Solipsism

Solipsism (Latin: solus, alone + ipse, self) is an extreme form of skepticism, saying that nothing exists beyond oneself and one's immediate experiences. More generally, it is the epistemological belief that one's self is the only thing that can be known with certainty and verified (sometimes called egoism). Solipsism is also commonly understood to encompass the metaphysical belief that only one's self exists, and that "existence" just means being a part of one's own mental states — all objects, people, etc, that one experiences are merely parts of one's own mind. Solipsism is first recorded with the Greek presocratic sophist Gorgias (c. 483–375 B.C.E.) who is quoted by the Roman sceptic Sextus Empiricus as having stated:

1. Nothing exists
2. Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it, and
3. Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others

Solipsism is generally identified with statements 2 and 3 from Gorgias.^{[citation needed]}

Questions about solipsism

Is solipsism one or many?

Philosophical disputes about the character and the consequences of solipsism hinge on the questions of (1) whether there is anything approaching a rigorous definition of solipsism, (2) whether a unique definition can be singled out as the one and only proper definition, or (3) there are as many definitions of solipsism as there are solipsists.

Is solipsism falsifiable?

According to one argument, no experiment can be designed to refute solipsism, other than the death of the solipsist, which would render the question moot in any case, so solipsism is said to be unfalsifiable in the sense that Karl Popper used the word.

According to another argument, logical properties like being a tautology or being unfalsifiable are matters of what seems to be so in consciousness. As such they would seem to be psychological properties, relative to the mind.

According to a contrary argument, the claim that solipsism is unfalsifiable confuses a question of logic, namely, the logical contingency of the solipsistic thesis by virtue of its logical form, with a question of rhetoric, namely, the practical difficulties of persuading a particular person, with a particular psychological constitution, of the contingency thereof. But the normative science of logic is quite distinct from the descriptive science of psychology, and has nothing to do with the peculiarites of an individual person's thought process.

To say this another way, not all solipsists need be alike. Some may see the possibility that their solipsistic hypothesis is false, even if some do not, just as a person may accept any other hypothesis on a provisional basis and yet see the possibility of its being shown false. To say that solipsism is unfalsifiabile is to say that it is a necessary truth, a tautology. But such a claim cannot be supported by the existence or the possibile existence of a diverse population of solipsists. The usual run of argument for solipsism being indefeasible picks a hypothetical case from this population, one that is hypothesized to be the worst possible case. The imagination of such a case is often very diverting, but it begins as insufficient reasoning and ends the same way.

Varieties of solipsism

Metaphysical solipsism

Metaphysical solipsism is the variety of idealism which maintains that the individual self of the solipsistic philosopher is the whole of reality and that the external world and other persons are representations of that self having no independent existence (Wood, 295).

Methodological solipsism

Methodological solipsism is the epistemological thesis that the individual self and its states are the sole possible or proper starting point for philosophical construction (Wood, 295). A skeptical turn along these lines is cartesian skepticism.

Imaginary scenarios and thought experiments

Brain in a vat

A thought-experiment related to solipsism, although in principle distinct (for one thing, it posits a real mad scientist, brain, and vat), is the brain in a vat. The person performing the thought-experiment considers the possibility that they are trapped within some utterly unknowable reality, much like that illustrated in the movie The Matrix. A mad scientist could be sending the same impulses to one's brain in a vat that one's brain (understood to be that of a person in the "real world") might receive, thereby creating "the world" as one knows it from the mad scientist's program. Yet, for one's brain in the vat, that "world" would obviously not be "real." This raises the possibility that everything one thinks or knows is illusion. Or, at the least, that one cannot know with any certainty whether one's brain is in the "real world" or in a vat receiving impulses that would create an equivalent consciousness— or even if there is a real world, mad scientist, brain, or vat (all experience could be simply a never-ending dream).

Sole surviving soul

Is the last person alive, in one scenario, after a nuclear holocaust, a solipsist? Not necessarily, because for the solipsist, it is not merely the case that he believes that his thoughts, experiences, and emotions are, as a matter of contingent fact, the only thoughts, experiences, and emotions that can be. Rather, the solipsist can attach no meaning to the supposition that there could be thoughts, experiences, and emotions other than his own — that events may occur or objects or people exist independently of the solipsist's own imagination. In short, the metaphysical solipsist understands the word 'pain', for example, to mean 'my pain' — he cannot accordingly conceive how this word is to be applied in any sense other than this exclusively egocentric, non-empathetic one.

