Tariff

Definitions

A tariff is a tax on foreign goods upon importation. When a ship arrives in port a customs officer inspects the contents and charges a tax according to the tariff formula. Since the goods cannot be landed until the tax is paid it is the easiest tax to collect, and the cost of collection is small. Smugglers of course seek to evade the tariff. Tariffs may be of various kinds:

• An "ad valorem tariff" is a percentage of the value of the item, say 10 cents on the dollar
• A "specific tariff" does not relate to the value of the imported goods but to its weight, volume, surface, etc. The specific duty stipulates how many units of currency are to be levied per unit of quantity (e.g. US$2 per kg).

and have various intended purpose:

• A "revenue tariff" is a set of rates designed primarily to raise money for the government. A tariff on coffee imports, for example (imposed by countries where coffee cannot be grown) raises a steady flow of revenue.
• A "protective tariff" is intended to artificially inflate prices of imports and "protect" domestic industries from foreign competition (see also effective rate of protection). For example, a 50% tax on an imported machine that raises the price from $100 to $150. Without a tariff the local manufacturers could only charge $100 for the same machine; now they can charge $149 and make the sale.
• A "prohibitive tariff" is one so high that no one imports any of that item.

The distinction between protective and revenue tariffs is subtle: protective tariffs in addition to protecting local producers also raise revenue; revenue tariffs produce revenue but they also offer some protection to local heroes.

An import tariff or import duty is a schedule of duties imposed by a country on imported goods. It is paid at a border or port of entry to the relevant government to allow a good to pass into that government's territory. In medieval and ancient times, such tariffs were even collected by local governments. Now this is very rare. Typically they are collected by national governments or, in a customs union, by the regional authority.

The tariff can be levied on a percentage of the value of the import, or the amount of the import (amount per unit of import). Tariffs are traditionally designed to raise revenue for the government, however they can also be for;

• Reducing the level of imports by making them more expensive relative to domestic substitutes (this lowers a balance of trade deficit).
• To counter the practice of dumping by raising the import price of the dumped good to market level.
• To retaliate against trade barriers imposed by another country, a trade war.
• To protect key industries such as agriculture, such as the European Union has done with its Common Agricultural Policy.
• To protect a new industry until it is sufficiently well established to compete on the international market.

In the United States and other countries, import tariffs are controversial, and the World Trade Organization has attempted to minimize them. In the United Kingdom, import tariffs were abolished by Harold Macmillan's Conservative government in 1959, a method which arguably did much to increase American cultural influence in the UK.

Tax, tariff and trade rules in modern times are usually set together because of their common impact on industrial policy, investment policy, and agricultural policy. A trade bloc is a group of allied countries agreeing to minimize or eliminate tariffs against trade with each other, and possibly to impose protective tariffs on imports from outside the bloc. A customs union has a common external tariff, and, according to an agreed formula, the participating countries share the revenues from tariffs on goods entering the customs union.

If a country's major industries lose to foreign competition, the loss of jobs and tax revenue can severely impair parts of that country's economy. Protective tariffs have been used as a measure against this possibility. However, protective tariffs have disadvantages as well. The most notable is that they increase the price of the good subject to the tariff, disadvantaging consumers of that good or manufacturers who use that good to produce something else: for example a tariff on food can increase poverty, while a tariff on steel can make automobile manufacture less competitive. They can also backfire if countries whose trade is disadvantaged by the tariff impose tariffs of their own, resulting in a trade war and disadvantaging both sides.

There are two main ways of implementing a tariff:

• An ad valorem tariff is a fixed percentage of the value of the good that is being imported. Sometimes these are problematic as when the international price of a good falls, so does the tariff, and domestic industries become more vulnerable to competition. Conversely when the price of a good rises on the international market so does the tariff, but a country is often less interested in protection when the price is higher. They also face the problem of transfer pricing where a company declares a value for goods being traded which differs from the market price, aimed at reducing overall taxes due.
• A specific tariff is a tariff of a specific amount of money that does not vary with the price of the good. These tariffs may be harder to decide the amount at which to set them, and they may need to be updated due to changes in the market or inflation.

