Li (rites)

Li (禮 pinyin: Lǐ)is a classical Chinese ideograph which finds its most extensive use in Confucian and post-Confucian Chinese philosophy. Just like other ideographs of the Chinese lexicon, li encompasses not a definitive object but rather a somewhat abstract idea; as such, it is translated in a number of different ways. Most often, li is described using some form of the word ‘ritual’ (as in Burton Watson’s ‘rites’, and Henry Rosemont and Roger Ames’ ‘ritual propriety’), but it has also been translated as ‘customs’, ‘etiquette’, ‘morals’, and ‘rules of proper behavior’, among other terms.

Confucian Context

See also: Confucianism, Li Ji

As with many other classical Chinese concepts, li does not map neatly onto any particular Western notion. While it includes elements that would definitively be termed "religious rituals" (such as ancestor worship and the various elements of the Imperial Cult catalogued in the Book of Rites), it can also be used to refer to domains as variegated as ethical norms, social etiquette, and even (in the case of Mencius) internal moral impulses. The unifying thread between these seemingly disparate notions is that they are all related in practice — li, stated simply, refers to the standards of behavior that both constrain and guide human action. Given the overarching concern with social order and ethical conduct prevalent in classical Chinese religion and philosophy, it is easy to see how this notion became entirely central to the early Confucians. However (and despite this general consensus on the idea's import), each of the classical Confucian philosophers addressed the notion differently, which necessitates examining them each in turn.

Confucius

To begin, it is helpful to recall, as Angus Graham does, that Confucius had a particularly immediate relationship with li, in that he was professionally employed as an intinerant teacher of rites and ceremonies. As Graham suggests,

It may be a mistake to think of [Confucius] as finding his message first and attracting disciples afterwards. His thought and his sense of mission are of a kind which might develop naturally from the experience of an ordinary teacher of the Songs, Documents, ceremony and music of Chou, distinguished only in that his disciples learn from him, as from an inspiring schoolmaster, much more than is on the curriculum.

In his context as an educator (and later as a religious and moral philosopher), Confucius perceived the necessity of li (here defined broadly as contextually-appropriate behavior) in promoting ethics and social harmony. Regardless of the situation, li, in the sense of internalized models of (and guides to) appropriate behavior, were understood to discipline one's conduct and channel it into the context where it would be most personally, socially, and (perhaps) spiritually beneficial:

Yan Hui said, "Could I ask what becoming authoritative [ren] entails?” The Master replied, “Do not look at anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety [li]; do not listen to anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not speak about anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not do anything that that violates the observance of ritual propriety" (12:1).

Likewise, the Analects suggest that "Exemplary persons (junzi) learn broadly of culture, discipline this learning through observing ritual propriety (li), and moreover, in so doing, can remain on course without straying from it" (6:27).

In the above examples, individual learning (in thought and practice) is seen to depend on the selection and adoption of positive models of appropriate behaviors (in all contexts, from the mundane to transcendent). However, these examples of propriety should not be seen as overtly stultifying forces. Instead, they provide a framework within which one can act to bring harmony and order to the world. Just as a poet has limitless options, even when working within a restricted creative domain (such as the sonnet form), so to does the doctrine of li discipline conduct without totally subverting human agency. This type of disciplined-yet-unhindered conduct is suggested in the Analects, when Confucius states that "from seventy I could give my heart-and-mind [xin] free rein without overstepping the boundaries" (2:4).

Intriguingly, the Confucian schema goes on to suggest that, by internalizing this style of conduct, an individual would begin to impact those around thems, seemingly through a process ethical osmosis:

The Master said, "Deference unmediated by observing ritual propriety (li) is lethargy; caution unmediated by observing ritual propriety is timidity; boldness unmediated by observing ritual propriety is rowdiness; candor unmediated by observing ritual propriety is rudeness. Where exemplary people (junzi) are earnestly committed to their parents, the people will aspire to authoritative conduct (ren); where they do not neglect their old friends, the people will not be indifferent to each other" (8:2).

