Difference between revisions of "Idealism" - New World Encyclopedia
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:''This article is about the '''philosophical''' notion of Idealism. Idealism is also a term in [[Idealism in international relations theory|international relations theory]] and in [[Idealism (Christian eschatology)|Christian eschatology]].'' | :''This article is about the '''philosophical''' notion of Idealism. Idealism is also a term in [[Idealism in international relations theory|international relations theory]] and in [[Idealism (Christian eschatology)|Christian eschatology]].'' | ||
| − | '''Idealism''' is a term used to describe a wide variety of philosophical positions. | + | '''Idealism''' is a term used to describe a wide variety of philosophical positions. We can distinguish two general senses: a Platonic sense, and a modern sense. Idealism in the [[Plato|Platonic]] sense involves the claim that ideal things occupy a metaphysically privileged position in the universe. Idealism in the modern sense centers around the claim that at least large portions of reality (in particular, the experienced physical world) are [[metaphysics|metaphysically]] based in something mental (minds and their ideas or representations). Such a view is stands in stark opposition with '[[materialism|materialist]]' views of reality, which claim that mental entities and properties are somehow based or grounded in non-mental, material entities and properties of the sort with which physics is concerned (there are positions between the two extremes, such as [[dualism]]). |
| − | Though idealism | + | Though both types of idealism are first and foremost metaphysical positions, their proponents have typically tried to motivate them using [[epistemology|epistemological]] considerations. Plato's concern with the ideal realm appears to have been largely motivated by questions concerning knowledge. Epistemological arguments play a central role in the defenses of modern idealism presented by the two most prominent idealists in modern Western philosophy: George [[Berkeley]] and Immanuel [[Kant]]. |
| − | ==Overview== | + | ==Overview of Modern Idealism== |
In the first section of his 1783 work, ''Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics'', [[Kant]] defined 'genuine' idealism as consisting in the assertation that, "there are none but thinking beings; all other things which we believe are perceived in intuitions are nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them corresponds" (4:288-89 in the Akademie edition). The view described here applies as well to [[Leibniz]] as to [[Berkeley]]. It involves a sweeping claim about the nature of reality - namely, that the very ''notion'' of something entirely non-mental existing is either incoherent (Berkeley) or else cannot survive philosophical reflection (Leibniz). | In the first section of his 1783 work, ''Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics'', [[Kant]] defined 'genuine' idealism as consisting in the assertation that, "there are none but thinking beings; all other things which we believe are perceived in intuitions are nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them corresponds" (4:288-89 in the Akademie edition). The view described here applies as well to [[Leibniz]] as to [[Berkeley]]. It involves a sweeping claim about the nature of reality - namely, that the very ''notion'' of something entirely non-mental existing is either incoherent (Berkeley) or else cannot survive philosophical reflection (Leibniz). | ||
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The absolute sense of 'idealism,' then, is relative idealism about ''all'' entities and properties. This is then a much stronger position, and one that cannot be conclusively argued for one entity or property at a time. | The absolute sense of 'idealism,' then, is relative idealism about ''all'' entities and properties. This is then a much stronger position, and one that cannot be conclusively argued for one entity or property at a time. | ||
| − | ==[[George Berkeley]]== | + | ===[[George Berkeley]]=== |
Inspired by the work of the French philosopher and theologian Nicolas [[Malebranche]], the Irish Bishop George Berkeley believed that philosophical positions that posited absolutely non-mental entities in the universe (in particular, [[Descartes|Cartesian]] material substance) were responsible for the spread of atheism and skepticism across Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. According to a philosophical picture such as that advanced by John [[Locke]], material substance was the crucial aspect of the physical world, and was responsible for causing representations in our minds. It could not, however, be directly perceived, and could only be known indirectly through the representations it caused. | Inspired by the work of the French philosopher and theologian Nicolas [[Malebranche]], the Irish Bishop George Berkeley believed that philosophical positions that posited absolutely non-mental entities in the universe (in particular, [[Descartes|Cartesian]] material substance) were responsible for the spread of atheism and skepticism across Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. According to a philosophical picture such as that advanced by John [[Locke]], material substance was the crucial aspect of the physical world, and was responsible for causing representations in our minds. It could not, however, be directly perceived, and could only be known indirectly through the representations it caused. | ||
