any superficial theory might be blasted by those opponents. Interestingly, Surin and Kropf both speak of the suffering of God over the misery of humans in the world in which evil and suffering have emerged from their wrong choices of the will. God suffers because of his love. Hick and Plantinga may not talk about the suffering of God, but they at least speak of God's love, because of which God has given free will to humans, thinking that it is a greater alternative for the happiness of humans. All these seem to constitute new insights into the nature of God. Also, for Hick, Plantinga, Kropf, and Surin, the free will of humans does not mean that God is finite. God is still unquestionably omnipotent, although he may not be able to violate his own principle of love by which he has decided to give free will to humans. Alan Richardson, who served as the Dean of York in Northern England, greatly supports this point, when he says: "God is not limited by anything external to himself (as in dualism or pluralism)," although "God's power is limited by his own character of righteousness, truth and love."<ref>Alan Richardson, "Evil, The Problem of," in ''The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology,'' ed. Alan Richardson and John Bowden (Philadelphia: Westminster press, 1983), p. 195.</ref>
  
 +
Despite opposition to theodicy, there are arguments for the resolution of its core challenge. Humans are endowed with the free will required for the arising of genuine creativity and genuine love. This condition for an infinite horizon of joy has the shadow of "wrong choice" possibility. The prospect of "[[Redemption|redemption]]" and full [[self-realization]] ([[Sanctification|sanctification]]) recreates the arising of freedom and joy.  There are systems that reasonably envision an end to evil.
  
 
==Notes==
 
==Notes==
 
<references/>
 
<references/>
  
−
==Bibliography==
+
==References==
−
There are a large number of works on the topic of theodicy. Here are some of them:
+
*Braiterman, Zachary. ''(God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and Change in Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought''. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
 +
*Camus, Albert. ''The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt''. Translated by Anthony Bower. New York: Knopf, 1956.
 +
*Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. ''The Brothers Kamarazov''. Translated by David Magarshack. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958.
 +
*Eby, Lloyd. "The Problem of Evil and the Goodness of God." In ''Unification Theology in Comparative Perspectives.'' Edited by Antony J. Guerra. Barrytown, NY: Unification Theological Seminary, 1988.
 +
*Farrer, Austin. ''Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited''. New York: Doubleday, 1961.
 +
*Gibson. A. Boyce. ''The Religion of Dostoevsky''. London: SCM, 1973.
 +
*Griffin, David Ray. ''God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy''. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976.
 +
*Hartshorne, Charles. ''Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes''. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 1984.
 +
*Hick, John. ''Evil and the God of Love''. London: Macmillan, 1966.
 +
*Hick, John. "The Problem of Evil." In ''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' Edited by Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1967.
 +
*Hoitenga, Dewey J., Jr. "Logic and the Problem of Evil." ''American Philosophical Quarterly'' IV (1967).
 +
*Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and John O'Leary-Hawthorne. "Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense." ''International Journal for Philosophy of Religion'' 44 (1998): 1-21.
 +
*Hume, David. ''Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion''. FQ Classics, 2007.
 +
*Kropf, Richard W. ''Evil and Evolution: A Theodicy''. London: Associated University press, 1984.
 +
*Mackie, J.L. "Evil and Omnipotence." In ''God and Evil: Readings on the Theological Problem of Evil.'' Edited by Nelson Pike, 46-60. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
 +
*McCloskey, H.J. "God and Evil." In ''God and Evil: Readings on the Theological Problem of Evil.'' Edited by Nelson Pike, 61-84. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
 +
*Madden, Edward H., and Peter H. Hare. ''Evil and the Concept of God''. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1968.
 +
*Madden, Edward H. "Evil and Inconclusiveness." ''Sophia'' XI (1972).
 +
*Penelhum, Terence. "Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil." ''Religious Studies'' II (1966).
 +
*Pike, Nelson (ed.). ''God and Evil: Readings on the Theological Problem of Evil''. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
 +
*Pike, Nelson (ed.). "God and Evil: A Reconsideration." ''Ethics'' LXVIII (1958).
 +
*Plantinga, Alvin. ''God and Other Minds''. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967.
 +
*Richardson, Alan. "Evil, The Problem of." In ''The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology.'' Edited by Alan Richardson and John Bowden. Philadelphia, Westminster press, 1983.
 +
*Surin, Kenneth. ''Theology and the Problem of Evil''. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
  
−
*Anselm, ''Du Casu Diaboli''. English ed.: Anselm of Canterbury, ''Truth Freedom and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues'', trans. and ed. by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Harper Torchbooks, 1967.
+
==External links==
−
*Camus, Albert, ''The Rebel''. Trans. by Anthony Bower. New York: Knopf, 1956.
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All links retrieved April 30, 2023.
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*Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, ''The Brothers Kamarazov'', ed. By Ralph E. Matlaw. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976.
 
