Difference between revisions of "Antinomy" - New World Encyclopedia

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'''Antinomy''' ([[Greek language|Greek]] αντι-, against, plus νομος, law) literally means the mutual incompatibility, real or apparent, of two laws. It is a term often used in [[logic]] and [[epistemology]], when describing a [[paradox]] or unresolvable contradiction.
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'''Antinomy''' ([[Greek language|Greek]] αντι-, against, plus νομος, law) literally means the mutual incompatibility, real or apparent, of two laws. It is a term often used in [[logic]] and [[epistemology]], when describing a [[paradox]] or unresolvable contradiction. The term antinomy is best known for its use in Kant's arguments in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the ''Critique of Pure Reason.'' The concept of antinomy is also discussed in the other two of three critiques (''Critique of Practical Reason'' and ''Critique of Judgment''). Kant tried to show that the faculty of reason can necessarily fall into a contradiction, or an antinomy, unless one takes Kant's perspective. The idea of antinomy is, thus, built into Kant's arguments themselves. In the ''Critique of Practical Reason,'' Kant presented the antinomy of [[morality]] and [[happiness]]. Simply stated, a morally good life does not necessarily bring about happiness on earth. Moral goodness can result in persecution and even death. Kant argued that the [[existence of God]] and the [[immortality]] of the soul in the afterlife are be necessarily postulated in order to satisfy the conditions for "supreme goodness" (realization of both moral goodness and happiness).
 
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{{toc}}
 
==Historical background==
 
==Historical background==
The term antinomy is found in [[Plutarch]] (46 – 127), but it became a key philosophical term with [[Kant]]. The term was used as a legal term since seventeenth century and it meant a [[contradiction]] among laws. Kant adopted this legal term as well as other legal terms and concepts into philosophy. With the term "antinomy," Kant tried to present that the faculty of reason can establish equally sound but incompatible or contradictory claims. With the argument of antinomy, Kant attempted show the limit of the valid use of the capacity of reason.
+
The term antinomy is found in the works of [[Plutarch]] (46 – 127), but it became a key philosophical term with [[Kant]]. The term was used as a legal term since the seventeenth century and it meant a [[contradiction]] among laws. Kant adopted this legal term as well as other legal terms and concepts into philosophy. With the term "antinomy," Kant tried to present that the faculty of reason can establish an equally sound, but incompatible or contradictory claim. With this concept of the antinomy, Kant attempted show the limits of the valid use of the capacity of reason.
  
 
=="Ideas" in Kant's critical works==
 
=="Ideas" in Kant's critical works==
[[Kant]] carried out the critique of the faculty of reason in his three critical works, ''Critique of Pure Reason'', ''Critique of Practical Reason'', and ''Critique of Judgment''. He tried to present the limit of use of reason by presenting contradictions reason can fall into. These critical works dealt with issues on [[epistemology]] or theory of knowledge, [[Ethics]], and [[Aesthetics]] respectively. In the ''Critique of Pure Reason'', he examined reason as a faculty of knowledge or cognition. In the ''Critique of Practical Reason'', he dealt with reason as a faculty of moral judgment and actions, and in the ''Critique of Judgment'', he examined reason as a faculty of aesthetic judgment. For Kant, critique meant a critical examination of reason as a faculty of judgment. Kant discussed issues of antinomy in all these critical works. Antinomy discussed in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'' is, however, best known.
+
[[Kant]] carried out the critique of the faculty of [[reason]] in his three critical works, ''Critique of Pure Reason,'' ''Critique of Practical Reason,'' and ''Critique of Judgment.'' He tried to present the limits of how reason can be used by presenting the antinomies or contradictory claims reached by reason. These critical works dealt with issues of [[epistemology]], or theory of knowledge, [[Ethics]], and [[Aesthetics]] respectively. In the ''Critique of Pure Reason,'' he examined reason as a faculty of knowledge or cognition. In the ''Critique of Practical Reason,'' he dealt with reason as a faculty of moral judgment and action, and in the ''Critique of Judgment,'' he examined reason as a faculty of aesthetic judgment. For Kant, a critique meant a critical examination of reason as a faculty of judgment. Kant discussed antinomies in all of these critical works. The antinomy discussed in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'' is, however, best known.
 +
 
 +
===Antinomy in the ''Critique of Pure Reason''===
 +
 
 +
The faculty of reason naturally pursues the unconditioned from the conditioned, or the premise from the conclusion. Kant called the unconditioned, "Ideas." There are three "Ideas," which are the [[soul]], the [[world]], and [[God]].
  