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The first argument, however, is not nearly strong enough to establish absolute idealism, which was Berkeley's aim. It leaves open the possibility that the objects we perceive have an unknown reality, as well as the possibility that there might be unperceivable and non-mental objects. To rule out those possibilities, Berkeley presented another line of argument. Accepting a strong form of [[empiricism]], Berkeley claimed that the only understanding of 'existence' we can have must be one derived from our experiences. Our experiences, however, are all of our own mind and our own representations. But in that case, the only ''meaning'' that 'exist' can have is 'to have a representation or be a representation.' Material substance, however, was supposed to be something that was neither a representation nor a possessor of representations. The conclusion is that 'material substance exists' is in fact a contradiction. | The first argument, however, is not nearly strong enough to establish absolute idealism, which was Berkeley's aim. It leaves open the possibility that the objects we perceive have an unknown reality, as well as the possibility that there might be unperceivable and non-mental objects. To rule out those possibilities, Berkeley presented another line of argument. Accepting a strong form of [[empiricism]], Berkeley claimed that the only understanding of 'existence' we can have must be one derived from our experiences. Our experiences, however, are all of our own mind and our own representations. But in that case, the only ''meaning'' that 'exist' can have is 'to have a representation or be a representation.' Material substance, however, was supposed to be something that was neither a representation nor a possessor of representations. The conclusion is that 'material substance exists' is in fact a contradiction. | ||
| − | ==[[Kant]]== | + | ===[[Kant]]=== |
Berkeley's second argument (presented above) relied heavily on the claim that all of our meaningful thoughts must be based in direct experience. While this thought has appealed to some philosophers (perhaps most notably in the 20th century, the [[logical positivism|logical positivists]]), it strikes most people as highly problematic. For instance, we seem to be able to think thoughts with universal and necessary content (for instance, all events have a cause), even though experience alone seems insufficient to yield ideas of universality or necessity. | Berkeley's second argument (presented above) relied heavily on the claim that all of our meaningful thoughts must be based in direct experience. While this thought has appealed to some philosophers (perhaps most notably in the 20th century, the [[logical positivism|logical positivists]]), it strikes most people as highly problematic. For instance, we seem to be able to think thoughts with universal and necessary content (for instance, all events have a cause), even though experience alone seems insufficient to yield ideas of universality or necessity. | ||
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Nevertheless, Kant was clear that this does not mean that the objects we encounter only ''exist'' in our representations. The objects exist on their own - it is rather a certain set of their properties that are ideal. They almost certainly have other properties beyond those we encounter, and those properties needn't have any relation to anything mental. Kant often puts this distinction in terms of a contrast between 'things as they appear to us' and 'things as they are in themselves.' By emphasizing our ignorence of how things are in themselves, Kant hoped to rule out the possibility that natural science (which has to do only with things as they appear) could disprove the existence of freedom of the will or the existence of God. | Nevertheless, Kant was clear that this does not mean that the objects we encounter only ''exist'' in our representations. The objects exist on their own - it is rather a certain set of their properties that are ideal. They almost certainly have other properties beyond those we encounter, and those properties needn't have any relation to anything mental. Kant often puts this distinction in terms of a contrast between 'things as they appear to us' and 'things as they are in themselves.' By emphasizing our ignorence of how things are in themselves, Kant hoped to rule out the possibility that natural science (which has to do only with things as they appear) could disprove the existence of freedom of the will or the existence of God. | ||
| − | ==German Idealism== | + | ===German Idealism=== |
Kant's idealism was enormously influential. Many of his successors, however, believed that his insistence on the existence of things in themselves showed that he had not taken his own insight concerning our knowledge seriously enough. If our knowledge only concerns our representations, they thought, how could we even know the ''possibility'' of something outside of our representations? How could that even make sense? In response to these worries, absolute idealism surfaced again in Germany in the work of such thinkers as [[Fichte]] and [[Hegel]]. This issued in the era known as 'German Idealism.' | Kant's idealism was enormously influential. Many of his successors, however, believed that his insistence on the existence of things in themselves showed that he had not taken his own insight concerning our knowledge seriously enough. If our knowledge only concerns our representations, they thought, how could we even know the ''possibility'' of something outside of our representations? How could that even make sense? In response to these worries, absolute idealism surfaced again in Germany in the work of such thinkers as [[Fichte]] and [[Hegel]]. This issued in the era known as 'German Idealism.' | ||
