Normative ethics

Normative ethics is one of three main component areas of inquiry of philosophical ethics, the two others being applied ethics and meta-ethics. Normative ethics, also known as normative theory, or moral theory, intends to find out which actions are right and wrong, or which character traits are good and bad. Applied ethics is just the application of normative ethics to particular issues of practical concern such as abortion, euthanasia, cloning, criminal punishment, and the treatment of animals. In contrast, meta-ethics, as the term suggests, is a study of the nature of ethics. A meta-ethical study would be concerned, amongst other things, with determining the meaning and objectivity of moral concepts of right and wrong, or good and bad.

Normative ethics is normative in that they have either moral principles as standards of right action or virtues as standards of good character in terms of which right action can be known eventually. There are four normative theories: 1) utilitarianism with the principle of utility as the basic moral principle; 2) Kantianism with the categorical imperative as the fundamental moral principle; 3) ethical intuitionism (in its methodological sense) with a plurality of moral principles; and 4) virtue ethics with virtues as its focus.

Some tension has been noticed between two different emphases of normative ethics: action, on the one hand, and virtue, on the other. The former asks which actions are right, whereas the latter asks which states of character are morally good. But, the unity of normative ethics can be explored by understanding that at least to some degree the moral principles of action and the virtues of character can be known in view of each other.

Furthermore, if normative ethics works together with meta-ethics that investigates what moral principles and virtues mean and where they come from, perhaps it can more effectively answer its other difficult questions, even including the question of whether or not moral rules and virtues come from God.

Meta-ethics and normative ethics

Because applied ethics is the practical application of normative ethics, philosophical ethics is usually divided into two main component areas of inquiry: 1) normative ethics, and 2) meta-ethics. It is helpful to consider the relation between these two areas of investigation in understanding the concept of normative ethics.

Meta-ethics

Meta-ethics is an inquiry into the nature of ethics. The prefix meta suggests "aboutness," as, for example, in the word meta-psychology, which is the study of psychology—what it is as a discipline—rather than a study in psychology. Simplifying somewhat, we can say that a meta-inquiry is a study of a study. Meta-ethics is then the study of ethics, which is itself an area of study.

Meta-ethics is concerned with determining the nature of judgments of moral right or wrong, good and bad. It is not concerned with finding out which actions or things are right and wrong, or which states are good and bad, but with understanding the nature and meaning of concepts of right and wrong, good and bad. Meta-ethics does not ask whether lying is always wrong. Rather, it tries to ascertain whether there really is difference between right and wrong, or tries to clarify what it means to say that an action is right or wrong. A meta-ethical inquiry may ask: What, if anything, makes a judgment that lying is always wrong, true (or false)?

Normative ethics

Meta-ethics as the study of ethics usually studies about normative ethics. It might then be better to identify ethics with normative ethics and see meta-ethics as the study of ethics. But this isn't the way in which the terms are most commonly employed. One reason for this is that the actual codes and practices of cultural groups may be called the ethics of these groups. The usage of the term "ethics" in this case is not prescriptive or normative but descriptive, giving rise to what can be called descriptive ethics, and so normative ethics is not the only component of what might be called ethics.

The word normative is an adjective which comes from "norm." In a philosophical context, the word norm usually means standard, or rule, or principle, as opposed to what is "normal" for people to do, i.e., what they actually do. For example, the rules of arithmetic are normative in the philosophical sense, because reasoning can be assessed against these rules and judged correct or incorrect, irrespective of whether this usage is the normal usage. If everyone were to calculate 7+5 as 57, they would have made a mistake, for they would have misunderstood the rules (norms) of arithmetic. So even if this mistake were "normal," a normative appraisal would hold everyone's actual thinking to the rule which legislates how they ought to think, and judge it incorrect.

Normative ethics is concerned with moral norms. A moral norm is a norm in the sense of being a standard with which moral agents ought to comply. "Thou shall not murder" is an example of a moral norm: it is meant to guide our actions, and to the extent that we do not comply, we may be judged morally—that is, morally blamed. This is then the meaning of a moral norm.

