Difference between revisions of "Dualism" - New World Encyclopedia

From New World Encyclopedia
(importing from wiki)
 
 
(25 intermediate revisions by 7 users not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{mergefrom|Combative dualism}}
+
{{Approved}}{{Images OK}}{{Submitted}}{{Paid}}{{Copyedited}}
  
{{Portalpar|Philosophy|Socrates.png|26px}}The term '''''dualism''''' has a number of uses in the history of thinking. In a given domain of knowledge, the idea involves the existence of two fundamental classes of things, or principles, often in opposition to each other. In [[theology]], ''dualism'' can refer the belief that there are two basic opposing principles, such as [[Goodness and value theory|good]], and [[evil]]. In [[philosophy of mind]], ''dualism'' refers to the views that mind and [[Physical body|matter]] are two ontologically separate entities.
+
The term "dualism" can be used for any theory according to which two entities, properties or types of facts are given equal status—that is, neither is taken as completely reducible or explicable in terms of the other. In contemporary philosophy, it refers to a certain view in the [[philosophy of mind]]. According to this view, whose clearest proponent is [[Descartes]], mental entities or properties are parts of the universe which are just as fundamental as physical entities or properties. Descartes accepted a form of dualism often called ''[[substance]] dualism'', according to which the [[mind]] is a special sort of substance, one which could, in principle continue to exist even if all physical substances (e.g. particles) were destroyed.
 +
{{toc}}
 +
In the past century, substance dualism has enjoyed relatively little popularity, but ''property dualism'' has established a substantial following. According to property dualism, there may be no special mental entities that are capable of existing independently of all physical things, but some entities have certain mental properties (e.g. [[consciousness]]) that cannot be reduced to their physical properties (e.g. size and shape).
  
== Usage in Hindu Philosophy ==
+
This article will survey the major dualist positions, and consider some of the main arguments for and against dualism.
[[Samkhya]] proposes the dualism of [[Prakriti]] and [[Purusha]]. [[Prakriti]] is the nature and [[Purusha]] is the conciousness (i.e. the silent witness of Prakriti).
 
  
In Vedantic philosophy (which denies the dualism of Samkhya and proposes that Prakriti and Purusha are one and the same), [[Dvaita]] believes the dualism in [[Atma]] (soul of human beings) and the [[Paramatma]] (the GOD).
+
==Major Dualist Positions==
 +
===Ancient Dualism===
 +
Most traditions that accept the existence of a thinking or feeling entity that can survive the death of the physical body can be counted as dualist. Among the ancient Greeks, such positions were common. [[Plato]], in the ''Phaedo'', argued that his rational part would survive the death of his body. His main reasons for the claim seem to stem from his being impressed with the ability of the mind to know eternal, necessary truths. This ability appears to be something beyond the reach of crude matter.
  
== Theological usage ==
+
[[Aristotle]]'s ''De Anima'' contains much material that seems to anticipate the contemporary anti-dualist position known as functionalism (see [[Philosophy of Mind]]). According to functionalism, mental features simply consist in the physical arrangement of the physical parts of some entity. Aristotle seems to have thought that many aspects of the soul could be understood in terms of the "form" of the organs of the body. Yet, in chapter 4 of book 3, Aristotle notes that the intellect is capable of understanding all things and so must not be 'mixed' with the body. Many of Aristotle's Christian commentators took this suggestion as the acceptance of an immaterial soul.
=== "Western" or "theistic" usage ===
 
''Main Article: [[Theology]]''
 
  
In [[theology]], ''dualism'' can refer to ''ditheism'': the belief that there are two basic principles, usually personified as [[deity|deities]], that work in polar opposition to each other.  For example, one god is [[Goodness and value theory|good]], the other [[evil]]; or one god works for order, the other for chaos.  Both the [[Zoroastrian]] religion, three-millennia old and still extant, and the essentially dead [[Gnosticism|gnostic]] religion (and its variations such as, [[Manichaeism]], [[Bogomils]], [[Cathar|Catharism]], etc.) are dualistic, as is [[Mandaeanism]].  The third-century Christian [[heresy|heretic]] [[Marcion of Sinope]] held that the Old and New Testaments were the work of two opposing gods.  The Christian conflict between [[God]] (the source of all good) and [[Satan]] (the source of all evil) is sometimes described in dualistic terms.
+
Both Plato and Aristotle, then, appear to be pulled towards some dualist position on the basis of the type of things that our intellects are capable of grasping. This stands in interesting contrast to the main arguments advanced in favor of dualism in the modern and contemporary periods, discussed below (an interesting exception is the related argument for [[idealism]] that [[Kant]] provides at the end of his ''Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals'').
  