The faculty of reason naturally pursues the unconditioned from the conditioned or the premise from the conclusion. Kant called the unconditioned “Ideas.” There are three Ideas, soul, world, and God.
+
When we have an internal experience, we try to think of the totality of the internal experience, and come to have the Idea (in Kantian sense) of the “soul.” Likewise, from experiences that we have with external things, we tend to think of the totality of the external things, and thus we have the Idea of the “world.” Similarly, from experiences that we have with particular beings, we are led to think the totality of all beings and come to think of the Idea of God.
  
When we have internal experiences, we try to think the totality of internal experiences and led to the Idea of “soul.” Likewise, from experiences we have with external things, we tend to think the totality of the external experiences and led to the Idea of “world.” From experiences we have with particular beings, we are led to think the totality of all beings and think the Idea of God.
+
For Kant, an object of cognition must have some sensible content. We, however, tend to mistakenly conceive these Ideas (soul, world, and God) as the objects of cognition. These Ideas are, however, not the objects of cognition since they lack any sensible content such as color, shape, sound, smell, and texture. We cannot see, smell, and touch them unlike other tangible objects. The problem arises, Kant argued, when we conceive the real existence of these Ideas in the same sense that a tangible thing exists. Kant collectively called these mistakenly understood Ideas as the “transcendental illusions” or the “transcendental semblances” (in German, “transzendentaler Schein”).  
  
Kant argued that we tend to think of these Ideas (soul, world, and God), as the objects of cognition. These Ideas are, however, not the objects of cognition since they lack any sensible contents such as colors, shapes, sound, smells, and textures. We cannot see, smell, and touch them unlike other tangible objects. The problem arises, Kant argued, when we take these Ideas as real existence in the same sense that a tangible thing exists. Kant called these mistakenly understood Ideas “transcendental illusion” or “transcendental semblance” (in German, “transzendentaler Schein”).  
+
For Kant, knowledge is the result of the constitution of two components: first, sensible content, such as colors and shapes, supplied by things; second, the forms that the mind is equipped with such as space, time, quality, quantity, relation, and modality. We impose these categories or forms of mind, which the mind has [[a priori]], onto the content we acquire from things outside of us. Human experience or cognition is the result of the constitution of these forms of mind and the sensible content that exists outside of the person. These Ideas such as God, the soul, and the world, are not directly observable and do not have any sensible content (such as color, shape, smell, etc.), and so they cannot be an object of cognition. In the ''Critique of Pure Reason,'' Kant examined the mechanism of the process of how we gain experience and presented the limit of what is knowable.  
  
These Ideas such as God, soul, and the world, had traditionally been thought to exist by themselves. Kant opposed the position that took Ideas as objects of cognition, and rejected the perspective that assumed their existence without consideration of conditions of human knowledge. For Kant, knowledge is the result of constitution of sensible contents, such as colors and shapes, supplied by things and the form which mind is equipped with such as space, time, quality, quantity, relation, and modality. We impose these categories or forms of mind onto sensible contents we acquire form things outside of us. Human experience is the result of constitution of these forms of mind and sensible contents coming from outside. Since these Ideas lack sensible contents, they cannot be an object of cognition. In the ''Critique of Pure Reason'', Kant examined the process of how we know anything and the limit of what we can know.
+
Kant argued that these Ideas are not elements that constitute knowledge. In his words, These Ideas do not make up the “constitutive principle” (“konstitutives Prinzip”) of knowledge, but they should simply serve as the “regulative principle” (“regulatives Prinzip”), or the “heuristic principle” (“heuristisches Prinzip”) that guides our thought.  
  
