Normative ethics

Normative ethics is one of two main component areas of inquiry of philosophical ethics, the other being meta-ethics. Meta-ethics, as the term suggests, is a study of the nature of ethics, or morality. A meta-ethical study would be concerned, amongst other things, with the meaning and objectivity of moral judgments, such as, e.g., saying that this action is right and that one wrong. In contrast, normative ethics assumes that some actions are right, and that some are wrong, and that we can know which ones these are. One aim of normative ethics is the construction of theories about which actions are right and wrong, and what makes them right and wrong. Utilitarianism is an example of a normative theory, according to which, an action is right if and only if it maximizes overall happiness.

Meta-ethics and normative ethics

Philosophical ethics is usually divided into two main component areas of inquiry. These are: 1) normative ethics, also known as normative theory, or moral theory; and 2) meta-ethics. It is helpful to consider the relation between these areas of investigation in understanding the concept of normative ethics.

Meta-ethics

Meta-ethics is an inquiry into the nature of ethics. The prefix meta suggests "aboutness," as, for example, in the word meta-psychology, which is the study of psychology—what it is as a discipline—rather than a study in psychology. Simplifying somewhat, we can say that a meta-inquiry is a study of a study. Meta-ethics is then the study of ethics, which is itself an area of study.

Meta-ethics is concerned with determining the nature of judgments of moral right or wrong, good and bad. It is not concerned with finding out which actions or things are right and wrong, or which states are good and bad, but with understanding the nature and meaning of concepts of right and wrong, good and bad. Meta-ethics does not ask whether lying is always wrong. Rather, it tries to ascertain whether there really is difference between right and wrong, or tries to clarify what it means to say that an action is right or wrong. A meta-ethical inquiry may ask: What, if anything, makes a judgment that lying is always wrong, true (or false)? One possible answer canvassed by meta-ethics is that moral rules are nothing other than the social codes of a particular group of people. This entails that the judgment that lying is always wrong is simply an expression of the beliefs of a group of people, and it is their beliefs about the matter that make it true. This view is called moral relativism or cultural relativism.

Normative ethics

Meta-ethics as the study of ethics usually studies about normative ethics. It might then be better to identify ethics with normative ethics and see meta-ethics as the study of ethics. But this isn't the way in which the terms are most commonly employed. One reason for this is that the actual codes and practices of cultural groups may be called the ethics of these groups. The usage of the term "ethics" in this case is not normative but descriptive, even referring to descriptive ethics, and so normative ethics is not the only component of what might be called ethics.

The word normative is an adjective which comes from "norm." In a philosophical context, the word norm usually means standard, or rule, or principle, as opposed to what is "normal" for people to do, i.e., what they actually do. For example, the rules of arithmetic are normative in the philosophical sense, because reasoning can be assessed against these rules and judged correct or incorrect, irrespective of whether this usage is the normal usage. If everyone were to calculate 7+5 as 57, they would have made a mistake, for they would have misunderstood the rules (norms) of arithmetic. So even if this mistake were "normal," a normative appraisal would hold everyone's actual thinking to the rule which legislates how they ought to think, and judge it incorrect.

Normative ethics is concerned with moral norms. A moral norm is a norm in the sense of being a standard with which moral agents ought to comply. "Thou shall not murder" is an example of a moral norm: it is meant to guide our actions, and to the extent that we do not comply, we may be judged morally—that is, morally blamed. This is then the meaning of a moral norm. Contrast an anthropological study of the ethical practices of cultural groups, which is not normative but descriptive. It studies what they do, rather than what they ought to do. It does not cast judgment but tries to describe the practices of the cultural group.

Lastly, it is important to bear in mind that when doing normative ethics, one sets aside concerns about whether there really is a moral truth and what moral judgments mean, and assumes that there is a difference between right and wrong, good and bad. In other words, the concerns of philosophers doing meta-ethics are put to the one side. This does not imply that divergent meta-ethical theories do not have important implications for the nature of normative ethics (see the article on moral relativism). However, it does seem possible for normative ethics to reason about what is right or wrong, quite independently of meta-ethical thoughts about whether moral statements (e.g. "Thou shall not kill") are objectively true.

Two foci of normative ethics: action and character

Normative ethics has two central concepts: the right and the morally good. The concept of the right is, roughly, the concept of duty, the concept of which actions we ought to perform, which it would be wrong not to perform. The concept of the morally good (a target of the theory of value, or axiology (Greek: axios = worth; logos = study of)) refers to morally good properties of human beings. Virtuous character traits such as kindness, courage, and honesty are examples of states that are generally thought to be morally good. It is worth noting here that the term "right" is usually reserved for actions, whereas, the "morally good" for states of character, including motives. But normative ethics is interested in both: it is, roughly, the field of study that aims to determine which actions are right, and which states of character are morally good.

Which actions are right?

Perhaps the central question of normative ethics involves asking which actions fall into the category of the right and the category of the wrong. This is called the theory of right action. The theory of right action is an investigation and an attempt to answer the question: "What ought I to do?" The "ought" in this question is to be interpreted as a moral ought, and may be understood as equivalent to the question: "What is the right thing to do?" Besides the already mentioned terms, "right," "wrong," and "ought," other important normative concepts relating to action include "obligatory," "forbidden," "permissible," and "required."

So, a normative theory aims to answer the question of "what makes actions right or wrong." This usually amounts to drawing out basic principles as standards of right action. These basic principles may be employed as a moral guide to human beings in their lives, deciding whether particular courses of action—or particular types of action—are right or wrong. The principle of utility in utilitarianism, for example, is a fundamental moral principle according to which right actions are those that maximize happiness. In Kantianism, the categorical imperative is such a fundamental principle from which right actions are derived as duties.

