Xunzi

Xún Zǐ (Wade-Giles: Hsün Tzu) (荀子; b. Zhao c.310– 237 B.C.E.) was a Chinese philosopher whose notoriety is derived mainly from his contentious thesis that human nature is evil, and, resultantly, that people require the positive influence of teachers and ritual praxis to become functioning and productive members of society. Despite this pessimistic conjecture, he is still a resoundingly Confucian scholar, stressing the importance of education, ritually-appropriate action, and conservative reliance of past texts and models as normative sources for lifestyles and ethics. Some scholars suggest that his synthesis of Confucian humanism with a cynically pragmatic outlook could was likely a product of the intensive political and social turmoil that characterized China during the Warring States Period (5th century B.C.E.-221 B.C.E.).

Little is known of the historical Xun Zi, save that he was born in the state of Zhao, studied in Qi, and held three successive terms as the headmaster of the prestigious Ji Xia Academy. He is perhaps best known through his two famous pupils: Li Si (prime minister to (the first Qin emperor) and the philosopher Han Fei Zi, who developed the quasi-authoritarian aspects of his teacher's thought into the doctrine called Legalism. While Xun Zi's thought was influential during Han times (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.), his influence waned from the Tang dynasty (618-907 C.E.) onwards (especially when compared to the idealistic Confucianism of Mencius).

The Xunzi

Unlike the aphoristic style of the Analects and Mencius, Xun Zi wrote elaborately argued essays that were collected into the book bearing his name. Emerging as it did in the end of the philosophically florescent Hundred Schools of Thought period, Xunzi was in the unique position of being able to both critique and adapt elements of all rival philosophers and theorists - leading to a text that is both argumentatively dense and notably syncretistic. Some of the more significant chapters (with their primary theses) include::

• A Discussion of Heaven (Tian), which rejects the Mencian notion that heaven has a moral will. Instead, Xun Zi asserts that heaven is simply the natural world, that natural disasters have no connection to human action, and that people must focus their energies on the social realm, rather than waste them on soothsaying, astrology or metaphysical speculation.
• Discussion of Rites (li), which rehabilitates the role of li from its near omission in the Mencius, and argues that ritual action is key to developing a moral consciousness.
• Dispelling Obsessions, which argues for the necessity of remaining flexible in one's outlook and describes the disasters that can befall an individual who loses this perspective.
• Proper Use of Terms (Zhengming), which uses names as a means of assessing roles and determining the propriety of actions (a theme that is addressed in even more detail by Han Fei Zi).
• Man's Nature is Evil, which overtly rejects the Mencian claim that people have a natural inclination toward goodness. This chapter argues that humans are naturally inclined towards selfishness and evil, and that if these inclinations are not curbed, human societies would devolve into anarchy. Thus, he argues for morality as a social construct, inculcated through exemplary teachers, study of the classics, punitive law, and following ritual precepts.

These issues and themes will be addressed in greater detail below.

Chapters of the Xunzi

Discussion of Music

Mozi, another philosopher of the Warring States era (pre-unification of China), discouraged the use of music and other forms of culture as being unhelpful for moral cultivation and wasteful of resources needed to keep the state healthy and prosperous. Xunzi's chapter, written as an explicit counter to Master Mo, criticizes this stance through a number of queries: why should music be renounced if it was created by the sage kings to create order in expression? if it brings people into unity and harmony, and soldiers into order (for example, via war dances)? if it has the ability to reform people? Following the conservative bent of classical Confucian thought, Xunzi argues that music, as defined and ordered by the ancient sage kings, acts like ritual in that it moderates and restrains the person listening and the person performing. It also positively inspires people and is thus an effective adjunct to proper governance. However, and again agreeing with Confucius, Xunzi does admit that there are types of music which can lead one into licentiousness, but notes that the gentleman knows to be wary of his environment and of the sounds that he hears.

