Inheritance tax

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Inheritance tax, estate tax and death duty are the names given to various taxes which arise on the death of an individual. Technically, the inheritance tax and the estate tax are different although we shall use the terms interchangeably, except where the distinction is important; in the UK, an inheritance tax would be equivalent to an estate tax.

In the U.S. an estate tax is paid out of the deceased’s estate before it is distributed. The same total tax is paid, therefore, whether there is one heir or dozens and the same tax is paid whether the heirs are rich or poor.

Brief overview of the Inheritance and/or Estate Tax

Some basic definitions

Depending on where you live the tax code may make reference to "inheritance tax," "estate tax" and even "death duty."

In the United States, there is a difference between estate taxes and inheritance taxes. Estate taxes are levied on representatives of the deceased person, while inheritance taxes are levied on the beneficiaries of an estate.

Elsewhere in the world, the terms estate tax and inheritance tax are used interchangeably.


An "inheritance tax" is paid by the heir and may vary according to the heir’s relation to the deceased, the heir’s income and wealth, and the amount inherited. If an inheritance tax is, in any of the senses above, progressive then the total tax paid will vary according to the number of heirs and their wealth.


The “estate tax” is a tax on net worth, the value of all property owned minus debt and any estate expenses. Essentially the tax is an “everything tax.” It’s a tax on cash and bank accounts, stocks, bonds, real estate, businesses, equipment and machinery, automobiles and other property, life insurance policies, artwork, even personal belongings.


In, both, the U.S. and Great Britain, egalitarians tend to prefer an inheritance tax since this gives the deceased an incentive to spread wealth across many heirs ( John Stuart Mill proposed an inheritance tax, for example) while pragmatists tend to support the estate tax because it is easier to administer and will tend to raise more revenue than the inheritance tax (precisely because it cannot be avoided by increasing the number of heirs).

Calculation of Inheritance Tax in the U.S.

  • Inheritance Tax Basis:

The first step used to determine any inheritance tax that might be due is to calculate the fair market value of the entire estate. This would include cash, bank accounts, stocks and bonds, real state, insurance and similar items of value. The total fair market value of all these items is termed the Gross Estate.


  • Adjustments to Gross Estate:

The next step would be to calculate any adjustments to the gross estate. Typical adjustments include the remaining balance on a mortgage or the fees associated with settling the estate. This last item might include items such as estate administration fees or payments made to an attorney. Finally, there is also a Marital Deduction that can be taken for property that is left to a surviving spouse.


  • Net Value of Property:

Once all the deductions have been taken from the gross estate, the remaining balance is considered the net value of the property - or the inheritance tax basis.

To calculate whether nor not any inheritance tax is due; the net value of the property must be subtracted from the inheritance tax credits appearing in the tables below. If the net estate is larger than the tax exclusion, then the federal income taxes due can be found on the standard tax brackets or tax rate tables published by the IRS.


  • Taxing of Life Insurance Proceeds:

Life insurance proceeds paid to you are used in the calculation of the gross estate. The value of any insurance received is subject to the unified credits and inheritance tax exemptions explained later. This last statement is true if you elect to receive the proceeds in the form of a single lump sum.

If you elect to receive life insurance proceeds in installments, then you need to separate the value of the insurance inherited from the total of all payments to determine your federal tax liability.

For example, you may be able to elect to receive a lump sum of $100,000 or $10,000 per month for 12 months. The difference between the lump sum payment and the money received is due to interest you are earning on the policy by taking installments.

In this example, you are receiving a total of 12 x $10,000 or $120,000, which is $20,000 higher than the lump sum of $100,000. This means that you would need to pay income tax on the $20,000 received in the form of interest income.


  • Unified Credits, Gift Tax and Estate Tax:

The Unified Credit is used to eliminate or reduce your tax liability. The credit applies to both gifts you may have received and estates that have been inherited. The credit is termed a lifetime credit because as it is consumed by each gift or estate inherited the credit is reduced. The lifetime credit applies to all inheritance or gifts received since 1977.

The lifetime gift tax exclusion you can take in 2006 is $1,000,000. Another way of looking at the same information is to state that you have a $345,000 tax credit that you can apply to any income taxes owed on gifts.