=== "Eastern" or "mystic" usage ===
+
===Modern Dualism===
''Main Article: [[Mysticism]]''
+
The great French philosopher [[Descartes|René Descartes]] argued at length for dualism in his ''Meditations on First Philosophy'' and ''Principles of Philosophy''. According to Descartes, both our [[mind]]s and our bodies are equally substances, meaning that they are capable of existing independently of all other entities (with the exception of [[God]]), and that "supported" properties. The properties of the body, Descartes thought, were those described in geometrical physics—in particular, extension. The properties of the mind, by contrast, were all at root manifestations of [[thought]]. At least in his mature work, however, Descartes recognized that from the claims that the body is an extended thing and that the mind is a [[thinking]] thing, it does not yet follow that the mind is a distinct entity from the body. The possibility that remained, in his mind, was that some single thing was both extended and thinking (this is the position now known as ''property dualism''). It was with this possibility in view that he offered the arguments advanced below. Descartes does not appear to have considered the possibility that the ''property'' of thinking could itself be a physical property.
  
[[Image:Yin yang.svg|right|100px|thumb|The [[Taijitu]] symbolizes the duality in nature and all things in Taoist religion.]]
+
Another crucial part of Descartes' substance dualism was his claim that the mind and body were capable of causally affecting each other. It was on this point that much criticism was levied. Given his insistence on the distinct natures of the mind and body, it was hard to see how such distinct things could affect one another (consider, perhaps, how ghosts in most movies are unable to causally interact with the physical world). Indeed, the third proposition proved in [[Spinoza]]'s ''Ethics'' was that things with nothing in common were incapable of causally affecting each other.
  
Alternatively, ''dualism'' can mean the tendency of humans to perceive and understand the world as being divided into just two [[categorization|categories]]. In this sense, it is dualistic when one perceives a tree as a thing separate from everything surrounding it, or when one perceives a "self" that is distinct from the rest of the world. In traditions such as [[Zen]], a key to enlightenment is "overcoming" this sort of dualism, without merely substituting it with [[monism]] or [[Pluralism (philosophy of mind)|pluralism]].
+
Much of continental Europoean metaphysics of the two centuries following Descartes revolved around ways to resolve this exact problem. ''Occasionalists'' such as [[Malebranche]] claimed that mind and body did not interact, but that God constantly affected each so that they effectly operated ''as though'' they interacted. [[Leibniz]] and his followers instead claimed that God had 'preprogramed' each substance so as to make them run in parallel, again creating the mere appearance of interaction.
  
The opposition and combination of the universe's two basic principles of [[Yin Yang|Yin and Yang]] is a large part of [[Taoism|Taoist]] religion. Some of the common associations with Yang and Yin, respectively, are: male and female, [[light]] and [[darkness|dark]], active and passive, motion and stillness. Although, these interpretations are common and understandable misconceptions of the greater meaning. The Tai-Chi in actuality has very little to do with dualism.
+
===Contemporary Dualism===
 +
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, dualism was defended by relatively few [[philosophy|philosophers]].  Influential parts of the German philosophical tradition moved towards [[idealism]]—the view that the most fundamental substances and properties of the universe were mental, and that physical entities were somehow reducible to ideas or thinking entities. The English-speaking tradition included some idealists (such as J. M. E. McTaggart), but other parts moved towards [[physicalism]]—the view that the most fundamental substances and properties of the universe were physical (that is, just those substances and properties describes in physics).
  
The complementary aspects of [[masculinity]] and [[femininity]] are revered by certain [[Neo-pagan]] religions.
+
By the mid-twentieth century, dualism was probably at its lowest popularity in history. Yet, in the second half of the century, new advocates of property dualism began to emerge, such as Saul Kripke and David Chalmers. In more recent years, Peter Unger published a book-length defense of substance dualism. The new dualists have devoted much of their philosophical energy to refining earlier arguments for dualism, such as those considered in the next section.
  
== Usage in philosophy of mind ==
+
==Descartes' Arguments for Dualism==
''Main Article: [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)|Mind-body dualism]]''
+
[[Descartes]] offered to main arguments for [[substance]] dualism, one based on our ability to conceive of physical and mental things existing without one another, and another based on the fact that the body is divisible, whereas the mind seems to be utterly simple. The former has traditionally enjoyed more popularity, and appears to capture a very common intuition; namely, that which we might express with the question "How could mere matter ''think''?" Yet the second argument has had its advocates—indeed, [[Leibniz]] took something like it to show that physical entities couldn't be ''substances'' in the proper sense, so that the fundamental constituents of reality had to be mental substances.
  