It is important to bear in mind that when doing normative ethics, one sets aside meta-ethical concerns about whether there really is a moral truth and what moral judgments mean, and assumes that there is a difference between right and wrong, good and bad. Quite independently of meta-ethical thoughts about whether moral statements (e.g., "Thou shall not kill") are objectively true, normative ethics reasons about what is right or wrong. This is what John Rawls (1921-2002) means by the "independence of moral theory." This does not imply that divergent meta-ethical theories do not have important implications for the nature of normative ethics at all.

Two foci of normative ethics: action and character

Normative ethics has two central concepts: the right and the morally good. The concept of the right is, roughly, the concept of duty, the concept of which actions we ought to perform, which it would be wrong not to perform. The concept of the morally good, a target of the theory of value, or axiology (Greek: axios = worth; logos = study of), refers to morally good properties of human beings. Virtuous character traits such as kindness, courage, and honesty are examples of states that are generally thought to be morally good. It is worth noting here that the term "right" is usually reserved for actions, whereas the "morally good" is for states of character, including motives. But normative ethics is interested in both: it is, roughly, the field of study that aims to determine which actions are right, and which states of character are morally good.

Which actions are right?

Perhaps the central question of normative ethics involves asking which actions fall into the category of the right and the category of the wrong. This is called the theory of right action. The theory of right action is an investigation and an attempt to answer the question: "What ought I to do?" The "ought" in this question is to be interpreted as a moral ought, and may be understood as equivalent to the question: "What is the right thing to do?" Besides the already mentioned terms, "right," "wrong," and "ought," other important normative concepts relating to action include "obligatory," "forbidden," "permissible," and "required."

So, a normative theory aims to answer the question of "what makes actions right or wrong." This usually amounts to drawing out basic principles as standards of right action. These basic principles may be employed as a moral guide to human beings in their lives, deciding whether particular courses of action—or particular types of action—are right or wrong. The principle of utility in utilitarianism, for example, is a fundamental moral principle according to which right actions are those that maximize happiness. In Kantianism, the categorical imperative is such a fundamental principle from which right actions are derived as duties.

Which states of character are morally good?

The second important focus of normative theory is the question of what states of character are desirable, or morally good. Here normative ethics attempts to answer the question: "What sort of person ought I to be?" This is called the theory of virtue, or virtue ethics. The focus of this aspect of normative ethics is character. A virtue is a morally desirable state of character such as courage. So, the theory of virtue is directed not at what actions one ought to do, but what person one should be. What is a virtuous person like? What is a vicious person like? What makes traits of character virtuous or vicious? Important concepts for the theory of virtue include terms such as good, bad, virtuous, vicious, honest, courageous, and praiseworthy.

Just as a theory of right action aims to specify which actions are right, a theory of virtue should specify the virtues, i.e., traits of character it is good or bad to possess. It should say, e.g., that courage is a virtue, and cowardice a vice. It should explain why we should think of traits like these as virtues or vices. The form of this justification might be: courage is a virtue because it tends to bring benefits to other people. Here again, the state of character is assessed against a basic normative principle, namely, that it is right to bring benefits to other people.

Important normative theories

Normative theories are concerned with, broadly, the nature of right action and the nature of virtue. All normative theories will have something to say about which actions are right, and which states of character are virtues. Four normative theories currently exist. These are utilitarianism, Kantianism, ethical intuitionism (in its methodological sense), and virtue ethics. If we were to accept the division of normative theories into teleological and non-teleological theories, then utilitarianism and virtue ethics would count as teleological theories, whereas Kantianism and intuitionism as non-teleological theories (see the article on teleological ethics).

Utilitarianism

Classical utilitarianism says that the right action is that which produces the greatest balance of overall happiness. By saying that happiness is the only determinant of the rightness of an action, classical utilitarianism endorses hedonism as a theory of value. Utilitarianism has undergone many revisions, but one common move has been to deny the hedonistic element, and preserve the claim that right action depends on the best consequences overall in view of the principle of utility, although the best consequences are not necessarily understood in terms of happiness but more broadly in terms of valuable states of affairs. (See the article on consequentialism also.)