Rising problems with Inheritance tax in OECD

"Inheritance tax" used to make the news only when it forced once super-rich dynasties to flog their heirlooms after the head of the family died. But suddenly, death is getting expensive for a much larger number of Europeans, and that's starting to attract the attention of politicians and headline writers across the Continent.

Furious discussions about whether to limit, amend or suppressinheritance taxes broke out last week in both Britain and France.

In Italy, meanwhile, there's controversy and skepticism about plans by the new government[an error occurred while processing this directive] of Romano Prodi to reinstate the inheritance tax abolished by former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in one of his first acts on taking office in 2001.

The debate is erupting now because death duties of up to 40%, once paid only by the affluent, are starting to affect a growing number of middle-class Europeans—and will likely hit millions more in the decade to come.


"……Inheritance tax used to be a problem for the rich. Now it's a problem for you and me….." says Anne Young, a tax expert at the Edinburgh financial-services firm Scottish Widows, who calculates that about 1 in 3 of Britain's 24 million households now have estates that would fall within the taxman's reach. Young herself admits she has an inheritance-tax "problem."


Blame the explosion of house prices. Unlike their parents, European baby boomers tend to own their homes. As prices have soared over the past few years in almost every country except Germany, these homeowners have enjoyed big increases in the value of their total assets. But in many cases, the rise has pushed their net worth over the national minimum thresholds for inheritance tax, which haven't been adjusted in step with the housing boom. The result: almost anyone owning a detached house in London or southeast England is already well over the U.K. tax-free limit on estates of $540,000.


France is even tougher. There, inheritance tax is levied in theory from the first euro passed on, but a series of tax-free thresholds apply to family members, including a €50,000 one for children of the deceased. The value of even a modest two-bedroom apartment in central Paris is enough to push families into a 30% tax bracket (the top rate for them is 40%, for estates valued at over €1.7 million).

For nonfamily members and unmarried partners, the situation is even more complicated, with inheritance tax rising as high as 60%. And unlike many other countries, where the tax is levied when assets are handed down a generation, husbands and wives in France are subject to death duties on what they inherit from their spouses.


In the U.S., the subsequent administrations to Ronald Reagan's one have left the following legacy concerning the Inheritance Tax:


  • The rate was scheduled to fall to 50 percent by 1993, however, ERTA ( i.e. Economic Recovery Act of 1981 ) had scheduled the rate to fall to 50 percent by 1985, but this reduction has been twice delayed and pushed off to the farther future; the general public may never see the 50 percent rate promised in ERTA.
  • Marginal rates begin at 37 percent after the first $600,000.
  • There is a peculiar non-linearity in the schedules so that the tax rises to 60 percent between $10,000,000 and $21,040,000 but then falls to 55 percent again. It’s unclear why this non-linearity exists.


Economics of minimal Inheritance Taxes

Before we enter this domain, a few excerpts should precede it:

“…..This does not imply that once-earned wealth perpetuates itself forever. On the contrary, even if a fortune were completely immune from risk it would tend to quickly dissipate so long as there is more than one heir in each generation. In a free market wealth is continually changing hands…… .….Increasing and even maintaining a fortune requires entrepreneurial skill……” ( von Mises 1981, pp. 338–40 ).

“…….Consider how much easier it is to waste a million dollars than it is to make a million dollars. Nevertheless, wealth will typically last more than one generation so it is reasonable to argue that at least two generations of heirs are significantly harmed by the estate tax……"( ibid.).

“…In modern times the funds raised by the estate and gift tax have accounted for only a small proportion of government revenue…In 1990 death and gift taxes raised just over $15 billion in revenue, approximately $11 billion of which was because of the Federal estate and gift tax the remainder because of state death and gift taxes; as seen in Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990…” ( Tabarrok, 1997) .


Inter-generation transfers and “working” capital accumulation

In spite of the best efforts of social engineers, the estate tax has not had a revolutionary effect on aggregate income inequality, although some families have been devastated by the tax. In fact, both, Adam Smith and David Ricardo ( Smith, 1904 ; Ricardo, 1917) argued that the inheritance tax reduced savings, and, in causal relation, future capital investments.


