Difference between revisions of "Categorical imperative" - New World Encyclopedia

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The '''categorical imperative''' is the [[philosophy|philosophical]] concept central to the [[moral philosophy]] of [[Immanuel Kant]] and to modern [[deontological ethics]]. He introduced the concept in his ''[[Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals]]''. It is outlined here according to the arguments found in this work.
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The '''Categorical Imperative''' is the central concept in [[Kant]]’s [[ethics]]. It refers to the “supreme principle of [[morality]]” (4:392), from which all our moral [[duty|duties]] are derived. The basic principle of morality is an imperative because it commands certain courses of [[Action (philosophy)|action]]. It is a categorical imperative because it commands unconditionally, quite independently of the particular ends and desires of the moral agent.
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Kant formulates the Categorical Imperative in several different ways but according to the well-known "Universal Law" formulation, you should "…act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law." Since maxims are, roughly, principles of action, the categorical imperative commands that one should act only on universal principles, principles that could be adopted by all rational agents.
  
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Kant defined an imperative as any proposition that declares a certain kind of action (or inaction) to be [[Logical possibility|necessary]].  A [[hypothetical imperative]] would compel action under a particular circumstance: ''If I wish to satisfy my thirst, then I must drink this lemonade''.  A categorical imperative would denote an absolute, unconditional requirement that exerts its authority in all circumstances, and is both required and justified as an end in itself. It is best known in its first formulation:
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==Imperatives: Hypothetical and Categorical==
  
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:''Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it would become a universal law.''
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An imperative is a command (e.g. “shut the door!”). Kant thinks that imperatives may be expressed in terms of there being some action that one ‘ought’ to do. For example, the imperative “Be quiet!” may be expressed as: “you ought to be quiet.” Kant distinguishes two types of imperatives: categorical imperatives and hypothetical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives have the general form, “If you want Φ then you ought to do Ψ.” “If you want to lose weight, you should not eat chocolate,” is an example of a hypothetical imperative. Refraining from eating chocolate is something that is required of one insofar as one is committed to the end of losing weight. In this respect, the imperative commands conditionally: it applies only on the condition that one shares the end for which the imperative prescribes means. To the extent that this end is not one that is required (and someone may say, “losing weight is really not that important!”), one is not required to perform the actions instrumental to it. One can escape what is required by the imperative by giving up the end.
  
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He expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the moral philosophy of his day because he believed it could never surpass the level of hypothetical imperatives. For example, a [[consequentialism|consequentialist]] standard may indicate that murder is wrong because it does not maximize good for the greatest number; but this would be irrelevant to someone who is not interested in maximizing the good. Consequently, Kant argued, hypothetical moral systems cannot persuade moral action or be regarded as bases for moral judgments against others, because the imperatives they are based on rely too heavily on subjective considerations.  
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In contrast with hypothetical imperatives, which depend on one’s having particular desires or ends (such as wanting to lose weight), categorical imperatives describe what we are required to do independently of what we may desire or prefer. In this respect they prescribe behavior categorically. A categorical imperative has the general form, “Do A!” or “you ought to do A.” Kant argues that moral rules are categorical imperatives, since the content of a moral prohibition is supposed to apply quite independently of our desires and preferences. Consider, for example, the moral rule “You shall not murder.” This moral rule has application quite absolutely. It does not include any condition such as “You shall not murder if you want to avoid punishment,” or “You shall not murder if you want to be a moral person.” The categorical applies quite independently of out desires and preferences. We cannot escape its force insofar as we are moral agents.
  
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A [[deontological]] moral system based on the demands of the categorical imperative was presented as an alternative.
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==Moral Rules and the Categorical Imperative==
  
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==Nature of the concept==
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According to Kant, moral rules are categorical imperatives. Furthermore, Kant thought that all our moral duties, substantive categorical imperatives, depend on a basic requirement of rationality, which he regards as the supreme principle of morality (4: 392): this is the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative, as opposed to categorical imperatives, substantive moral rules, is the basic form of the moral law.  
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The nature of a moral proposition ("It is wrong to commit murder") must necessarily mean that a particular act or kind of act ought not be carried out under any circumstance ("One ought not commit murder"). This is the central point of his [[Meta-ethics|meta-ethical]] theory that establishes Kant as an extreme [[moral objectivism|moral objectivist]]. A categorical imperative is the one and only basis for all moral statements, because a hypothetical imperative would depend on the subjective desires of the rational actors, rendering it powerless to compel moral action.
 
  
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=== Freedom and autonomy ===
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An analogy with the biblical [[Golden Rule]] might help to make the relation between categorical imperatives and the Categorical Imperative somewhat clearer. In Mathew 7:6, [[Jesus Christ]] urges that “all things … that you want men to do to you, you also must likewise do to them: this, in fact, is what the Law and the Prophets mean.” In this text Jesus makes two important claims: firstly, he prescribes the Golden Rule as a regulating principle for how we conduct ourselves; secondly, he says that the Mosaic Law and declarations of the prophets may be summed up in terms of this rule. Jesus may be understood here as maintaining that the Golden Rule is to be employed in helping us identify what actions we ought to perform, and also, to justify particular moral rules. Taking first the point about identification, Jesus’ suggestion is that whenever one is unsure about whether to pursue a particular course of action, he may employ the Golden Rule to ascertain whether this course of action is correct. This is to identify certain courses of action as morally permissible and impermissibly. Secondly, with respect to justification, the Golden Rule may be used to justify the moral codes expressed in the [[Mosaic Law]] because it is the fundamental principle upon which [[Jewish moral codes]] are expressions. The Golden Rule is a fundamental moral principle that may be used to explain why particular moral rules apply (e.g., those of the Mosaic Law).  
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In contrast to [[David Hume]], Kant viewed the human individual as a rationally [[autonomy|autonomous]] self-conscious being with full freedom of action and self-determination. For a will to be considered "free", we must understand it as capable of effecting causal power without being caused to do so. But the idea of lawless [[free will]], that is, a will acting without any causal structure, is incomprehensible. Therefore, a free will must be acting under laws that it gives to ''itself''.  
 