Kant refused to take Ideas as the “constitutive principle” (“konstitutives Prinzip”)  of knowledge and accepted them as the “regulative principle” (“regulatives Prinzip”) or “heuristic principle” (“heuristisches Prinzip”) that guide our reasoning. Kant, however, revealed a different way to approach these Ideas in his moral philosophy. For Kant, these Ideas are properly approachable within the sphere of [[morality]] and he argued that these Ideas are postulated as necessary elements for moral behaviors. Kant refused traditional speculative [[metaphysics]] which posited these Ideas as existence behind and above phenomena we can experience. Kant was accused of being a “destroyer” of metaphysics for his rejection of these Ideas. Kant denied metaphysicians’ approaches to Ideas but opened a practical approach to them in the sphere of morality.
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Kant refused traditional speculative [[metaphysics]], which posited the existence of these Ideas behind and above phenomena that we can experience. Kant was accused of being a “destroyer” of metaphysics for his rejection of traditional views of metaphysicians. Kant denied metaphysicians’ approaches to these Ideas, but opened a practical approach to them in the sphere of morality. Kant argued that they are not the objects of cognition but they are postulated as necessary elements for moral reasoning.
  
==Four Types of Antinomy==
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==Four Types of Antinomy in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the ''Critique of Pure Reason''==
In the section, “Transcendental Dialectic” in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'', Kant presented four types antinomy. They arise when we take the Idea of the world as the object of cognition. Reason, Kant argues, has an inherent problem: it naturally poses a question it cannot answer. Antinomy is the exemplification of the problem of reason.
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In the section, “Transcendental Dialectic” in the ''Critique of Pure Reason,'' Kant presented four types of antinomies.  
  
 
'''The First Antinomy'''
 
'''The First Antinomy'''
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<blockquote>
 
<blockquote>
 
Kant's own formulation in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'':
 
Kant's own formulation in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'':
*Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space.
+
*Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited in terms of space.
*Antithesis: The world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space.  
+
*Antithesis: The world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite in terms of both time and space.  
  
(Kant, ''Critique of Pure Reason'', Book II, Chapter II, Section 2. Norman Kemp-Smith's translation)
+
(Kant, ''Critique of Pure Reason,'' Book II, Chapter II, Section 2. Norman Kemp-Smith's translation)
 
</blockquote>
 
</blockquote>
The first antinomy arises for the question of whether the world has the beginning in time or not, and whether it is specially finite or not. Reason can argue for each position but cannot reach any conclusive position. Reason cannot decide and resolve the antinomy.
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The first antinomy arises for the question of whether the world has the beginning in time or not, and whether it is spatially finite or not. Reason can argue for each position but cannot reach any conclusive position. Reason cannot decide and resolve the antinomy.
  
 
'''The Second Antinomy'''
 
'''The Second Antinomy'''
*Thesis: The world is consisted of indivisible elements.
+
*Thesis: The world consists of indivisible elements.
*Antithesis: The world is not consisted of indivisible elements.
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*Antithesis: The world does not consist of indivisible elements.
 
<blockquote>
 
<blockquote>
 
Kant's own formulation in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'':
 
Kant's own formulation in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'':
*Thesis: Every composite substance in the world is made up of
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*Thesis: Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts, and nothing anywhere exists save the simple or what is composed of the simple.
simple parts, and nothing anywhere exists save the simple
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*Antithesis: No composite thing in the world is made up of simple parts, and nothing simple exists in the world anywhere.(Ibid.)
or what is composed of the simple.
 
*Antithesis: No composite thing in the world is made up of simple
 
parts, and there nowhere exists in the world anything simple.
 
 
 
(Ibid)
 
 
</blockquote>
 
</blockquote>
 
The question is about the divisibility of components of the world. Can we divide the component of the world into such elements as atoms or particles, and further divide into finer components indefinitely? Or do we reach the final component whose further division is impossible?  
 
The question is about the divisibility of components of the world. Can we divide the component of the world into such elements as atoms or particles, and further divide into finer components indefinitely? Or do we reach the final component whose further division is impossible?  
  
 
'''The Third Antinomy'''
 
'''The Third Antinomy'''
*Thesis: There is freedom as a causailty in the world.  
+
*Thesis: Freedom exists as a causality in the world.  
 
*Antithesis: There is no freedom and everything in the world takes place according to laws of nature.
 
*Antithesis: There is no freedom and everything in the world takes place according to laws of nature.
 