In [[philosophy of mind]], dualism is any of a narrow variety of views about the relationship between mind and matter, which claims that mind and matter are two ontologically separate categories. In particular, mind-body dualism claims that neither the mind nor matter can be reduced to each other in any way, and thus is opposed to [[materialism]] in general, and [[reductive materialism]] in particular. Mind-body dualism can exist as [[substance dualism]] which claims that the mind and the body are composed of a distinct substance, and as [[property dualism]] which claims that there may not be a distinction in substance, but that mental and physical properties are still categorically distinct, and not reducible to each other. This type of dualism is sometimes referred to as "''mind and body''". This is in contrast to [[monism]], which views mind and matter as being ultimately the same kind of thing.  See also [[Cartesian dualism]], [[substance dualism]], [[epiphenomenalism]].
+
===The Conceivability Argument===
 +
In rough outline, Descartes' Conceivability Argument runs as follows:
  
The belief in possessing both a body and a spirit as two separate entities was first documented in approximately 1000 B.C. by Zoroastrianism, and has become a very common view in the present day.
+
#I can conceive my mind as existing apart from my body.
 +
#I can conceive my body as existing apart from my mind.
 +
#If I can conceive something, then it is possible.
 +
#Therefore, it is possible for my mind and body to exist apart from one another (1-3).
 +
#Both my mind and body are substances.
 +
#Substances for which it is possible to exist apart from one another are distinct substances.
 +
#Therefore, my mind and body are distinct substances (4-6).
  
=== Mind-Matter Dualism in Eastern Philosophy ===
+
The main point on which this argument has been criticized is that it is hard to find an understanding of 'conceive' which will make premises 1-3 obviously true. Clearly, we seem to have ''some'' sort of imaginative ability that extends well beyond what is actually possible. For instance, I can pretend to be a square circle, even though such things are impossible. In that sense, I can certainly imagine the distinctness of my mind and body, but it is clear that substituting "imagine" for "conceive" in premise 3 will yield a false claim.
  
==== In Samkhya Philsophy ====
+
Descartes himself took the conceivability to be "clear and distinct perception"—a type of conception which was introspectively discernible (that is, one always knows when one is having a clear and distinct perception). He also provided a separate argument in order to show that there was a divine guarantee that whatever he clearly and distinctly perceived was possible. While that way of supporting the opening premises seemed acceptable to many of his contemporaries, later philosophers (even theistically-inclined ones) have found it unconvincing.
As per Samkhya, the whole of nature is called [[Prakriti]] which consists of three [[Guna]]s: [[Sattva]], [[Rajas]] and [[Tamas]]. Mind is as much part of the nature as matter is. Only conciousness is separate.
 
  
==== In Vedantic Philosophy ====
+
This exact issue has received considerable attention in the last half-century, however. One of the major lines of thought (explored in detail by David Chalmers) works by focusing the argument on the case of imagining beings that are physically identical to us, but which lack mental properties (that is, they have no consciousness). Chalmers argued that we can be more confident in the connection between conceivability and possibility in cases like this than in other cases, since what we're conceiving is something very closely tied to conception (that is, consciousness).
Vedantic philosophy also does not propose dualism in mind and matter. It rather looks at everything as [[Brahman]] which is also called [[Satchitananda]] (Being-Conciousness-Bliss). The nature (which consists of mind as well as matter) is a projection of this Brahman.
 
  
==== In Buddhist Philosophy ====
+
===The Divisibility Argument===
During the classical era of [[Buddhist philosophy in India]], philosophers such as [[Dharmakirti]] argue for a dualism between states of consciousness and [[Buddhist atoms]] (Buddhist atoms are merely the basic building blocks that make up reality), according to "the standard interpretation" of Dharmakirti's [[Buddhist metaphysics]]. (See Georges B.J. Dreyfus, ''Recognizing Reality'', [[SUNY Press]], for more information.) Typically, in [[Western philosophy]], dualism is considered to be a dualism between mind (nonphysical) and brain (physical), which ultimately involves mind interacting with pieces of tissue in the brain, and therefore, also interacting, in some sense, with the micro-particles (basic building blocks) that make up the brain tissue. Buddhist dualism, in Dharmakirti’s sense, is different in that it is a dualism between not the mind and brain which is made of particles, but rather, between states of consciousness (nonphysical) and basic building blocks (according to the [[Buddhist atomism]] of Dharmakirti, Buddhist atoms are also nonphysical: they are unstructured points of energy). Like so many Buddhists from 600-1000 C.E., Dharmakirti’s philosophy involved [[mereological nihilism]], meaning that other than states of consciousness, the only things that exist are momentary quantum particles, much like the particles of [[quantum physics]] ([[quarks]], [[electrons]], etc.).  Dharmakirti’s dualism however has one similarity to Western accounts of mind-body dualism, Dharmakirti’s dualism may also be considered as being not well worked-out, where few philosophers would assert that clear accounts of dualism in either tradition have been given, and many philosophers will assert, following Descartes, that dualism involves serious problems that remain unsolved.
+
Descartes' second argument for dualism is shorter than his first, but for that reason is more difficult to interpret. In outline, it runs as follows:
  