  
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Although Kant conceded that there could be no conceivable example of free will, because any example would only show us a will as it ''appears'' to us — as a subject of natural laws — he nevertheless argued against [[determinism]]. He proposed that determinism is logically inconsistent: The determinist claims that because ''A'' caused ''B'', and ''B'' caused ''C'', that ''A'' is the true cause of ''C''. Applied to a case of the human will, a determinist would be arguing that the will does not have causal power because something else had caused the will to act as it did. But that argument merely assumes what it set out to prove; that the human will is not part of the causal chain.  
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The categorical imperative is significantly different from the Golden Rule, but the relation between it as a basic moral principle and higher order moral principles is the same. It may be employed in similar fashion to identify and justify particular moral rules, or what might be called, substantive categorical imperatives. First, with respect to identification, as we shall see below, the categorical imperative may be used as a decision procedure in identifying certain courses of action as permissible and impermissible. Secondly, with respect to justification, Kant thinks that the categorical imperative underlies all commonly recognized moral laws, such as those prohibiting telling lies, those requiring beneficence, forbidding murder, and others. Since these moral laws can be derived from the categorical imperative, these moral rules may be justified with reference to that basic moral principle. The categorical imperative then explains why our moral duties, whatever they might be, bind us as rational moral agents.
  
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Secondly, Kant remarks that free will is ''inherently unknowable''. Since even a free person could not possibly have knowledge of his own freedom, we cannot use our failure to find a proof for freedom as evidence for a lack of it. The observable world could never contain an example of freedom because it would never show us a will as it appears to ''itself'', but only a will that is subject to natural laws imposed on it. But we do appear to ourselves as free.  Therefore he argued for the idea of transcendental freedom — that is, freedom as a presupposition of the question "what ''ought'' I to do?" This is what gives us sufficient basis for ascribing moral responsibility: the rational and self-actualizing power of a person, which he calls [[moral autonomy]]: "the property the will has of being a law unto itself".
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==Kant’s derivation of the Categorical Imperative==
  
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=== Good Will, duty, and the categorical imperative  ===
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Kant attempts to derive our moral duties from the very concept of a moral rule or moral obligation. Kant argues that moral obligations are categorical imperatives. Since categorical imperatives apply to rational agents without regard to their particular ends and purposes, they cannot be explained in terms of what a person has self-interested reason to do. A categorical imperative applies to moral agents independently of facts about their own goals, and desires; it prescribes nothing other than “obey the law!” The essential property of a law is universality. The laws of physics, for instance, describe the behavior of all physical properties of the universe. Similarly, moral laws are universal in scope in that they are universally applicable, applicable to all rational beings. (Of course, moral laws are not descriptive of how things actually operate but prescribe how rational agents would act insofar as they are rational.) From this line of thought, Kant infers the basic principle of morality, the categorical imperative, which says that one should “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (4:421). This version of the categorical is often called that formula of the Universal Law of Nature.
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Since considerations of the physical details of actions are necessarily bound up with a person's subjective preferences, and could have been brought about without the action of a rational will, Kant concluded that the expected [[consequentialism|consequences]] of an act are themselves morally neutral, and therefore irrelevant to moral deliberation. The only objective basis for moral value would be the rationality of the Good Will, expressed in recognition of moral duty.
 
  
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Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law set by the categorical imperative. Because the consequences of an act are not the source of its moral worth, the source must be the [[maxim_(philosophy)|''maxim'']] under which the act is performed, irrespective of all aspects or faculties of desire. Thus, an act can have moral content if, and only if, it is carried out solely with regard to a sense of moral duty; it is not enough that the act be consistent with duty, but carried out to achieve some particular interest.
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A [[maxim]] is a principle of action, or a policy prescribing some course of action. The maxim of an action gives the principle upon which an agent acts. It specifies the reason for which a person acts. Since the categorical imperative requires that the maxims upon which we act be capable of becoming universal laws, this is equivalent to the requirement that we act for reasons that are universally acceptable. We ought to act for reasons that could be adopted by all. A maxim that could consistently be adopted by all rational agents is said to be universalizable. Taking into account this equivalence, the categorical imperative may be formulated as follows: Act only according to maxims that are universalizable.
  
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==The first formulation==
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==The Categorical Imperative as Decision Procedure==
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From this step, Kant concludes that a moral proposition that is true must be one that is not tied to any particular conditions, including the identity of the person doing the moral deliberation. One could not morally command others by saying ''"It is wrong for you to murder, but it is not wrong for me to murder"'' because that would be a hypothetical imperative: Effectively saying "If I am person A, murder is right; If I am person B, murder is wrong". Therefore, a moral commandment must have [[universality (philosophy)|universality]], which is to say that it must be disconnected from the particular physical details surrounding the proposition, and could be applied to any rational being. This leads to the first formulation of the categorical imperative:
 
  
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*"Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it would become a universal law."
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The categorical imperative in its Universal Law formulation—“Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”—may be used as a decision procedure, to test the permissibility of maxims. If a maxim fails the universalizability test, then acting on this maxim is forbidden. Conversely, if a maxim passes the universalizability test then it is permissible for one to act on this maxim. Kant holds that the notion of consistency is central to the concept of universality and argues that a maxim passes the universalizabilty test only if it can be consistently willed as a universal law. The Categorical Imperative, used as a decision procedure, and employed to test maxims for permissibility, is essentially then a logical test, and involves calculating whether the maxim could be consistently (without contradiction) willed as a universal law. This encapsulates Kant’s conviction that ‘willing’ is governed by laws of rationality so that there is something deeply irrational about wrongdoing.
  
