Theodicy

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Theodicy is a specific branch of theology and philosophy that attempts to solve the problem of evil, which is the problem of reconciling the observed existence of evil in the world with the assumption of the existence of a God who is fully good (or benevolent) as well as powerful. Any attempt to reconcile the co-existence of evil and God may thus be called a "theodicy".

Origin of the Term

The term theodicy comes from the Greek θεός (theós, "god") and δίκη (díkē, "justice"), meaning literally "the justice of God." The term was coined in 1710 by the German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz in a work entitled Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal ("essay of theodicy about the benevolence of God, the free will of man, and the origin of evil"). The purpose of the essay was to show that the evil in the world does not conflict with the goodness of God, and that notwithstanding its many evils, the world is the best of all possible worlds.

The Problem of Evil

The problem of evil for theists consists in the existence of a contradiction amongst the following three statements or claims integral and central to them:

• 1) that God is omnipotent;
• 2) that God is fully good (or loving, or benificent); and
• 3) that evil and suffering exist in the world.

For how can an omnipotent and fully good God create such an evil world?

If it can be shown that one of those statements is false, however, then the "problem" of contradiction disappears. Consequently, nearly all traditionally received theistic theodicies can be understood as attempts to reconcile those statements, arguing that one or another of those statements is false in some essential or important way. Therefore, there are three major types of traditional theodicies: 1) a first type, which denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God; 2) a second one, which denies or qualifies the goodness of God; and 3) a third type, denying or qualifying the reality of revil.

But, these received theodicies have been criticized more recently by some insightful thinkers. There are two points of criticism. Frist, these traditional theodicies are merely logical attempts to solve the contradiction of the three statements, without offering any real solution for the actual removal of evil; evil is still there. Second, when they merely attempt to logically solve the contradiction, their treatments of the omnipotence and goodness of God, whether they affirm or deny these divine attributes, are rather simplistic, external, and superficial, without being able to understand the nature of God any further. So, those who are critical towards the traditional types of theodicies go beyond the superficial level of logically addressing the contradiction of the three statementsare; without even seeing any contradiction amongst the three statements, they rather attempt to find a solution on a different horizen, and their new solutions tend to be more insightful

Antitheistic Responses

Before we deal with the traditional theistic theodicies, it would be useful to know David Hume's celebrated antitheistic response in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) because it was basically the above-mentioned contradiction of the three theistic statements that led him to be antitheistic. According to him, the reality of evil is undeniable because in the world we can see "four circumstances" on which evil depends: 1) that pain motivates creatures to action; 2) that laws of nature cause collision, drowning, burning, etc.; 3) that man is so fragile for perseverance; and 4) that rain, wind, heat, etc. in nature are excessive. This is logically "incomaptible" with an omnipotent and fully good God. So, we have to believe that God does not exist. This is usually called the "logical argument from evil." It has been followed by philosophers such as J. L. Mackie and H. J. McCloskey, who argue that all traditional theodicies are defective.

A little less straightforward than the logical argument is the "evidential argument from evil," which contends that evil is evidence against the likelihood of God's existence. According to William Rowe, for example, the fact of gratuitous evil, which is more than necessary for the potential use of evil, makes it unlikely that God exists.

Three Major Traditional Theodicies

There are three major kinds of traditional theodicies: 1) finitism, which denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God in the context of dualism; 2) despotism, which denies or qualifies the goodness of God, because of its belief that God's absolute sovereignty makes him look evil to humans; and 3) a third kind, denying or qualifying the reality of evil.