Assuming the validity of solipsism, one must infer that it makes as much or as little sense, on these premises, to attribute any psychological predicate to another human being as it does to attribute it to a table or a rock. Thus on these premises, it makes no sense to attribute consciousness to another human being at all, whether or not they're the last man on Earth or not. A non-solipsistic 'last man alive' would not believe that tenet if he suddenly stumbled across another human being (or simply recalled one from memory). (Thornton 2006).

Solipsism in epistemology

The foundations of solipsism lie at the heart of the view that the individual understands all psychological concepts (thinking, willing, perceiving, etc.) by analogy with his own mental states, i.e. by abstraction from inner experience. And this view, or some variant of it, has been held by a great many, if not indeed the majority of, philosophers, since Descartes elevated the egocentric search for incontrovertible certainty to the status of the primary goal of critical epistemology. In this sense, then, it is at least contestable that epistemelogical solipsism is implicit in many philosophies of knowledge and mind since Descartes, and that any philosophy which adopts the Cartesian egocentric approach as its basic frame of reference is inherently solipsistic.

The problem of solipsism also merits close examination because it is based upon three widely held philosophical presuppositions, which are themselves fundamental and wide-ranging in importance. These are: (1) That my most certain knowledge is the contents of my own mind — my thoughts, experiences, affects, etc.; (2) That there is no conceptual or logically necessary link between the mental and the physical — between, say, the occurrence of certain conscious experiences or mental states and the 'possession' and behavioral dispositions of a 'body' of a particular kind (see the thought experiment which follows); and (3) That the experiences of a given person are necessarily private to that person. These presuppositions are unmistakably Cartesian in origin, and are very widely accepted by philosophers and non-philosophers alike.[1]

Solipsism in relation to other philosophies

Idealism and materialism

One of the most fundamental debates in philosophy concerns the "true" nature of the world — whether it is some ethereal plane of ideas, or a cold reality of atoms and energy. Materialism[2] posits some reality that can be touched and felt, with our thoughts and dreams nothing more than the interaction of firing neurons. The only thing that dreams and hallucinations prove are that some neurons can malfunction, but there is no fundamental reality behind an idea except as a brain-state. Idealists[3], on the other hand, believe that the mind and its thoughts are the only true things that exist. It's often called Platonism[4] after its most famous proponent. The material world is ephemeral, but a perfect triangle or "love" is eternal. Religious thinking tends to be some form of idealism, as God usually becomes the highest ideal (such as Neoplatonism) [5] [6] [7] On this scale, solipsism tends toward extreme idealism. Thoughts and concepts are all that exist, and furthermore, only 'my' thoughts and consciousness exist. The so-called "reality" is nothing more than an idea that the solipsist has (perhaps unconsciously) created.

Cartesian dualism

There is another option, of course; the belief that both ideals and "reality" exist. Dualists commonly argue that the distinction between the mind (or 'ideas') and matter can be proven by employing Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. This states that two things are identical if, and only if, they share exactly the same qualities, that is, are indistinguishable. Dualists then attempt to identify attributes of mind that are lacked by matter (such as privacy or intentionality) or vice versa (such as having a certain temperature or electrical charge).[8] [9] One notable application of the identity of indiscernibles was by René Descartes in his Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes concluded that he could not doubt the existence of himself (the famous cogito ergo sum argument), but that he could doubt the (separate) existence of his body. From this he inferred that the person Descartes must not be identical to the Descartes body, since one possessed a characteristic that the other did not: namely, it could be known to exist. Solipsism agrees with Descartes in this aspect, and goes further: only things that can be known to exist for sure should be considered to exist. The Descartes body could only exist as an idea in the mind of the person Descartes[10][11] Descartes and dualism go on to prove the actual existence of reality as opposed to a phantom existence (as well as the existence of God in Descartes' case), using the realm of ideas merely as a starting point, but solipsism usually finds those further arguments unconvincing. The solipsist instead proposes that their own unconscious is the author of all seemingly "external" events from "reality".