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Kant divides the duties imposed by this formulation into two subsets:
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The basic steps in testing maxims for consistency are the following. First, formulate your maxim for the proposed action. Secondly, generalize this maxim so that it is formulated as a universal law that determines the behavior of all rational agents. This is to imagine that one’s proposed maxim is one that all other agents adopt and must adopt as a maxim. Thirdly, check to see whether the generalized maxim can be conceived as a universal law. If this is possible, check to see whether it can be consistently willed as a universal law. It is morally permissible to act on a maxim only if it can be consistently willed as a universal law—in other words, it passes all the aforementioned steps. Another way of putting this point is to say that universalizability of a maxim is both necessary and sufficient for the moral rightness of acting on this particular maxim.
  
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===Perfect duty===
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This procedure may be illustrated in concrete detail by examining Kant’s well-known example of a lying promise. Kant imagines someone who is in need of money and knows that he would be able to acquire some by borrowing with a promise to repay, a promise he knows that he will not be able to keep. The question is then whether this person should make a lying promise in order to secure the money. In Kant’s own words, “May I not, when I am hard pressed, make a promise with the intention of not keeping it?” (Gr. 18/402) Following the steps outlined above, Kant argues that we are able to demonstrate that acting on the maxim of a lying promise is morally impermissible.
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First, we have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that result in logical contradictions when we attempt to universalize them. The moral proposition ''A'': "It is permissible to steal" would result in a contradiction in conceivability because the notion of stealing presupposed the existence of property. But were ''A'' universalized, then there could be no property, and the proposition has logically annihilated itself. Hence we have a perfect duty never to steal. Similarly, if the moral proposition ''B'': "It is permissible to lie" were true, there must be language, but the universalization of lying would destroy the meaning of language. Therefore proposition ''B'' results in a logical contradiction, and Kant (rather famously) declared that lying is impermissible in any and all conceivable circumstances.
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Firstly, formulating the maxim for the proposed action, the man in Kant’s example would be acting on something like the following maxim.  
  
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===Imperfect duty===
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[M] Whenever it is to my advantage do so, I shall make lying promises to obtain what I want.
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Second, we have imperfect duty, which is the duty to act only by maxims that we would desire to be universalized. Since it depends somewhat on the subjective preferences of mankind, this duty is not as strong as a perfect duty, but it is still morally binding. The moral proposition ''C'': "One should never lend aid to another person unless there is something in it for oneself" could only be morally true if no one ever wanted help from another person, because that is the only case in which we could will it to be true. Since we can determine (by empirical observation) that this is not the case, ''C'' results in a "contradiction of the will", and Kant claims we have an imperfect duty to help others in their times of need, when possible.
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The next step in testing the permissibility of the maxim requires that we imagine a world in which this maxim were generalized, that it were be one upon which all agents acted. Generalizing M, we obtain,
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[GM] Whenever it is to anyone’s advantage, he shall make lying promises to obtain what he wants.
  
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==The second formulation==
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Kant argues that [GM] cannot be conceived as a universal law. His reasoning seems to be that if everyone were to adopt the maxim of false promising, trust would break down to such an extent that one would no longer be able to make promises at all. This implies that the generalized maxim of false promising [GM] could not function as a universal law and the maxim is internally inconsistent. The categorical imperative requires one to test the moral quality of a maxim by considering whether it is possible to will one’s proposed maxim [M] together with its generalized version [GM]. As we have already seen, [GM] is internally inconsistent: in a world where everyone lied all the time, there could be no promise making. This generates a contradiction in our will because one cannot will to make a lying promise in a world in which there were no promises. This is to conceive of a world in which one has promised, and yet, there are no promises—and this is something which cannot be rationally willed.  
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All rational action must set before itself not only a principle, but also an end. Most ends are of a subjective kind, because they need only be pursued if they are in line with some particular hypothetical imperative that a person may choose to adopt. For an end to be objective, it would be categorically necessary that we pursue it.  
 
  
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The free will is the source of all rational action. But to treat it as a subjective end is to deny the possibility of freedom in general. Because the autonomous will is the one and only source of moral action, it would contradict the first formulation to claim that a person is merely a means to some other end, rather than always an end in his or her self.  
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Lastly, it is important to note that Kant is not saying that we should ask whether it would be a good or bad thing if everyone did what the man in his example is contemplating. Kant is not a utilitarian. Rather, his point is that the maxim of making false promises cannot be consistently willed with a universalized version of that maxim. There are various ways of interpreting the practical contradiction that arises in this sort of case, but I shall refer to this as a contradiction in conception. One’s proposed maxim cannot be conceived together with its generalized version.
  
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On this basis, Kant derives second formulation of the categorical imperative from the first.
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There is a second way in which a maxim might fail the universalizability test, which does not involve a contradiction in conception. Even if one can consistently will one’s maxim together with the universalized version of the maxim, one cannot consistently will this maxim because it conflicts with something else one must will. To illustrate this, consider Kant’s example of someone who, when his own life is flourishing acts on the maxim of simply ignoring those who are in need. Following the steps as outlined about, the rule, or maxim that this person would be following in failing to help others in need may be formulated as follows:
  
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*"Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."
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[M] Whenever I am flourishing, I shall give nothing to anyone else in need.
  
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By combining this formulation with the first, we learn that a person has ''perfect duty'' not to use itself or others merely as a means to some other end. As a [[slavery|slaveowner]] would be effectively asserting a moral right to own a person as a slave, he or she would be asserting a property right in another person. But this would violate the categorical imperative because it denies the basis for there to be free rational action at all; it denies the status of a person as an end in himself. One cannot, on Kant's account, ever suppose a right to treat another person as a mere means to an end.
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The next step requires the deliberating agent to enquire whether the maxim may be conceived as a universal law
  
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The second formulation also leads to the ''imperfect duty'' to further the ends of ourselves and others. If any person desires perfection in himself or others, it would be his moral duty to seek that end for all persons equally, so long as that end does not contradict perfect duty.
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[GM] Whenever anyone is flourishing, then he will give nothing to anyone else in need.
  