<blockquote>
 
<blockquote>
 
Kant's own formulation in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'':
 
Kant's own formulation in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'':
 
*Thesis: Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.
 
*Thesis: Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.
*Antithesis: There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature.
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*Antithesis: There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature.(Ibid)</blockquote>
 
+
If we trace a chain of cause and effect, do we reach the final point called freedom, which is the initial cause of the causal chain? Or do we never reach the final point, and so the chain of cause and effect continues endlessly? Is there any point outside of the causal chain of beings in the universe?
(Ibid)
 
</blockquote>
 
If we trace a chain of cause and effect, do we reach the final point called freedom, which is the initial cause of the causal chain? Or do we never reach the final point and the chain of cause and effect continues endlessly? Is there any point outside of causal chain of beings in the universe?
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
'''The Fourth Antinomy'''
 
'''The Fourth Antinomy'''
*Thesis: There is the absolutely necessary being (such as God) in the causal chain of beings
+
*Thesis: There is an absolutely necessary being (such as God) in the causal chain of beings
 
*Antithesis: There is no absolutely necessary being.
 
*Antithesis: There is no absolutely necessary being.
 
<blockquote>
 
<blockquote>
 +
Kant's own formulation in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'':
 
*Thesis: There belongs to the world, either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary.
 
*Thesis: There belongs to the world, either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary.
 
+
*Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being exists nowhere in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.
*Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.
 
  
 
(Ibid)
 
(Ibid)
 
</blockquote>
 
</blockquote>
  
==Kant's arguments==
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The question, here, is whether we can suppose the existence of God as the being which necessarily exists. [[Anselm of Canterbury]] formulated an [[existence of God|ontological proof of the existence of God]]: God is a unique being who exists by its essence. Anselm's was based upon the idea that God is that which "is" or who He is. The validity of this ontological argument has been discussed throughout the history of philosophy. Kant argued that we cannot settle the argument conclusively through rational arguments because the faculty of reason can make two incompatible claims.
  
 +
===Kant's arguments===
 +
An antinomy arises, Kant argued, based upon two illegitimate presuppositions: first, that space and time are forms of existence; second, that we do not make a distinction between [[Phenomena]] and [[Noumena]]. For Kant, [[space]] and [[time]] are not forms of existence but subjective forms of the mind. When a man has certain experiences, he or she unconsciously applies these forms of the mind in order to organize the experiences. Furthermore, human cognition is limited to the sphere of phenomena which has a certain sensible content. But, things considered in themselves ("noumena" or "[[things in themselves]]") without the consideration of the human cognitive apparatus are, in principle, unknowable. (see [[Noumenon]] for further details.)
  
 +
An antinomy arises when we take space and time as forms of existing objects that are conceived as forms of "things in themselves" or "noumena." According to Kant, the first two forms of an antinomy (Kant called "mathematical antinomy") are both false, and the third and the fourth forms of an antinomy (Kant called "dynamic antinomy") are both true.
  
about each of which pure reason contradicts the empirical, as thesis and antithesis.
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===Examination of the Third Antinomy===
 +
The third antinomy is often considered to be of vital importance since the question of freedom is essential to [[ethics|moral philosophy]]. When we view the issue from two difference perspectives, Kant argued, the antinomy disappears. When we view human actions as natural phenomena, we can perceive them in terms of the causal chain and all phenomena occurs according to causality. If we view the same human actions from the perspective of [[will]], which is outside of the causal chains of beings, we can perceive that humans' actions are guided by free will. In other words, freedom can be the cause, as opposed to a natural cause.
  
This was part of Kant's critical program of determining limits to [[science]] and [[philosophy|philosophical]] inquiry. Kant claimed to solve these contradictions by saying, that in no case is the contradiction real, however really it has been intended by the opposing partisans, or must appear to the mind without critical enlightenment. It is wrong, therefore, to impute to Kant, as is often done, the view that human reason is, on ultimate subjects, at war with itself, in the sense of being impelled by equally strong arguments towards alternatives contradictory of each other. The difficulty arises from a confusion between the spheres of phenomena and noumena. In fact no rational cosmology is possible.  
+
==Antinomy in the ''Critique of Practical Reason''==
 +
[[Kant]] presents an antinomy in the ''Critique of Practical Reason'' between [[morality]] and [[happiness]]. The [[supreme good]] is realized when both moral goodness and happiness are achieved. However, even if a man tries to be morally good, he can be mistreated and lead a life of misery. The faculty of reason demands both moral perfection and the attainment of happiness at the same time, although there is no guarantee for the simultaneous attainment of both. The pursuit of happiness likewise does not necessarily guide a person to be morally good.
  