Finitism: God is not omnipotent

Finitism denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God and says that the finite God cannot avoid evil. It takes various forms of dualism. Some religions such as Zoroastrianism, Gnosticism, and Manichaeism presented the cosmic dualism of God and Satan. Plato and Aristotle were of the metaphysical dualism of God (or Demiurge) and prime matter (or Receptacle), where God is finite because he must have recorse to prime matter for the constitution of the world. Nikolai Berdyaev and Alfred North Whitehead suggested the mystical dualism of God and Uncreated Freedom (or Creativity), where God is finite because of the pre-existent principle of Uncreated Freedom. The American Methodist philosopher Edgar Brightman suggested a unique kind of finitism with his internal dualism of form and matter within God, where his power is restrained because of form. Finitism sometimes entails the so-called "free will defense" of God because it gives free will to humans in the context of God's finitude. But this free will defense based on finitism is not the same as the more insightful free will defense proposed by the American philosopher Alvin Plantinga to be treated below.

Despotism: God is not fully good

This type of theodicy can be seen in staunch Calvinism, and it presupposes the absolute sovereignty of God. God is so sovereign that, although he may be a good God, he is not wholly good. God is also the active creator and instigator of all sin and evil, including the fall, using these as instruments to accomplish his plan. Satan, thus, is considered to have no power of his own but is merely God's puppet. An important part of staunch Calvinism is the belief in the absolute predestination of all things by God, i.e., nothing happens unless God actively makes something happen. Whatever is is right, as long as God wills it. So, there can be no such thing as a problem of evil. In this view, humans have no free will. But, they will still be held responsible for whatever sins they commit because God has decided to judge them by his laws.

Besides this Calvinist despotism, so-called "maltheism," the view that God is evil, also solves the problem of evil by attributing evil to God. But, maltheism is quite diffrent from Calvinism because it says that God is simply evil himself without being necessarily despotic.

Evil is not real

• Evil as "non-being"

The non-being theme of evil started from St. Augustine, who as a Neoplatonic Christian regarded all being as good, thus referring to evil as non-being. Critiquing the Manichean dualism, which he used to adhere to, he asserted that the universe, including matter, and its unique Creator God are unambiguously good. Evil, therefore, is non-being (non esse). It is the privation, corruption, or perversion of something that was previously or otherwise good. Evil has no substantial being in itself, but is always parasitic upon good. Evil entered the universe through the culpable free actions of otherwise good beings — angels and humans. Sin consisted not in choosing evil (because there was no evil to choose) but in turning away from the higher good of God to a lower good. Natural evils (see below) were held by Augustine to be consequences of the fall too, and thus also consequences of human or angelic free will. When we ask what caused man to fall, Augustine answers through his doctrine of deficient causation. In his view, there is no positive cause of evil will, but rather a negation of deficiency. Augustine seems to mean by this that free volitions are, in principle, inexplicable — free willing is itself an originating cause, with no prior cause or explanation.

This Augustinian definition of evil as the privation of good (privatio boni) can be seen also in St. Thoams Aquinas. It constites much of the Christian tradition on the subject of evil.

There are other ways of saying that evil is non-existent. According to Spinoza's pantheism, there is no evil in the world which is divine. Mary Baker Eddy, founder of Christian Science, regarded evil simply as illusion, echoing the Hindu and Buddhist views. Using relational logic and not theology, Canadian Baha’i mathematician William Hatcher has argued that evil is bot absolute but simply "less good" than good.

• Aesthetic conception of evil

Augustine additionally held to what we can call the aesthetic conception of evil, and it can be still another important way of saying that evil is not real. It is a view derived from the principle of plenitude in Plato's Timaeus 41 b-c. That principle holds that a universe in which all possibilities are being realized — a universe containing lower and lesser, as well as higher and greater things — is greater than a universe that contains only the highest type(s) of things. Lower beings thus are not evil as such, but merely different and lesser goods. According to that view, what appears to be evil is such only when seen in an isolated or limited context, but when viewed in the context of the totality of the universe it is good because it is a necessary element in that good universe.

This was held less philosophically by many believers and theologians such as John Calvin who asserted that all events are part of God's righteous plan, and therefore although they may involve evil in themselves, they are intended by God for morally justified purposes.