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Despite this daunting philosophical challenge, the philosophical picture proposed by the German Idealists was extremely influential. It enjoyed a surge of popularity in English speaking countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as present in such figures as [[F.H. Bradley]], J.M.E. [[McTaggart]] and [[Josiah Royce]]. | Despite this daunting philosophical challenge, the philosophical picture proposed by the German Idealists was extremely influential. It enjoyed a surge of popularity in English speaking countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as present in such figures as [[F.H. Bradley]], J.M.E. [[McTaggart]] and [[Josiah Royce]]. | ||
| − | ==Criticisms of Idealism== | + | ===Criticisms of Idealism=== |
The most natural response the idealism is that it violates some tenet of common sense. Berkeley was well aware of this, and spent much of his ''Three Dialogues'' attempted to argue to the contrary. | The most natural response the idealism is that it violates some tenet of common sense. Berkeley was well aware of this, and spent much of his ''Three Dialogues'' attempted to argue to the contrary. | ||
Revision as of 14:59, 8 May 2007
- This article is about the philosophical notion of Idealism. Idealism is also a term in international relations theory and in Christian eschatology.
Idealism is a term used to describe a wide variety of philosophical positions. We can distinguish two general senses: a Platonic sense, and a modern sense. Idealism in the Platonic sense involves the claim that ideal things occupy a metaphysically privileged position in the universe. Idealism in the modern sense centers around the claim that at least large portions of reality (in particular, the experienced physical world) are metaphysically based in something mental (minds and their ideas or representations). Such a view is stands in stark opposition with 'materialist' views of reality, which claim that mental entities and properties are somehow based or grounded in non-mental, material entities and properties of the sort with which physics is concerned (there are positions between the two extremes, such as dualism).
Though both types of idealism are first and foremost metaphysical positions, their proponents have typically tried to motivate them using epistemological considerations. Plato's concern with the ideal realm appears to have been largely motivated by questions concerning knowledge. Epistemological arguments play a central role in the defenses of modern idealism presented by the two most prominent idealists in modern Western philosophy: George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant.
Overview of Modern Idealism
In the first section of his 1783 work, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant defined 'genuine' idealism as consisting in the assertation that, "there are none but thinking beings; all other things which we believe are perceived in intuitions are nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them corresponds" (4:288-89 in the Akademie edition). The view described here applies as well to Leibniz as to Berkeley. It involves a sweeping claim about the nature of reality - namely, that the very notion of something entirely non-mental existing is either incoherent (Berkeley) or else cannot survive philosophical reflection (Leibniz).
Kant offered this definition, however, in order to distance himself from such positions (when writing the Prolegomena, he was reeling from reviews of his 1781 Critique of Pure Reason which charged him with merely restating Berkeley's position). His view, which he described as 'transcendental' or 'critical' idealism (4:293-94), did not involve the claim that all non-mental things must exist in representations.
The distinction Kant aimed to draw can be turned into a useful general point. It is clearest to understand the term 'idealism' in a relative sense and an absolute sense. In the relative sense, a philosopher is an idealist about a certain sort of entity or property, where this simply means that she believes that the existence and nature of that entity or property ultimately reduces to facts about minds and their representations. Given this, certain forms of idealism should be generally accepted - for instance, we might be idealists about a certain fictional character. Kant, then, was an idealist about a certain set of properties (including space and time), but not about others (for instance, the property of being able to affect other entities).
The absolute sense of 'idealism,' then, is relative idealism about all entities and properties. This is then a much stronger position, and one that cannot be conclusively argued for one entity or property at a time.
George Berkeley
Inspired by the work of the French philosopher and theologian Nicolas Malebranche, the Irish Bishop George Berkeley believed that philosophical positions that posited absolutely non-mental entities in the universe (in particular, Cartesian material substance) were responsible for the spread of atheism and skepticism across Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. According to a philosophical picture such as that advanced by John Locke, material substance was the crucial aspect of the physical world, and was responsible for causing representations in our minds. It could not, however, be directly perceived, and could only be known indirectly through the representations it caused.