It can also be argued that antinomies do not highlight limitations in the power of logical reasoning. This is because the conclusion that there is a limitation is (supposedly) derived from the antinomy by logical reasoning; therefore any limitation in the validity of logical reasoning imposes a limitation on the conclusion that there is a limitation on logical reasoning. (This is an argument by [[self-reference]].) In short, in terms of the validity of logical reasoning as a whole, antinomies are self-isolating: they are like scattered discontinuities within the field of logic, incapable of casting doubt on anything else but themselves.
+
In order to answer this antinomy, Kant argued that we are led to postulate the existence of God and the [[immortality]] of the soul in the world after death. God guarantees the agreement of happiness and moral goodness, or the realization of the supreme good in the world after death.
  
This carefree position is incompatible with the [[principle of explosion]]. In [[mathematical logic]], antinomies are patently not ''self-isolating'', and are usually seen as disasters for the [[formal system]] in which they arise (as [[Russell's paradox]] in [[Gottlob Frege|Frege]]'s work).
+
==Antinomy in the ''Critique of Judgment''==
 +
In the ''Critique of Judgment,'' Kant discusses the antinomy of the [[teleology|teleological]] view of nature and the [[mechanism|mechanical]] view of nature. Nature can be seen as having a built-in purpose or a mechanically organized being without purpose. Kant argued that both positions are true. The resolution can be made when we see teleology and the mechanistic view not as the objective principles of being, but as the subjective principles of judgment.
  
 
== References ==
 
== References ==
*Al-Azm, J. Sadik ''Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies'' Oxford University Press, 1972. ISBN 0198243758 ISBN 978-0198243755
+
 
*Bransen, Jan. ''The Antinomy of Thought: Maimonian Skepticism and the Relation between Thoughts and Objects.'' Nijhoff international philosophy series, v. 43. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. ISBN 0792313836 ISBN 9780792313830 ISBN 9780792313830 ISBN 0792313836
+
*Al-Azm, J. Sadik. ''Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies'' Oxford University Press, 1972. ISBN 0198243758  
*F. Paulsen, ''I. Kant'' (Eng. trans. 1902), pp. 216 foll.
+
*Bransen, Jan. ''The Antinomy of Thought: Maimonian Skepticism and the Relation between Thoughts and Objects.'' Nijhoff international philosophy series, v. 43. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. ISBN 0792313836  
*Guyer, Paul. ''Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays. Critical essays on the classics.'' Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003. ISBN 0742514188 ISBN 9780742514188 ISBN 9780742514188 ISBN 0742514188 ISBN 0742514196 ISBN 9780742514195 ISBN 9780742514195 ISBN 0742514196
+
* Paulsen, F. ''I. Kant'' (Eng. trans. 1902), 216 foll.
*H. Sidgwick, ''Philos. of Kant'', lectures x. and xi. (Lond., 1905)
+
*Guyer, Paul. ''Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays. Critical essays on the classics.'' Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003. ISBN 0742514188  
*John Watson, ''Selections from Kant'' (trans. Glasgow, 1897), pp. 155 foll.
+
*Sidgwick, H.''Philos. of Kant'', lectures x. and xi. (Lond., 1905)
*Melnick, Arthur. Themes in Kant's Metaphysics and Ethics. Studies in philosophy and the history of philosophy, v. 40. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004. ISBN 0813213711 ISBN 9780813213712 ISBN 9780813213712 ISBN 0813213711
+
*John Watson, ''Selections from Kant.'' (trans. Glasgow, 1897), 155 foll.
*White, D. ''Kant's First Antinomy: An Essay in Philosophical Cosmology''. University of Edinburgh, 1982.  
+
*Melnick, Arthur. ''Themes in Kant's Metaphysics and Ethics. Studies in philosophy and the history of philosophy,'' v. 40. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004. ISBN 0813213711  
*Windelband, W. ''A History of Philosophy''. New York: Harper, 1958.
+
*White, D. ''Kant's First Antinomy: An Essay in Philosophical Cosmology.'' University of Edinburgh, 1982.  
 +
*Windelband, W. ''A History of Philosophy.'' New York: Harper, 1958.
 +
 