However,since the 1950s,the above classics notwithstanding, the dominant opinion among economists has been that the bequest motive has little to do with saving and capital accumulation. So, even if true, the slight sapping of savings by estate taxation was not to be worried about.


As a matter of fact, however, the modern bequest theory is an inter-generational transfer theory of saving. Hence, a tax on the transfer of property between the generations can affect savings by changing the behavior of the bequestor or the heir. The effect on the bequestor is composed of two parts:


  • the price effect and
  • the wealth effect.


The tax raises the price of bequests and therefore reduces the desired bequest. The effect on savings, however, is ambiguous.

Imagine, for instance, that a man wishes to bequeath an estate of $1 million to his daughter. If there is no tax he must save $1 million, but if there is a tax of 50 percent and he still wishes to bequeath $1 million he must increase his savings to $2 million.

In most circumstances the bequestor will want to reduce the amount of bequest, but so long as the reduction in final bequest is less than 50 percent the price effect works to increase saving. The price effect can be summarized in terms of elasticities. If the demand to give bequests is inelastic the price effect works to increase savings.


Little data exist on this elasticity but a demand curve must be elastic above some price, otherwise a consumer could be made to spend all of his income on the single taxed good ( Wagner 1977, p. 19 ). At today’s rates of 55 percent the demand for bequests is probably elastic and there is little doubt that if the rates were raised by any significant degree the amount of savings would be reduced.


Reinforcing the reduced savings because of the price effect is the wealth effect. For a given size of bequest, an increase in the estate tax is equivalent to a reduction in wealth. The desire to give bequests decreases (increases) as wealth decreases (increases). In other words, bequests are a “normal” good.


The effect of estate taxation on the heir’s savings decision is important although rarely discussed even though it formed the focus of Ricardo’s comments ( Ricardo, 1917 ).


An inheritance is a large, one-time, increase in wealth. Income smoothing requires that the bulk of this wealth be saved. A decrease in the heir’s inheritance is therefore ipso facto, a large decrease in savings.


Indeed, if the bequestor and heir have similar wealth and value scales, the heir will want to save the principal portion of the estate so that it can be passed on to his own heirs. This is what accounts for the fact that family fortunes are typically the accumulated savings of more than one generation.


Bequest-saving tends to be long-term and continuous and therefore allows for what F.W. Taussig called “…sustained accumulation and permanent investment…..” ( Taussig, 1920, p. 249) .This is especially true when savings are passed along in the form of family businesses.


Questions of morality and efficiency of inheritance

Those who are able to bequeath a material inheritance are also often able to bequeath a sound moral and educational inheritance. Along with pecuniary and physical capital the founding generation bequeaths human capital.

In a capitalist society, therefore, the institution of inheritance is more than a moral institution, it is part of the process whereby wealth is transferred to those who can best use it to serve the wishes of consumers.


Consider the following three proposals and try to assess which will cause the most efficient distribution of wealth according to the wishes of consumers:


  • (1) Inheritance according to the will of the owner,
  • (2) Inheritance to a randomly picked individual, or
  • (3) The state takes the inheritance as tax revenue ( see Rothbard, 1970 in the below note )?


In the long run only the market can reveal who possesses the entrepreneurial spark. But when wealth must be passed from one generation to another the institution of inheritance seems to be both moral and efficient ( see von Mises' comment at the beginning of this chapter ).

Problems in government "investing" of the inheritance tax

One reason most neo-classical economists ignore the effect of the estate tax on the heir’s saving is the argument that the government can also “save” the estate tax by investing it in capital projects.


From that does not immediately follows that if the bequestor reduces his savings in the face of the estate tax, savings must decline regardless of what the government does with the tax revenue.

At best, this objection, even if accepted, blunts but does not overturn the negative effect on savings derived from the behavior of bequestors.


But, generally, there are several flaws with this argument:


  • First, the wealthy tend to have low rates of time preference, which allows family fortunes to be invested in long-term projects, as seen in the above Taussig’s “..sustained accumulation and permanent investment..”( Lawrence, 1991).