Adherents of supply-side economics sometimes refer to domestic taxes, such as income taxes, as being a "tariff" affecting inter-household trade.

Economic analysis

Some economic theories hold that tariffs are a harmful interference with the individual freedom and the laws of the free market. They believe that it is unfair toward consumers and generally disadvantageous for a country to artificially maintain an inefficient industry, and that it is better to allow it to collapse and to allow a new one to develop in its place. The opposition to all tariffs is part of the free trade principle; the World Trade Organization aims to reduce tariffs and to avoid countries discriminating between other countries when applying tariffs.

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In the following graph we see the effect that an import tariff has on the domestic economy. In a closed economy without trade we would see equilibrium at the intersection of the demand and supply curves (point B), yielding prices of $70 and an output of Y*. In this case the consumer surplus would be equal to the area inside points A, B and K, while producer surplus is given as the area A, B and L. When incorporating free international trade into the model we introduce a new supply curve denoted as S_W. This curve makes the assumption that the international supply of the good or service is perfectly elastic and that the world can produce at a near infinite quantity at the given price. Obviously, in real world conditions this is somewhat unrealistic, but making such assumptions is unlikely to have a material impact on the outcome of the model. In this case the international price of the good is $50 ($20 less than the domestic equilibrium price).

As a result of this price differential we see that domestic consumers will import these cheaper international alternatives, while decreasing consumption of domestic made produce. This reduction in domestic production is equal to Y* minus Y1, thus reducing producer surplus from the area A, B and L to F, G and L. This shows that domestic producers are unambiguously worse off with the introduction of international trade. On the other hand we see that consumers are now paying a lower price for the goods, which increases the consumer surplus from the area A, B and K to a new surplus of F, J and K. From this increase in consumer surplus we see that some of this surplus was, in fact, redistributed from producer surplus, equal to the area A, B, F and G. However, the net societal gains from trade, in terms of net surplus, are equal to the area B, G and J. The level of consumption has increased from Y* to Y2, while imports are now equal to Y2 minus Y1.

Let’s say we now introduce a tariff of $10/unit on imports. This has the effect of shifting the world supply curve vertically by $10 to S_W + Tariff. Again, this will create a redistribution of surplus within the model. We see that consumer surplus will decrease to the area C, E and K, which is a net loss of the area C, E, F and J. This now makes consumers unambiguously worse off than under a free trade regime, but still better off than under a system without trade. Producer surplus has increased, as they are now receiving an extra $10 per sale, to the area C, D and L. This is a net gain of the area C, D, F and G. With this increase in price the level of domestic production has increased from Y1 to Y3, while the level of imports has reduced to Y4 minus Y3.

The government also receives an increase in revenues as a result of the tariff equal to the area D, E, H and I. In dollar terms this figure is essentially $10*(Y4-Y3). However, with this redistribution of surplus we do see that some of the redistributed consumer surplus is lost. This loss of surplus is known as a deadweight loss, and is essentially the loss to society from the introduction of the tariff. This area is equal to the area E, I and J. The area D, G and H is a transfer from consumers to those the producers must pay to bring their product to market.

The model above is only completely accurate in the extreme case where none of the consumers belong to the producers group and the cost of the product is a fraction of their wages. If instead, we take the opposite extreme, and assume all consumers come from the producers group, and also assume their only purchasing power comes from the wages earned in production and the product costs their whole wage, then the graph looks radically different. Without tariffs, only those producers/consumers able to produce the product at the world price will have the money to purchase it at that price. The small FGL triangle will be matched by an equally small mirror image triangle of consumers still able to buy. With tariffs, a larger CDL triangle and its mirror will survive.