== Usage in philosophy of science ==
+
#My body is divisible.
In [[philosophy of science]], ''dualism'' often refers to the dichotomy between the "subject" (the observer) and the "object" (the observed). Some critics of Western science see this kind of dualism as a fatal flaw in science. In part, this has something to do with potentially complicated interactions between the subject and the object, of the sort discussed in the [[social construction]] literature.
+
#My mind is not divisible.
 +
#Therefore, my body is distinct from my mind. (1-2)
  
== Usage in physics ==
+
The chief difficulty with this argument is finding an understanding of "divisible" that will make the premises of the argument acceptable to someone who isn't already convinced of dualism. For instance, if "divisible" means "has parts that can be spatially separated from one another," then premise 2 will be question begging.
''Main Article: [[Wave-particle duality]]''
 
  
In [[physics]], ''dualism'' refers generally to the duality of waves and particles. Where an elementary particle shows the characteristics of both a wave and a physical particle.
+
At the same time, this argument does seem to be getting at ''something''. My mind appears to be simple in a certain way: it may have different aspects to it, but it does not seem to have (co-temporal) parts that could exist independently of each other. In addition, it seems to be entirely ''determinate''. That is, whereas there may not be ''exact'' boundaries in the world between physical things (e.g. there seems to be no exact boundary between my shoulder and my arm), there does seem to be an exact boundary between my mind everything else. This latter line of thought has been recently defended by Peter Unger.
  
==Usage in contemporary feminist theory==
+
==Objections to Dualism==
 +
Every worked-out version of substance or property dualist has faced objections that turn on the details of the version.  There are, however, certain lines of argument that appear in response to most types of dualism. This section presents two.
  
An interesting theory relating to dualism and a contemporary feminist world view is presented by [[Susan Bordo]]. Bordo contends that dualism has shaped Western culture since the time of [[Plato]], through [[Augustine of Hippo|Augustine]] and [[Descartes]], up to the present day.  
+
===The Causal Objection===
 +
Dualism tends to emerge from our sense that the mind is somehow very different than physical things, such as our bodies.  Yet, however much inclination we might have to see them as distinct, we have just as much inclination (if not more) to think that they are able to affect one another. Every time you make up your mind and decide to move your body, the background assumption is that your mental decision is capable of participating in a causal chain that ends with the movement of your body. We noted above how this, in conjunction with the thought that things must have something in common in order to interact, made troubles for Descartes. Descartes' dualist successors might have found ways to accept the principle commonality and causation, but their resulting theories strayed very far from common sense (for more, see [[Rationalism]]).
  
All three of these philosophers provide instructions, rules or models as to how to gain control over the body, with the ultimate aim of learning to live without it. The mind is superior to the body, and strength comes from disregarding the body's existence to reach an elevated spiritual level.
+
It may seem that the fact that the mind and body interact only presents problems for substance dualists, not property dualists. After all, it is open to a property dualist to say that there is just one thing (e.g. your brain) that has both physical and mental properties. There is then no need for a picture where radically distinct entities somehow "touch" each other.
  
Bordo believes that the existence of [[anorexia nervosa]] is the most telling and compelling argument that dualism is still a key aspect of modern thinking. She believes it is oftentimes a dangerous way of looking at the world. Those who are [[anorexic]] seek to gain ultimate control, and depriving oneself of food makes one a master of one's own body, which creates a sense of purity and perfection. Again, Bordo contends this stems from dualism, the separation of the mind and body.
+
Nevertheless, property dualism faces a more subtle version of the causal objection.  Consider an instance where, trying to make sense of fancy-sounding philosophy, you close your eyes to eliminate distraction. Now, if we asked what caused your eyes to close, it looks like there will be two stories. In one story, your eyes closed because certain neural impulses traveled to your eyes, and these impulses came from your brain, which produced these impulses because of some pattern of neural activity. In another story, you ''decided'' to close your eyes, and you did so. The objection stems from asking what the relation between these two stories is supposed to be. After all, "deciding to close your eyes" would, for the property dualist, be a mental property of your brain, whereas 'having some pattern of neural activity' would be a physical property. The dualist asserts that these properties are distinct, which seems to mean that these two causal stories have different starting points. But each starting point seems sufficient (intuitively) to cause your eyes to close, yet if both were sufficient, it would seem that only one of them could ''really'' be the cause. Yet this seems to be an absurd choice, which some have taken to suggest that the picture provided by property dualism is itself absurd.
  