−
*Eby, Lloyd, “The Problem of Evil and the Goodness of God,” in Antony J. Guerra, ed., ''Unification Theology in Comparative Perspectives''. Barrytown, NY: Unification Theological Seminary, 1988.
 
−
*Farrer, Austin, ''Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited''. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961.
 
−
*Griffin, David Ray, ''God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy''. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976
 
−
*Hartshorne, Charles, ''Omnipotence and other Theological Mistakes''. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 1984.
 
−
*Hick, John, ''Evil and the God of Love''. London: Macmillan, 2nd. ed., 1977.
 
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*--------, “The Problem of Evil,” in Paul Edwards, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', 8 vols. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc & The Free Press, 1967. Vol. 3: 136-141.
 
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*Hoitenga, Dewey J., Jr. “Logic and the Problem of Evil," ''American Philosophical Quarterly'' IV (1967)
 
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*Madden, Edward H, and Peter H. Hare, ''Evil and the Concept of God''. Springfield IL: Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, 1968.
 
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*--------, “Evil and Inconclusiveness, ''Sophia'' XI (1972)
 
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*Penelhum, Terence, “Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil," ''Religious Studies'' II (1966)
 
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*Pike, Nelson, ed., ''God and Evil''. Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964
 
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*--------, “God and Evil: A Reconsideration,” ''Ethics'' LXVIII (1958).
 
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*Plantinga, Alvin, ''God and Other Minds''. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967.
 
  
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==External links==
 
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* [http://christiancadre.org/topics/evil_suffering.html Christian Cadre, Theodicy]
 
 
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/ Stanford Encyclopedia: Problem of Evil]
 
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/ Stanford Encyclopedia: Problem of Evil]
 
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/ Stanford Encyclopedia: Leibniz on the Problem of Evil]
 
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/ Stanford Encyclopedia: Leibniz on the Problem of Evil]
 
* [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/atheism/evil.html Evidential Arguments from Evil]
 
* [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/atheism/evil.html Evidential Arguments from Evil]
 
* [http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/17147 Project Gutenburg: Leibniz, Theodicy (English translation)]
 
* [http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/17147 Project Gutenburg: Leibniz, Theodicy (English translation)]
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===General Philosophy Sources===
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===General philosophy sources===
 
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
 
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
 
*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
 
*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
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*[http://www.epistemelinks.com/  Philosophy Sources on Internet EpistemeLinks]
 
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*[http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/gpi/index.htm Guide to Philosophy on the Internet]
 
 
*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online]
 
*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online]
 
*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg]  
 
*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg]  
  
 
[[Category:Theology]]
 
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[[Category:Philosophy of religion]]
 
 
[[Category:Christian theology]]
 
[[Category:Christian theology]]
 
[[Category:Philosophy and religion]]
 
[[Category:Philosophy and religion]]
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Latest revision as of 17:55, 30 April 2023


Theodicy is a specific branch of theology and philosophy, which attempts to solve The Problem of Evil—the problem that arises when trying to reconcile the observed existence of evil in the world with the assumption of the existence of a God who is fully good (or benevolent) and who is also all-powerful (omnipotent). A "theodicy" also refers to any attempted solution to this conundrum.

Almost all traditional theodicies have attempted to logically solve the contradiction amongst the three points—the omnipotence of God, the goodness of God, and the real existence of evil—by negating or qualifying one or another of them. Hence, traditional theodicies are of three types:

  1. Denying or qualifying the omnipotence of God
  2. Denying or qualifying the goodness of God
  3. Denying the reality of evil

In recent years, new theodicies have appeared which take a different approach: Rather than trying to eliminate an uncomfortable contradiction, one can accept the contradiction between the reality of evil and a God who is both omnipotent and good, and view it as pointing to a path toward the actual removal of evil, or as revealing a deeper understanding of the nature of God, or both. For example, one might theorize that God, because of his love, has given humans free will through which they could make wrong choices and create evil, but has also given them, out of his omnipotence, the ability to use their free will to overcome evil, and that this path to grow to maturity through such a life of overcoming evil is the ultimate expression of God's goodness.