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== The third formulation ==
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Clearly this maxim can be conceived as a universal law and does not involve any contradiction in conception. A person could consistently will GM and M: it is possible to conceive of this maxim with its generalized form without contradiction. However, Kant says that it is nonetheless irrational to will M. His reasoning seems to go through the following steps. Firstly, insofar as we are rational then we will he means to our ends. Secondly, we are not independent and self-sufficient creatures. We need the help of others achieve some of our ends or the ends of our loved ones, which are our ends insofar as we love them. If one wills M and GM, one would be willing something that goes against us satisfying our ends. But this is irrational—it conflicts with a fundamental principle of rationality So M cannot be rationally willed a universal law of nature, although it can be rationally conceived as a law of nature (Sullivan 1989, 179).
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Because a truly autonomous will would not be subject to any particular interest, it would only be subject to those laws which it makes for itself. But it must also regard those laws as if they would be binding to others, or they would not be universalizable, and hence they would not be laws of conduct at all. Thus Kant presents the notion of the hypothetical [[Kingdom of Ends]] of which he suggests all persons should consider themselves both members and heads.  
 
  
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*"So act as though you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends."
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==The Categorical Imperative and the Derivation of Duties==
  
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We ought to act only by maxims which would harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends. We have ''perfect duty'' not to act by maxims that create incoherent or impossible states of natural affairs when we attempt to universalize them, and we have ''imperfect duty'' not to act by maxims that lead to unstable or greatly undesirable states of affairs.
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Kant argues that the principles of human duty can be justified with reference to the categorical imperative. But moral duties do not bind us in exactly the same way. Kant claims that two sorts of duties may be distinguished: perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties are negative and strict: we simply are forbidden from doing these sorts of actions. Examples of perfect duties include “Thou shall not murder” and “Thou shall not lie.” By contrast, imperfect duties are positive duties: they refer to what we are required to do, rather than refrain from doing. Imperfect duties are not strict in that they do not specify how much we ought to do to. Although one, for example, ought to act beneficently as far as possible, the “as far as possible” is left indeterminate: not every action that fails to measure up is wrong; there is more leeway in meeting one’s imperfect duties.
  
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==Formal criticism==
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Kant argues that the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties corresponds to the two possible ways in which a maxim may fail the categorical imperative test. Roughly speaking, as we saw in the last section, a maxim may fail the test by generating a contradiction when conjoined with its universalized form (contradiction in conception), or when conjoined with other maxims which one must will (contradiction in will). The maxim of an action that violates a perfect duty always generates a contradiction in conception. This maxim then specifies a moral rule that is a perfect duty. A maxim that violates an imperfect duty generates a contradiction in will.
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An objection based on the coherence of Kant's position has been stated by [[Onora O'Neill]] (1993):
 
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:"This [most central] objection is that Kant's basic framework is incoherent. His account of human knowledge leads to a conception of human beings as parts of nature, whose desires, inclinations and actions are susceptible of ordinary causal explanation. Yet his account of human freedom demands that we view human agents as capable of self-determination, and specifically of determination in accordance with the principles of duty. Kant is apparently driven to a dual view of man: we are both phenomenal (natural, causally determined) beings and noumenal (non-natural, self-determining) beings. Many of Kant's critics have held that this dual-aspect view of human beings is ultimately incoherent."
 
  
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This objection is based on the view that human [[free will]] is [[compatibilism and incompatibilism|incompatible]] with a [[determinism|deterministic]] world of cause and effect. The question of free will is contested in philosophical debates and literature even today.
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In addition to the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, Kant believes that ordinary moral thinking recognizes another basic distinction within our moral duties. This is the distinction between duties to oneself and duties to others. Kant provides four examples to illustrate how the categorical imperative may be used in this fashion to test maxims for moral permissibility, which include specification of perfect duties to self and other, and imperfect duties to self and other (4:422). The examples illustrate that the categorical imperative can be used to generate all commonly recognized duties. Kant’s examples include a perfect duty to ourselves—not to commit suicide—an imperfect duty to ourselves to develop our talents, a perfect duty to others not to lie or make false promises, and an imperfect duty to others of beneficence.
  
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==Normative interpretation==
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==The Categorical Imperative: Other formulae==
  
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Although Kant was intensely critical of the use of examples as moral yardsticks, because they tend to rely on our moral intuitions (feelings) rather than our rational powers, this section will explore some interpretations of the categorical imperative  for illustrative purposes.
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Kant provided several formulations of the categorical imperative and claimed that they were all equivalent. Commentators disagree about exactly how many distinct formulas Kant recognizes. In addition to the Universal Law of Nature formula discussed above, it is widely agreed that Kant elaborates three others: (2) The Humanity Formula (3) The [[Autonomy]] formula and (4) the Kingdom of Ends formula.  
  
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===Deception===
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In its best known formulation the humanity formula is: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (Gr. 66-67/429). The humanity formula is closely linked with the idea of respecting persons. This formula makes clear one of Kant’s deepest disagreements with [[consequentialism]], which does not place any ‘in principle’ limitations on what it is permissible to do to a person: anything is permitted, so long as the consequences are good enough. In contrast, Kant argues that human beings are ends in themselves, which means that they have value that is intrinsic, absolute, incomparable, and objective. Kant argues that every human agent possesses this sort of ultimate value, and gives it a special name: [[dignity]]. When Kant says that human beings are ends in themselves, he means that they have dignity and the appropriate response to dignity is respect. The humanity formula of the categorical imperative prescribes, then, that we respect persons because they possess dignity. We do so by treating persons as ends in themselves, that is, treat them in ways that acknowledge their fundamental value or dignity.  
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Kant asserted that lying, or deception of any kind, would be forbidden under any interpretation and in any circumstance. In ''Groundwork'', Kant gives the example of a person who seeks to borrow money without intending to pay it back. The maxim of this action, says Kant, results in a contradiction in conceivability (and thus contradicts perfect duty) because it would logically contradict the reliability of language. The right to deceive could also not be claimed because it would deny the status of the person deceived as an end in himself. And the theft would be incompatible with a possible kingdom of ends. Therefore, Kant denied the right
 
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to lie or deceive for any reason, regardless of context or anticipated consequences.
 