Even assuming that governments were to “invest” the proceeds of the tax rather than spend it on redistribution and pork barrel projects, governments are dominated by politicians whose time horizons are measured in years to the next election rather than in decades and generations.


  • Second, and more fundamentally, there is a crucial difference between government investment and private sector investment.

Only the private sector investment can be defined as welfare-enhancing ( Rothbard 1956 ). Private sector savings are necessarily allocated to maximize consumer and producer well-being.


Government savings are allocated according to arbitrary political fiat. Rothbard (1970) has made a strong case that so called government investment is better understood as consumption by government officials rather than savings.


Adam Smith’s distinction between unproductive and productive labor was never more apt than when he wrote:


“…..All taxes upon the transference of property . . . are all more or less unthrifty taxes that increase the revenue of the sovereign, which seldom maintains any but unproductive laborers; at the expense of the capital of the people, which maintains none but productive….”( Smith, 1904 ).


To evaluate the effect of higher estate ( or inheritance ) taxes, it is therefore necessary to examine the "life cycle theory" ( see the next paragraph ).


Traditionally, many economists believed that the most important reason people saved was to give bequests. Alfred Marshall (1949, p. 227), however, held that:

“….family affection is the main motive for saving…..”


Similarly, Schumpeter (1942, p. 160) called the “….family motive” the “mainspring” of savings…..,” and F.W. Taussig (1920, p. 249) argued that for long-term savings “…..the main motives are domestic affection and family ambition…….”


Elsewhere Taussig (1920, p. 509) called inheritance “……the great engine for the maintenance of capital……” and, in his highly regarded principles text, Frank A. Fetter (1913, p. 371) argued that:

“…….Much of the existing wealth probably never would have been created if men did not have [the] right of gift…...”


In fact, the entire capitalist order for Schumpeter is founded on the family motive:


“…….When the capitalist-entrepreneur-bourgeois is sundered from longterm family ties he becomes, to borrow a phrase, a wage slave or bureaucrat-cog easily crushed by the state and its philosophical apparatus……..” ( Schumpeter,1942, p.160 and passim).


Cycle Theory of Saving

The theory of saving was the central component of post World War II Keynesian macroeconomics but the bequest theory was completely abandoned during this period. In its place was put the life cycle theory of saving by the main protagonists: Modigliani and Brumberg (1954).


The life cycle theory places the main motivation for saving on the desire to provide for retirement. The theory implies that savings should follow a “hump” pattern.

Young adults begin the saving process by borrowing; as their career stabilizes they pay off old debts and begin to save, then, when retirement begins, they draw down their savings until they die.

In the simple model, everyone wishes to consume up to the moment of death and then die penniless. In more complicated models a bequest motive is tacked on as an afterthought.


Yet, far before the life cycle theory was born, Alfred Marshall recognized an important fact which casts doubt on the theory. He noted that:


“…. men seldom spend, after they have retired from work, more than the income that comes in from their savings, preferring to leave their stored up wealth intact for their families……..” ( Marshall, 1949, p.228).


In other words, the elderly do not dissave as the life cycle theory predicts. Marshall’s observation has been verified by a number of studies in recent years. Far from dying penniless, the elderly often die richer than at any other point in their life.

A related point is the low demand among the elderly for annuities and reverse mortgages. Some economists have claimed that "uncertainty about time of death" explains why the elderly do not dissave.


But if this were the motivation for maintaining income in old age we would expect the elderly to invest in annuities and reverse mortgages.

An annuity is like life insurance in reverse. A large and certain payment is made today in return for an income stream which lasts until death. Similarly, in a reverse mortgage the buyer promises to will his house to a firm in return for an income stream which is paid until death.

If they wanted to do so, the elderly could use these devices to consume their wealth without fear of being destitute in the event that they live longer than expected. The fact that these markets are relatively small suggests that the main reason the elderly do not dissave is to make bequests.

Instead of buying annuities, which the life cycle theory predicts, many elderly persons are trying to get rid of annuities the government has forced them to buy.