 +
*This article incorporates text from the Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition, a publication now in the public domain.
 +
*This article was originally based on material from the Free On-line Dictionary of Computing, which is licensed under the GFDL.
  
 
== External links==
 
== External links==
*Kant, Immanuel. [http://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/ ''Critique of Pure Reason''] translated by Norman Kemp Smith. Electronic edition, Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved March 22, 2007. See Book II, Chapter II, Section 2 for issues about Antinomy.
+
All links retrieved July 31, 2023.  
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-metaphysics/#4.1 Kant's Critique of Metaphysics], Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 22, 2007.
+
 
 +
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-metaphysics/#4.1 Kant's Critique of Metaphysics], Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
 +
 
 
===General Philosophy Sources===
 
===General Philosophy Sources===
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy] Retrieved March 22, 2007.
+
 
*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] Retrieved March 22, 2007.
+
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]  
*[http://www.epistemelinks.com/  Philosophy Sources on Internet EpistemeLinks] Retrieved March 22, 2007.
+
*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]  
*[http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/gpi/index.htm Guide to Philosophy on the Internet] Retrieved March 22, 2007.
+
*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online]  
*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online] Retrieved March 22, 2007.
+
*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg]  
*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg] Retrieved March 22, 2007.
 
  
 
[[category:Philosophy and religion]]
 
[[category:Philosophy and religion]]
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*This article incorporates text from the Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition, a publication now in the public domain.
 
*This article was originally based on material from the Free On-line Dictionary of Computing, which is licensed under the GFDL.
 

Latest revision as of 06:35, 31 July 2023

Not to be confused with antimony, a chemical element.

Antinomy (Greek αντι-, against, plus νομος, law) literally means the mutual incompatibility, real or apparent, of two laws. It is a term often used in logic and epistemology, when describing a paradox or unresolvable contradiction. The term antinomy is best known for its use in Kant's arguments in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason. The concept of antinomy is also discussed in the other two of three critiques (Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment). Kant tried to show that the faculty of reason can necessarily fall into a contradiction, or an antinomy, unless one takes Kant's perspective. The idea of antinomy is, thus, built into Kant's arguments themselves. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant presented the antinomy of morality and happiness. Simply stated, a morally good life does not necessarily bring about happiness on earth. Moral goodness can result in persecution and even death. Kant argued that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in the afterlife are be necessarily postulated in order to satisfy the conditions for "supreme goodness" (realization of both moral goodness and happiness).

Historical background

The term antinomy is found in the works of Plutarch (46 – 127), but it became a key philosophical term with Kant. The term was used as a legal term since the seventeenth century and it meant a contradiction among laws. Kant adopted this legal term as well as other legal terms and concepts into philosophy. With the term "antinomy," Kant tried to present that the faculty of reason can establish an equally sound, but incompatible or contradictory claim. With this concept of the antinomy, Kant attempted show the limits of the valid use of the capacity of reason.

"Ideas" in Kant's critical works

Kant carried out the critique of the faculty of reason in his three critical works, Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgment. He tried to present the limits of how reason can be used by presenting the antinomies or contradictory claims reached by reason. These critical works dealt with issues of epistemology, or theory of knowledge, Ethics, and Aesthetics respectively. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he examined reason as a faculty of knowledge or cognition. In the Critique of Practical Reason, he dealt with reason as a faculty of moral judgment and action, and in the Critique of Judgment, he examined reason as a faculty of aesthetic judgment. For Kant, a critique meant a critical examination of reason as a faculty of judgment. Kant discussed antinomies in all of these critical works. The antinomy discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason is, however, best known.

Antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason

The faculty of reason naturally pursues the unconditioned from the conditioned, or the premise from the conclusion. Kant called the unconditioned, "Ideas." There are three "Ideas," which are the soul, the world, and God.