  
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===Theft===
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The third formulation of the categorical imperative is “the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law” (4:432). This is not formulated as an imperative, but may be transposed into imperative form as, “Act only in such a way that your maxims could serve as legislations of universal laws.” This formula is closely correlated with the Universal Law formulation but places emphasis on the capacity of rational agents to legislate the moral law. The capacity of rational agents to legislate the law for themselves is at the heart of human dignity.  
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Kant argued that any action taken against another person to which he or she ''could not possibly'' consent is a violation of perfect duty interpreted through the second formulation. If a thief were to steal a book from an unknowing victim, it may have been that the victim would have agreed, had the thief simply asked. However, no person can consent to theft, because the presence of consent would mean that the transfer was not a theft. Since the victim could not have consented to the action, it could not be instituted as a universal law of nature, and theft contradicts perfect duty.
 
  
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===Suicide===
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The fourth, “Kingdom of Ends” formulation of the categorical imperative, states that we must “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends” (4:439). The Kingdom of Ends formulation has proved influential in contemporary debates especially in the political philosophy of [[John Rawls]].
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Kant applied his categorical imperative to the issue of suicide in ''Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals'', writing that:
 
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:If a man is reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes and feels wearied of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life, he should ask himself a question. He should inquire whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is:  From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction. It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature.  Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself, and therefore could not exist as a system of nature; hence the maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature, and consequently would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.
 
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===Animal rights===
 
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A Kantian mode of thinking states only rational and autonomous beings are held to have intrinsic worth, and objects or creatures that are not autonomous are held to have no intrinsic moral value.
 
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Although actions with respect to non-persons do not have intrinsic moral content, Kant derived a prohibition against cruelty to animals as a violation of a duty in relation to oneself. According to Kant, man has the duty to strengthen the feeling of compassion, since this feeling promotes morality in relation to other human beings. But, cruelty to animals deadens the feeling of compassion in man. Therefore, man is obliged not to treat animals brutally (Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, § 17).
 
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===Euthanasia===
 
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== Normative criticism ==
 
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===Inquiring murderer===
 
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One of the first major challenges to Kant's reasoning came from the [[Switzerland|Swiss]] philosopher [[Benjamin Constant]], who asserted that since truth telling must be universal, according to Kant's theories, one must (if asked) tell a known murderer the location of his prey. This challenge occurred while Kant was still alive, and his response was the essay ''On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives''. In this reply, Kant agreed with Constant, and argued that it is indeed one's moral duty to be truthful to a murderer.
 
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Kant argued that telling the truth to the murderer is required because moral actions do not derive their worth from the expected consequences. He claimed that because lying to the murderer would treat him as a mere means to another end, the lie denies the rationality of another person, and therefore denies the possibility of there being free rational action at all. This lie results in a contradiction in conceivability and ergo the lie is in conflict with duty.
 
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Furthermore, Kant questioned our ability to know that the expected future outcomes of our actions would actually occur. For example, suppose Jim said that the victim was in the park, when he thought the target was in the library. However, unbeknownst to Jim, the victim actually left the library and went to the park. The lie would actually lead the murderer to the victim, which would make Jim responsible for the murder. Another example post-Kantians bring up is that one would not be morally responsible for the action anyway; the murderer would be. If one told the truth, it might turn out the murderer decides not to murder after all{{fact}}.
 
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=== Prioritization of moral duties ===
 
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Because Kant's theory only draws distinctions between right acts and wrong acts, some question how the categorical imperative can explain the prioritization of moral duties when they come into conflict{{fact}}.  For example, if one must steal in order to keep a promise, how should he or she act?  Some Kantians have argued that promising to steal is an immoral act itself, because the declaration of intent to act immorally is inconsistent with [[free will]]. The fact that one has acted immorally in the past would not release him or her from the duty to act morally in the future; therefore, when confronted with the issue of choosing between stealing or promise-breaking, breaking the promise would not be an immoral act, but stealing would.
 
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=== Universal oath-breaking ===
 
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Another objection to Kant came from the Englishman, [[W._D._Ross| Sir David Ross]], argued that a world where everyone could be depended upon to always break their promises would be just as effective and reliable as a world where everyone kept their promises, and one could thus will that promise-breaking become universalisable{{fact}}. However, this argument may fail to take into account Kant's argument that lying would violate the second formulation of the categorical imperative, which forbids treating another person as a means to another end.
 
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=== Eudaimonia assumed ===
 
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[[Ayn Rand]]'s critique amounts to this ''[[reductio ad absurdum]]'': The deduction that the entire human race has a duty to die is entirely consistent with the Categorical Imperative provided that the deducer agrees that he himself, or she herself, has a duty to die too - regardless of any, some or all's inclination, rooted in [[self-love]], to stay alive{{fact}}. At the root of her critique is her conclusion that Kantian appeals to the good implicitly appealed to Aristotle's ''[[eudaimonia]]'' while explicitly denying its relevance to morals. An example: a duty to promote universal war is exactly the same as a duty to promote universal peace once ''[[eudaimonia]]'' is removed.
 
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===Prudential vs. moral maxims===
 
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[[Louis White Beck]] argued that within Kant's theory, it is unclear what is a moral maxim and what is a prudential maxim{{fact}}. For example the maxim that the purchaser of every new book should write their name on the flyleaf:  There is nothing in the categorical imperative to discern that this is not a moral imperative for it is easily something which one would wish to be universally applied, and this universal application would lead to no irrational contradictions. Of course this imperative is actually hypothetical, but the condition is merely omitted.  One could say that you should always inscribe your name inside a new book, if you want it to be returned. The categorical imperative on its own cannot differentiate between a prudential maxim and one that is truly moral—this requires a longer and more complex method of reasoning.
 
