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| − | :''This article attempts to confine itself to discussion of relativism in morality and ethics. For other manifestations of relativism, see [[relativism]].''
| + | #REDIRECT[[Moral relativism]] |
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| − | In [[philosophy]], '''moral relativism''' is the position that [[Morality|moral]] or [[Ethics|ethical]] propositions do not reflect [[Moral absolutism|absolute]] and universal moral truths, but instead make claims [[relativism|relative]] to [[Society|social]], [[Culture|cultural]], [[History|historical]] or [[person]]al circumstances. Moral relativists hold that no universal standard exists by which to assess an ethical proposition's truth. Relativistic positions often see moral [[values]] as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries or in the context of individual preferences. An extreme relativist position might suggest that judging the moral or ethical judgments or acts of another person or group has no meaning, <!--note I rephrased to remove reference to "cannot or should not be judged", as "should not" implies a moral ought, which an extreme relativist would reject—> though most relativists propound a more limited version of the theory. <!--Who would suggest the former?—><!--I would, for what that is worth.—>
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| − | Some moral relativists — for example, the [[Existentialism|existentialist]] [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] — hold that a personal and [[Subjectivity|subjective]] [[moral core]] lies or ought to lie at the foundation of individuals' moral acts. In this view public [[morality]] reflects social convention, and only personal, subjective morality expresses true [[Authenticity (philosophy)|authenticity]]. <!-- Did Sartre use the expression public morality?—>
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| − | Moral relativism differs from [[Value pluralism|moral pluralism]] — which acknowledges the co-existence of opposing ideas and practices, but accepts limits to differences, such as when vital human needs get violated. Moral relativism, in contrast, grants the possibility of moral judgments that do not accept such limits. <!-- Who has used the expression "moral pluralism"? Not sure what that sentence means. —>
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| − | In popular culture people often describe themselves as "morally relativist," meaning that they are accepting of other people's values and agree that there is no one "right" way of doing some things. However, this actually has little to do with the philosophical idea of relativism; relativism does not necessarily imply tolerance, just as moral absolutism does not imply intolerance. These people's moral outlook can be explained from both theoretical frameworks.
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| − | == History==
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| − | Commentators may describe relativism as a temporal idea of the "new" that conflicts with absolute moral standards supplied by [[tradition]]. Moral relativism, however, encompasses views and arguments that people in some cultures have held for a very long time, such as the ancient [[Jainism|Jaina]] [[Anekantavada]] principle of [[Mahavira]] (c. 599 – 527 B.C.E.) and the ancient [[Taoist]] writings of [[Zhuangzi|Chuang Tzu]] (4th century B.C.E.).
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| − | History records relativist positions over several thousand years. The assertion by [[Protagoras]] (c. [[481 B.C.E.|481]] – [[420 B.C.E.]]) that "man is the measure of all things" provides an early [[philosophical]] precursor to modern relativism. The [[Ancient Greece|Greek]] historian [[Herodotus]] (c. [[484 B.C.E.|484]] – [[420 B.C.E.]]) observed that each society regards its own belief system and way of doing things as the best, in contrast to that of others. Various ancient philosophers also questioned the idea of an absolute standard of morality.
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| − | The 18th-century [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] philosopher [[David Hume]] (1711 - 1776) serves in several important respects as the father both of modern [[emotivism]] and of moral relativism, though Hume himself did not espouse relativism. He distinguished between matters of fact and matters of value, and suggested that moral judgments consist of the latter, for they do not deal with verifiable facts that obtain in the world, but only with our sentiments and passions. But Hume regarded some of our sentiments as universal. He famously denied that morality has any objective standard, and suggested that the universe remains indifferent to our preferences and our troubles.