Theodicies on a Different Horizen

The above three types of received theodicies are merely logical attempts to solve the contradiction amongst the three statements of the omnipotence of God, the goodness of God, and the reality of evil, by denying or qualifying one or another of them. But these theodicies cannot offer any real solution for the actual removal of evil; evil is still there. Also, they seem to treat God's attributes such as divine omnipotence and goodness rather simplistically and superficially, without being able to have any deeper insights into God's nature. All this is due to the logical nature of these theodicies. (The antitheistic arguments against God's existence from evil cannot eradicate evil, either. Nor can they perhaps have any deeper insights into the naturer of God, either; so, they end up rejecting God's existence.)

So, more profound theodicists do not want to stay with the logical level of removing the contradiction of the three basic statements. To them, the logical contradiction does not matter. They do not even see it. They rather attempt to find a solution at a different level with the result that they increasingly see the possibility of knowing the true nature of God and the possibility of eventual eradication of evil.

The Book of Job: evil as a mystery of faith

The theodicy of the Book of Job is a good start because it suggests that the apparent contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God should not be handled logically but faithfully. In spite of his initial complaint to the Lord and to his "comforters" that his sufferings have been inflicted on him unjustly, Job finally accepted the difficult situation by repentance and faith, when he was confronted by the overwhelming greatness and wisdom of God. This attitude of faithfully accepting it and not logically explaining it away can at least help open a new possibility of knowing the nature of God deeply. Also, evil somehow disappears in the end: "And the Lord restored the fortune of Job, when he had prayed for his friends; and the Lord gave Job twice as much as he had before" (Job 42:10).

John Hick: the world as vale of "soul-making"

The British philosopher of religion John Hick is not interested in any logical solution of the contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God. Instead, his starting point is his deeper understanding and conviction of God's love of agape expressed in the life and work of Jesus Christ. This love of God, says Hick, is supposed to be completely realized in our personal relationships with him eventually. The reality of evil should be interpreted in view of this eschatological realization of God's love. If so, the world in which we really experience moral and natural evil can help us to grow to reach a point at which we enjoy our personal relationships with God. Thus, the world is vale for "soul-making."

The process of growth might involve moral evil because humans are imperfect. But from its undesirable outcomes they can learn about becoming better through their more responsible decisions. They can eventually become perfect creatures without moral evil only by going through "a hazardous adventure in individual freedom." And this freedom was given them because of God's love. Even the natural harshness of our environment apart from human sin was given to humans out of the love of God, so that they may be able to grow through hunting, agriculture, and construction of shelter. This way, natural evil also will be gradually overcome. What is interesting is Hick's suggestion that if our eschatological goal of experiencing our personal relationships with God is not realized on earth, then it should be realized in the other world eventually.

According to Hick, his theodicy is of the "Irenaean" type, given the view of St. Irenaeus (c. 125-202 C.E.) that the pre-fall Adam was more like a child than a mature and responsible adult, i.e., that Adam stood at the beginning of a long process of development because although he had been created in the "image" of God, he had to develop into the "likeness" of God.

Alvin Plantinga: the free will defense

According to the American philosopher Alvin Plantinga, it has never been shown logically impossible that God allows evil for a good purpose. So, there is no contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God. Plantinga thus accepts the omnipotence of God in his treatment of the problem of evil. Therefore, his free will defense, which says that God has endowed humans with free will, not only defends God from being held responsible for their evil choices; it also defends the omnipotence of God. So, Plantinga's position is to be distinguished from some versions of finitism (such as Whitehead's and open theism's finitism) which give free will to humans to the neglect of divine omnipotence. What is important is his belief that there may conceivably be a good long-term purpose of God for which the evil choices of free humans are temporarily permitted. The purpose of God is to have "the greater good of having created persons with free will with whom he could have relationships and who are able to love one another and do good deeds," although there may possibly be their evil choices. This seems to be a profound insight.