Origin of the term

The term theodicy comes from the Greek θεός (theós, "god") and δίκη (díkē, "justice"), meaning literally "the justice of God." The term was coined in 1710 by the German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz in a work entitled Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal ("Essay of theodicy about the benevolence of God, the free will of man and the origin of evil"). The purpose of the essay was to show that the evil in the world does not conflict with the goodness of God, and that notwithstanding its many evils, the world is the best of all possible worlds.

The problem of evil

The problem of evil for theists consists in the existence of a contradiction amongst the following three statements or claims integral and central to them:

  • 1) That God is omnipotent
  • 2) That God is fully good (or loving, or beneficent)
  • 3) That evil and suffering exist in the world

For how can an omnipotent and fully good God create such an evil world?

If it can be shown that one or another of those statements is false, however, then the "problem" of contradiction disappears. Consequently, nearly all traditionally received theistic theodicies can be understood as attempts to reconcile those statements, arguing that one or another of those statements is false in some essential or important way. Therefore, there are three major types of traditional theodicies: 1) A first type, which denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God; 2) a second one, which denies or qualifies the goodness of God; and 3) a third type, denying or qualifying the reality of evil.

But, these received theodicies have been criticized more recently by some insightful thinkers. There are two points of criticism. First, these traditional theodicies are merely logical attempts to solve the contradiction of the three statements, without offering any real solution for the actual removal of evil; evil is still there. Second, when they merely attempt to logically solve the contradiction, their treatments of the omnipotence and goodness of God, whether they affirm or deny either of these divine attributes, are rather simplistic, external, and superficial, without being able to understand the nature of God any further. So, those who are critical towards the traditional types of theodicies go beyond the logical level of addressing the contradiction of the three statements; without even seeing any contradiction amongst the three statements, they rather attempt to find a solution on a different horizon, and their new solutions tend to be more insightful.

Three major traditional theodicies

The three major types of traditional theodicies are: 1) Finitism, which denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God in the context of dualism; 2) despotism, which denies or qualifies the goodness of God, because of its belief that God's absolute sovereignty lets him do evil things in the eyes of humans; and 3) a third kind, denying or qualifying the reality of evil.

Finitism: God is not omnipotent

Finitism denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God and says that the finite God cannot avoid evil. It takes various forms of dualism. Some religions, such as Zoroastrianism, Gnosticism, and Manichaeism presented the cosmic dualism of God and Satan. Plato and Aristotle were of the metaphysical dualism of God (or Demiurge) and prime matter (or Receptacle), where God is finite because he must have recourse to prime matter for the constitution of the world. Nikolai Berdyaev and Alfred North Whitehead suggested the mystical dualism of God and Uncreated Freedom (or Creativity), where God is finite because of the pre-existent principle of Uncreated Freedom. The American Methodist philosopher Edgar Brightman suggested a unique kind of finitism with his internal dualism of form and matter within God, where his power is restrained because of form. Finitism sometimes entails the so-called "free will defense" of God (as in Berdyaev and Whitehead) because it gives free will to humans in the context of God's finitude. But this free will defense based on finitism is not the same as the more insightful free will defense proposed by the American philosopher Alvin Plantinga to be treated below.

Despotism: God is not fully good

This type of theodicy can be seen in staunch Calvinism, and it presupposes the absolute sovereignty of God. God is so sovereign that although he may be a good God in principle, he does not look fully good in actuality. For God is the active creator and instigator of all sin and evil, including the fall, using these as instruments to accomplish his plan. Satan, thus, is considered to have no power of his own but is merely God's puppet. An important part of staunch Calvinism is the belief in the absolute predestination of all things by God, that is, that nothing happens unless God actively makes something happen. Whatever is is right, as long as God wills it. So, there can be no such thing as a problem of evil. In this view, humans have no free will. But, they will still be held responsible for whatever sins they commit because God has decided to judge them by his laws.

Besides this Calvinist despotism, so-called "maltheism," the view that God is evil, also solves the problem of evil by attributing evil to God. But, maltheism is quite different from Calvinism because it says that God is simply evil himself without being necessarily despotic.