  
 
==See also==
 
==See also==
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*[[Immanuel Kant]]
 
*[[Immanuel Kant]]
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*[[Kantianism]]
 
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*[[Deontological ethics]]
 
 
*[[Ethics]]
 
*[[Ethics]]
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*[[Moral philosophy]]
 
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*[[Marcus George Singer]]
 
  
 
==References==
 
==References==
  
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* {{cite book | author=[[Immanuel Kant|Kant, Immanuel]] | title=Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals| publisher=Harper and Row Publishers, Inc | year=1964| id=ISBN 0-06-131159-6}}
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*Kant, Immanuel. ''Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals'' New York: Harper and Row, 1964. ISBN 0061311596.
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* {{cite book | author=[[Christine Korsgaard|Korsgaard, Christine]] | title=Creating the Kingdom of Ends |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1996 |id=ISBN 0521499623}}
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*Kant, Immanuel. ''Kant: Critique of Practical Reason''. Edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
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* {{cite book | author=[[Onora O'Neill|O'Neill, Onora]] | title='Kantian Ethics' in 'A Companion to Ethics', ed. Peter Singer |location=Oxford | publisher=Blackwell Reference|year=1993 |id=ISBN 0631187855}}
+
 
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==Further Reading==
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*Korsgaard, Christine. ''Creating the Kingdom of Ends''. Cambridge University Press, 1996. ISBN 0521499623.
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*Beck, Lewis White. ''A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason''. University of Chicago Press, 1996. ISBN 0226040755
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*O’Neill, Onora. ''Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy''. Cambridge University Press, 1990. ISBN 0521388163
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*O’Neill, Onora. "Kantian Ethics" in ''A Companion to Ethics''. Edited by Peter Singer. Oxford: Blackwell Reference, 1993. ISBN 0631187855.
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*Paton, H. J. ''The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy''. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999. ISBN 0812210239
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*Sullivan, Roger J. ''Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory''. Cambridge University Press, 1989. ISBN 0521369088
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*Sullivan, Roger J. ''An Introduction to Kant's Ethics''. Cambridge University Press, 1994. ISBN 0521467691
  
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[[Category:Deontological ethics]]
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== External Links ==
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[[Category:Kantianism]]
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All links retrieved November 30, 2023.
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/ Kant’s Moral Philosophy in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personal-autonomy/ Personal Autonomy in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/respect/ Respect in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
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*[http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03432a.htm Categorical Imperative in the Catholic Encyclopedia]
  
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[[cs:Kantův kategorický imperativ]]
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===General Philosophy Sources===
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[[da:Kategoriske imperativ]]
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
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[[de:Kategorischer Imperativ]]
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*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online]
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[[he:הצו הקטגורי]]
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*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
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[[nl:Categorische imperatief]]
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*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg]
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[[no:Det kategoriske imperativ]]
 
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[[fi:Kategorinen imperatiivi]]
 
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[[sv:Kategoriska imperativet]]
 
  
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[[Category:Ethics]]
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[[Category:Philosophy and religion]]
  
 
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Latest revision as of 17:59, 30 November 2023


The Categorical Imperative is the central concept in Kant’s ethics. It refers to the “supreme principle of morality” (4:392), from which all our moral duties are derived. The basic principle of morality is an imperative because it commands certain courses of action. It is a categorical imperative because it commands unconditionally, quite independently of the particular ends and desires of the moral agent.

Kant formulates the Categorical Imperative in several different ways but according to the well-known "Universal Law" formulation, you should "…act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law." Since maxims are, roughly, principles of action, the categorical imperative commands that one should act only on universal principles, principles that could be adopted by all rational agents.

Imperatives: Hypothetical and Categorical

An imperative is a command (e.g. “shut the door!”). Kant thinks that imperatives may be expressed in terms of there being some action that one ‘ought’ to do. For example, the imperative “Be quiet!” may be expressed as: “you ought to be quiet.” Kant distinguishes two types of imperatives: categorical imperatives and hypothetical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives have the general form, “If you want Φ then you ought to do Ψ.” “If you want to lose weight, you should not eat chocolate,” is an example of a hypothetical imperative. Refraining from eating chocolate is something that is required of one insofar as one is committed to the end of losing weight. In this respect, the imperative commands conditionally: it applies only on the condition that one shares the end for which the imperative prescribes means. To the extent that this end is not one that is required (and someone may say, “losing weight is really not that important!”), one is not required to perform the actions instrumental to it. One can escape what is required by the imperative by giving up the end.

In contrast with hypothetical imperatives, which depend on one’s having particular desires or ends (such as wanting to lose weight), categorical imperatives describe what we are required to do independently of what we may desire or prefer. In this respect they prescribe behavior categorically. A categorical imperative has the general form, “Do A!” or “you ought to do A.” Kant argues that moral rules are categorical imperatives, since the content of a moral prohibition is supposed to apply quite independently of our desires and preferences. Consider, for example, the moral rule “You shall not murder.” This moral rule has application quite absolutely. It does not include any condition such as “You shall not murder if you want to avoid punishment,” or “You shall not murder if you want to be a moral person.” The categorical applies quite independently of out desires and preferences. We cannot escape its force insofar as we are moral agents.

Moral Rules and the Categorical Imperative

According to Kant, moral rules are categorical imperatives. Furthermore, Kant thought that all our moral duties, substantive categorical imperatives, depend on a basic requirement of rationality, which he regards as the supreme principle of morality (4: 392): this is the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative, as opposed to categorical imperatives, substantive moral rules, is the basic form of the moral law.

An analogy with the biblical Golden Rule might help to make the relation between categorical imperatives and the Categorical Imperative somewhat clearer. In Mathew 7:6, Jesus Christ urges that “all things … that you want men to do to you, you also must likewise do to them: this, in fact, is what the Law and the Prophets mean.” In this text Jesus makes two important claims: firstly, he prescribes the Golden Rule as a regulating principle for how we conduct ourselves; secondly, he says that the Mosaic Law and declarations of the prophets may be summed up in terms of this rule. Jesus may be understood here as maintaining that the Golden Rule is to be employed in helping us identify what actions we ought to perform, and also, to justify particular moral rules. Taking first the point about identification, Jesus’ suggestion is that whenever one is unsure about whether to pursue a particular course of action, he may employ the Golden Rule to ascertain whether this course of action is correct. This is to identify certain courses of action as morally permissible and impermissibly. Secondly, with respect to justification, the Golden Rule may be used to justify the moral codes expressed in the Mosaic Law because it is the fundamental principle upon which Jewish moral codes are expressions. The Golden Rule is a fundamental moral principle that may be used to explain why particular moral rules apply (e.g., those of the Mosaic Law).