Radical empiricism

The Irish idealist philosopher George Berkeley argued that physical objects do not exist independent of the mind. An item truly exists only so long as it is observed; otherwise, it is not only meaningless, but simply nonexistent. Berkeley does attempt to show things can and do exist apart from the human mind and our perception, but only because there is an all-encompassing Mind in which all 'ideas' are perceived - in other words, God, who observes all. The solipsist appreciates the fact that nothing exists outside of perception, but would further point out that Berkley falls prey to the egocentric predicament - he can only make his own observations, and can't be truly sure that this God or other people exist to observe "reality". Therefore, the solipsist would say, better to throw away the unreliable possible observations of others and rely upon your own. [12][13]

Pantheism

While solipsism is not generally compatible with traditional views of God, it is somewhat related to Pantheism, the belief that everything is God and part of God. The difference is usually a matter of focus; the pantheist would tend to be identify themselves with being a part of everything in reality, which is actually all God beneath the surface. For instance, many ancient Indian philosophies advocate the notion that all matter (and thus humans) is subtly interconnected not only to our immediate surroundings, but to everything in the universe; that all we can perceive is a kind of vision, Samsara. The solipsist, however, would be more likely to put themselves squarely in the center as the only item of reality, with all other beings in reality illusions. It could be said to be another naming dispute; "The Universe" / "God" for the pantheist is "My Unconscious Mind" / "Me" for the solipsist.

Eastern philosophies

Thoughts somewhat similar to solipsism are present in much of eastern philosophy. Taoism and several interpretations of Buddhism, especially Zen, teach that drawing a distinction between self and universe is nonsensical and arbitrary, and merely an artifact of language rather than an inherent truth.

Hinduism

"He who sees everything as nothing but the Self, and the Self in everything he sees, such a seer withdraws from nothing.

"For the enlightened, all that exists is nothing but the Self, so how could any suffering or delusion continue for those who know this oneness?"

Isha Upanishad; sloka 6, 7

Buddhism

Some later representatives of one Yogacara subschool (Prajnakaragupta, Ratnakirti) were proponents of extreme illusionism and solipsism (as well as of solipsism of this moment). The best example of such extreme ideas was the treatise of Ratnakirti (XI century) "Refutation of the existence of other minds" (Santanantara dusana).

[It is important to note that all mentioned Yogacara trends are not purely philosophical but religious—philosophical. All Yogacara discourse takes place within the religious and doctrinal dimension of Buddhism. It is also determined by the fundamental Buddhist problem, that is living being and its liberation from the bondage of Samsara.]

Objections

The following are some common critiques and responses about solipsism:

People die

But the solipsist himself is not dead. The solipsist cannot meaningfully "die" in any case, because should he truly "die," the entire universe would cease to exist. Therefore, death is another illusion of the solipsist's unconscious. Since the being who has "died" is only a phantom of the solipsist's imagination anyway, the elimination of that phantom proves nothing. A critic would point out that many (self-proclaimed) solipsists have died in the history of the world, and it hasn't disappeared yet. However, the solipsist would respond that he has not died, and therefore his solipsism is not yet disproved.

Life is imperfect

Why would a solipsist create things such as pain and loss for his or her self? More generally, it might be asked "If the world is completely in my head, how come I don't live the most fantastic life imaginable?" One response would be to simply plead ignorance and note that there may be some reason which was forgotten on purpose. Another response is that categories such as 'pain' are a perception assumed with all of the other socio-cultural human values the solipsist has created for himself- a package deal, so to speak (Khashaba 2002). More creatively, perhaps this is all out of a desire to avoid being bored, or perhaps even that the solipsist is in fact living the most perfect life he or she could imagine. This issue is somewhat related to theodicy, the "problem of evil", except that the solipsist himself is the all-powerful God who has somehow allowed imperfection into his world.

Solipsism undercuts morality

If solipsism is true, then practically all standards for moral behavior would seem to be meaningless, according to this argument. There is no God, so that basis for morality is gone, but even secular humanism becomes meaningless since there is no such thing as other humans. Everything and everyone else is just a figment of imagination, so there's no particular reason not to make these figments disappear by, say, mass annihilation. The subconcious mind could always imagine them back to life, if that's what's really wanted, anyway. The problem with this argument is that it falls prey to the Appeal to Consequences Fallacy; if solipsism is true, then it doesn't matter that it has unfortunate implications. This can possibly be countered by people who believe that (a non-solipsist) morality is an inherent part of the universe that can be proved to exist.