Note also, that with or without tariffs, there is no incentive to buy the imported goods over the domestic, as the price of each is the same. Only by altering available purchasing power through debt, selling off assets, or new wages from new forms of domestic production, will the imported goods be purchased. Or, of course, if its price were only a fraction of wages.

In the real world, as more imports replace domestic goods, they consume a larger fraction of available domestic wages, moving the graph towards this view of the model. If new forms of production are not found in time, the nation will go bankrupt, and internal political pressures will lead to debt default, extreme tariffs, or worse.

Moderate tariffs would slow down this process, allowing more time for new forms of production to be developed.

Infant industry argument

Some proponents of protectionism claim that imposing tariffs that help protect newly founded infant industries allows those domestic industries to grow and become self sufficient within the international economy once they reach a reasonable size.

The infant industry argument is an economic reason for protectionism. The crux of the argument is that nascent industries often do not have the economies of scale that their older competitors from other countries may have, and thus need to be protected until they can attain similar economies of scale.

Reasons for protectionism

Among theoretical academic economists, the infant industry argument is often derided, whereas applied economists and economic historians are generally more sympathetic to this viewpoint.^{[citation needed]}

Reasons against protectionism

Infant industries are by definition those that are not strong enough to survive open competition — they are dependent on government largesse and protectionism in order to survive. At a given point in time, protectionist policy, along with inefficient industries leads to higher prices and lower quality goods for the consumer than if the good or service produced by the industry was produced on the international market.

For these reasons the infant industry argument is often criticized. Firstly it is hard for government to know which industries will ultimately turn out to have growth potential. A lack of domestic capacity or unforeseen emergence of (even more superior) foreign rivals may, in fact, prohibit industries from becoming competitive in the long run. It is often the case that rather than developing or innovating, the protected industry becomes complacent, due to a lack of competition from the international market.

Since countries that put up barriers to imports will often face retaliatory barriers to exports, protectionism could hurt certain infant industries because the size of their potential market would be smaller.

Infant industry argument in popular culture

A Thomas Nast cartoon was showing the Democrats wanting to do away with protective tariffs. Nast appeared to make his cartoon against protectionism. A "Democrat donkey" is seen looking furiously at a rolled-up bill, which is dressed in a head covering and made to look like a nanny. The "nanny bill" is seen holding a full grown man marked with "infant industries," and exclaims to the donkey "Brute! Would you strike me with the child in my arms?" The point of this cartoon, particularly with an adult male marked "infant industries," was that the "infancy" of these industries has matured to a point where they no longer require protection.

Revenue argument

Critics of free trade have argued that tariffs are especially important to developing countries as a source of revenue. Developing nations do not have the institutional capacity to effectively levy income and sales taxes. In comparison with other forms of taxation, tariffs are relatively easy to collect. The trend of lifting tariffs and promoting free trade has been argued to have had disproportionately negative effects on the governments of developing nations who have greater difficulty than developed nations in replacing tariffs as a revenue source.

History of tariffs in the United States

There are two sides to the history of tariffs in the economic history of the United States and the role they have played in U.S. trade policy. In the first place, it was the single most important source of federal revenue from the 1790s to the eve of World War I, when it was finally surpassed by income taxes. So essential was this revenue source, and so easy was it to collect at the major ports, that all sides agreed that the nation should have a tariff for revenue purposes. In practice, that was an average tax of about 20% of the value of some imported goods. (Imports that were not taxed were "free".)

The second issue was protection to industry; it was the political dimension of the tariff. From the 1790s to the 2000s, the tariff (and closely related issues such as import quotas and trade treaties) have generated enormous political stresses. For a brief moment in 1832 South Carolina made vague threats to leave the Union over the tariff issue. In the 1850s the southerners controlled tariff policy, keeping it low (thus it was not a reason for secession).