One of those annuities is Social Security that taxes income in early periods and then returns that income in later periods in annuitized form. Social Security changes not only the amount of saving but the type of saving which occurs—it favors annuity saving rather than saving in the form of bequestable wealth.

Imagine, for instance, that a man has paid $100,000 into Social Security. After he retires, this money begins to return to him in periodic payments. If he lives long enough he may even see the entire $100,000 again, but if he dies after consuming only half of his $100,000 payment he cannot bequest the remaining $50,000.


In addition to these theoretical arguments, recent econometric work by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) indicates that the stock of wealth is far too large to be accounted for by life cycle reasons. Although hotly debated and challenged, the bequest wealth is now recognized to be much more important than previously thought.


Hence, the theoretical and empirical shortcomings of the life cycle theory indicate that the bequest motive is an important determinant of savings. This means that far from being negligible the estate tax and gift tax could significantly reduce total savings. If the current exemption were to be lowered the increase in the estate tax base would be considerable and savings could be even more adversely affected.


Ethical Justifications of Inheritance Tax

Equality of Opportunity

Economists and other writers often ethically rationalize the estate and inheritance taxes by appealing to the principle of equality of opportunity. Economist and Nobel Prize winner James Buchanan, for example, argue that:


”…… a guarantee of “some” equality of opportunity is inherent in the political philosophy of the free society…….” ( Buchanan, 1975, p. 303 ).


And Groves (1939, p. 248) correctly notes that "...equality of opportunity is often accepted as desirable “by the most ‘rugged’ of individualists....”


Closely linked with the idea of equality of opportunity is the principle of desert. Many who reject as morally repugnant confiscatory income taxes accept the inheritance tax because the individual does not “earn” his inheritance and is therefore undeserving. Harlan Read (1918, p. 279) stated the thesis boldly in his Abolition of Inheritance:

“…….All estates are unearned by the heirs and should therefore, be taken by taxation……..”


From the correct idea that a man deserves what he earns he draws the incorrect conclusion that a man does not deserve what he does not earn.


The principle of equality of opportunity and the principle of desert are both inimical to the free society. There are, however, at least two uncertainties in these moral principles:


  • 1) Stated in a certain fashion it appears inherently just and when contrasted with equality of condition or outcome it appears manifestly superior. Equality of opportunity is often presented in the context of lack of opportunity.


Typical argument: The intelligent child of the inner city who is unable to excel because he lacks a good education is contrasted with the luckier child of the suburb. Why should forces for which the child is not responsible and does not control be such a large factor in his life? Why are otherwise identical individuals placed in such differing circumstances?

In this context equality of opportunity seems compelling. An argument can be made, however, that what is compelling about these anecdotes is the lack of opportunity of the inner-city child and not the notion of equality of opportunity.

Counter-argument: Let us establish equality of opportunity by ruining the schools for all. ( NOTE: Mind you only the spiteful and envious could prefer such a situation to happen when the children were unequal.)


Yet, such must be the argument behind inheritance taxes because taxing the rich does not improve the lot of the poor.

Even if the taxes raised from the rich were redistributed to the poor, instead of wasted or spent on consumption by the state, the wealth of the poor would not increase but trivially.


The issue of opportunity must be separated from that of equality of opportunity. To increase opportunities for individuals to excel is a worthy goal but to restrict the opportunities of some in order to create “equality” among all is impossible, not to say "monstrous". Among the opportunities it is desirable to increase is the opportunity to inherit wealth.


  • 2) The second reason equality of opportunity is highly regarded is that it is often favorably contrasted with equality of condition or outcome.


Equality of opportunity, it is said, allows men to rise as far and as fast as their talents allow so long as each generation begins the race on an equal footing.

Equality of outcome, by contrast, is inefficient, coercive, and totalitarian. In actuality, equality of opportunity is nothing but equality of outcome applied at the beginning of life rather than throughout life.


Both forms of equality are coercive and totalitarian. Taken seriously, equality of opportunity requires that all inheritance --- monetary, genetic, and experiential --- be abolished.


Of the three forms, monetary inheritance is the most obvious but probably the least important creator of inequality.