Evil is not real

  • Evil as "non-being"

The non-being theme of evil started from St. Augustine, who as a Neoplatonic Christian regarded all being as good, thus referring to evil as non-being. Critiquing the Manichean dualism, which he used to adhere to, he asserted that the universe, including matter and its unique creator, God, are unambiguously good. Evil, therefore, is non-being (non esse). It is the privation, corruption, or perversion of something that was previously or otherwise good. Evil has no substantial being in itself, but is always parasitic upon good. Evil entered the universe through the culpable free actions of otherwise good beings—angels and humans. Sin consisted not in choosing evil (because there was no evil to choose) but in turning away from the higher good of God to a lower good. Natural evils were held by Augustine to be consequences of the fall too, and thus also consequences of human or angelic free will. When one asks what caused man to fall, Augustine answers through his doctrine of "deficient" causation. In his view, there is no positive cause of evil will, but rather a negation of deficiency. Augustine seems to mean by this that free volitions are, in principle, inexplicable—free willing is itself an originating cause, with no prior cause or explanation.

This Augustinian definition of evil as the privation of good (privatio boni) can be seen also in St. Thomas Aquinas. It constitutes much of the Christian tradition on the subject of evil.

There are other ways of saying that evil is non-existent. According to Spinoza's pantheism, there is no evil in the world which is divine. Mary Baker Eddy, founder of Christian Science, regarded evil simply as illusion, echoing Hinduism and Buddhism. Using relational logic and not theology, Canadian Baha’i mathematician William Hatcher has argued that evil is not absolute but simply "less good" than good.

  • Aesthetic conception of evil

Augustine additionally held to what we can call the aesthetic conception of evil, and it can be still another important way of saying that evil is not real. It is a view derived from the principle of plenitude in Plato's Timaeus 41 b-c. That principle holds that a universe in which all possibilities are being realized—a universe containing lower and lesser, as well as higher and greater things—is greater than a universe that contains only the highest type(s) of things. Lower beings thus are not evil as such, but merely different and lesser goods. According to that view, what appears to be evil is such only when seen in an isolated or limited context, but when viewed in the context of the totality of the universe it is good because it is a necessary element in that good universe.

This was held less philosophically by many believers and theologians, such as John Calvin, who asserted that all events are part of God's righteous plan, and therefore although they may involve evil in themselves, they are intended by God for morally justified purposes.

Theodicies on a different horizon

The above three types of received theodicies are merely logical attempts to solve the contradiction amongst the three statements of the omnipotence of God, the goodness of God, and the reality of evil, by denying or qualifying one or another of them. But these theodicies cannot offer any real solution for the actual removal of evil; evil is still there. Also, they seem to treat God's attributes, such as divine omnipotence and goodness, rather simplistically and superficially, without being able to have any deeper insights into God's nature. All this is due to the logical nature of these theodicies.

Thinkers who do not want to stay with the logical level of removing the contradiction of the three basic statements, have attempted to find a solution at a different level. To them, the logical contradiction does not matter. They do not even see it. On a different horizon, they seem to be able to better understand the nature of God and seem to be able to better explain how evil is eventually removed.

The Book of Job: Evil as a mystery of faith

The theodicy of the Book of Job is a good start because it suggests that the apparent contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God should not be handled logically but faithfully. In spite of his initial complaint to the Lord and to his "comforters" that his sufferings have been inflicted on him unjustly, Job finally accepted the difficult situation by repentance and faith, when he was confronted by the overwhelming greatness and wisdom of God. This attitude of faithfully accepting it and not logically explaining it away can at least help open a new possibility of knowing the nature of God deeply, although the nature of God may yet to be revealed in Book of Job. Also, evil somehow disappears in the end: "And the Lord restored the fortune of Job, when he had prayed for his friends; and the Lord gave Job twice as much as he had before" (Job 42:10).

John Hick: The world as vale of "soul-making"

The British philosopher of religion John Hick is not interested in any logical solution of the contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God. Instead, his starting point is his deeper understanding and conviction of God's love of agape expressed in the life and work of Jesus Christ. This love of God, says Hick, is supposed to be completely realized in our personal relationships with him eventually. The reality of evil should be interpreted in view of this eschatological realization of God's love. If so, the world in which people really experience moral and natural evil can help them to grow to reach a point at which the enjoy their personal relationships with God. Thus, the world is vale for "soul-making."

The process of growth might involve moral evil because humans are imperfect. But from its undesirable outcomes they can learn about becoming better through their more responsible decisions. They can eventually become perfect creatures without moral evil only by going through "a hazardous adventure in individual freedom."[1] And this freedom was given them because of God's love. Even the natural harshness of the environment apart from human sin was given to humans out of the love of God, so that they may be able to grow through hunting, agriculture, construction of shelter, and so on. This way, natural evil also will be gradually overcome. What is interesting is Hick's suggestion that if the eschatological goal of experiencing a personal relationship with God is not realized on earth, then it should be realized in the other world eventually.