1789 to 1828

The Tariff Act of 1789 imposed the first national source of revenue for the newly formed United States. The new Constitution allowed only the federal government to levy tariffs, so the old system of state rates disappeared. The new law taxed all imports at rates from 5 to 15 percent. These modest rates were primarily designed to generate revenue to pay the national debt and annual expenses of the federal government. In his Report on Manufactures Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton proposed a far-reaching scheme to use protective tariffs as a lever for rapid industrialization. His proposals were not adopted.

The high protectionism Hamilton called for was not adopted until after the War of 1812 when nationalists like Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun wanted more industry so the nation would have a balanced economy. In wartime, they declared, having a home industry was a necessity. Likewise owners of the small new factories that were springing up in the northeast to produce boots, hats, candles, nails and other common items failed to obtain higher tariffs that would significantly protect them from more efficient British producers. A 10% discount on the tax was offered on items imported in American ships, so that the American merchant marine would be supported.

Once industrialization started, the demand for higher and higher tariffs came from manufacturers and factory workers. They believed that Americans should be protected from the low wages of Europe. Every Congressman was eager to logroll a higher rate for his local industry. Senator Daniel Webster, formerly a spokesperson for Boston's merchants who imported goods (and wanted low tariffs), switched dramatically to represent the manufacturing interests in the Tariff of 1824. Rates were especially high for bolts of cloth and for bar iron, of which Britain was a low-cost producer. The culmination came in the Tariff of 1828, ridiculed by free traders as the "Tariff of Abominations," with duties averaging over 50 percent. Intense political reaction came from South Carolinians, who concluded that they would pay more for imports and sell less cotton abroad, so their economic interest was being unfairly injured. They attempted to "nullify" the federal tariff and spoke of secession (see the Nullification Crisis). The compromise that ended the crisis included a lowering of the tariff over ten years to a uniform 20% in 1842.

Tariff 1828-60

Henry Clay and his Whig Party, envisioning a rapid modernization based on highly productive factories, sought a high tariff. Their key argument was that startup factories, or "infant industries," would at first be less efficient than European (British) producers. Furthermore, American factory workers would be paid higher wages than their European competitors. The arguments proved highly persuasive in industrial districts. Clay's position was adopted in the 1828 and 1832 Tariff Acts.

The Nullification Crisis forced an abandonment of the Whig position of higher tariffs over ten years until 1842. When the Whigs won victories in the 1840 and 1842 elections, taking control of Congress, they re-instituted higher tariffs with the Tariff of 1842.

The Democrats won in 1844, electing James K. Polk as president. Polk succeeded in passing the Walker tariff of 1846 by uniting the rural and agricultural factions of the country for lower taxes. They sought minimal levels of a "tariff for revenue only" that would pay the cost of government but not show favoritism to one section or economic sector at the expense of another. The Walker Tariff remained in place until 1857, when a nonpartisan coalition lowered them again with the Tariff of 1857 to 18 percent. The United States thus had a low-tariff policy that favored the South until the Civil War began in 1861.

Civil War Protective Policy, 1861-1913

The Panic of 1857 was blamed by many former Whigs and industrialists on the free trade policy of the 1857 law. Legislators such as Justin Morrill and economist Henry Carey began to push for a restoration of the Whig American System program of protective tariffs. War was at hand and the Union urgently needed revenues. With the Southern senators gone, Congress passed the Morrill Tariff in early 1861; it took effect a few days before the war began, and was not collected in the South. The Confederate States of America passed its own tariff of 15% on most items, including all items that previously were duty-free from the North.

As the American Civil War became a major conflict Washington needed vast revenues. The Morrill Tariff was revised upward twice more between 1861 and 1862. With the low-tariff southerners gone, the Republican-controlled Congress doubled and tripled the rates on European goods, which topped out at 49 percent in 1868. The U.S. never put a tariff on goods from the Confederacy because the U.S.A. never recognized the legal existence of the C.S.A. Throughout the Civil War the southern states were under a blockade by the northern states. Very little trade that was legal occurred between either side because most goods were considered war contraband. Thus the Confederacy collected a mere $3.5 million in tariff revenue from the start to end and had to resort to inflation and confiscation instead.