But if material substance was at the core of physical reality and could not be directly known, then, Berkeley, believed, it was inevitable that people would come to doubt whether it existed, and thereby come to question the reality of the world of everyday objects. Worse, in his view, this view described a universe that seemed capable of operating independently of God. Were people to become convinced of such a picture, it was inevitable that they would come to wonder if they had any reason for believing in God at all.
On the other hand, if people believed (1) that all that existed were minds and their representations, (2) that the world of everyday objects was simply composed of representations, and (3) that most of their representations were directly caused by God, then the source of those temptations towards skepticism and atheism would dry up.
In his two major works, the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713), Berkeley presented two general arguments for his idealism: the first based on the differing representations we have of supposedly unchanging objects, and the second based on the very conceivability of something non-mental.
The first general argument might be schematized as follows: our perceptions of objects change with changes in us (e.g. objects appear different shapes from different perspectival angles), but, on the view that there exists some non-mental material substance, the underlying substance needn't change with (e.g.) changes in our position. Yet there is no non-arbitrary way of determining which of those changing perceptions is correct, in the sense of revealing to us true nature of the object. Because those perceptions are often incompatible, they cannot all reveal the nature of the object, but since they are all on par, the only reasonable conclusion is that none of them do. But that, Berkeley claimed, is obviously absurd; of course our perceptions tell us something about the nature of the object. That's why we use our perception in the first place. Given this, he thought that the only reasonable alternative was to identify the object with our perceptions of it, thereby allowing us direct epistemic access to it (this relied on the uncontroversial assumption that we haev direct access to our perceptions).
The first argument, however, is not nearly strong enough to establish absolute idealism, which was Berkeley's aim. It leaves open the possibility that the objects we perceive have an unknown reality, as well as the possibility that there might be unperceivable and non-mental objects. To rule out those possibilities, Berkeley presented another line of argument. Accepting a strong form of empiricism, Berkeley claimed that the only understanding of 'existence' we can have must be one derived from our experiences. Our experiences, however, are all of our own mind and our own representations. But in that case, the only meaning that 'exist' can have is 'to have a representation or be a representation.' Material substance, however, was supposed to be something that was neither a representation nor a possessor of representations. The conclusion is that 'material substance exists' is in fact a contradiction.
Kant
Berkeley's second argument (presented above) relied heavily on the claim that all of our meaningful thoughts must be based in direct experience. While this thought has appealed to some philosophers (perhaps most notably in the 20th century, the logical positivists), it strikes most people as highly problematic. For instance, we seem to be able to think thoughts with universal and necessary content (for instance, all events have a cause), even though experience alone seems insufficient to yield ideas of universality or necessity.
Motivated by just such thoughts, Kant rejected the strong empiricist assumptions that underlay Berkeley's most radical arguments. Nevertheless, in his Critique of Pure Reason, he advanced arguments for forms of relative idealism about almost all qualities of objects, including their spatiality, temporality, and all sensible qualities.
With respect to space and time, Kant believed that some form of idealism was required to explain the vast store of a priori knowledge we have concerning the spatial and temporal properties of objects (the clearest example being geometry). How, Kant wondered, could we know, as we doubtless do, that all objects we could encounter have a spatial relation to each other and can be described mathematically? After all, we have experienced only a minute fraction of what exists, so we are hardly in a place to draw any inductive inference to such a conclusion. The only way we could explain this bulk of necessary, universal knowledge, Kant believed, was if space and time only existed as representations in our minds that we impose on objects we encounter.
Nevertheless, Kant was clear that this does not mean that the objects we encounter only exist in our representations. The objects exist on their own - it is rather a certain set of their properties that are ideal. They almost certainly have other properties beyond those we encounter, and those properties needn't have any relation to anything mental. Kant often puts this distinction in terms of a contrast between 'things as they appear to us' and 'things as they are in themselves.' By emphasizing our ignorence of how things are in themselves, Kant hoped to rule out the possibility that natural science (which has to do only with things as they appear) could disprove the existence of freedom of the will or the existence of God.