Kantianism

Kantian ethics stems from the work of the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant. His work has been tremendously influential and thus the need to designate a branch of ethics as Kantian, in order to accommodate the many theories which are broadly influenced by Kant. Kant's own theory revolves around what he calls the categorical imperative, a moral principle which he regards as the fundamental principle of morality, and from which all our duties may be derived. The categorical imperative is basically a principle of consistency, demanding that we act on reasons which all rational agents could endorse, i.e., universally acceptable reasons. Kant produces several different versions of the categorical imperative, and introduces the concept of respect for persons. The Kantian conception of respect has proved particularly significant, and here Kant has influenced important contemporary thinkers such as John Rawls.

Ethical intuitionism

When ethical intuitionism says that we can directly intuit or apprehend moral principles, it is epistemological and undoubtedly belongs to meta-ethics. But, ethical intuitionism has another sense in which it can be considered to be part of normative ethics as it methodologically refers to unranked pluralism that claims that there are a plurality of moral principles, and that none of these moral principles is more basic or important than any other. Ethical intuitionism in this sense is a normative ethical theory contrasted with versions of monism such as utilitarianism and Kantianism, which assert that there is only one basic moral principle: the principle of utility (utilitarianism) or the categorical imperative (Kantianism). The most well-known theorist in ethical intuitionism in this sense is probably W.D. Ross (1877-1971), who is the author of The Right and the Good. According to him, there are a number of irreducible moral duties (e.g., to keep our promises, to refrain from harming the innocent, etc.), none of which takes precedence over any other. Ross thinks that the right action in a given situation is determined by a careful weighing of various moral principles which apply in that situation.

Virtue ethics

The last of the four ethical theories currently under discussion is virtue ethics. In contrast with the other normative theories which tend to start with right action, virtue ethics begins with an account of virtuous character. In other words, virtue ethics offers an account of what states of character are desirable, or virtues, and then tends to define right actions in terms of these virtues. For example, virtue ethics might say that lying is wrong because it is dishonest, or not what an honest person (virtuous person) would do. (Contrast it with the utilitarian explanation: lying is wrong because it tends to bring about unhappiness). Virtue ethicists, particularly, Aristotle and those who follow him, argue that right action cannot be understood as conformity of actions to rules (not even of the prima facie sort suggested by Ross). They tend to emphasize that the virtuous person is someone who acts rightly in the situation upon requirements that are unique to the situation. The virtuous person is someone who is able to perceive what the situation requires and act accordingly.

Issues on normative ethics

Internal tension within normative ethics

Normative ethics has two different foci it is interested in dealing with: action and character. The question of action is usually asked by utilitarianism, Kantianism, and ethical intuitionism in its methodological sense, and they address it by setting up moral rules and principles which determine which actions are right. By contrast, the question of character is handled by virtue ethics, which begins with an account of virtuous character. There is some tension between both approaches, which therefore usually criticize each other. Utilitarianism and Kantianism criticize virtue ethics for not being able to tell what the moral rules and principles should be to give clear guidance on how to act in specific circumstances. Virtue ethics, in turn, blames utilitarianism and Kantianism for inflexibly imposing rules and principles upon all situations without being able to appropriately accommodate complex circumstances such as abortion, euthanasia, and cloning where the virtue of wisdom, for example, might be needed case by case.

One way to help decrease the tension between the two approaches of normative ethics, is to remind ourselves that virtue ethics, as originally developed by Plato and Aristotle, is actually grounded in some absolute standard which could originate rules and principles very likely. According to Plato, the soul's virtue consists in knowledge of eternal truth in the Forms, and eudaimonia (happiness or well-being) that results from virtue is rooted in the Form of the Good that pertains to God. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the highest good, which, although it is not a transcendent Form at all, is something perfectly enjoyed in the life of God. So, the above criticism which virtue ethics receives is not entirely legitimate. It may be that virtue ethics, as long as it is teleological, intends to eventually reach moral rules and principles that are grounded in the Form of the Good or God, although its starting point is the development of virtues as character traits of the soul. A radical version of virtue ethics goes even further by ambitiously arguing that moral principles, if not necessarily considered to be grounded in God, can be defined in terms of virtuous states of character.