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| − | In the modern era, [[anthropologists]] such as [[Ruth Benedict]] (1887 – 1948) cautioned observers against [[ethnocentricism]] — using the standards of their own culture to evaluate their subjects of study. Benedict said that morals do not exist — only [[custom]]s do; and that in comparing customs, the anthropologist "insofar as he remains an anthropologist . . . is bound to avoid any weighting of one in favor of the other". To some extent, the increasing body of knowledge of great differences in belief among societies caused both [[social scientist]]s and philosophers to question whether any objective, absolute standards pertaining to values could exist. This led some to posit that differing systems have equal validity, with no standard for adjudicating among conflicting beliefs. The Finnish philosopher-anthropologist [[Edward Westermarck]] (1862 – 1939) ranks as one of the first to formulate a detailed theory of moral relativism. He portrayed all moral ideas as subjective judgments that reflect one's upbringing. He rejected [[G.E. Moore]]'s (1873 – 1958) [[ethical intuitionism]] — in vogue during the early part of the 20th century, and which identified moral propositions as true or false, and known to us through a special faculty of [[Intuition (knowledge)|intuition]] — because of the obvious differences in beliefs among societies, which he said provided evidence of the lack of any innate, intuitive power.
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| − | == Philosophical views ==
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| − | Moral relativism generally stands in marked contrast to [[moral absolutism]], [[moral realism]], and [[moral naturalism]], which all maintain the existence of moral facts: facts that entities can both know and judge, whether through some process of verification or through intuition. Examples include the philosophy of [[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] (1712 – 1778), who saw man's nature as inherently good, or of [[Ayn Rand]], who believed morality derives from people exercising their unobstructed rationality. Other moral absolutists believe that humankind can derive moral knowledge from external sources such as a deity or [[revelation|reveal]]ed doctrines. Some hold that moral facts inhere in [[nature]] or [[reality]]. In each case, however, moral facts remain invariant, though the circumstances to which they apply may differ. Moreover, each of these schools of thought sees moral facts as objective and determinable.
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| − | Moral relativism rejects the idea of an objective morality, but its proponents do not all agree as to the nature of morality.
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| − | === Descriptive relativism===
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| − | So-called [[descriptive relativism|descriptive relativist]]s (for example, [[Ralph Barton Perry]] [1876 - 1957]) accept the existence of fundamental disagreements about the right course of action even when the same facts obtain and the same consequences seem likely to arise. However, the descriptive relativist does not necessarily deny the existence of a single correct moral appraisal, given the same set of circumstances. Other descriptivists believe that opposing moral beliefs can both hold true simultaneously, though their critics point out that this leads to obvious logical problems. The later descriptivists (for example, several leading [[Existentialists]]) regard morality as entirely subjective and personal, and beyond the judgment of others. In this view moral judgments resemble aesthetic considerations and remain resistant to rational analysis.
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| − | ===Meta-ethical relativism ===
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| − | [[meta-ethics|Meta-ethical]] relativists maintain that all moral judgments have their origins either in societal or in individual standards, and that no single objective standard exists by which one can assess the truth of a moral proposition. While he preferred to deal with more practical [[real life|real-life]] ethical matters, the British philosopher [[Bernard Williams]] (1929 – 2003) reluctantly came to this conclusion when he wrote from a meta-ethical standpoint. Meta-ethical relativists, in general, believe that the descriptive properties of terms such as "good", "bad", "right", and "wrong" do not stand subject to [[Universality (philosophy)|universal]] [[truth]] conditions, but only to societal convention and personal preference. Given the same set of verifiable facts, some societies or individuals will have a fundamental disagreement about what one ''ought'' to do based on societal or individual [[norm (sociology)|norm]]s, and one cannot adjudicate these using some independent standard of evaluation. The latter standard will always be societal or personal and not universal, unlike, for example, the scientific standards for assessing temperature or for determining mathematical truths.