The categorical imperative is significantly different from the Golden Rule, but the relation between it as a basic moral principle and higher order moral principles is the same. It may be employed in similar fashion to identify and justify particular moral rules, or what might be called, substantive categorical imperatives. First, with respect to identification, as we shall see below, the categorical imperative may be used as a decision procedure in identifying certain courses of action as permissible and impermissible. Secondly, with respect to justification, Kant thinks that the categorical imperative underlies all commonly recognized moral laws, such as those prohibiting telling lies, those requiring beneficence, forbidding murder, and others. Since these moral laws can be derived from the categorical imperative, these moral rules may be justified with reference to that basic moral principle. The categorical imperative then explains why our moral duties, whatever they might be, bind us as rational moral agents.

Kant’s derivation of the Categorical Imperative

Kant attempts to derive our moral duties from the very concept of a moral rule or moral obligation. Kant argues that moral obligations are categorical imperatives. Since categorical imperatives apply to rational agents without regard to their particular ends and purposes, they cannot be explained in terms of what a person has self-interested reason to do. A categorical imperative applies to moral agents independently of facts about their own goals, and desires; it prescribes nothing other than “obey the law!” The essential property of a law is universality. The laws of physics, for instance, describe the behavior of all physical properties of the universe. Similarly, moral laws are universal in scope in that they are universally applicable, applicable to all rational beings. (Of course, moral laws are not descriptive of how things actually operate but prescribe how rational agents would act insofar as they are rational.) From this line of thought, Kant infers the basic principle of morality, the categorical imperative, which says that one should “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (4:421). This version of the categorical is often called that formula of the Universal Law of Nature.

A maxim is a principle of action, or a policy prescribing some course of action. The maxim of an action gives the principle upon which an agent acts. It specifies the reason for which a person acts. Since the categorical imperative requires that the maxims upon which we act be capable of becoming universal laws, this is equivalent to the requirement that we act for reasons that are universally acceptable. We ought to act for reasons that could be adopted by all. A maxim that could consistently be adopted by all rational agents is said to be universalizable. Taking into account this equivalence, the categorical imperative may be formulated as follows: Act only according to maxims that are universalizable.

The Categorical Imperative as Decision Procedure

The categorical imperative in its Universal Law formulation—“Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”—may be used as a decision procedure, to test the permissibility of maxims. If a maxim fails the universalizability test, then acting on this maxim is forbidden. Conversely, if a maxim passes the universalizability test then it is permissible for one to act on this maxim. Kant holds that the notion of consistency is central to the concept of universality and argues that a maxim passes the universalizabilty test only if it can be consistently willed as a universal law. The Categorical Imperative, used as a decision procedure, and employed to test maxims for permissibility, is essentially then a logical test, and involves calculating whether the maxim could be consistently (without contradiction) willed as a universal law. This encapsulates Kant’s conviction that ‘willing’ is governed by laws of rationality so that there is something deeply irrational about wrongdoing.

The basic steps in testing maxims for consistency are the following. First, formulate your maxim for the proposed action. Secondly, generalize this maxim so that it is formulated as a universal law that determines the behavior of all rational agents. This is to imagine that one’s proposed maxim is one that all other agents adopt and must adopt as a maxim. Thirdly, check to see whether the generalized maxim can be conceived as a universal law. If this is possible, check to see whether it can be consistently willed as a universal law. It is morally permissible to act on a maxim only if it can be consistently willed as a universal law—in other words, it passes all the aforementioned steps. Another way of putting this point is to say that universalizability of a maxim is both necessary and sufficient for the moral rightness of acting on this particular maxim.

This procedure may be illustrated in concrete detail by examining Kant’s well-known example of a lying promise. Kant imagines someone who is in need of money and knows that he would be able to acquire some by borrowing with a promise to repay, a promise he knows that he will not be able to keep. The question is then whether this person should make a lying promise in order to secure the money. In Kant’s own words, “May I not, when I am hard pressed, make a promise with the intention of not keeping it?” (Gr. 18/402) Following the steps outlined above, Kant argues that we are able to demonstrate that acting on the maxim of a lying promise is morally impermissible.

Firstly, formulating the maxim for the proposed action, the man in Kant’s example would be acting on something like the following maxim.

[M] Whenever it is to my advantage do so, I shall make lying promises to obtain what I want.

The next step in testing the permissibility of the maxim requires that we imagine a world in which this maxim were generalized, that it were be one upon which all agents acted. Generalizing M, we obtain,

[GM] Whenever it is to anyone’s advantage, he shall make lying promises to obtain what he wants.

Kant argues that [GM] cannot be conceived as a universal law. His reasoning seems to be that if everyone were to adopt the maxim of false promising, trust would break down to such an extent that one would no longer be able to make promises at all. This implies that the generalized maxim of false promising [GM] could not function as a universal law and the maxim is internally inconsistent. The categorical imperative requires one to test the moral quality of a maxim by considering whether it is possible to will one’s proposed maxim [M] together with its generalized version [GM]. As we have already seen, [GM] is internally inconsistent: in a world where everyone lied all the time, there could be no promise making. This generates a contradiction in our will because one cannot will to make a lying promise in a world in which there were no promises. This is to conceive of a world in which one has promised, and yet, there are no promises—and this is something which cannot be rationally willed.

Lastly, it is important to note that Kant is not saying that we should ask whether it would be a good or bad thing if everyone did what the man in his example is contemplating. Kant is not a utilitarian. Rather, his point is that the maxim of making false promises cannot be consistently willed with a universalized version of that maxim. There are various ways of interpreting the practical contradiction that arises in this sort of case, but I shall refer to this as a contradiction in conception. One’s proposed maxim cannot be conceived together with its generalized version.