This perspective is echoed by the (perhaps apocryphal) tale of Confucius' desire to live amongst the "uncivilized" people on the fringes of the Chinese polity:

The Master wanted to go and live amongst the nine clans of the Eastern Yi Barbarians. Someone said to him, "What would you do about their crudeness?"

The Master replied, "Were an exemplary person (junzi) to live among them, what crudeness could there be?" (9:14).

Such ideas were also central to the Confucian notion of proper governance, which set up the li framework as a foil to the notion of coersive laws and punishments:

Lead the people with administrative injunctions and keep them orderly with penal law, and they will avoid punishments but will be without a sense of shame. Lead them with excellence (de) and keep them orderly through observing ritual propriety (li) and they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover, will order themselves (2.3).

The clearest statement of faith in this perspective is found in the Analects (2:1), which argues that "Governing with excellence (de) can be compared to being the North Star: the North Star dwells in its place, and the multitude of stars pay it tribute."

Mencius

Unlike his storied antecedent, Mencius adopted a considerably more internalized understanding of li. Instead of describing an external (though learnable) model of propriety, the term for Mencius came to signify an "inward sense of good manners." In the process, li lost its place of primacy, becoming simply one of four innate virtues (yi ("righteousness"), ren ("benevolence"), li ("propriety"), and zhi ("wisdom")). His faith in the inherency of these virtues was central to his doctrine that human nature is good:

As for [people's] qing [essence], "what they genuinely are," they can become good. This is what I mean by calling their natures good. As for their becoming not good, this is not the fault of their potential. Humans all have the heart of compassion. Humans all have the heart of disdain. Humans all have the heart of respect. Humans all have the heart of approval and disapproval. The heart of compassion is benevolence. The heart of disdain is righteousness. The heart of respect is propriety. The heart of approval and disapproval is wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not welded to us externally. We inherently have them. It is simply that we do not concentrate upon them. Hence, it is said, "Seek it and you will get it. Abandon it and you will lose it" (Mencius 6A:6).

Thus, one can see a notable shift in focus between the Confucian and the Mencian perspectives. While Confucius stressed the necessity of li in promoting harmonious behavior, Mencius has substantially more faith in human nature. The difference between these perspectives is eloquently summarized by Benjamin Schwartz:

As a Confucian, Mencius also believes in the ‘objective’ prescriptions of li. He even seems to believe that they must be learned. Yet he has a burning faith that what is learned is really ours to begin with because the li are ultimately the external expressions of a capacity for ‘humanity and righteousness’ as intrinsic to the human organism as is his whole physical organization. He obviously also believes that only if humans understand that what is right is inherently in their ‘natures’ can they be brought to exercise their responsibility as moral agents.

Later Confucians

See also: Zhu Xi, Wang Yang-ming

Li in Other Religio-Philosophical Systems

See also: Mozi, Moism, Legalism, Han Feizi, Daoism, Dao De Jing, Zhuangzi

On the other hand, the Legalist movement espoused a much more rigid framework, valuing large-scale order over individual freedom.

References

ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

• de Bary, William Theodore. Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume 1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. ISBN 0-231-02255-7.
• Berthrong, John. Transformations of the Confucian Way. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. ISBN 0-8133-2804-7.
• Chan, Wing-tsit. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963. 49-83.
• Graham, A.C. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1993. ISBN 0-8126-9087-7
• Mencius. With Introduction and Translation by Bryan W. van Norden. Included in Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2001. 111-155. ISBN 1889119091
• Schwartz, Benjamin I. The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985. ISBN 0-674-96190-0.
• Watson, Burton. Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967.
• Watson, Burton. Xunzi: Basic Writings. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-231-12965-3.
• Yao, Xinzhong. An Introduction to Confucianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-521-64430-5.

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