According to Hick, his theodicy is of the "Irenaean" type, given the view of St. Irenaeus (c. 125-202 C.E.) that the pre-fall Adam was more like a child than a mature and responsible adult; that is, that Adam stood at the beginning of a long process of development because although he had been created in the "image" of God, he had to develop into the "likeness" of God.

Alvin Plantinga: The free will defense

According to the American philosopher Alvin Plantinga, it has never been shown logically impossible that God allows evil for a good purpose. So, there is no contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God. Plantinga thus accepts the omnipotence of God in his treatment of the problem of evil. Therefore, his free will defense, which says that God has endowed humans with free will, not only defends God from being held responsible for their evil choices; it also defends the omnipotence of God. So, Plantinga's position is to be distinguished from some versions of finitism (such as Whitehead's finitism) which give free will to humans to the neglect of divine omnipotence. What is important is his belief that there may conceivably be a good long-term purpose of God for which the evil choices of free humans are temporarily permitted. The purpose of God is to have "the greater good of having created persons with free will with whom he could have relationships and who are able to love one another and do good deeds," although there may possibly be their evil choices.[2] This seems to be a profound insight.

Plantinga's free will defense has been criticized by Antony Flew and J. L. Mackie, who argue that such a God is still responsible because he has not created the world in which free human beings always in fact freely make right choices, and that such a God, therefore, is not omnipotent. To this, Plantinga has responded that although there may be such a fantastic world as a possibility, there also may not possibly be any such world. For what happens in this world in terms of choosing evil would happen in any other possible world. Thus, humans suffer from what he calls "transworld depravity." Also, God is still omnipotent, because divine omnipotence does not include the power to do what is logically impossible.

Perhaps Plantinga's position may not give much hope for the eventual removal of evil. Hence, one recent, friendly response from Daniel Howard-Snyder and John O'Leary-Hawthorne regarding this, claiming that the possibility of all persons being transworld depraved cannot be supported. After all, there is another prima facie possibility that all persons are in fact transworld sanctified (and so would do no wrong). So, Plantinga's argument should be repaired in order to incorporate this other possibility as well.[3] Even so, Plantinga's original understanding of the reason why God has given humans free will in spite of possible evil can be appreciated.

Richard Kropf: Evil within an evolutionary natural order

Somewhat similar to Hick's position is the American Roman Catholic priest Richard Kropf's treatment of evil in the context of evolution, although Kropf adds at least two more things in the discussion: the suffering of God during the process of growth in the world and the eventual redemption of non-human parts of the world as well as humans. Kropf specifically criticizes the traditional theodicies, by saying that they failed because they "simplified the problem" by trying to only address the logical contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God. He, therefore, maintained four "stubborn factors" that cannot be denied:

  1. An omnipotent and good God
  2. The reality of evil
  3. Human freedom and responsibility
  4. The world in growth and evolution

These can all be related to one another without contradiction, if they are centered on a key notion: The process of evolution. This approach, according to him, helps to "unlock the secrets of reality, including the problem of evil, on a much broader scale."[4] It is in this context that he suggests a newer understanding of God, which is that the God of compassionate love suffers over the miseries humans go through as a result of their evil choices in their revolutionary process of growth. He also suggests to include non-human creatures as part of the eventual redemption of the whole cosmos through Christ.

Kenneth Surin: The "practical" approach

The British theologian Kenneth Surin is still another thinker to stay away from the traditional theodicies that merely "theoretically" explain away evil without being able to make "practical" efforts to remove it.[5] The traditional theodicies are usually based on their adherence to classical theism, and they use it to theoretically justify God in face of evil. Surin, however, follows the theologies of the cross of Dorothee Soelle, Jürgen Moltmann, and so on, and believes that the suffering of the God of love is revealed through the crucifixion of Christ and experienced by those who suffer from evil, and that this God is available not as an object of theodicy discussion but rather as a real help for the removal of evil. This does not mean that God is finite, but rather that Surin is suggesting a new definition of divine omnipotence that can also explain God's accessibility for people. Through inner conversion, people are encouraged to become like Christ who shows the suffering love of God. We should accomplish the practical task of overcoming evil through our Christ-like commitment to, presence in, and solidarity with, the victim of evil. Surin's approach is so advanced in a practical direction that it even criticizes the quite innovative theodicies of John Hick and Alvin Plantinga among others of being still very theoretical; and Surin specifically makes use of Ivan Karamazov's moral frustration in Dostoyevsky's novel The Brothers Karamazov to criticize Hick's theodicy of theoretically justifying evil for the purpose of "soul-making," although Hick's intention has been to emphasize the love of God.