After the war, high tariffs remained. Advocates insisted that tariffs brought prosperity to the nation as a whole and no one was really injured. As industrialization proceeded apace throughout the Northeast, some Democrats, especially Pennsylvanians, became high tariff advocates. The Republican high tariff advocates appealed to farmers with the theme that high-wage factory workers would pay premium prices for foodstuffs. This was the "home market" idea, and it won over most farmers in the Northeast, but it had little relevance to the southern and western farmers who exported most of their cotton, tobacco and wheat. In the late 1860s the wool manufacturers (based near Boston and Philadelphia) formed the first national lobby, and cut deals with wool-growing farmers in several states. Their challenge was that fastidious wool producers in Britain and Australia marketed a higher quality fleece than the careless Americans, and that British manufacturers had costs as low as the American mills. The result was a wool tariff that helped the farmers by a high rate on imported wool—a tariff the American manufacturers had to pay—together with a high tariff on finished woolens and worsted goods. Apart from wool and woolens, American industry and agriculture—and industrial workers—had become the most efficient in the world by the 1880s. They were not at risk from cheap imports. No other country had the industrial capacity, the high efficiency and low costs, or the complex distribution system needed to compete in the vast American market. Indeed, it was the British who watched in stunned horror as cheaper American products flooded their home islands. Wailed the London Daily Mail in 1900,

"We have lost to the American manufacturer electrical machinery, locomotives, steel rails, sugar-producing and agricultural machinery, and latterly even stationary engines, the pride and backbone of the British engineering industry."

Nevertheless American manufacturers and workers demanded the high tariff be maintained. The tariff represented a complex balance of forces. Railroads, for example, consumed vast quantities of steel. To the extent tariffs raised steel prices, they felt injured. The Republicans became masters of negotiating exceedingly complex arrangements so that inside each of their congressional districts there were more satisfied "winners" than disgruntled "losers." The tariff after 1880 was an ideological relic with no economic rationale—it was a timebomb waiting to explode—and it repeatedly did explode.

Democratic president Grover Cleveland redefined the issue in 1887, with his stunning attack on the tariff as inherently corrupt, opposed to true republicanism, and inefficient to boot: "When we consider that the theory of our institutions guarantees to every citizen the full enjoyment of all the fruits of his industry and enterprise... it is plain that the exaction of more than [minimal taxes] is indefensible extortion and a culpable betrayal of American fairness and justice." The election of 1888 was fought primarily over the tariff issue, and Cleveland lost. Republican Congressman William McKinley argued,

"Free foreign trade gives our money, our manufactures, and our markets to other nations to the injury of our labor, our tradespeople, and our farmers. Protection keeps money, markets, and manufactures at home for the benefit of our own people."

Democrats campaigned energetically against the high McKinley tariff of 1890, and scored sweeping gains that year; they restored Cleveland to the White House in 1892. The severe depression that started in 1893 destroyed the Democratic party. Cleveland and the Bourbon Democrats insisted on a much lower tariff. His problem was that Democratic electoral successes had brought in Democratic congressmen from industrial districts who were willing to raise rates to benefit their districts. The Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 did lower overall rates from 50 percent to 42 percent, but contained so many concessions to protectionism that Cleveland refused to sign it. McKinley campaigned heavily in 1896 on the tariff as a positive solution to depression. Promising protection and prosperity to every economic sector, he won a smashing victory. The Republicans rushed through the Dingley tariff in 1897, boosting rates back to the 50 percent level. Democrats responded that the high rates created "trusts" (monopolies) and led to higher consumer prices. McKinley won reelection by an even bigger landslide and started talking about a post-tariff era of reciprocal trade agreements. Reciprocity went nowhere; McKinley's vision was a half century too early.