There is another kind of way to help decrease the tension, and it is from the side of theories of right action such as utilitarianism and Kantianism. For they may have something to say about which states of character are virtues in view of some principles. A utilitarian, for example, may argue that states of character, dispositions, are virtuous, insofar as they tend to promote happiness. Similarly, a Kantian may argue that someone of virtuous character will cultivate dispositions that enable him to do his duty.

The ground of moral values in normative ethics

Normative ethics is interested in establishing moral principles (to determine which actions are right) and virtues (to decide which states of character are morally good). But, the question is: Where do these moral values (i.e., moral principles and virtues) come from? Are they simply human conventions (as in moral relativism adhered to by well-known people such as Greek skeptic philosopher Sextus Empiricus, sixteenth-century French writer Michel de Montaigne, nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche) or eternal truths from some realm beyond our physical world (as in Platonic realism and Medieval philosophy)? This metaphysical inquiry is usually not part of the task of normative ethics. It is rather handled by meta-ethics, which, of course, deals also with many other kinds of inquiries that are epistemogical, semantic, and psychological.

But, when this metaphysical question is answered by saying that moral values are eternal truths from some realm beyond our physical world, God is often referred to as the ground of morality. While theists in religion undoubtedly agree to refer to God this way, meta-ethics in its metapysical inquiry, too, has developed among others a similar option called the divine command theory, according to which moral values ultimately depend on God. Twentieth-century philosophers such as Philip L. Quinn (1940-2004) and Robert Merrihew Adams defend this theory.

The divine command theory, which is often regarded as a highly controvertial theory in meta-ethics in the modern and contemporary philosophical climate, is a response to the atheistic proposal made by the British analytic philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe (1919-2001) in her famous 1958 article, "Modern Moral Philosophy." According to her, there is no lawgiver (God) anyway, so that when theories of right action are based on moral laws and principles but without a lawgiver, they are incoherent. So, these theories of mpral laws should be abandoned in favor of theories of virtues, which, according to her, are not grounded in God but merely in eudaimonia.

It is usually common for normative ethicists to develop their theories separately from meta-ethics. For example, John Rawls explicitly argues for what he calls the "independence of moral theory." These days, however, scholars such as Stephen Darwall argue that normative ethics should work together with meta-ethics to be able to answer its own difficult questions.

See also

• Categorical imperative
• Consequentialism
• Deontological ethics
• Immanuel Kant
• Ethical intuitionism
• Meta-ethics
• Utilitarianism
• Virtue

References

ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

• Anscombe, G.E.M. "Modern Moral Philosophy." Retrieved November 20, 2008.
• Darwall, Stephen. "Why Ethics Is Part of Philosophy: A Plea for a Philosophical Ethics." In The Proceedings of the Twentieth world Congress of Philosophy, Volume 1: Ethics, edited by Klaus Brinkmann. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999. ISBN 1889680052
• Fieser, James, ed. Metaethics, Normative Ethics, and Applied Ethics: Contemporary and Historical Readings. Wadsworth Publishing, 1999. ISBN 0534573843
• Kagan, Shelly. Normative Ethics Westview Press, 1997. ISBN 0813308461
• McPherson, Tristram. "For Unity in Moral Theorizing." Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999. Abstract online. Retrieved November 21, 2008
• Petersen, Thomas S., and Jesper Ryberg, eds. Normative Ethics: 5 Questions. Automatic Press, 2007. ISBN 8792130003
• Shaw, Wulliam H. Moore on Right and Wrong: The Normative Ethics of G. E. Moore. Springer, 1995. ISBN 0792332237
• Smith, Jeffery D. Normative Theory and Business Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008. ISBN 0742548414
• Smith, Tara. Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist. Cambridge University Press, 2007. ISBN 0521705460

External links

• "Normative Ethics" in Moral Philosophy.Info. Retrieved November 21, 2008.
• "Normative Ethics" in About.com. Retrieved November 21, 2008.

General Philosophy Sources

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Philosophy Sources on Internet EpistemeLinks
• Guide to Philosophy on the Internet
• Paideia Project Online
• Project Gutenberg

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