Plantinga's free will defense has been criticized by Antony Flew and J. L. Mackie, who argue that such a God is still responsible because he has not created the world in which free human beings always in fact freely make right choices, and that such a God, therefore, is not omnipotent. To this, Plantinga has responded that although there may be such a fantastic world as a possibility, there also may not possibly be any such world. For what happens in this world in terms of choosing evil would happen in any other possible world. Humans suffer from what he calls "transworld depravity." Also, God is still omnipotent, because divine omnipotence does not include the power to do what is logically impossible.

Perhaps Plantinga's position may not give much hope for the eventual removal of evil. Hence, one recent, friendly response from Daniel Howard-Snyder and John O'Leary-Hawthorne regarding this. They claim that the possibility of all persons being transworld depraved cannot be supported. After all, there is another prima facie possibility that all persons are in fact transworld sanctified (and so would do no wrong). So, Plantinga's argument should be repaired in order to incorporate this other possibility as well. Even so, Plantinga's original understanding of the reason why God has given us free will in spite of possible evil can be appreciated.

Richard Kropf: evil within an evolutionary natural order

Somewhat similar to Hick's position is the American Roman Catholic priest Richard Kropf's treatment of evil in the context of evolution, although Kropf adds at least two more things in the discussion: the suffering of God during the process of growth and the eventual redemption of non-human parts of the world as well as humans. Kropf specifically criticizes the traditional theodicies, by saying that they failed because they "simplified the problem" by tryng to only address the logical contradiction between evil and an omnipotent and good God. He therefore maintains that the four "stubborn factors" that cannot be denied — 1) an omnipotent and good God, 2) the reality of evil, 3) human freedom and responsibility, and 4) the world in growth and evolution — can all be related to one another without contradiction, if they are centered on a key notion: the process of evolution. This approach, according to him, helps to "unlock the secrets of reality, including the problem of evil, on a much broader scale." It is in this context that he suggests a newer understanding of God, which is that the God of compassionate love suffers over the miseries humans go through as a result of their evil choices in theie rvolutionary process of growth. He also newly suggests to include non-human creatures as part of the eventual redemption of the whole cosmos through Christ.

Kenneth Surin: the "practical" approach

The British theologian Kenneth Surin is still another thinker to stay away from the traditional theodicies that "theoretically" explain away evil without being able to make "practical" efforts to remove it. Another problem of the traditional theodicies, says Surin, is their adherence to the

Other Stuff to Be Organized yet

Satan as the Origin of Evil

In some accounts of the origin of evil, Satan (or a demon or a fallen Lucifer) figures prominently as the seducer or deceiver of humans, and the primary onus or responsibility for the origin of evil is supposed to rest with that being. For some Jews and some Christians, that view comes at least partly from an interpretation of Genesis 3:1-7; in this interpretation the “serpent” of Genesis is Satan, and Satan’s seduction is the cause of the Fall of Adam and Eve, and thus of the introduction of evil into the world and human life. Some commentators – Augustine among them – even attribute natural evil to this primordial Fall.

Lloyd Eby has claimed that attributing the origin of evil to Satan does not solve the problem of theodicy, but merely pushes it back one stage to an investigation of why Satan was evil or chose evil, and doing that reintroduces all the received problems of theodicy. Eby has also claimed that Satan was a victim, in a similar way to Adam and Eve, of circumstances not of their own making, but instead set up by God.

Unless one rejects Statement 2 and holds to a cosmic dualism in which there were two beings – a good and an evil one, or a principle of light and a principle of darkness, or God and Satan – existing primordially from the beginning, Satan had to be a being who came originally from God or was created by God. Thus Satan is not the ultimate cause of whatever characteristics, deficiencies, desires, and impulses that were present within him and that led to his falling or seducing man into evil. If one holds that God creates only good things and not some evil ones – as nearly all devout creationist views do hold – then the conclusion must be that the being who became Satan must have been originally good, meaning that somehow the being who became Satan fell into evil or sin. Thus, in most devout views on this question, Satan was originally created good by God but fell into evil.