German Idealism
Kant's idealism was enormously influential. Many of his successors, however, believed that his insistence on the existence of things in themselves showed that he had not taken his own insight concerning our knowledge seriously enough. If our knowledge only concerns our representations, they thought, how could we even know the possibility of something outside of our representations? How could that even make sense? In response to these worries, absolute idealism surfaced again in Germany in the work of such thinkers as Fichte and Hegel. This issued in the era known as 'German Idealism.'
Fichte and Hegel's views are present in some of the most difficulty pieces of philosophy ever produced (e.g. Fichte's 'Theory of Science' or Wissenschaftslehre and Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit). Yet the core idea is relatively simple: whereas Berkeley believed that some supremely powerful mind (God) was needed to explain the varied perceptions we experience, and Kant explained our experience in terms of our interactions with things whose inner natures we were unaware of, Fichte (in his later work) and Hegel believed that that explanation could come from features internal to the force that manifests itself in finite minds (some sort of general mental force).
The advantage of such a move was that there was no longer an appeal to anything as supernatural as God or things in themselves. The disadvantage is the resulting difficulty in explaining how features of our own minds could possibly account for the wildly varying and deeply complex set of representations we experience.
Despite this daunting philosophical challenge, the philosophical picture proposed by the German Idealists was extremely influential. It enjoyed a surge of popularity in English speaking countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as present in such figures as F.H. Bradley, J.M.E. McTaggart and Josiah Royce.
Criticisms of Idealism
The most natural response the idealism is that it violates some tenet of common sense. Berkeley was well aware of this, and spent much of his Three Dialogues attempted to argue to the contrary.
Yet a sustained philosophical attack on idealism was made (largely in response to Hegelian idealism) by the British philosophy G. E. Moore in the early 20th century (Bertrand Russell made a parallel attack). Moore directly attacked that essential assumption of idealism that what we are directly aware of are our representations. Instead, Moore proposed that we should understand the objects of our thoughts to be propositions, where propositions can be understood as states of affairs constituted by genuinely non-mental objects in the world. Such a picture has become the dominant one in contemporary analytic philosophy, and idealism is not often counted as a viably philosophical position. Nevertheless, defenders of idealism may well note that Moore's alternative picture is no more self-evident than the picture it meant to replace, so that the matter is far from settled.
ReferencesISBN links support NWE through referral fees
- Baldwin, Thomas (1998, 2003). "Moore, George Edward." In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. ISBN 0415073103 ISBN 9780415073103
- Berkeley, George. (1988, originally 1710 and 1713) Principles of Human Knowledge/Three Dialogues, Roger Woolhouse (ed.). London: Penguin Books. ISBN 0192835491
- Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. (1992) Foundations of the Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova Methodo (1796-1799), Daniel Breazeale (ed. and trans.). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Hegel, G.W.F. (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit, A.V. Miller (trans). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0198245300 ISBN 9780198245308
- Kant, Immanuel. (1977) Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. James W. Ellington, trans. Indianapolis, Hackett. ISBN 0915144336 ISBN 9780915144334 ISBN 0915144255 ISBN 9780915144259
- Kant, Immanuel. (1963) Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith. London: MacMillan & Co.
- Moore, G.E. (1993) Selected Writings, ed. T. Baldwin, London: Routledge. ISBN 041509853X ISBN 9780415098533 ISBN 0415098548 ISBN 9780415098540
- Sprigge, T.L.S. (1998) "Idealism." In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. ISBN 0415073103 ISBN 9780415073103
External links
- German Idealism, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved May 3, 2007.
- Idealism, Catholic Encyclopedia. Retrieved May 3, 2007.
- G. E. Moore. THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM, Mind 12 (1903), Transcribed into Hypertext by Andrew Chrucky, March 5, 1997. Retrieved May 3, 2007.
- THE SOCIETY FOR GERMAN IDEALISM. Retrieved May 3, 2007.
- The U.K. Kant Society. Retrieved May 3, 2007.
General Philosophy Sources
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved May 3, 2007.
- The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved May 3, 2007.
- Philosophy Sources on Internet EpistemeLinks. Retrieved May 3, 2007.
- Guide to Philosophy on the Internet. Retrieved May 3, 2007.
- Paideia Project Online. Retrieved May 3, 2007.
- Project Gutenberg. Retrieved May 3, 2007.
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