==Usage in recent religious and philosophical movements==
+
===The Naturalist Objection===
 +
The last points of the previous objection point to the central thought behind the current objection. "[[Naturalism]]" is the view that the only things that exist are the entities described in the natural sciences (most importantly, physics). This view has some definite attraction: after all, contemporary science has made awe-inspiring strides in understanding many, many aspects of the universe, from atomic physics to the theory of evolution to [[Neuropsychology]]. Its predictive power is incredible (as a grim example: who, for most of our history, would have thought that two small spheres of plutonium were capable of mass destruction?). 
  
In recent years, with world travel and rapid communication systems, the distinction between "eastern" and "western" philosophy has been less significant than in previous times. In the wake of these changes new religious and philosophical movements have drawn freely upon all the world's philosophy to create syntheses and compendia based around [[new age]] and [[holism|holistic]] ideas. Dualism is often cited within these groups, along with ideas of [[Oneness (concept)|Oneness]], [[:Category:Holism|Wholeness]] and [[Theory of multiple intelligences|Theories of multiple intelligences]].
+
But this predictive power strongly suggests that natural science is not missing out on any the crucial pieces of reality. For instance, a version of physics which included all the fundamental particles, with the exception of photons, would soon be revealed as predictively inadequate. It would be missing some part of reality, and so would be unable to predict (for instance) the fact that black plastic gets hot on a sunny day. But [[physics]] seems, so far at least, to be quite capable of predicting occurrences in the world, and this suggests that it is not missing any of the fundamental constituents (entities or properties) of reality.
  
In the [[Emin Society]] (printed in their archives) Dualism is presented as the Law of Two, which is said to have [[Octave|seven levels]]:
+
Yet, naturalism and both types of dualism are inconsistent. There remain moves for the dualist to make: perhaps the most popular is for the dualist to say that mental properties have some strong relation (such as necessary covariance) with physical properties, but insist that this is less than identity.
  
* First level: Apparent Opposites
+
==References==
* Second level: The apparent opposites are actually two ends of the same bar (or the North-South [[vector]] is split by the East-West vector) (or the law of things adjacent)
+
*Aristotle. 1995. ''Selections''. translated and edited by Irwin and Fine. Indianapolis: Hackett Press. ISBN 0915145685
* Third level: [[Pitching]] and [[Yaw|Yawing]], (or [[Basque bargaining]])
+
*Chalmers, David. 1996. ''The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory''. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195117891
* Fourth level: [[Balance]] and [[motion|Movement]]
+
*Descartes, René. 1984. ''The Philosophical Writings of Descartes.'' Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521403238
* Fifth level: [[Solution|Solve]] and [[Coagulation|Coagulate]]
+
*Kant, Immanuel, Allen W. Wood, and J. B. Schneewind. 2002. ''Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Rethinking the Western tradition.'' New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300094862
* Sixth level: Over and Under [[Compensation]]
+
*Leibniz, G. W. 1989. ''Philosophical Essays''. translated and edited by Ariew and Garber. Indianpolis: Hackett Publishing. ISBN 0872200620
* Seventh level: Apparent movement between two poles (or [[heat|hot and cold]])
+
*Spinoza, B. 1992. ''Ethics''.  edited by Feldman, and translated by Shirley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.  ISBN 0872201317
 +
*Plato. 1997. ''Complete Works''. edited by Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett Press. ISBN 0872203492
 +
*Unger, Peter. 2006. ''All the Power in the World''. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195339347
  
== See also ==
+
==External links==
{|width=100%
+
All links retrieved January 30, 2024.
|-valign=top
 
|width=50%|
 
* [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)]]
 
* [[Advaita]]
 
* [[Dialectic]]
 
* [[Manicheism]] (moral dualism)
 
* [[Monism]]
 
|width=50%|
 
* [[Nondualism]]
 
* [[Pluralism]]
 
* [[Reductionism]]
 
* [[Didache#The Two Ways|Didache – The Two Ways]]
 
|}
 
  
== External links ==
+
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/ Dualism] – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
* [http://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/cosmology/dualism.htm Iranian Cosmogony & Dualism (CAIS)]
+
*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/dualism.htm Dualism and Mind] – The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
* [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-05 ''Dictionary of the History of ideas'':] Dualism in Philosophy and Religion
 
* [http://www.cogwriter.com/two.htm Binitarian View: One God, Two Beings from Before the Beginning] Discusses the biblical and historical belief of the nature of God
 