The delicate balance flew apart on president William Howard Taft's watch. Taft campaigned in 1908 for tariff "reform," which everyone assumed meant lower rates. The House lowered rates with the Payne Bill, then sent it to the Senate where Nelson Wilmarth Aldrich worked his sleight of hand. Whereas Aldrich was a New England businessman and a master of the complexities of the tariff, the Midwestern Republican insurgents were rhetoricians and lawyers who distrusted the special interests and assumed the tariff was sheer robbery for the benefit of fat cats at the expense of the ordinary consumer. Rural America believed that its superior morality deserved special protection, while the dastardly immorality of the trusts—and cities generally—merited financial punishment. Aldrich baited them. Did the insurgents want lower tariffs? His wickedly clever Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 lowered the protection on Midwestern farm products, while raising rates favorable to his Northeast.

Tariff with Canada

The Canadian-American Reciprocity Treaty increased trade between 1855 and its ending in 1866. When it ended Canada turned to tariffs. The National Policy was a Canadian economic program introduced by John A. Macdonald's Conservative Party in 1879 after it returned to power. It had been an official policy, however, since 1876. It was based on high tariffs to protect Canada's manufacturing industry. Macdonald campaigned on the policy in the 1878 election, and handily beat the Liberal Party, which supported free trade. Efforts to restore free trade with Canada collapsed when Canada rejected a proposed reciprocity treaty in fear of American imperialism in the Canadian federal election, 1911. Taft negotiated a reciprocity agreement with Canada, that had the effect of sharply lowering tariffs. Democrats supported the plan but Midwestern Republicans bitterly opposed it. Barnstorming the country for his agreement, Taft undiplomatically pointed to the inevitable integration of the North American economy, and suggested that Canada should come to a "parting of the ways" with Britain. Canada's Conservative Party now had an issue to regain power from the low-tariff Liberals; after a surge of pro-imperial anti-Americanism, the Conservatives won. Ottawa rejected reciprocity, reasserted the National Policy and went to London first for new financial and trade deals. The Payne Aldrich Tariff of 1909 actually changed little and had slight economic impact one way or the other, but the political impact was enormous. The insurgents felt tricked and defeated and swore vengeance against Wall Street and its minions Taft and Aldrich. The insurgency led to a fatal split down the middle in 1912 as the GOP lost its balance wheel.

President Teddy Roosevelt watches GOP team pull apart on tariff issue

Low tariff policy, 1913 to present

Woodrow Wilson made a drastic lowering of tariff rates a major priority for his presidency. The 1913 Underwood Tariff cut rates, but the coming of world war in 1914 radically revised trade patterns. Reduced trade and, especially, the new reveues generated by the federal income tax made tariffs much less important. When the Republicans regained power after the war they restored the usual high rates. The Great Depression was worldwide, and international trade shrank drastically. The crisis baffled the GOP, and it unwisely tried its magic one last time in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. This time it backfired, as Canada, Britain, Germany, France and other industrial countries retaliated with their own tariffs and special, bilateral trade deals. American imports and exports both went into a tailspin. Franklin Roosevelt and the New Dealers made promises about lowering tariffs on a reciprocal country-by-country basis (which they did), hoping this would expand foreign trade (which it did not.) Frustrated, they gave much more attention to domestic remedies for the depression; by 1936 the tariff issue had faded from politics, and the revenue it raised was small. In World War II both tariffs and reciprocity were insignificant compared to trade channeled through Lend Lease.

Post World War II

After the war the U.S. promoted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) established in 1947, to minimize tariffs and other restrictions, and to liberalize trade among all capitalist countries. In 1995 GATT became the World Trade Organization WTO; with the collapse of Communism its open markets/low tariff ideology became dominant worldwide in the 1990s.

