Altruism

“Psychological altruism” refers to behavior that both benefits others and is undertaken for their benefit. In this sense, altruism is opposed to egoism. Philosophical concerns relating to altruism include whether altruism is in fact possible, that is, whether we ever in fact do act for reasons other than our own best interests.

“Biological altruism” refers to the tendency of some organisms to behave in ways that benefit other creatures at a cost to themselves. Biological altruism is widespread in the natural world. Examples include sterile worker bees devoting their whole lives to caring for their queen, and the “helpers” of certain bird species, who guard the nest and care for the young of other breeding pairs. Altruism is of significance for socio-biology, because its existence is apparently in conflict with basic principles of Darwin’s theory of evolution, which seem to suggest that organisms would not behave in ways that decreased their own reproductive fitness.

Psychological Altruism

Psychological altruism (sometimes called ‘real’ altruism) refers to behavior that benefits others, often at a cost to the agent, which is undertaken for the motive of benefiting others. Behavior benefiting other people is not necessarily altruistic. For example, if one helped out another person with the motive of enhancing one’s own reputation, this behavior would not count as altruistic, but as self-interested.

Psychological altruism is opposed to psychological egoism. Psychological egoism is an empirical hypothesis about human behaviour: it holds that every human has only one ultimate goal: his or her own good (where this good can variously be defined as welfare, happiness or pleasure). Thus, while it allows for action that does not accomplish its goal of maximising self-interest, as well as action that is at odds with one’s intentions (a weak will), most forms of psychological egoism rule out both altruistic behaviour and acting solely out of respect for duty.

One basic philosophical concern relating to altruism is whether it is in fact possible, that is, whether we ever in fact do act for reasons other than our own best interests. Since egoism is opposed to altruism, arguments for psychological egoism are arguments against the possibility of altruism. Psychological egoism is motivated in various ways: Firstly, it is sometimes thought to follow from widespread and frequent observations of self-interested behaviour. Secondly, we often motivate people to act in certain ways by appealing to their self-interest in the form of rewards and punishments, and thirdly, acts appearing altruistic can often be shown to be motivated by self-interest.

In contrast with egoism, psychological altruism says that human beings do sometimes act for the interests of others out of a genuine concern for their well being. Consider an example in which a soldier throws himself on a grenade in order to prevent other people from being killed. His motivation for this act of self-sacrifice might be plausibly a desire to save the other peoples’ lives. This seems to qualify his act as altruistic because he has benefited other people, at great cost to himself, from the motivation of saving their lives.

When faced with examples of altruistic behaviour such as these, egoists may try to defend their position by arguing that the soldier’s action, although it appears to be altruistic, ought to be explained by some more fundamental self-interested motive. Perhaps the soldier believes in an afterlife in which he will be rewarded ten-fold for his apparently selfless act on earth, or perhaps, if he had not hurled himself on the grenade, he would be overcome by guilt and a concomitant sense of self-loathing. In both cases then, he is, at least from his perspective, acting in his self-interest by acting in this apparently selfless manner.

There are two problems with this response. The first is that, while it might explain many instances of apparent self-sacrifice as motivated by egoistic concerns, it does not necessarily cover all cases. The psychological egoist must argue that all instances of ostensible altruistic behaviour are in fact motivated by self-interested desires. If, for instance, our soldier disagrees with this, and claims that his action was truly altruistic in motivation, the egoist must respond that he is lying or is deceiving himself. At this point, however, egoism turns out to be trivially true, which means that it is un-falsifiable, since there is no empirical instance that could in principle disprove the hypothesis; it provides no useful information and therefore fails as an empirical theory.

Psychological altruism in its historical context

All ancient ethical theories are forms of eudaimonism, conceiving of human persons as fundamentally directed towards their individual eudaimonia, or (in its common English translation) happiness. It might seem to follow from this that ancient ethics cannot accommodate altruism, because it conceives of each person as ultimately focused on his or her individual well being.

This appearance may be deceiving, however, because all the main writers—such as Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics—emphasize the importance of civic virtues, such as justice, as essential components of individual eudaimonia. If one conceives of the virtue of justice as involving a disposition to respect the interests of one’s fellow citizens because of one’s regard for the importance of these interests, it is easy to see that someone with the virtue of justice will behave altruistically. Given that the main ancient writers conceive of justice as an indispensable component of the good life, it follows that they also regard altruism as a component in the happy life. On Plato’s version of this idea, the altruistic person, in the sense of the just person, is someone who acquires and preserves a state of psychological harmony, which is necessary (and perhaps sufficient) for the attainment of happiness (Republic).