* [http://www.renneslechateaubooks.info/languedocdualism/index.htm Books on (Religious) Dualism] Recommendations and Reviews
 
* [http://www.kolahstudio.com/Underground/?p=153 A very good gallery of  images about Dualiti and twins symbols from the book Twins and doubles]
 
  
[[Category:Metaphysics]]
+
===General Philosophy Sources===
[[Category:Dualism]]
 
  
[[ca:Dualisme]]
+
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy].
[[da:Dualisme]]
+
*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy].
[[de:Dualismus (Philosophie)]]
+
*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online].
[[et:Dualism]]
+
*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg].
[[es:Dualismo]]
+
[[eo:Dualismo]]
+
[[category:Philosophy and religion]]
[[fr:Dualisme]]
+
[[Category:philosophy]]
[[fy:Dualisme]]
 
[[hr:Dualizam]]
 
[[is:Tvíhyggja]]
 
[[he:דואליזם]]
 
[[nl:Dualisme]]
 
[[ja:二元論]]
 
[[pl:Dualizm (religia)]]
 
[[pt:Dualismo]]
 
[[ru:Дуализм]]
 
[[simple:Dualism]]
 
[[sr:Дуализам]]
 
[[fi:Dualismi]]
 
[[sv:Dualism]]
 
[[tr:İkisellik]]
 
[[zh:二元論]]
 
  
 
+
{{Credit|136069738}}
{{Credit|61041902}}
 

Latest revision as of 21:17, 30 January 2024


The term "dualism" can be used for any theory according to which two entities, properties or types of facts are given equal status—that is, neither is taken as completely reducible or explicable in terms of the other. In contemporary philosophy, it refers to a certain view in the philosophy of mind. According to this view, whose clearest proponent is Descartes, mental entities or properties are parts of the universe which are just as fundamental as physical entities or properties. Descartes accepted a form of dualism often called substance dualism, according to which the mind is a special sort of substance, one which could, in principle continue to exist even if all physical substances (e.g. particles) were destroyed.

In the past century, substance dualism has enjoyed relatively little popularity, but property dualism has established a substantial following. According to property dualism, there may be no special mental entities that are capable of existing independently of all physical things, but some entities have certain mental properties (e.g. consciousness) that cannot be reduced to their physical properties (e.g. size and shape).

This article will survey the major dualist positions, and consider some of the main arguments for and against dualism.

Major Dualist Positions

Ancient Dualism

Most traditions that accept the existence of a thinking or feeling entity that can survive the death of the physical body can be counted as dualist. Among the ancient Greeks, such positions were common. Plato, in the Phaedo, argued that his rational part would survive the death of his body. His main reasons for the claim seem to stem from his being impressed with the ability of the mind to know eternal, necessary truths. This ability appears to be something beyond the reach of crude matter.

Aristotle's De Anima contains much material that seems to anticipate the contemporary anti-dualist position known as functionalism (see Philosophy of Mind). According to functionalism, mental features simply consist in the physical arrangement of the physical parts of some entity. Aristotle seems to have thought that many aspects of the soul could be understood in terms of the "form" of the organs of the body. Yet, in chapter 4 of book 3, Aristotle notes that the intellect is capable of understanding all things and so must not be 'mixed' with the body. Many of Aristotle's Christian commentators took this suggestion as the acceptance of an immaterial soul.

Both Plato and Aristotle, then, appear to be pulled towards some dualist position on the basis of the type of things that our intellects are capable of grasping. This stands in interesting contrast to the main arguments advanced in favor of dualism in the modern and contemporary periods, discussed below (an interesting exception is the related argument for idealism that Kant provides at the end of his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals).

Modern Dualism

The great French philosopher René Descartes argued at length for dualism in his Meditations on First Philosophy and Principles of Philosophy. According to Descartes, both our minds and our bodies are equally substances, meaning that they are capable of existing independently of all other entities (with the exception of God), and that "supported" properties. The properties of the body, Descartes thought, were those described in geometrical physics—in particular, extension. The properties of the mind, by contrast, were all at root manifestations of thought. At least in his mature work, however, Descartes recognized that from the claims that the body is an extended thing and that the mind is a thinking thing, it does not yet follow that the mind is a distinct entity from the body. The possibility that remained, in his mind, was that some single thing was both extended and thinking (this is the position now known as property dualism). It was with this possibility in view that he offered the arguments advanced below. Descartes does not appear to have considered the possibility that the property of thinking could itself be a physical property.