Anselm discusses the fall of Satan and tries to account for it on the basis of a distorted will. He tries to use this as a means of putting the onus for Satan’s fall on Satan himself and not on God. Anslem discusses this problem in terms of whether Satan was given the perseverance and a will to resist evil. According to Anselm, God gave Satan a will and perseverance sufficient for him to avoid the fall, but Satan nevertheless fell. So Anslem asserts that it was Satan’s failure to receive, and not God’s failure to give, that caused the problem.

Eby has asked whether Anselm’s answer really accomplishes the goal of removing the onus of Satan’s fall from God. Eby states that it seems false to say that Satan was given a sufficient will and perseverance to avoid falling – as Anslem tries to claim – because the fact that Satan fell seems to show that he did not have a will and a perseverance sufficient to resist falling. Eby observes that if Satan had possessed a will and perseverance sufficient to avoid falling, then he would not have fallen, and he goes on to say that since the will and perseverance Satan actually possessed were given to him by God, this must imply that God did not give him a will and perseverance sufficient to resisting the temptation to fall. Moreover, Eby adds that if, as Anselm says, God offered but Satan did not receive, this means that God did not give Satan a sufficient desire and will to receive, so the ultimate fault seems to rest with God and not Satan.

Hindu answers to the problem of evil

Hindu philosophers, especially those from the Vedanta school, have also attempted to craft solutions to the problem of evil. The whole notions of karma and reincarnation were possible explanations - that is, bad things happen to good people because they have been reincarnated in a lesser place due to their misdeeds in previous incarnations (which they cannot remember). Shri Madhvacharya, with his beliefs of dualism, has crafted his own solutions to the problem of evil that persists in spite of an all-loving omnipotent supreme Being.

Existential Theodicy

Most theodicies have offered philosophical and theological attempts to deal directly with the problem(s). There is at least one additional approach that we might call an "existential" one. One of the best sources for such an approach occurs in Dostoyevsky's novel, The Brothers Karamazov and in various commentaries on that novel, especially that of Albert Camus in his book The Rebel.

The existential problem is whether rebellion against God may be preferable to union with God, even if this rebellion leads to damnation.

The indictments against God in Dostoyevsky's novel occur primarily in Ivan's speech in a long conversation with his brother Alyosha. He gives many harrowing and heartrending stories of the mistreatment and suffering of innocent children, so that Alyosha — a novice in a religious order — agrees that he too would want the perpetrators of these injustices shot. Ivan jumps on this admission and declares that it shows that the world is absurd. Moreover, Ivan demands retribution here on earth and not in some infinite time or space — i.e. he rejects an eschatological solution to the problem. He rejects the view that there is some higher harmony that this serves, meaning that he rejects the aesthetic conception of evil. He ends by saying, "It's not God that I don't accept, Alyosha, only I most respectfully return Him the ticket." Alyosha tries to protest that Christ — because he gave his innocent blood for all and anything — is the Being on whom a foundation for the edifice of justice and forgiveness is constructed, but Ivan rejects this possibiliy in the chapter entitled "The Grand Inquisitor."

In his comments, Camus noted that Ivan's rebellion goes beyond that of previous more-or-less individualistic rebels against God, goes beyond reverential blasphemy, and puts God Himself on trial. Camus wrote, "If evil is essential to divine creation, then creation is unacceptable. Ivan will no longer have recourse to this mysterious God, but to a higher principle — namely, justice. He launches the essential undertaking of rebellion, which is that of replacing the reign of grace by the reign of justice." (From The Rebel. Trans. by Anthony Bower.)

Dostoyevsky's response to Ivan's indictments is not a direct philosophical or theological argument, but occurs primarily in the contrast in the novel between the two priests, Father Ferapont and Father Zosima — in fact, Dostoyevsky himself saw Ivan's indictments and the accounts of the two monks as pro and contra on this issue of divine goodness or evil. (That's why we can call this an existential theodicy.)