Although Epicurus is a hedonist and conceives as the good life as the life of maximal pleasure, this is not, necessarily, incompatible with altruism. It is open for Epicurus to argue that practicing justice, and other forms of altruism, are ultimately productive of pleasure. This would be to invoke the commonplace that altruism is often advantageous, when it motivates others to respond in kind. However, it is difficult to see how this could amount to a justification of ‘real altruism’, that is, altruistic behavior undertaken from altruistic motives. Rather, it seems at most to justify acting in ways that appear to be altruistic. Indeed, Epicurus admits that one should abstain from actions that harm others, only in return for a similar undertaking from them. The motivation for adhering to the social contract is thoroughly egoistic.

In the modern period, Thomas Hobbes is generally agreed to have endorsed psychological egoism, and therefore, to have denied the reality of altruism. The strategy of reinterpreting apparently altruistic motives so that they reappear as egoistic (e.g. understanding the soldier’s act of self sacrifice as motivated by a desire for reward in the after life), discussed in the last section, derives from Hobbes. Hobbes’s psychological egoism came under heavy attack by the Earl of Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume. They argue that human beings are capable of altruism, since they naturally have desires for their own good and for that of others (“private good” and “public good”). In the vocabulary of the day, there are principles of benevolence and self-love, where, roughly speaking, benevolence is a desire for the happiness of others, whereas self-love is a desire for one’s own happiness. In this way, Hobbes’ critics tried to show that benevolence, pity and sympathy are as natural as self-love

One of the most sophisticated modern defences of altruism is found in the writings of Joseph Butler. Butler analyses man’s nature into a hierarchy of motivations, and tries to show that self-love cannot be the only element in our motivational system. He argues, against Hobbes, that even though the satisfaction of desires produces pleasure, this does not entail that pleasure is the object of those desires. Taking pleasure in one’s actions is compatible with altruistic motives. That someone experiences pleasure upon helping another person in need does not show that he or she acted in order to attain this pleasure.

Biological altruism

“Biological altruism” refers to the tendency of some organisms to behave in ways that benefit other creatures at a cost to themselves. Biological altruism is widespread in the natural world. Examples include sterile worker bees devoting their whole lives to caring for their queen, and the “helpers” of certain bird species, who guard the nest and care for the young of other breeding pairs. Altruism is of significance for socio-biology, because its existence is apparently in conflict with basic Darwinian principles, which seem to suggest that organisms would not behave in ways that decreased their own reproductive fitness.

Evolutionary biologists are interested in altruism because it seems to contradict certain basic tenets of Darwin’s theory of evolution, or more particularly, his theory of the mechanism of evolution, viz. natural selection. The operation of natural selection may be explained as follows. Imagine that in a population, say a population of horses, an individual is born who possesses a new gene, via mutation or recombination, which results in a new characteristic. Assume too that this characteristic serves to enhance its fitness; i.e., with the characteristic the individual is more likely to survive and reproduce. For example, we might imagine that this gene enables the horse to run faster than its peers so it can better outrun predators; it is therefore more likely to survive longer and to reproduce more. The next generation inheriting the gene will have a competitive advantage, and hence will also be more likely to survive and reproduce. In this way, the “slower” gene will be eliminated from the population of horses, and replaced by the “speedier” gene.

It now is possible to explain how why biological altruism seems in tension with the operations of natural selection. In evolutionary biology, benefit is measured in terms of reproductive fitness, units of heredity, or expected number of offspring. When an organism behaves altruistically, it reduces its own reproductive fitness, and increases the reproductive fitness of other organisms. For example, when the ‘helper birds’ guard the nest of another breeding pair, they make it more likely that they will be killed by predators, and more likely that the offspring of other breeding pairs will survive. Consequently, they make it less likely that they will pass on their own altruistic genes in comparison with other birds that do not display similar altruism. So it seems that natural selection ought to favour selfish birds, and to eliminate altruists from the genetic pool. Given the mechanism of natural selection, we should not expect altruism to occur in nature.

There are various attempts to reconcile the existence of biological altruism with the mechanics of natural selection. Firstly, as Darwin himself pointed out, if natural selection operates not only at the individual level but also at the level of groups, then altruistic behaviour may be expected. Altruistic behaviour could make a group more likely to survive even if the individual’s reproductive fitness is diminished. However, one notable difficulty with Darwin’s group selection explanation of altruism is the problem of ‘subversion from within’. Imagine that in a group of birds with altruistic genes, one mutant bird with selfish genes is born. This selfish bird will be a ‘free rider’ because it will have an advantage in reproductive fitness in virtue of the altruism of the other birds. Consequently, its selfish gene is more likely to be reproduced, and, over time, we should expect selfish mutant genes to dominate over the altruistic gene.