Another crucial part of Descartes' substance dualism was his claim that the mind and body were capable of causally affecting each other. It was on this point that much criticism was levied. Given his insistence on the distinct natures of the mind and body, it was hard to see how such distinct things could affect one another (consider, perhaps, how ghosts in most movies are unable to causally interact with the physical world). Indeed, the third proposition proved in Spinoza's Ethics was that things with nothing in common were incapable of causally affecting each other.

Much of continental Europoean metaphysics of the two centuries following Descartes revolved around ways to resolve this exact problem. Occasionalists such as Malebranche claimed that mind and body did not interact, but that God constantly affected each so that they effectly operated as though they interacted. Leibniz and his followers instead claimed that God had 'preprogramed' each substance so as to make them run in parallel, again creating the mere appearance of interaction.

Contemporary Dualism

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, dualism was defended by relatively few philosophers. Influential parts of the German philosophical tradition moved towards idealism—the view that the most fundamental substances and properties of the universe were mental, and that physical entities were somehow reducible to ideas or thinking entities. The English-speaking tradition included some idealists (such as J. M. E. McTaggart), but other parts moved towards physicalism—the view that the most fundamental substances and properties of the universe were physical (that is, just those substances and properties describes in physics).

By the mid-twentieth century, dualism was probably at its lowest popularity in history. Yet, in the second half of the century, new advocates of property dualism began to emerge, such as Saul Kripke and David Chalmers. In more recent years, Peter Unger published a book-length defense of substance dualism. The new dualists have devoted much of their philosophical energy to refining earlier arguments for dualism, such as those considered in the next section.

Descartes' Arguments for Dualism

Descartes offered to main arguments for substance dualism, one based on our ability to conceive of physical and mental things existing without one another, and another based on the fact that the body is divisible, whereas the mind seems to be utterly simple. The former has traditionally enjoyed more popularity, and appears to capture a very common intuition; namely, that which we might express with the question "How could mere matter think?" Yet the second argument has had its advocates—indeed, Leibniz took something like it to show that physical entities couldn't be substances in the proper sense, so that the fundamental constituents of reality had to be mental substances.

The Conceivability Argument

In rough outline, Descartes' Conceivability Argument runs as follows:

  1. I can conceive my mind as existing apart from my body.
  2. I can conceive my body as existing apart from my mind.
  3. If I can conceive something, then it is possible.
  4. Therefore, it is possible for my mind and body to exist apart from one another (1-3).
  5. Both my mind and body are substances.
  6. Substances for which it is possible to exist apart from one another are distinct substances.
  7. Therefore, my mind and body are distinct substances (4-6).

The main point on which this argument has been criticized is that it is hard to find an understanding of 'conceive' which will make premises 1-3 obviously true. Clearly, we seem to have some sort of imaginative ability that extends well beyond what is actually possible. For instance, I can pretend to be a square circle, even though such things are impossible. In that sense, I can certainly imagine the distinctness of my mind and body, but it is clear that substituting "imagine" for "conceive" in premise 3 will yield a false claim.

Descartes himself took the conceivability to be "clear and distinct perception"—a type of conception which was introspectively discernible (that is, one always knows when one is having a clear and distinct perception). He also provided a separate argument in order to show that there was a divine guarantee that whatever he clearly and distinctly perceived was possible. While that way of supporting the opening premises seemed acceptable to many of his contemporaries, later philosophers (even theistically-inclined ones) have found it unconvincing.

This exact issue has received considerable attention in the last half-century, however. One of the major lines of thought (explored in detail by David Chalmers) works by focusing the argument on the case of imagining beings that are physically identical to us, but which lack mental properties (that is, they have no consciousness). Chalmers argued that we can be more confident in the connection between conceivability and possibility in cases like this than in other cases, since what we're conceiving is something very closely tied to conception (that is, consciousness).

The Divisibility Argument

Descartes' second argument for dualism is shorter than his first, but for that reason is more difficult to interpret. In outline, it runs as follows:

  1. My body is divisible.
  2. My mind is not divisible.
  3. Therefore, my body is distinct from my mind. (1-2)

The chief difficulty with this argument is finding an understanding of "divisible" that will make the premises of the argument acceptable to someone who isn't already convinced of dualism. For instance, if "divisible" means "has parts that can be spatially separated from one another," then premise 2 will be question begging.

At the same time, this argument does seem to be getting at something. My mind appears to be simple in a certain way: it may have different aspects to it, but it does not seem to have (co-temporal) parts that could exist independently of each other. In addition, it seems to be entirely determinate. That is, whereas there may not be exact boundaries in the world between physical things (e.g. there seems to be no exact boundary between my shoulder and my arm), there does seem to be an exact boundary between my mind everything else. This latter line of thought has been recently defended by Peter Unger.