Oppositions to theodicy

Antitheism: God does not exist

David Hume shows his celebrated antitheistic response in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). According to him, the reality of evil is undeniable because in the world, one can see "four circumstances" on which evil depends: 1) That pain motivates creatures to action; 2) that laws of nature cause collision, drowning, burning, and so on; 3) that humankind is so fragile for perseverance; and 4) that rain, wind, heat, and so on, in nature are excessive. This is logically "incomaptible" with an omnipotent and fully good God. So, one has to believe that God does not exist, instead of securing the justice of God. This is usually called the "logical argument from evil." It has been followed by philosophers such as J.L. Mackie and H.J. McCloskey, who reject all traditional theodicies.[6]

A little less straightforward than the logical argument is the "evidential argument from evil," which contends that evil is evidence against the likelihood of God's existence. According to William Rowe, for example, the fact of gratuitous evil, which is more than the necessary level of evil which is potentially useful for a good purpose, makes it unlikely that God exists.

Theodicy has a predetermined goal

Some have argued that the predetermined goal of theodicy (that of justifying the existence of God with the existence of evil) tarnishes any aspirations it might have to be a serious philosophical discipline because an intellectual pursuit having a predefined goal and pre-assumed conclusions cannot be deemed in any reasonable way to be methodical, scientific, or rational. Should one respect an inquiry whose goal is not to find out the truth, but to prove by any means possible that a particular thing reasonably doubted is true? Proceeding from the proposition to be shown to find a proof of that proposition invites confirmation bias on the part of the theorist.

Theodicy is immoral

One argument that has been raised against theodicy is that if theodicy were true, it would completely nullify morality.[7] If theodicy were true, then all evil events, including human actions, can be somehow rationalized as permitted or affected by God, and therefore there can no longer be such a thing as "evil" values, even for a murderer. Indeed, this is the basis of the "moral argument from evil" by Dean Stretton.[8]

Ivan Karamazov: Theodicy is morally difficult

In Fyodor Dostoyevsky's novel The Brothers Karamazov,[9] Ivan vehemently challenges the legitimacy of theodicy by pointing out a number of cases of extreme and excessive cruelty in the world. Ivan accepts God's existence, purpose, and wisdom and understands the eternal harmony God plans to bring about eventually. But, he cannot accept the reality of too much cruelty and evil in the world: "I refuse to accept this world of God's… Please understand, it is not God that I do not accept, but the world he has created. I do not accept God's world and I refuse to accept it." One particular case of intolerable cruelty which Ivan mentions is that an army general let his hounds eat an eight-year old boy because the child had injured his favorite dog a little bit with a stone. Ivan's complaint is that if people including innocent children have to go through this kind of torturous suffering in the world so as to purchase eternal harmony in the future, it is entirely incomprehensible. Ivan concludes:

I don't want harmony… too high a price has been placed on harmony. We cannot afford to pay so much for admission. And therefore I hasten to return my ticket of admission… It's not Go that I do not accept, Alyosha. I merely most respectfully return him the ticket.

The devastating nature of Ivan's challenge for theodicy cannot be neglected. According to A. Boyce Gibson, "Henceforward, no justification of evil, by its outcome or its context, has been possible; Ivan Karamazov has seen to that."[10]

Ivan is not an atheist in the sense of being a person who finds it impossible to believe that there is a God. His real problem is the moral question of why people, including very cruel people, are content with the belief that God expects such an unthinkably terrible price to be paid for humanity's final salvation: "And what is so strange… is not that God actually exist, but that such an idea—the idea of the necessity of God—should have entered the head of such a savage and vicious animal as man."