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| − | === Relativism and emotivism===
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| − | Some philosophers maintain that moral relativism devolves into [[emotivism]], the movement inspired by [[logical positivists]] in the early part of the 20th century. (Leading exponents of logical positivism include [[Rudolph Carnap]] (1891 – 1970) and [[A. J. Ayer]] (1910 – 1989).) Going beyond Hume, positivists regard a proposition as ''meaningful'' only if one can verify it by [[logic]]al or scientific inquiry. Thus [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] propositions, which one cannot verify in this manner, are not simply incorrect, ''they are meaningless'', nonsensical. Moral judgments are primarily expressions of emotional preferences or states, devoid of cognitive content; consequently, they are not subject to verification. As such, moral propositions are essentially meaningless utterances or, at best, express personal attitudes (see, for example, [[Charles L. Stevenson]] [1908–1979]). Not all relativists would regard moral propositions as meaningless; indeed, many make any number of assertions about morality, assertions that they undoubtedly believe meaningful. However, other philosophers have argued that, since we have no means of analyzing a moral proposition, it is essentially meaningless, and (in their view) relativism is therefore tantamount to emotivism.
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| − | The proposition that one cannot verify moral judgement by empirical means (and that it remains therefore meaningless) presents, according to many philosophers, a self-[[contradiction]]. In this view, the statement, "X is meaningless if it isn't subject to verification" cannot be verified by the very criterion set forth by the proposition.
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| − | ===Leo Strauss ===
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| − | Political theorist [[Leo Strauss]] (1899 – 1973) subscribed to a species of relativism, believing that there do not exist objective criteria for assessing ethical principles, and that one can form a rational morality only in the limited sense that one must accept its ultimate subjectivity. This view closely resembles the one advocated by existentialist philosophers [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889 – 1976) and [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] (1905 - 1980). The latter famously maintained that ethical principles only arise from our personal feelings at the time we act, and not from any antecedent principles.
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| − | === Karl Marx===
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| − | Some have linked [[Karl Marx]] (1818 – 1883) with a type of moral relativism. He asserted that each society's moral system simply came about as a product of its [[mode of production]] and of its [[class structure]]. He believed that the interests of the ruling socioeconomic [[Social class|class]] would prevail as a society's dominant moral system. How Marx viewed this sociological morality remains the subject of debate. Some argue he had a [[historicism|historicist]] view that the movement of history would bring society to a true, final form of morality. Others believe that Marx did not put much weight behind societal morality and that he used other moral standards.
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| − | === Friedrich Nietzsche ===
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| − | {{main|Perspectivism}}
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| − | [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] identified morality as an error, introduced to human thought through the concept of [[dualism]] and maintained through the [[Christianity|church]]. He saw his life-long task, the revaluing of all values, as rescuing mankind from these errors. He envisioned a future where individuals acted naturally, using their full natural potential or [[will to power]]. He believed that mankind would progress and fulfil this potential only by starting to act naturally and instinctively according to each individual's desires and drives. The [[Übermensch]] would represent the strong, powerful, natural and happy outcome. Happiness would naturally emerge, defined as "the feeling that power increases, that a resistance is overcome". Nietzsche wanted to prepare the soil for mankind's growth by "re-naturalising" human drives. Once we become free of morality (and, by association, of religion) he believed that the coming generations would grow unpolluted, free and strong. (See ''[[Beyond Good and Evil]]'', ''[[The Twilight of the Idols]]'', ''[[The Antichrist (book)|The Antichrist]]'', etc.)
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| − | == Debate on moral relativism ==
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| − | {{Unreferencedsect|date=June 2006}}
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| − | ===Other cultures===
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| − | Those who support positions of moral absolutism or [[Moral universalism|universalism]] often express trenchant criticism of moral relativism; some sometimes equate it with outright "[[immorality]]" or [[amorality]]. Some believe that various historical and cultural events and practices (including [[the Holocaust]], [[Stalinism]], [[Apartheid]] in South Africa, [[genocide]], [[Just War theory|unjust war]]s, [[genital mutilation]], [[slavery]], [[terrorism]], [[Nazism]], etc.) present difficult problems for relativists. An observer in a particular time and place, depending on his outlook (e.g., culture, religion, background), might call something ''good'' that another observer in a particular time and place would call ''evil''.