American industry and labor prospered after World War II, but hard times set in after 1970. For the first time there was stiff competition from low-cost producers around the globe. Many rust belt industries faded or collapsed, especially the manufacture of steel, TV sets, shoes, toys, textiles and clothing. Toyota and Nissan threatened the giant domestic auto industry. In the late 1970s Detroit and the auto workers union combined to fight for protection. They obtained not high tariffs, but a voluntary restriction of imports from the Japanese government. Quotas were two-country diplomatic agreements that had the same protective effect as high tariffs, but did not invite retaliation from third countries. By limiting the number of Japanese automobiles that could be imported, quotas inadvertently helped Japanese companies push into larger, and more expensive market segments. The Japanese producers, limited by the number of cars they could export to America, opted to increase the value of their exports to maintain revenue growth. This action threatened the American producers' historical hold on the mid- and large-size car markets.

1980s to present

The GOP under Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush abandoned the protectionist ideology, and came out against quotas and in favor of the GATT/WTO policy of minimal economic barriers to global trade. Free trade with Canada came about as a result of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1987, which led in 1994 to the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA. It was based on George H. W. Bush's plan to enlarge the scope of the market for American firms to include Canada and Mexico. US President Bill Clinton, with strong Republican support, pushed NAFTA through Congress over the vehement objection of labor unions. Likewise in 2000 he worked with Republicans to give China entry into WTO and "most favored nation" trading status (i.e., low tariffs). NAFTA and WTO advocates promoted an optimistic vision of the future, with prosperity to be based on intellectuals skills and managerial know-how more than on routine hand labor. They promised that free trade meant lower prices for consumers. It also meant lower wages and fewer jobs in older industries that could no longer compete. Opposition to liberalized trade came increasingly from labor unions, but their shrinking size and diminished political clout repeatedly left them on the losing side.

References

ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

• Altshuler, Alan A. and Daniel Roos. The Future of the Automobile : The Report of MIT's International Automobile Program. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press (1984)
• Doran, Charles F. and Gregory P. Marchildon. The NAFTA Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America (1994)
• Eckes, Alfred. Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy since 1776 (1995)
• Kaplan, Edward S.; Prelude to Trade Wars: American Tariff Policy, 1890-1922 Greenwood Press 1994
• Kaplan, Edward S. American Trade Policy: 1923-1995 (1996), online review
• Mark A. Smith; The Tariff on Wool 1926
• Schattsneider, E. E. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (1935). Passage of Hawley-Smoot tariff
• Stanwood, Edward. American Tariff Controversies in the nineteenth century. (1903), political narrative
• Ida M. Tarbell; The Tariff in Our Times 1911
• Taussig, F. W. Some Aspects of the Tariff Question: An Examination of the Development of American Industries Under Protection (1931)
• Taussig, F. W. The Tariff History of the United States. 8th edition (1931); 5th edition 1910 is online
• Taussig, F.W. "Tariff," Encyclopedia Britannica (11th edition, 1911) vol 26
• Taylor, George Rogers, ed. The Great Tariff Debate, 1820-1830 (1953), excerpts from primary and secondary sources
• Terrill, Tom E. The Tariff, Politics, and American Foreign Policy 1874-1901 (1973).
• Festus P. Summers; William L. Wilson and Tariff Reform, a Biography 1953
• Tariffs and Trade in U.S. History: An Encyclopedia (2003) Edited by Elaine C. Prange Turney and Cynthia Clark Northrup.
• Wolman, Paul. Most Favored Nation: The Republican Revisionists and U.S. Tariff Policy, 1897-1912 (1992)

• Dominick Salvatore, Introduction to International Economics (2004)
• Taussig, F.W. "Tariff," Encyclopedia Britannica (11th edition, 1911) vol 26 pp. 422-27.

External links

• UN's ITC website for accessible tariff information
• India Import Tariff information
• UN's ITC website for accessible tariff & import duty information
• Infodriveindia's Indian Import Tariff

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