Two other attempts to reconcile the existence of altruism with natural selection are “kin selection” theories, and theories of “reciprocal altruism”. According to the “kin selection” theory, altruists will not necessarily be at a reproductive disadvantage if they are careful about how they direct their altruism. If they behave altruistically only toward their relatives (kin), they will enhance the likelihood that their genes continue, because their relatives have the same genes as they do. This explains how the altruistic gene can perpetuate itself. Altruistic genes reduce the reproductive fitness of individuals, but increase the fitness of their kin, who carry the same (altruistic) genes as they do.

“Kin selection” theories do not explain all instances of altruistic behaviour found in nature because some creatures behave altruistically toward non-relatives. It is here that the theory of “reciprocal altruism” provides a more general explanation for biological altruism. The basic idea underlying “reciprocal altruism” is a simple one: “if you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours”. Altruistic genes may not be eliminated by natural selection if altruistic behaviour makes it more likely that other creatures will respond in kind. The loss in reproductive fitness due to altruistic behaviour is compensated by the increase in reciprocal behaviour of those creatures that are inclined to ‘return the favour’.

What is the relation between psychological and biological altruism? Biological altruism emphasizes actual benefit, and not the conscious motives for which altruistic behavior is undertaken. This distinguishes it from psychological altruism, since benefit-bringing behavior performed for non-altruistic motives does not entail for psychological altruism. Conversely, an action done with a conscious altruistic motive may not actually enhance or diminish reproductive potential at all. Therefore, psychological altruism does not entail biological altruism. Psychological and biological altruism are logically independent concepts.

References and further reading

Psychological altruism

• Butler, Jospeh. (1900). Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel. In The Works of Bishop Butler. J. H. Bernard (ed.). London: Macmillan. Available online at: http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/3150 [See Sermons I and XI for responses to Hobbes’ version of exclusive egoism]
• Hobbes, Thomas. (1651). Leviathan. Michael Oakeshott (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell. Available online at: http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/3207 [A classical account of psychological egoism and ethical egoism]
• Hume, David. (1975). An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. In Enquiries. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [See Appendix II for an elegant criticism of psychological egoism]
• Kavka, Gregory. (1986). Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [A partial defense of Hobbesian ethical and political theory. See pp. 64-80 for an explication of predominant egoism]
• Long, A.A., and D.N. Sedley, ‘’The Hellenistic Philosophers’’, vol 1 and 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)
• Nagel, Thomas. (1970). The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Plato, ‘’Plato's Complete Works’’, John M. Cooper, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997).
• Slote, Michael Anthony. (1964). “An Empirical Basis for Psychological Egoism”. In Journal of Philosophy 61: 530-537.

Biological altruism

• Darwin, C., 1859, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, London: John Murray.
• Darwin, C., 1871, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, New York: Appleton
• Dawkins, R., 1976, The Selfish Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Dawkins, R., 1979, ‘Twelve Misunderstandings of Kin Selection’, Zeitschrift fur Tierpsychologie, 51: 184-200
• Hamilton, W. D., 1970, ‘Selfish and Spiteful Behaviour in an Evolutionary Model’, Nature, 228: 1218-1220
• Hamilton, W. D., 1972, ‘Altruism and Related Phenomena, mainly in the Social Insects’, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 3: 193-232.
• Maynard Smith, J., 1964, ‘Group Selection and Kin Selection’, Nature, 201: 1145-1147
• Maynard Smith, J., 1998, ‘The Origin of Altruism’, Nature, 393: 639-640
• Singer, Peter. (1982). The Expanding Circle. New York: New American Library. [A discussion of the relevance of sociobiology to egoism]
• Sober, E. and Wilson D.S., 1998, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
• Sober, E., 1988, ‘What is Evolutionary Altruism?’, in New Essays on Philosophy and Biology (Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp. Vol. 14), B. Linsky and M. Mathen (eds.), Calgary: University of Calgary Press

Fiction and Popular Literature

A selection of literature in popular culture dealing with egoism and altruism:

• Clavell, James. (1962). King Rat. London: Martin Joseph; Delta, 1999. ISBN 0385333765
• Lavey, Anton Szandor, Gilmore, Peter H. (1969). The Satanic Bible. Avon; Reissue edition, 1969. ISBN 0380015390
• Rand, Ayn. (1957). Atlas Shrugged. New York: Signet; 35th Anniv edition, 1996. ISBN 0451191145
• Rand, Ayn. (1964). The Virtue of Selfishness. New York: Signet; Reissue edition, 1964. ISBN 0451163931

External links

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Egoism
• The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Egoism

General Philosophy Sources

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Philosophy Sources on Internet EpistemeLinks
• Guide to Philosophy on the Internet
• Paideia Project Online
• Project Gutenberg