Father Ferapont possessed the trappings of genuine religion and spirituality — fierce asceticism, fervent prayer, wearing chains under his robes to mortify his flesh — but nevertheless spread discord and dissension among the monks. Father Zosima, however — although he did not exhibit those signs of spirituality of Ferapont — nevertheless spreads dignity, blessings, counsel to the ordinary people, and well-being to all. He has a strong sense of the mystery of faith, as well as good humor and good feeling for all. He recommends to Alyosha that he leave the monastery and marry — suggesting that he realized that intimacy is one of the primary paths to good faith and true spirituality. Ivan goes mad in the end, but those who follow the way of life of Father Zosima undergo inner transformation to a higher state of consciousness and way of life.

Through this novel Dostoyevsky shows the consequences of rebellion against God and the divinely-created cosmos, as well as an alternative, and does it in what we could call a thought experiment in novelistic form. Thus this work can be understood as a special kind of theodicy.

The problem of evil

Some have argued that the predetermined goal of theodicy (that of justifying the existence of God with the existence of evil) tarnishes any aspirations it might have to be a serious philosophical discipline because an intellectual pursuit having a predefined goal and preassumed conclusions cannot be deemed in any reasonable way to be methodical, scientific, or rational. Should we respect an inquiry whose goal is not to find out the truth, but to prove by any means possible that a particular thing reasonably doubted (Bayle and all who follow him) is true? Proceeding from the proposition to be shown to find a proof of that proposition invites confirmation bias on the part of the theorist.

Others argue that theodicy begins with a hypothesis about God, God's nature, and the observable facts about the world, and then tests the hypothesis to see if the hypothesis can be reconciled with experience and reason. Theodicy, according to that view, is a reasonable attempt to reconcile the hypothesised existence of God, along with the characteristics this God is presumed to have (i.e. being both all good and all powerful), with the perceived existence of evil. While theodicy cannot prove the existence of God, it can make belief in God reasonable by showing that the existence of God is not necessarily incompatible with the existence of evil. On the other hand, unlike in mathematics, in a philosophical project like a theodicy it is difficult to say what precisely constitutes a valid logical step, and though one proponent of a theodicy may be convinced of its rigour, another person may find it logically weak or reject some of its assumptions. For this reason, theodicies tend to be controversial, even among theists.

Natural Evil

Many philosophers make a distinction between what is usually called "moral evil" and what is usually called "natural evil." Moral evil is evil that results from human action and agency, and includes such things as murder, war, theft, rape, fraud, lying, and adultery. Natural evil is evil that does not involve human agency or choice, but results from what are sometimes called "acts of God." This includes natural events such as tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, hurricanes, and other natural events that kill thousands of children and other innocent people. It also includes plagues and diseases such as smallpox, typhus, malaria, polio, influenza and other sicknesses that also kill thousands of people.

The free will defense, if successful, works only for moral evils; it does not work at all well for natural evils, despite Augustine's claim otherwise. In addition, the existence of natural evils implies that the creation made by God cannot be wholly good, at least not in any simple way. Thus the idea of "natural evil" poses another complication in the development of theodicy.

Anti-Theodicy and Ad Hominem Attacks

Some efforts to deal with the problem of theodicy amount to ad hominem attacks on those who attempt to raise and deal with the issue. Those attacks take some form of "Who are you, unworthy creature, to think that you have the ability or authority to challenge God and ask questions of or about Him in this way?" (Interestingly enough, the two places in the Bible where the problem of theodicy is dealt with directly, in Job 39 through 41, and in Romans 9: 14-21, the answers given are of that form, namely "You, human, are unworthy to question God and his ways; God is higher and more powerful than you and He can do as He pleases.")

The late Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder wrote an unfinished essay entitled "Trinity Versus Theodicy: Hebraic Realism And The Temptation To Judge God" (1996). This can be understood as a subtle version of the ad hominem approach to the problem of theodicy.

Yoder argues that "if God be God" then theodicy is an oxymoron and idolatry. Yoder is not opposed to attempts to reconcile the existence of a God with the existence of evil; rather, he is against a particular approach to the problem. He does not "deny that there are ways in which forms of discourse in the mode of theodicy may have a function, subject to the discipline of a wider setting."

