Antinomy

Not to be confused with antimony, a chemical element.

Antinomy (Greek αντι-, against, plus νομος, law) literally means the mutual incompatibility, real or apparent, of two laws. It is a term often used in logic and epistemology, when describing a paradox or unresolvable contradiction.

Historical background

The term antinomy is found in Plutarch (46 – 127), but it became a key philosophical term with Kant. The term was used as a legal term since seventeenth century and it meant a contradiction among laws. Kant adopted this legal term as well as other legal terms and concepts into philosophy. With the term "antinomy," Kant tried to present that the faculty of reason can establish equally sound but incompatible or contradictory claims. With the argument of antinomy, Kant attempted show the limit of the valid use of the capacity of reason.

"Ideas" in Kant's critical works

Kant carried out the critique of the faculty of reason in his three critical works, Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgment. He tried to present the limit of how reason can be used, by presenting antinomy or contradictory claims reason can reach. These critical works dealt with issues on epistemology or theory of knowledge, Ethics, and Aesthetics respectively. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he examined reason as a faculty of knowledge or cognition. In the Critique of Practical Reason, he dealt with reason as a faculty of moral judgment and actions, and in the Critique of Judgment, he examined reason as a faculty of aesthetic judgment. For Kant, critique meant a critical examination of reason as a faculty of judgment. Kant discussed issues of antinomy in all these critical works. Antinomy discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason is, however, best known.

The faculty of reason naturally pursues the unconditioned from the conditioned or the premise from the conclusion. Kant called the unconditioned “Ideas.” There are three Ideas, soul, world, and God.

When we have internal experiences, we try to think the totality of internal experiences and come to have the Idea (in Kantian sense) of the “soul.” Likewise, from experiences we have with external things, we tend to think the totality of the external things and have the Idea of the “world.” Similarly, from experiences we have with particular beings, we are led to think the totality of all beings and think the Idea of God.

For Kant, an object of cognition must have some sensible contents. We, however, tend to mistakenly conceive these Ideas (soul, world, and God) as the objects of cognition. These Ideas are, however, not the objects of cognition since they lack any sensible contents such as colors, shapes, sound, smells, and textures. We cannot see, smell, and touch them unlike other tangible objects. The problem arises, Kant argued, when we take these Ideas as real existence in the same sense that a tangible thing exists. Kant called these mistakenly understood Ideas “transcendental illusion” or “transcendental semblance” (in German, “transzendentaler Schein”).

For Kant, knowledge is the result of constitution of two components: first, sensible contents contents, such as colors and shapes, supplied by things; second, the forms which mind is equipped with such as space, time, quality, quantity, relation, and modality. We impose these categories or forms of mind, which mind has a priori, onto sensible contents we acquire from things outside of us. Human experience or cognition is the result of constitution of these forms of mind and sensible contents coming from outside. These Ideas such as God, soul, and world, are not directly observable and do not have any sensible contents (such as color, shape, smell, etc.), they cannot be an object of cognition. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant examined the mechanism of the process of how we gain experience and presented the limit of what is knowable.

Kant argued that these Ideas are not an element to constitute knowledge. In his phrase, Ideas are not “constitutive principle” (“konstitutives Prinzip”) of knowledge, but they should simply serve as the “regulative principle” (“regulatives Prinzip”) or “heuristic principle” (“heuristisches Prinzip”) that guide our thought.

Kant refused traditional speculative metaphysics which posited these Ideas as existence behind and above phenomena we can experience. Kant was accused of being a “destroyer” of metaphysics for his rejection of traditional metaphysicians' views. Kant denied metaphysicians’ approaches to Ideas but opened a practical approach to them in the sphere of morality. Kant argued that they are not the objects of cognition but they are postulated as necessary elements for moral reasoning.

Four Types of Antinomy in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason

In the section, “Transcendental Dialectic” in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presented four types antinomy.

The First Antinomy

• Thesis: The world is finite in time and space.
• Antithesis: The world is infinite in time and space.

Kant's own formulation in the Critique of Pure Reason:

• Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space.
• Antithesis: The world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space.

(Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Book II, Chapter II, Section 2. Norman Kemp-Smith's translation)

The first antinomy arises for the question of whether the world has the beginning in time or not, and whether it is specially finite or not. Reason can argue for each position but cannot reach any conclusive position. Reason cannot decide and resolve the antinomy.

The Second Antinomy

• Thesis: The world is consisted of indivisible elements.
• Antithesis: The world is not consisted of indivisible elements.