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| − | Relativists need not be considered supporters of (to us) evil acts and institutions. Their critics might consider rational to reject relativism on the basis that it allows the ''possibility'' of justifying wickedness, even if it is not carried through, since some acts are so abominable that they demand to be condemned utterly, and not just as being "against my personal precepts" or "not what my culture teaches".
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| − | ===Intervention and inaction===
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| − | A related criticism, in the sense that it essentially attacks relativism for being too weak, is that
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| − | relativists cannot justify intervening in other cultures' practices, since that would be "to impose their own morality". In fact, this objection cannot be applied to all relativists, since not all hold non-imposition as a basic tenet. (Likewise, not all absolutists reject the principle. Their is no obvious contradiction in the claim that "it is absolutely wrong to impose ones morality on others").
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| − | However, those who do hold to non-intervention as a primary virtue have to accept the criticism that they may be culpably unwilling to resist (what they would call) evil in some cases.
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| − | ===Other times===
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| − | Many people in other times and places thought slavery, for example, acceptable, even good; while most [[as of 2006|today]] view it as a great evil. Many writers and thinkers have held that one can justify any number of evils based on subjective or cultural preferences, and that morality requires some universal standard against which to measure ethical judgments. A moral relativist might respond that this criticism is only valid if one already accepts that such acts are indeed fundamentally evil - a position which the moral relativist would deny - and that the objection is therefore nothing other than an uncritical statement that morals are in fact [[Moral absolutism|absolute]].
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| − | However, if it is ''their'' society that has, for instance, rejected slavery, they presumably agree that it is (relativistically) wrong. This presents a meta-ethical problem in explaining what happens
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| − | when a society has a collective change of heart. Consider the case of someone who has minority moral views within their society, and yet is vindicated (even relativistically) by future developments. If "right" and "wrong" literally mean "what my society accepts/rejects", then a relativist in a slave-owning society of the past who says "slavery is wrong" is effectively saying "slavery is not approved of by my society", which is false — ''factually'' false. Yet, the relativist of the present is committed to agreeing with the relativist of the past, since they both oppose slavery.
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| − | === Meta-ethics ===
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| − | Some relativists regard this as an unfair criticism of relativism; they argue that this approach actually becomes a [[descriptive]], or [[meta-ethics|meta-ethical]], theory and not a [[normative]] one; and that relativists may have strong moral beliefs, notwithstanding their foundational position. Critics of this view, however, see it as disingenuous, and argue that the relativists do not merely make meta-ethical observations. These critics contend that stating there is no preferred standard of truth, or that standards are equally true, addresses the ultimate validity and truth of the ethical judgments themselves, which, they contend, consists of a normative judgment. In other words, the separation between meta-ethics and normative ethics arguably becomes a [[distinction]] without a [[difference]]. Relativists, however, would regard the notion that no preferred standard of truth exists as a [[straw man]] argument. [[Richard Rorty]] (1931 - ), for example, argued that relativist philosophers believe "that the grounds for choosing between such opinions is less algorithmic than had been thought", but not that any belief is equally as valid as any other.<ref>{{cite book | last=Rorty | first=Richard | title=Consequences of Pragmatism | location=Minneapolis | publisher=University of Minnesota Press | year=1982 | id=ISBN 0-8166-1064-9 }}</ref>
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| − | === R. M. Hare ===
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| − | Some philosophers, for example [[R. M. Hare]] ([[1919]] – [[2002]]), argue that moral propositions remain subject to logical rules, notwithstanding the absence of any factual content, including those subject to cultural or religious standards or norms. Thus, for example, they contend that one cannot hold contradictory ethical judgments. This allows for moral [[discourse]] with shared standards, notwithstanding the descriptive properties or [[truth condition]]s of moral terms. They do not affirm or deny that moral facts exist, only that logic applies to our moral assertions; consequently, they postulate an objective and preferred standard of moral justification, albeit in a very limited sense. Nevertheless, according to Hare, logic shows the error of relativism in one very important sense (see Hare's ''Sorting out Ethics''). Hare and other philosophers also point out that, aside from logical constraints, all systems treat certain moral terms alike in an evaluative sense. This parallels our treatment of other terms such as ''less'' or ''more'', which meet with universal understanding and do not depend upon independent standards (for example, one can convert measurements). It applies to good and bad when used in their non-moral sense, too; for example, when we say, "this is a ''good'' wrench" or "this is a ''bad'' wheel". This evaluative property of certain terms also allows people of different beliefs to have meaningful discussions on moral questions, even though they may disagree about certain "facts".