Objections to Dualism

Every worked-out version of substance or property dualist has faced objections that turn on the details of the version. There are, however, certain lines of argument that appear in response to most types of dualism. This section presents two.

The Causal Objection

Dualism tends to emerge from our sense that the mind is somehow very different than physical things, such as our bodies. Yet, however much inclination we might have to see them as distinct, we have just as much inclination (if not more) to think that they are able to affect one another. Every time you make up your mind and decide to move your body, the background assumption is that your mental decision is capable of participating in a causal chain that ends with the movement of your body. We noted above how this, in conjunction with the thought that things must have something in common in order to interact, made troubles for Descartes. Descartes' dualist successors might have found ways to accept the principle commonality and causation, but their resulting theories strayed very far from common sense (for more, see Rationalism).

It may seem that the fact that the mind and body interact only presents problems for substance dualists, not property dualists. After all, it is open to a property dualist to say that there is just one thing (e.g. your brain) that has both physical and mental properties. There is then no need for a picture where radically distinct entities somehow "touch" each other.

Nevertheless, property dualism faces a more subtle version of the causal objection. Consider an instance where, trying to make sense of fancy-sounding philosophy, you close your eyes to eliminate distraction. Now, if we asked what caused your eyes to close, it looks like there will be two stories. In one story, your eyes closed because certain neural impulses traveled to your eyes, and these impulses came from your brain, which produced these impulses because of some pattern of neural activity. In another story, you decided to close your eyes, and you did so. The objection stems from asking what the relation between these two stories is supposed to be. After all, "deciding to close your eyes" would, for the property dualist, be a mental property of your brain, whereas 'having some pattern of neural activity' would be a physical property. The dualist asserts that these properties are distinct, which seems to mean that these two causal stories have different starting points. But each starting point seems sufficient (intuitively) to cause your eyes to close, yet if both were sufficient, it would seem that only one of them could really be the cause. Yet this seems to be an absurd choice, which some have taken to suggest that the picture provided by property dualism is itself absurd.

The Naturalist Objection

The last points of the previous objection point to the central thought behind the current objection. "Naturalism" is the view that the only things that exist are the entities described in the natural sciences (most importantly, physics). This view has some definite attraction: after all, contemporary science has made awe-inspiring strides in understanding many, many aspects of the universe, from atomic physics to the theory of evolution to Neuropsychology. Its predictive power is incredible (as a grim example: who, for most of our history, would have thought that two small spheres of plutonium were capable of mass destruction?).

But this predictive power strongly suggests that natural science is not missing out on any the crucial pieces of reality. For instance, a version of physics which included all the fundamental particles, with the exception of photons, would soon be revealed as predictively inadequate. It would be missing some part of reality, and so would be unable to predict (for instance) the fact that black plastic gets hot on a sunny day. But physics seems, so far at least, to be quite capable of predicting occurrences in the world, and this suggests that it is not missing any of the fundamental constituents (entities or properties) of reality.

Yet, naturalism and both types of dualism are inconsistent. There remain moves for the dualist to make: perhaps the most popular is for the dualist to say that mental properties have some strong relation (such as necessary covariance) with physical properties, but insist that this is less than identity.

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Aristotle. 1995. Selections. translated and edited by Irwin and Fine. Indianapolis: Hackett Press. ISBN 0915145685
  • Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195117891
  • Descartes, René. 1984. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521403238
  • Kant, Immanuel, Allen W. Wood, and J. B. Schneewind. 2002. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Rethinking the Western tradition. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300094862
  • Leibniz, G. W. 1989. Philosophical Essays. translated and edited by Ariew and Garber. Indianpolis: Hackett Publishing. ISBN 0872200620
  • Spinoza, B. 1992. Ethics. edited by Feldman, and translated by Shirley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. ISBN 0872201317
  • Plato. 1997. Complete Works. edited by Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett Press. ISBN 0872203492
  • Unger, Peter. 2006. All the Power in the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195339347

External links

All links retrieved January 30, 2024.

General Philosophy Sources

Credits

New World Encyclopedia writers and editors rewrote and completed the Wikipedia article in accordance with New World Encyclopedia standards. This article abides by terms of the Creative Commons CC-by-sa 3.0 License (CC-by-sa), which may be used and disseminated with proper attribution. Credit is due under the terms of this license that can reference both the New World Encyclopedia contributors and the selfless volunteer contributors of the Wikimedia Foundation. To cite this article click here for a list of acceptable citing formats.The history of earlier contributions by wikipedians is accessible to researchers here:

The history of this article since it was imported to New World Encyclopedia:

Note: Some restrictions may apply to use of individual images which are separately licensed.