When we have an internal experience, we try to think of the totality of the internal experience, and come to have the Idea (in Kantian sense) of the “soul.” Likewise, from experiences that we have with external things, we tend to think of the totality of the external things, and thus we have the Idea of the “world.” Similarly, from experiences that we have with particular beings, we are led to think the totality of all beings and come to think of the Idea of God.

For Kant, an object of cognition must have some sensible content. We, however, tend to mistakenly conceive these Ideas (soul, world, and God) as the objects of cognition. These Ideas are, however, not the objects of cognition since they lack any sensible content such as color, shape, sound, smell, and texture. We cannot see, smell, and touch them unlike other tangible objects. The problem arises, Kant argued, when we conceive the real existence of these Ideas in the same sense that a tangible thing exists. Kant collectively called these mistakenly understood Ideas as the “transcendental illusions” or the “transcendental semblances” (in German, “transzendentaler Schein”).

For Kant, knowledge is the result of the constitution of two components: first, sensible content, such as colors and shapes, supplied by things; second, the forms that the mind is equipped with such as space, time, quality, quantity, relation, and modality. We impose these categories or forms of mind, which the mind has a priori, onto the content we acquire from things outside of us. Human experience or cognition is the result of the constitution of these forms of mind and the sensible content that exists outside of the person. These Ideas such as God, the soul, and the world, are not directly observable and do not have any sensible content (such as color, shape, smell, etc.), and so they cannot be an object of cognition. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant examined the mechanism of the process of how we gain experience and presented the limit of what is knowable.

Kant argued that these Ideas are not elements that constitute knowledge. In his words, These Ideas do not make up the “constitutive principle” (“konstitutives Prinzip”) of knowledge, but they should simply serve as the “regulative principle” (“regulatives Prinzip”), or the “heuristic principle” (“heuristisches Prinzip”) that guides our thought.

Kant refused traditional speculative metaphysics, which posited the existence of these Ideas behind and above phenomena that we can experience. Kant was accused of being a “destroyer” of metaphysics for his rejection of traditional views of metaphysicians. Kant denied metaphysicians’ approaches to these Ideas, but opened a practical approach to them in the sphere of morality. Kant argued that they are not the objects of cognition but they are postulated as necessary elements for moral reasoning.

Four Types of Antinomy in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason

In the section, “Transcendental Dialectic” in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presented four types of antinomies.

The First Antinomy

  • Thesis: The world is finite in time and space.
  • Antithesis: The world is infinite in time and space.

Kant's own formulation in the Critique of Pure Reason:

  • Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited in terms of space.
  • Antithesis: The world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite in terms of both time and space.

(Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Book II, Chapter II, Section 2. Norman Kemp-Smith's translation)

The first antinomy arises for the question of whether the world has the beginning in time or not, and whether it is spatially finite or not. Reason can argue for each position but cannot reach any conclusive position. Reason cannot decide and resolve the antinomy.

The Second Antinomy

  • Thesis: The world consists of indivisible elements.
  • Antithesis: The world does not consist of indivisible elements.

Kant's own formulation in the Critique of Pure Reason:

  • Thesis: Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts, and nothing anywhere exists save the simple or what is composed of the simple.
  • Antithesis: No composite thing in the world is made up of simple parts, and nothing simple exists in the world anywhere.(Ibid.)

The question is about the divisibility of components of the world. Can we divide the component of the world into such elements as atoms or particles, and further divide into finer components indefinitely? Or do we reach the final component whose further division is impossible?

The Third Antinomy

  • Thesis: Freedom exists as a causality in the world.
  • Antithesis: There is no freedom and everything in the world takes place according to laws of nature.

Kant's own formulation in the Critique of Pure Reason:

  • Thesis: Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.
  • Antithesis: There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature.(Ibid)

If we trace a chain of cause and effect, do we reach the final point called freedom, which is the initial cause of the causal chain? Or do we never reach the final point, and so the chain of cause and effect continues endlessly? Is there any point outside of the causal chain of beings in the universe?

The Fourth Antinomy

  • Thesis: There is an absolutely necessary being (such as God) in the causal chain of beings
  • Antithesis: There is no absolutely necessary being.