Kant's own formulation in the Critique of Pure Reason:

• Thesis: Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts, and nothing anywhere exists save the simple or what is composed of the simple.
• Antithesis: No composite thing in the world is made up of simple parts, and there nowhere exists in the world anything simple.

(Ibid)

The question is about the divisibility of components of the world. Can we divide the component of the world into such elements as atoms or particles, and further divide into finer components indefinitely? Or do we reach the final component whose further division is impossible?

The Third Antinomy

• Thesis: There is freedom as a causailty in the world.
• Antithesis: There is no freedom and everything in the world takes place according to laws of nature.

Kant's own formulation in the Critique of Pure Reason:

• Thesis: Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.
• Antithesis: There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature.

(Ibid)

If we trace a chain of cause and effect, do we reach the final point called freedom, which is the initial cause of the causal chain? Or do we never reach the final point and the chain of cause and effect continues endlessly? Is there any point outside of causal chain of beings in the universe?

The Fourth Antinomy

• Thesis: There is the absolutely necessary being (such as God) in the causal chain of beings
• Antithesis: There is no absolutely necessary being.

• Thesis: There belongs to the world, either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary.

• Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.

(Ibid)

The question, here, is whether we can suppose the existence of God as the being which necessarily exists. Anselm of Canterbury formulated ontological proof of the existence of God: God is a unique being who exists by its essence. Anselm's was based upon the idea that God is that which "is" or who He "is." Validity of ontological argument had been discussed in the history of philosophy. Kant argued that we cannot settle the argument conclusively through rational arguments. Faculty of reason can make two incompatible claims.

Kant's arguments

Antinomy arises, Kant argued, upon two illegitimate presuppositions we make: first, space and time are forms of existence; second, we do not make a distinction between phenomena and Noumena. For Kant, space and time are not forms of existence but subjective forms of mind. When a man has certain experiences, he or she unconsciously applies these forms of mind in order to organize the experiences. Furthermore, human cognition is limited to the sphere of phenomena which has certain sensible contents. But, things considered in themselves ("noumena" or "things in themselves") without consideration of human cognitive apparatus are, in principle, unknowable. (see Noumenon for further details.)

Antinomy arises when we take space and time as the forms of existing objects which are conceived as forms of "things in themselves" or "noumena." According to Kant, the first two forms of antinomy (Kant called "mathematical antinomy") are both false, and the third and the fourth forms of antinomy (Kant called "dynamic antinomy") are both true.

References

ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

• Al-Azm, J. Sadik Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies Oxford University Press, 1972. ISBN 0198243758 ISBN 978-0198243755
• Bransen, Jan. The Antinomy of Thought: Maimonian Skepticism and the Relation between Thoughts and Objects. Nijhoff international philosophy series, v. 43. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. ISBN 0792313836 ISBN 9780792313830 ISBN 9780792313830 ISBN 0792313836
• F. Paulsen, I. Kant (Eng. trans. 1902), pp. 216 foll.
• Guyer, Paul. Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays. Critical essays on the classics. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003. ISBN 0742514188 ISBN 9780742514188 ISBN 9780742514188 ISBN 0742514188 ISBN 0742514196 ISBN 9780742514195 ISBN 9780742514195 ISBN 0742514196
• H. Sidgwick, Philos. of Kant, lectures x. and xi. (Lond., 1905)
• John Watson, Selections from Kant (trans. Glasgow, 1897), pp. 155 foll.
• Melnick, Arthur. Themes in Kant's Metaphysics and Ethics. Studies in philosophy and the history of philosophy, v. 40. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004. ISBN 0813213711 ISBN 9780813213712 ISBN 9780813213712 ISBN 0813213711
• White, D. Kant's First Antinomy: An Essay in Philosophical Cosmology. University of Edinburgh, 1982.
• Windelband, W. A History of Philosophy. New York: Harper, 1958.

External links

• Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason translated by Norman Kemp Smith. Electronic edition, Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved March 22, 2007. See Book II, Chapter II, Section 2 for issues about Antinomy.
• Kant's Critique of Metaphysics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 22, 2007.

General Philosophy Sources

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Retrieved March 22, 2007.
• The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Retrieved March 22, 2007.
• Philosophy Sources on Internet EpistemeLinks Retrieved March 22, 2007.
• Guide to Philosophy on the Internet Retrieved March 22, 2007.
• Paideia Project Online Retrieved March 22, 2007.
• Project Gutenberg Retrieved March 22, 2007.

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