Music embodies an unchanging harmony, while rites represent unalterable reason. Music unites that which is the same; rites distinguish that which is different; and through the combination of rites and music the human heart is governed... Because he criticized music, one would expect Mozi to have met with some punishment. And yet in his lifetime the enlightened kings had all passed away and there was no one to correct his errors, so that stupid men continue to study his doctrines and bring jeopardy to themselves.

Dispelling Obsession

The core ideas presented in Xunzi's chapter on dispelling obsession are encapsulated in a quotation that he selects from the Book of Odes (one of the Five Classics that constituted the core of the Confucian curriculum):

I pick and pick the burr-weed

But it does not fill my slanting basket.

I sigh for my loved one;

I would be in the ranks of Zhou.

Because the mind of the ode's narrator is divided her work and her love for a man in the ranks of Zhou, she is unable to complete even this undemanding task. Avoiding this type of fixation, with its possibly devastating consequences, forms the basis for this chapter. Openly addressing the philosophical milieu that he was participating in, Xunzi used this chapter to contrast his own pragmatic viewpoint with those of other philosophers, which he claimed fell victim to various obsessions (i.e. that Mozi focused too much on utility, Zhuangzi fixated on Nature, and Huizi (an early logician) "was obsessed by words and did not understand the truth that lies behind them"). When thus distracted, he argues that an individual's mind will not be able to absorb any new information from outside of the realm of their obsession, making them both confused and ineffectual. This is contrasted with the Way of the Sage, who learns to refrain from obsession and to keep his(/her) mind open. When this happens, the mind is free to accurately perceive and respond to the world, such that "there are none of the myriad beings of creation that have form and yet are not perceived by it, none that are perceived and yet not comprehended, none that are comprehended andyet not assigned to their proper places." Once one achieves this perspective, the world can be properly understood, responded to, and regulated.

Rectifying Names

Seizing upon a philosophical issue debated by thinkers before him, such as Mozi and Confucius, Xunzi argues for the rectification of names. The most important reason for this process is that it would allow a ruler to accurate command his people in accordance with the Way, without being misunderstood. Indeed, promotion of effective government seems to be the primary goal of this chapter: "When the ruler's accomplishments are long lasting and his undertakings are brought to completion, this is the height of a good government. All of this is the result of being careful to see that men stick to the names which have been agreed upon."

Xunzi also uses the rectification of names to refute previous philosophers, such as the writer(s) of the Dao De Jing. For example, he uses this chapter to question the Daoist approach to "desire" - specifically, to the manner in which the Daodejing argues that desires should simply be renounced. Xunzi, however, argues that "those who maintain that desires must be gotten rid of before there can be orderly government fail to consider whether desires can be guided..." Here Xunzi asserts that if someone truly understood desires, they would not make such a contradictory statement (as desires, in Xunzi's mind, can only be guided through appropriate instruction and ritual praxis). In contrast to the Daoist view, Xunzi focuses on the mind's ability to reform actions: if one's mind is trained, although there are many desires they will not be acted upon. Conversely, if the mind is untrained, although there are few desires they will be acted upon. In this way, Xunzi uses classification and understanding to assert his point: it is the mind which has control over desires, desires cannot simply be forgotten because they are part of human nature and are from Heaven. Also, if a man is truly in accordance with the Way, he will not allow mere desires to change his course of direction.

The rectification of names is an important concept, especially considering the course of Chinese philosophy in this era. Philosophers such as Confucius and Laozi, for example, used the same terms (Dao, wu-wei , sage, etc.) with divergent meanings. Thus, one of the aims behind rectifying names would have been the creation of a consistent language that would allow each word to have a consistent and universal meaning.

Man's Nature is Evil

Xunzi believed that all people are born with natural tendencies toward "evil:" that is, a taste for profit and beauty and a susceptibility to jealousy and hate, all of which, if indulged in, would lead to disorder and criminality. In order to attain a oneness with the Way, a dedication to morality, Xunzi argued for the guidance of a proper teacher: only this would allow one to become morally upright. A proper teacher would have been trained in the teachings of the ancient sage kings who saw that human nature was inherently immoral and thus wrong. From this realization, the sage kings developed rituals and regulations to shape people into accordance with the Way. Thus the process of following the teachings of the sage kings (and a teacher who can teach them) equates a renunciation of one's evil nature and a commitment to conscious activity (conscious activity because one must deliberately and willingly change their actions in order to overstep their evils which would otherwise occur naturally, without conscious thought).