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| − | === Normative moral relativism ===
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| − | One might argue that if one assumed the complete truth of relativism, one would have no reason to prefer it over any other theory, given its fundamental contention that no preferred standard of truth exists. On this view relativism becomes not simply a meta-ethical theory, but a [[normative ethics|normative]] one, and its truth — by its own definition — remains (in the final analysis) outside assessment or beyond weighing against other theories. Relativism and absolutism thus can become the opposite sides of an argument about the existence (or not) of objective truth. Critics of this view assert that this argument places the [[burden of proof]] on relativism, by treating it as a theory that makes the positive existential claim "it is objectively true that there are no objective truths" as opposed to simply being the necessary consequence of a refusal to accept the absolutist's claim "there are objective truths". They argue that this objection can claim only to have defeated a rather singular version of relativism (singular in that it transparently appeals to an objective truth that it purports to deny).
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| − | == Religious critiques of moral relativism ==
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| − | Moral relativism inevitably opposes absolute morality as taught by various [[religion]]s.
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| − | === Roman Catholicism===
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| − | Some people attribute the perceived post-[[World War II|war]] decadence of Europe to the displacement of absolute values by moral relativism. [[Pope Benedict XVI]], [[Marcello Pera]] and others have argued that after about 1960 Europeans massively abandoned many traditional norms rooted in [[Christianity]] and replaced them with continuously-evolving relative moral rules. In this view, [[Human sexual behavior|sexual activity]] has become separated from procreation, which led to a decline in the importance of [[family|families]] and to [[Sub-replacement fertility|depopulation]] (compensated by immigration). Currently, Europe faces challenges from recent immigrants who brought with them absolute values which stand at odds with moral relativism.<ref>[[Pope Benedict XVI|Josef Cardinal Ratzinger]], [[Marcello Pera]], "Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam" (Basic Books, 0465006345, 2006).</ref>
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| − | === Buddhism===
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| − | [[Bhikkhu Bodhi]], an American [[Buddhist]] monk, wrote:
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| − | :“By assigning value and spiritual ideals to private subjectivity, the materialistic world view, threatens to undermine any secure objective foundation for morality. The result is the widespread moral degeneration that we witness today. To counter this tendency, mere moral exhortation is insufficient. If morality is to function as an efficient guide to conduct, it cannot be propounded as a self-justifying scheme but must be embedded in a more comprehensive spiritual system which grounds morality in a transpersonal order. Religion must affirm, in the clearest terms, that morality and ethical values are not mere decorative frills of personal opinion, not subjective superstructure, but intrinsic laws of the cosmos built into the heart of reality.”<ref>[[Bhikkhu Bodhi]], "A Buddhist Response to Contemporary Dilemmas of Human Existence" [http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/response.html article link at Access to Insight]</ref>
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| − | These two specific religious objections are, however, directed at what are considered to be the negative effects of moral relativism, and do not attempt to address the validity of the position itself.