Kant's own formulation in the Critique of Pure Reason:

  • Thesis: There belongs to the world, either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary.
  • Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being exists nowhere in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.

(Ibid)

The question, here, is whether we can suppose the existence of God as the being which necessarily exists. Anselm of Canterbury formulated an ontological proof of the existence of God: God is a unique being who exists by its essence. Anselm's was based upon the idea that God is that which "is" or who He is. The validity of this ontological argument has been discussed throughout the history of philosophy. Kant argued that we cannot settle the argument conclusively through rational arguments because the faculty of reason can make two incompatible claims.

Kant's arguments

An antinomy arises, Kant argued, based upon two illegitimate presuppositions: first, that space and time are forms of existence; second, that we do not make a distinction between Phenomena and Noumena. For Kant, space and time are not forms of existence but subjective forms of the mind. When a man has certain experiences, he or she unconsciously applies these forms of the mind in order to organize the experiences. Furthermore, human cognition is limited to the sphere of phenomena which has a certain sensible content. But, things considered in themselves ("noumena" or "things in themselves") without the consideration of the human cognitive apparatus are, in principle, unknowable. (see Noumenon for further details.)

An antinomy arises when we take space and time as forms of existing objects that are conceived as forms of "things in themselves" or "noumena." According to Kant, the first two forms of an antinomy (Kant called "mathematical antinomy") are both false, and the third and the fourth forms of an antinomy (Kant called "dynamic antinomy") are both true.

Examination of the Third Antinomy

The third antinomy is often considered to be of vital importance since the question of freedom is essential to moral philosophy. When we view the issue from two difference perspectives, Kant argued, the antinomy disappears. When we view human actions as natural phenomena, we can perceive them in terms of the causal chain and all phenomena occurs according to causality. If we view the same human actions from the perspective of will, which is outside of the causal chains of beings, we can perceive that humans' actions are guided by free will. In other words, freedom can be the cause, as opposed to a natural cause.

Antinomy in the Critique of Practical Reason

Kant presents an antinomy in the Critique of Practical Reason between morality and happiness. The supreme good is realized when both moral goodness and happiness are achieved. However, even if a man tries to be morally good, he can be mistreated and lead a life of misery. The faculty of reason demands both moral perfection and the attainment of happiness at the same time, although there is no guarantee for the simultaneous attainment of both. The pursuit of happiness likewise does not necessarily guide a person to be morally good.

In order to answer this antinomy, Kant argued that we are led to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in the world after death. God guarantees the agreement of happiness and moral goodness, or the realization of the supreme good in the world after death.

Antinomy in the Critique of Judgment

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant discusses the antinomy of the teleological view of nature and the mechanical view of nature. Nature can be seen as having a built-in purpose or a mechanically organized being without purpose. Kant argued that both positions are true. The resolution can be made when we see teleology and the mechanistic view not as the objective principles of being, but as the subjective principles of judgment.

References
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  • Al-Azm, J. Sadik. Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies Oxford University Press, 1972. ISBN 0198243758
  • Bransen, Jan. The Antinomy of Thought: Maimonian Skepticism and the Relation between Thoughts and Objects. Nijhoff international philosophy series, v. 43. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. ISBN 0792313836
  • Paulsen, F. I. Kant (Eng. trans. 1902), 216 foll.
  • Guyer, Paul. Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays. Critical essays on the classics. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003. ISBN 0742514188
  • Sidgwick, H.Philos. of Kant, lectures x. and xi. (Lond., 1905)
  • John Watson, Selections from Kant. (trans. Glasgow, 1897), 155 foll.
  • Melnick, Arthur. Themes in Kant's Metaphysics and Ethics. Studies in philosophy and the history of philosophy, v. 40. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004. ISBN 0813213711
  • White, D. Kant's First Antinomy: An Essay in Philosophical Cosmology. University of Edinburgh, 1982.
  • Windelband, W. A History of Philosophy. New York: Harper, 1958.
  • This article incorporates text from the Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition, a publication now in the public domain.
  • This article was originally based on material from the Free On-line Dictionary of Computing, which is licensed under the GFDL.

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