While Xunzi is a Confucianist, he disembarks from the arguments of previous Confucians here: Confucius claimed that some people (but not all, and not even Confucius himself) were born with the ability to love learning and act in accordance with the Way. Mencius believed that all people were inherently good and that it was negative environmental influences which caused immorality in people. But Xunzi picks apart Mencius's argument in his writing. Mencius, whom Xunzi refers to by name, does not understand the difference between nature and conscious practice. The former is inherent, as sight is to the eye or hearing is to the ear: one cannot be taught to see. However conscious thought is something which must be taught and learned:

Now it is the nature of man that when he is hungry he will desire satisfaction, when he is cold he will desire warmth, and when he is weary he will desire rest. This is his emotional nature. And yet a man, although he is hungry, will not dare to be the first to eat if he is in the presence of his elders, because he knows that he should yield to them, and although he is weary, he will not dare to demand rest because he knows that he should relieve others of the burden of labor. For a son to yield to his father or a younger brother to relive his elder brother - acts such as these are all contrary to man's nature and run counter to his proper forms enjoined by ritual principles.

However, the flaw with Xunzi's argument is as follows: if human nature is naturally evil, how did the sage kings come to invent the idea of goodness and morality? Xunzi recognizes the apparent flaw and argues that, just as a potter consciously creates a pot (an object and action not part of his own nature), so does a sage consciously create the rituals and regulations to be followed if morality is the goal. These creations are not part of one's nature, but rather stem from a departure from nature. Xunzi states that "every man who desires to do good does so precisely because his nature is evil... Whatever a man lacks in himself he will seek outside" as the sage kings did when they referenced their personal experiments and ideas to create a means toward morality. According to Xunzi, if people were naturally good, then leaving peoples and governments without laws and restrictions would cause no harm or disorder. Xunzi does not believe this state of affairs to be possible.

Xunzi believed that all people are born with the capacity to become good, according to Xunzi. For example, great kings like Yao and Shun were born no different from thieves like Robber Zhi or the tyrant Jie: that is, all four possessed the same nature at birth.

The man in the street can become a Yu. What does this mean? What made the sage emperor Yu a Yu, I would reply, was the fact that he practiced benevolence and righteousness and abided by the proper rules and standards. If this is so, then benevolence, righteousness, and proper standards must be based upon principles which can be known and practiced. Any man in the street [can become a Yu].

Xunzi argues that if one associates with gentlemen, one will become a gentleman; if one associates with the immoral, one will become immoral (a similar sentiment can be found in the Analects of Confucius). Xunzi ends the chapter with, "'If you do not know a man, look at his friends; if you do not know a ruler, look at his attendants.' Environment is the important thing! Environment is the important thing!" This attitude toward nurture over nature may appear similar to that of Mencius, but the stances of the two in this case should not be confused: while Mencius argues that people are born good but need a positive environment in order to fully prosper with the Way, Xunzi argues that it is only the environment which can save a person from immorality.

Significance

• historical evaluation (and the dao tong)
• western scholarship

References

ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

• de Bary, Wm. Theodore. Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume 1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. ISBN 0-231-02255-7.
• Graham, A.C. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1993. ISBN 0-8126-9087-7
• Schwartz, Benjamin I. The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985. ISBN 0-674-96190-0.
• Searle, J.R. and Vanderveken, D. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
• Watson, Burton. Xunzi: Basic Writings. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-231-12965-3.
• Yao, Xinzhong. An Introduction to Confucianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-521-64430-5.

External links

• Dmoz directory on Xun Zi
• Hsun Tzu historical information and writing excerpts
• Article from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Full text of the Xunzi (in Chinese)

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