Genetic inheritance is the least obvious but is likely of the greatest importance with experiential inheritance (the informal education and training given by one’s parents) falling close to that of genetic inheritance. ( NOTE: It is difficult to separate these influences because they are positively correlated. )


As a mere beginning, to create equality of opportunity would require a massive program of eugenics and the raising of children communally. Although eugenics is still a subject of taboo, some public schools, which make the communal raising of children a partial reality, are often justified on the grounds of equality of opportunity.

Principle of Desert

Consider first the issue of inheritance taxes. Let us pass over the difficulties of defining “deserve” and “earn” and assume that in some sense the heir does not deserve his inheritance because he has not earned it.


How does it follow from this that the state deserves the inheritance? It is the owner of the estate who earned it and not the government. Furthermore, if the owner of the estate earned it and thus deserves it he must also deserve the right to allocate the estate as he wishes. Who else could deserve this right? Thus, even accepting that a man does not deserve what he does not earn, this is no justification for inheritance taxes.


The argument that desert justifies ownership is entirely misplaced. It is not a man’s duty to “justify” his claims to the state or to other men.

It is the state which must justify its takings. The notion of desert as justification implicitly regards ownership as a gift granted by the state and given only so long as a man can “justify” such ownership to the state’s inquisitors.


However, it is the inquisitors who must be questioned. The state justifies its existence only to the extent that it protects the rights of individuals. This is the meaning of the “Declaration of Independence” when it declares that:


”…… every man has, certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness….That, to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it……”


Conclusion

So long as men are mortal, wealth should be --- for several reasons; among them: long-term capital projects, efficiency of capital investment and all the above reasons coming from: Smith, Ricardo, Marshall, Taussig and others--- transferred between the generations and so long as parents care for their children the dominant means of doing so will be through family inheritance.


The transference of wealth through the family benefits bequestor and heir, strengthens family ties, and increases long-term savings. When the state intervenes in this process it increase its coffers at the expense of the smooth operation of family, society, and economy.


Even if a given amount of taxes must be raised it is probably preferable to tax consumption rather than to tax capital accumulation because private savings are the basis of economic growth. The estate tax is among the worst taxes on these grounds, as Rothbard (1970, p. 113) notes:

“……The inheritance tax is perhaps the most devastating example of a tax on pure capital…...”

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Buchanan, J., Cost and Choice, Markham, Chicago, 1969
  • Fetter, Frank A., The Principles of Economics, Century New York, 1913
  • Groves, Harold. M., Financing Government, Henry Holt, New York: 1939
  • Kotlikoff, L., and L. Summers, “The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate

Capital Accumulation,“ Journal of Political Economy , vol. 89, 1981, pp. 706-732

  • Lawrence, M. and Carl Davidson,. "Tax incidence in a simple general equilibrium model with collusion and entry," Journal of Public Economics, vol. 45(2), Elsevier, 1991, pp. 161-190
  • Read, H.E., The Abolition of Inheritance, MacMillan, New York, 1918
  • Ricardo, D., Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Dent, London, 1817, chap. 8 ( for his comments on transfer taxes and savings )
  • Rothbard, M., “ Towards the Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics”; in: On Friedom and Free Enterprises ( ed. Mary Sonnholtz ) , Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1956
  • Rothbard, M., Nan, Economy and State, vols, 1 and 2. , Nash Publ. , Los Angeles, 1970
  • Schumpeter, Joseph A.. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper and Row, New York, 1942
  • Smith Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Methuen and Co., Ltd., ed. Edwin Cannan, 1904. Fifth edition, Book 5, chap. 2, pt. i, appendix to articles 1 and 2
  • Tabarrok, A.” Death Taxes: Theory, History, and Ethics” in: Essays in Political Economy, Ludwig von Mises Institute (Auburn University, Auburn, AL ) USA, 1997; translated into Spanish as Impuestos a la herencia: teoría, historia y ética (Eseade, 2002)
  • Taussig, F.W., Principles of Economics, Vol, 2, Macmillan, New York, 1920
  • von Mises, L., Socialism, Indianopolis 1934; Liberty Classics 1981
  • Wagner, R., Inheritance and State, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 1977


External links


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