Which states of character are morally good?

The second important focus of normative theory is the question of what states of character are desirable, or morally good. Here normative ethics attempts to answer the question: "What sort of person ought I to be?" This is called the theory of virtue, or virtue ethics. The focus of this aspect of normative ethics is character. A virtue is a morally desirable state of character such as, e.g., courage. So the theory of virtue is directed not at what actions one ought to do, but what person one should be. What is a virtuous person like? What is a vicious person like? What makes traits of character virtuous or vicious? Important concepts for the theory of virtue include terms such as good, bad, virtuous, vicious, honest, courageous, and praiseworthy.

Just as a theory of right action aims to specify which actions are right, a theory of virtue should specify the virtues, i.e., traits of character it is good or bad to possess. It should say, e.g., that courage is a virtue, and cowardice a vice. It should explain why we should think of traits like these as virtues or vices. The form of this justification might be: courage is a virtue because it tends to bring benefits to other people. Here again, the state of character is assessed against a basic normative principle, namely, that it is right to bring benefits to other people.

Relationship of the two

The theory of right action and the theory of virtue are generally distinguished. But it is important to see all normative theories of right will have something to say about which states of character are virtues. A utilitarian, for example, may argue that states of character, dispositions, are virtuous, insofar as they tend to promote happiness. Similarly, a Kantian may argue that someone of virtuous character will cultivate dispositions that enable him to do his duty. So, even though we may distinguish between theories of right action, and of virtuous character, a single normative theory (e.g., utilitarianism, Kantianism, or virtue ethics) will usually present both a theory of right action, and a theory of virtue.

Important normative theories

Normative theories are concerned with, broadly, the nature of right action and the nature of virtue. All normative theories will have something to say about which actions are right, and which states of character are virtues. Four normative theories currently exist. These are utilitarianism, Kantianism, ethical intuitionism (in its methodological sense), and virtue ethics. If we were to accept the division of normative theories into teleological and non-teleological theories, then utilitarianism and virtue ethics would count as teleological theories, whereas Kantianism and intuitionism as non-teleological theories (see the article on teleological ethics).

Utilitarianism

Classical utilitarianism says that the right action is that which produces the greatest balance of overall happiness. By saying that happiness is the only determinant of the rightness of an action, classical utilitarianism endorses hedonism as a theory of value. Utilitarianism has undergone many revisions, but one common move has been to deny the hedonistic element, and preserve the claim that right action depends on the best consequences overall. The best consequences are not necessarily understood in terms of happiness but more broadly in terms of valuable states of affairs. (See the article on consequentialism also.)

Kantianism

Kantian ethics stems from the work of the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant. His work has been tremendously influential and thus the need to designate a branch of ethics as Kantian, in order to accommodate the many theories which are broadly influenced by Kant. Kant’s own theory revolves around what he calls the categorical imperative, a moral principle which he regards as the fundamental principle of morality, and from which all our duties may be derived. The categorical imperative is basically a principle of consistency, demanding that we act on reasons which all rational agents could endorse, i.e., universally acceptable reasons. Kant produces several different versions of the categorical imperative, and introduces the concept of respect for persons. The Kantian conception of respect has proved particularly significant, and here Kant has influenced important contemporary thinkers such as John Rawls (1921-2002). (See the article on the categorical imperative also).

Ethical intuitionism

Although ethical intuitionism in its epistemological sense is unqdoubtedly part of meta-ethics, ethical intuitionism in its methodological sense belongs to normative ethics, referring to unranked pluralism that claims that there are a plurality of moral principles (which are considered to be directly intuited in the epistemological sense), and that none of these moral principles is more basic or important than any other. Ethical intuitionism in this sense is a normative ethical theory contrasted with versions of monism — the view that there is only one basic moral principle — such as utilitarianism and Kantianism. The most well known theorist in ethical intuitionism in this sense is probably W. D. Ross, who is the author of The Right and the Good. According to him, there are a number of irreducible moral duties (e.g., to keep our promises, to refrain from harming the innocent, etc.), none of which takes precedence over any other. Ross thinks that the right action in a given situation is determined by a careful weighing of various moral principles which apply in that situation.

Virtue ethics

The last of the four ethical theories currently under discussion is virtue ethics. In contrast with the other normative theories which tend to start with right action, virtue ethics begins with an account of virtuous character. In other words, virtue ethics offers an account of what states of character are desirable, or virtues, and then tends to define right actions in terms of these virtues. For example, virtue ethics might say that lying is wrong because it is dishonest, or not what an honest person (virtuous person) would do. (Contrast it with the utilitarian explanation: lying is wrong because it tends to bring about unhappiness). Virtue ethicists, particularly, Aristotle and those who follow him, argue that right action cannot be understood as conformity of actions to rules (not even of the prima facie sort suggested by Ross). They tend to emphasize that the virtuous person is someone who acts rightly in the situation upon requirements that are unique to the situation. The virtuous person is someone who is able to perceive what the situation requires and act accordingly.

See also

• Categorical imperative
• Consequentialism
• Deontological ethics
• Immanuel Kant
• Intuitionism
• Meta-ethics
• Utilitarianism
• Virtue

External links

• Virtue Ethics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

General Philosophy Sources

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Philosophy Sources on Internet EpistemeLinks
• Guide to Philosophy on the Internet
• Paideia Project Online
• Project Gutenberg

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