In his comments, Albert Camus has noted that Ivan's rebellion goes beyond that of previous more-or-less individualistic rebels against God, goes beyond reverential blasphemy, and puts God himself on trial. Camus writes, "If evil is essential to divine creation, then creation is unacceptable. Ivan will no longer have recourse to this mysterious God, but to a higher principle—namely, justice. He launches the essential undertaking of rebellion, which is that of replacing the reign of grace by the reign of justice."[11]

Dostoyevsky's own response to Ivan's indictments is not a direct philosophical or theological argument, but occurs primarily in the contrast between the two priests in the novel: Father Ferapont and Father Zosima. In fact, Dostoyevsky himself saw Ivan's indictments and the accounts of the two monks as pro and contra on this issue of divine goodness or evil. Father Ferapont possesses the trappings of genuine religion and spirituality—fierce asceticism, fervent prayer, wearing chains under his robes to mortify his flesh—but nevertheless spreads discord and dissension among the monks. However, Father Zosima, although he does not exhibit those signs of spirituality of Ferapont, nevertheless spreads dignity, blessings, counsel to the ordinary people, and well-being to all. He has a strong sense of the mystery of faith, as well as good humor and good feeling for all. He recommends to Alyosha that he leave the monastery and marry, suggesting that he realizes that intimacy is one of the primary paths to good faith and true spirituality. Ivan goes mad in the end, but those who follow the way of life of Father Zosima undergo inner transformation to a higher state of consciousness and way of life.

Although Dostoyevsky himself may have felt much more comfortable with the position of Father Zozima, nevertheless he was able to successfully have Ivan show a moral rebellion.

Antitheodicy

The late Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder wrote an unfinished essay entitled, "Trinity Versus Theodicy: Hebraic Realism And The Temptation To Judge God" (1996).[12] This can be understood as a subtle version of the ad hominem attack upon the problem of theodicy. He argues that "if God be God," then theodicy is an oxymoron and idolatry.

Yoder is not opposed to attempts to reconcile the existence of a God with the existence of evil; rather, he is against a particular approach to the problem. He does not deny that "there are ways in which forms of discourse in the mode of theodicy may have a function, subject to the discipline of a wider setting." He is deeply concerned and engaged with the problem of evil; specifically, the evil of violence and war and how people resist it. Yoder's "case [is] against garden variety 'theodicy'"—in particular, theodicy as a judgment or defense of God.

Yoder asks:

  • a) Where do you get the criteria by which you evaluate God? Why are the criteria you use the right ones?
  • b) Why [do] you think you are qualified for the business of accrediting Gods?
  • c) If you think you are qualified for that business, how does the adjudication proceed? [W]hat are the lexical rules?

Yoder's argument is against theodicy, strictly speaking. This is the narrow sense Zachary Braiterman mentions in his (God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and Change in Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought (1998). In this book, Braiterman coins the term "antitheodicy" meaning "refusing to justify, explain, or accept" the relationship between "God (or some other form of ultimate reality), evil, and suffering." He uses the term "in order to account for a particular religious sensibility, based (in part) on fragments selectively culled from classical Jewish texts, that dominates post-Holocaust Jewish thought." Braiterman asserts, "Although it often borders on blasphemy, antitheodicy does not constitute atheism; it might even express stubborn love that human persons have for God. After all, the author of a genuine antitheodic statement must believe that an actual relationship subsists between God and evil in order to reject it; and they must love God in order to be offended by that relationship."

Two of the Jewish post-Shoah thinkers that Braiterman cites as antitheodicists (Emil Fackenheim and Richard Rubinstein) are also cited by Yoder. Yoder describes their approach as "the Jewish complaint against God, dramatically updated (and philosophically unfolded) since Auschwitz … The faithful under the pogrom proceed with their prayers, after denouncing JHWH/Adonai for what He has let happen." Yoder sees this as a valid form of discourse in the mode of theodicy but he claims it is "the opposite of theodicy."

Assessment

Unlike the three types of traditional theodicies: 1) finitism, 2) despotism, and 3) the position that denies the reality of evil, theodocies such as those of the Book of Job, John Hick, Alvin Plantinga, Richard Kopf, and Kenneth Surin see no logical contradiction between evil and a God of omnipotence and goodness, and shift the problem of evil to a different horizon. They still believe that God is omnipotent and good, while evil really exists. But, they seem to be able to address the problem evil more effectively because they come up with a path towards the eventual removal of evil and a more insightful understanding of the nature of God in terms of his love. Among them, however, Surin's approach is the most advanced one in the "practical" direction perhaps because Surin has taken Ivan Karamazov's moral opposition to theodicy most seriously. To explain his move, Surin refers to the following comment from A. Boyce Gobson's The Religion of Dostoevsky:[13]

Theoretically, Ivan's criticisms are unanswered: Alyosha, in particular, simply agrees with him: And Dostoevsky himself held them to be "irrefutable." The answer is to go forward from theory to practice: and Dostoevsky distinguished in the end between the yearning love which does nothing and submits, and the active love which has power to save.