There is a second way in which a maxim might fail the universalizability test, which does not involve a contradiction in conception. Even if one can consistently will one’s maxim together with the universalized version of the maxim, one cannot consistently will this maxim because it conflicts with something else one must will. To illustrate this, consider Kant’s example of someone who, when his own life is flourishing acts on the maxim of simply ignoring those who are in need. Following the steps as outlined about, the rule, or maxim that this person would be following in failing to help others in need may be formulated as follows:

[M] Whenever I am flourishing, I shall give nothing to anyone else in need.

The next step requires the deliberating agent to enquire whether the maxim may be conceived as a universal law

[GM] Whenever anyone is flourishing, then he will give nothing to anyone else in need.

Clearly this maxim can be conceived as a universal law and does not involve any contradiction in conception. A person could consistently will GM and M: it is possible to conceive of this maxim with its generalized form without contradiction. However, Kant says that it is nonetheless irrational to will M. His reasoning seems to go through the following steps. Firstly, insofar as we are rational then we will he means to our ends. Secondly, we are not independent and self-sufficient creatures. We need the help of others achieve some of our ends or the ends of our loved ones, which are our ends insofar as we love them. If one wills M and GM, one would be willing something that goes against us satisfying our ends. But this is irrational—it conflicts with a fundamental principle of rationality So M cannot be rationally willed a universal law of nature, although it can be rationally conceived as a law of nature (Sullivan 1989, 179).

The Categorical Imperative and the Derivation of Duties

Kant argues that the principles of human duty can be justified with reference to the categorical imperative. But moral duties do not bind us in exactly the same way. Kant claims that two sorts of duties may be distinguished: perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties are negative and strict: we simply are forbidden from doing these sorts of actions. Examples of perfect duties include “Thou shall not murder” and “Thou shall not lie.” By contrast, imperfect duties are positive duties: they refer to what we are required to do, rather than refrain from doing. Imperfect duties are not strict in that they do not specify how much we ought to do to. Although one, for example, ought to act beneficently as far as possible, the “as far as possible” is left indeterminate: not every action that fails to measure up is wrong; there is more leeway in meeting one’s imperfect duties.

Kant argues that the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties corresponds to the two possible ways in which a maxim may fail the categorical imperative test. Roughly speaking, as we saw in the last section, a maxim may fail the test by generating a contradiction when conjoined with its universalized form (contradiction in conception), or when conjoined with other maxims which one must will (contradiction in will). The maxim of an action that violates a perfect duty always generates a contradiction in conception. This maxim then specifies a moral rule that is a perfect duty. A maxim that violates an imperfect duty generates a contradiction in will.

In addition to the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, Kant believes that ordinary moral thinking recognizes another basic distinction within our moral duties. This is the distinction between duties to oneself and duties to others. Kant provides four examples to illustrate how the categorical imperative may be used in this fashion to test maxims for moral permissibility, which include specification of perfect duties to self and other, and imperfect duties to self and other (4:422). The examples illustrate that the categorical imperative can be used to generate all commonly recognized duties. Kant’s examples include a perfect duty to ourselves—not to commit suicide—an imperfect duty to ourselves to develop our talents, a perfect duty to others not to lie or make false promises, and an imperfect duty to others of beneficence.

The Categorical Imperative: Other formulae

Kant provided several formulations of the categorical imperative and claimed that they were all equivalent. Commentators disagree about exactly how many distinct formulas Kant recognizes. In addition to the Universal Law of Nature formula discussed above, it is widely agreed that Kant elaborates three others: (2) The Humanity Formula (3) The Autonomy formula and (4) the Kingdom of Ends formula.

In its best known formulation the humanity formula is: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (Gr. 66-67/429). The humanity formula is closely linked with the idea of respecting persons. This formula makes clear one of Kant’s deepest disagreements with consequentialism, which does not place any ‘in principle’ limitations on what it is permissible to do to a person: anything is permitted, so long as the consequences are good enough. In contrast, Kant argues that human beings are ends in themselves, which means that they have value that is intrinsic, absolute, incomparable, and objective. Kant argues that every human agent possesses this sort of ultimate value, and gives it a special name: dignity. When Kant says that human beings are ends in themselves, he means that they have dignity and the appropriate response to dignity is respect. The humanity formula of the categorical imperative prescribes, then, that we respect persons because they possess dignity. We do so by treating persons as ends in themselves, that is, treat them in ways that acknowledge their fundamental value or dignity.

The third formulation of the categorical imperative is “the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law” (4:432). This is not formulated as an imperative, but may be transposed into imperative form as, “Act only in such a way that your maxims could serve as legislations of universal laws.” This formula is closely correlated with the Universal Law formulation but places emphasis on the capacity of rational agents to legislate the moral law. The capacity of rational agents to legislate the law for themselves is at the heart of human dignity.

The fourth, “Kingdom of Ends” formulation of the categorical imperative, states that we must “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends” (4:439). The Kingdom of Ends formulation has proved influential in contemporary debates especially in the political philosophy of John Rawls.

See also

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals New York: Harper and Row, 1964. ISBN 0061311596.
  • Kant, Immanuel. Kant: Critique of Practical Reason. Edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Further Reading

  • Korsgaard, Christine. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press, 1996. ISBN 0521499623.
  • Beck, Lewis White. A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. University of Chicago Press, 1996. ISBN 0226040755
  • O’Neill, Onora. Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1990. ISBN 0521388163
  • O’Neill, Onora. "Kantian Ethics" in A Companion to Ethics. Edited by Peter Singer. Oxford: Blackwell Reference, 1993. ISBN 0631187855.
  • Paton, H. J. The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999. ISBN 0812210239
  • Sullivan, Roger J. Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory. Cambridge University Press, 1989. ISBN 0521369088
  • Sullivan, Roger J. An Introduction to Kant's Ethics. Cambridge University Press, 1994. ISBN 0521467691

External Links

All links retrieved November 30, 2023.

General Philosophy Sources

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