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| − | ==See also ==
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| − | {{col-begin|width=50%}}
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| − | {{Col-break}}
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| − | *[[Analytic philosophy]]
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| − | *[[Anthropology]]
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| − | *[[Business ethics]]
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| − | *[[Deontology]]
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| − | *[[Emotivism]]
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| − | *[[Ethics]]
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| − | *[[Global justice]]
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| − | *[[Kohlberg's stages of moral development]]
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| − | *[[Logic]]
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| − | *[[Metaethics]]
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| − | *[[Moral codes]]
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| − | {{Col-break}}
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| − | *[[Moral purchasing]]
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| − | *[[Moral universalism]]
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| − | *[[Morality]]
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| − | *[[Objectivism]]
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| − | *[[Philosophy]]
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| − | *[[Relativism]]
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| − | *[[Situational ethics]]
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| − | *[[Subjectivism]]
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| − | *[[Veritatis Splendor]]
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| − | *[[Survival of the fittest]]
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| − | *[[Social Darwinism]]
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| − | {{Col-end}}
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| − | == References ==
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| − | <references />
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| − | == Bibliography ==
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| − | * [[Kurt Baier]], "Difficulties in the Emotive-Imperative Theory" in Paul W Taylor (editor): ''The Moral Judgement: Readings in Contemporary Meta-Ethics'' Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963
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| − | * [[Ruth Benedict]], ''Patterns of Culture'' (Mentor)
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| − | * Panayot Butchvarov, "Skepticism in Ethics" (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1989).
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| − | * [[Ronald F. Duska]], "What's the Point of a Business Ethics Course?", 1 ''Business Ethics Quarterly'' 335-352(1991), reprinted in Sterling Harwood, ed., ''Business as Ethical and Business as Usual'' (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996), pp. 11-21.
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| − | * [[R.M. Hare]], ''Sorting out Ethics'' ([[Oxford University Press]])
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| − | * [[Sterling Harwood]], "Taking Ethics Seriously — Moral Relativism versus Moral Realism" in Sterling Harwood, ed., ''Business as Ethical and Business as Usual'' (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996), pp. 2-4.
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| − | * [[Sterling Harwood]], "Against MacIntyre's Relativistic Communitarianism" in Sterling Harwood, ed., ''Business as Ethical and Business as Usual'' (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996), pp. 5-10.
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| − | * [[David Hume]], ''An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals'', ed. Tom L. Beauchamp ([[Oxford University Press]])
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| − | * [[G.E. Moore]], ''Principia Ethica'' ([[Cambridge University Press]])
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| − | * [[Jean-Paul Sartre]], "Existentialism is a Humanism" in ''Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre'', ed. by Walter Kaufmann (World Publishing Company)
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| − | * [[Leo Strauss]], ''The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism'', ed. Thomas L. Pangle ([[University of Chicago]] Press)
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| − | * [[Edvard Westermarck|Edward Westermarck]], ''The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas'' [[Macmillan Publishers|Macmillan]], 1906.
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| − | * [[Bernard Williams]], ''Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy'' ([[Harvard University Press]])
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| − | * [[David B. Wong]], ''Moral Relativity'' (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986), 248 pages.
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| − | ==External links ==
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| − | * [http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/ethics.htm#Metaphysical%20Issues:%20Objectivism%20and%20Relativism Objectivism and Relativism]
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| − | * [http://www.AllAboutPhilosophy.org/Moral-Relativism.htm Moral Relativism] - a Christian perspective.
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| − | * ''[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]'' [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/ entry]
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| − | * [http://philowiki.com/wiki/index.php/Moral_Relativism_Debate_Guide Moral Relativism debate guide]
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| − | * [http://www.definingmoment.tv/defining-moment-shows/index-231.html Online Interview: Moral Relativism & the Perversion of American Values]
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| − | {{Philosophy navigation}}
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| − | [[Category:philosophy]]
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| − | [[Category:philosophy and religion]]
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| − | {credit|111755416}}
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