Richard Kropf is another theodicist who takes Ivan Karamazov's moral opposition seriously. This illustrates how important it is for any theodicist to understand the agony and rebellion of opponents to theodicy. Any superficial theory might be blasted by those opponents. Interestingly, Surin and Kropf both speak of the suffering of God over the misery of humans in the world in which evil and suffering have emerged from their wrong choices of the will. God suffers because of his love. Hick and Plantinga may not talk about the suffering of God, but they at least speak of God's love, because of which God has given free will to humans, thinking that it is a greater alternative for the happiness of humans. All these seem to constitute new insights into the nature of God. Also, for Hick, Plantinga, Kropf, and Surin, the free will of humans does not mean that God is finite. God is still unquestionably omnipotent, although he may not be able to violate his own principle of love by which he has decided to give free will to humans. Alan Richardson, who served as the Dean of York in Northern England, greatly supports this point, when he says: "God is not limited by anything external to himself (as in dualism or pluralism)," although "God's power is limited by his own character of righteousness, truth and love."[14]

Despite opposition to theodicy, there are arguments for the resolution of its core challenge. Humans are endowed with the free will required for the arising of genuine creativity and genuine love. This condition for an infinite horizon of joy has the shadow of "wrong choice" possibility. The prospect of "redemption" and full self-realization (sanctification) recreates the arising of freedom and joy. There are systems that reasonably envision an end to evil.

Notes

  1. ↑ John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (London: Macmillan, 1966), 201-3, 290-95.
  2. ↑ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Logical Problem of Evil. Retrieved December 16, 2007.
  3. ↑ Daniel Howard-Snyder and John O'Leary-Hawthorne, "Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1998): 1-21.
  4. ↑ Richard W. Kropf, Evil and Evolution: A Theodicy (London: Associated University press, 1984), p. 27.
  5. ↑ Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
  6. ↑ J.L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," and H.J. McCloskey, "God and Evil," in God and Evil: Readings on the Theological Problem of Evil, ed. Nelson Pike (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 46-84.
  7. ↑ Strong Atheism, The Immorality of Theodicies. Retrieved December 17, 2007.
  8. ↑ Dean Stretton, The Moral Argument from Evil. Retrieved December 16, 2007.
  9. ↑ Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. David Magarshack (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1958).
  10. ↑ A. Boyce Gibson, The Religion of Dostoevsky (London: SCM, 1973), p. 176.
  11. ↑ Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Knopf, 1956).
  12. ↑ John Howard Yoder, Trinity Versus Theodicy: Hebraic Realism And The Temptation To Judge God. Retrieved December 17, 2007.
  13. ↑ Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 104.
  14. ↑ Alan Richardson, "Evil, The Problem of," in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed. Alan Richardson and John Bowden (Philadelphia: Westminster press, 1983), p. 195.

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

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  • Camus, Albert. The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt. Translated by Anthony Bower. New York: Knopf, 1956.
  • Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Kamarazov. Translated by David Magarshack. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958.
  • Eby, Lloyd. "The Problem of Evil and the Goodness of God." In Unification Theology in Comparative Perspectives. Edited by Antony J. Guerra. Barrytown, NY: Unification Theological Seminary, 1988.
  • Farrer, Austin. Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited. New York: Doubleday, 1961.
  • Gibson. A. Boyce. The Religion of Dostoevsky. London: SCM, 1973.
  • Griffin, David Ray. God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976.
  • Hartshorne, Charles. Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 1984.
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  • Hick, John. "The Problem of Evil." In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1967.
  • Hoitenga, Dewey J., Jr. "Logic and the Problem of Evil." American Philosophical Quarterly IV (1967).
  • Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and John O'Leary-Hawthorne. "Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1998): 1-21.
  • Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. FQ Classics, 2007.
  • Kropf, Richard W. Evil and Evolution: A Theodicy. London: Associated University press, 1984.
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  • McCloskey, H.J. "God and Evil." In God and Evil: Readings on the Theological Problem of Evil. Edited by Nelson Pike, 61-84. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
  • Madden, Edward H., and Peter H. Hare. Evil and the Concept of God. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1968.
  • Madden, Edward H. "Evil and Inconclusiveness." Sophia XI (1972).
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External links

All links retrieved April 30, 2023.

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