Yoder was deeply concerned and engaged with the problem of evil; specifically, the evil of violence and war and how we resist it. Yoder's "case [is] against garden variety 'theodicy' "— in particular, theodicy as a judgment or defense of God.

Yoder asks:

• a) Where do you get the criteria by which you evaluate God? Why are the criteria you use the right ones?
• b) Why [do] you think you are qualified for the business of accrediting Gods?
• c) If you think you are qualified for that business, how does the adjudication proceed? [W]hat are the lexical rules?

Yoder's argument is against theodicy, strictly speaking. This is the narrow sense Zachary Braiterman mentions in (God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and Change in Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought (1998). He writes, "Theodicy is a familiar technical term, coined by the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to mean 'the justification of God.' " In his book, Braiterman coins the term "antitheodicy" meaning "refusing to justify, explain, or accept" the relationship between "God (or some other form of ultimate reality), evil, and suffering."

Braiterman uses the term "in order to account for a particular religious sensibility, based (in part) on fragments selectively culled from classical Jewish texts, that dominates post-Holocaust Jewish thought." Braiterman asserts, "Although it often borders on blasphemy, antitheodicy does not constitute atheism; it might even express stubborn love that human persons have for God. After all, the author of a genuine antitheodic statement must believe that an actual relationship subsists between God and evil in order to reject it; and they must love God in order to be offended by that relationship."

Two of the Jewish post-Shoah thinkers that Braiterman cites as antitheodicists (Emil Fackenheim and Richard Rubinstein) are also cited by Yoder. Yoder describes their approach as "the Jewish complaint against God, dramatically updated (and philosophically unfolded) since Auschwitz ... The faithful under the pogrom proceed with their prayers, after denouncing JHWH/Adonai for what He has let happen." Yoder sees this as a valid form of discourse in the mode of theodicy but he claims it is "the opposite of theodicy."

Bibliography

There are a large number of works on the topic of theodicy. Here are some of them:

• Anselm, Du Casu Diaboli. English ed.: Anselm of Canterbury, Truth Freedom and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues, trans. and ed. by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Harper Torchbooks, 1967.
• Camus, Albert, The Rebel. Trans. by Anthony Bower. New York: Knopf, 1956.
• Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, The Brothers Kamarazov, ed. By Ralph E. Matlaw. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976.
• Eby, Lloyd, “The Problem of Evil and the Goodness of God,” in Antony J. Guerra, ed., Unification Theology in Comparative Perspectives. Barrytown, NY: Unification Theological Seminary, 1988.
• Farrer, Austin, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961.
• Griffin, David Ray, God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976
• Hartshorne, Charles, Omnipotence and other Theological Mistakes. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 1984.
• Hick, John, Evil and the God of Love. London: Macmillan, 2nd. ed., 1977.
• --------, “The Problem of Evil,” in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8 vols. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc & The Free Press, 1967. Vol. 3: 136-141.
• Hoitenga, Dewey J., Jr. “Logic and the Problem of Evil," American Philosophical Quarterly IV (1967)
• Madden, Edward H, and Peter H. Hare, Evil and the Concept of God. Springfield IL: Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, 1968.
• --------, “Evil and Inconclusiveness, Sophia XI (1972)
• Penelhum, Terence, “Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil," Religious Studies II (1966)
• Pike, Nelson, ed., God and Evil. Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964
• --------, “God and Evil: A Reconsideration,” Ethics LXVIII (1958).
• Plantinga, Alvin, God and Other Minds. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967.

External links

• Christian Cadre, Theodicy
• Stanford Encyclopedia: Problem of Evil
• Stanford Encyclopedia: Leibniz on the Problem of Evil
• Evidential Arguments from Evil
• Project Gutenburg: Leibniz, Theodicy (English translation)

General Philosophy Sources

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Philosophy Sources on Internet EpistemeLinks
• Guide to Philosophy on the Internet
• Paideia Project Online
• Project Gutenberg