The practical solipsist needs a language to formulate his thoughts about solipsism

Language is an essential tool to communicate with other minds. Why does a solipsist universe need a language? Indeed, one might even say, solipsism is necessarily incoherent, for to make an appeal to logical rules or empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing in which he purportedly refuses to believe: the 'reality' of intersubjectively valid criteria, and/or of a public, extra-mental world.[14][15] A possible response would be that to keep from becoming bored, perhaps the solipsist imagines "other" minds, which would actually be only elements of his own mind. He has chosen to forget control of these minds for the time being, and the elaborate languages in order to interact with these more isolated segments of his mind was merely part of the creation of "reality." As for the rules of logic, they are probably merely an artefact of the peculiar psychology of the solipsist and only appear to exist in the "real" world. A more telling question might be, why does the solipsist need to invent so many and such a variety of languages?

Realism vs. solipsism

An objection, raised by David Deutsch, among others, is that since the solipsist has no control over the "universe" he is creating for himself, there must be some unconscious part of his mind creating it. If the solipsist makes his unconscious mind the object of scientific study (e.g., by conducting experiments), he will find that it behaves with the same complexity as the universe offered by realism; therefore, the distinction between realism and solipsism collapses. What realism calls "the universe", solipsism calls "one's unconscious mind." But these are just different names for the same thing. Both are massively complex processes other than the solipsist's conscious mind, and the cause of all the solipsist's experiences; possibly merely a labelling distinction. Application of Occam's Razor might then suggest that postulating the existence of 'reality' may be a simpler solution than a massive unconscious mind. The solipsist would claim that the apparent independence of real world events just shows how good his unconscious mind is at maintaining the illusion. The realist's world may be every bit as complex as the solipsist's unconscious, but when the solipsist dies, the entire universe will cease to exist. (See also, Le Guin, Ursula K. Lathe of Heaven Eos; Reprint edition (April 1, 1997))

Philosophical poverty

Some philosophers hold the viewpoint that solipsism is entirely empty and without content. Like a 'faith' argument, it seems sterile, i.e., allows no further argument, nor can it be falsified. [16][17] The world remains absolutely the same— so where could a solipsist go from there? Viewed in this way, solipsism seems only to have found a facile way to avoid the more difficult task of a critical analysis of what is 'real' and what isn't, and what 'reality' means. The solipsist would hold that further argument is meaningless and there are limits to what can be known about 'reality.'

References

ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

• Carus, Titus Lucretius, (Lucretius), (c. 50 B.C.E.), De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things), Eprint

• Khashaba, D.R. (2002), "Subjectivism and Solipsism", Eprint.

• Popper, K.R., and Eccles, J.C. (1977), The Self and Its Brain, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany.

• Russell, Bertrand (1912), The Problems of Philosophy, 1st published 1912. Reprinted, Galaxy Book, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1959. Reprinted, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1988.

• Russell, Bertrand, (1921) The Analysis of Mind, Allen and Unwin, London, UK. Reprinted, Routledge, London, UK, 1995.

• von Schubert Soldern, Richard (1982), Über Transcendenz des Objects und Subjects, Leipzig.

• Thornton, Stephen P. (2006), "Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (eds.), Eprint.

• Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, 1974.

• Wood, Ledger (1962), "Solipsism", p. 295 in Runes (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy, Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ.

Reference works

• Runes, Dagobert D. (ed., 1962), Dictionary of Philosophy, Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ.

• Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged (1950), W.A. Neilson, T.A. Knott, P.W. Carhart (eds.), G. & C. Merriam Company, Springfield, MA. Cited as MWU.

• Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983), Frederick C. Mish (ed.), Merriam–Webster Inc., Springfield, MA. Cited as MWC.

See also

Dramatis personae

• Berkeley, George
• Descartes, René

Related topics

Cartesian skepticism Consensus reality Empiricism Falsifiability Idealism

Immaterialism Metaphysical solipsism Methodological solipsism Objective idealism Panpsychism

Phenomenalism Problem of other minds Realism Solipsism syndrome Subjective idealism

External links

• Solipsism experienced as a dissociative symptom of mental illness

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