Consequentialism

Consequentialism

OVERVIEW:

One central aim of normative ethics is to provide general principles of right conduct that specify the conditions under which an action is right or wrong. A consequentialist moral theory defines normative properties such as rightness, praiseworthiness, and virtuousness in terms of the promotion of valuable states of affairs. Classical Utilitarianism as advanced by Bentham and Mill provides a clear example of consequentialism, defining right actions as those maximising the happiness of sentient beings. Consequentialism epitomises the intuition that morality should be concerned with improving the quality of people’s lives, and, as such, can seem to be little more than common sense. However, consequentialism has problems accounting for intuitions concerning justice and rights, the existence of special obligations, and a distinction between what is morally required and morally supererogatory.

MORAL THEORIES: TELEOLOGICAL AND NON-TELEOLOGICAL

Moral theories include two components: a theory of value (a theory of the good) and a theory of the right. A theory of value provides an account of what things are intrinsically good, or what states of affairs we would like to have realised. For example, hedonism is a theory of value according to which the happiness (qualitative states) of sentient beings is the only intrinsic good. The second component of a moral theory is the specification of how moral agents ought to responds to the valuable properties specified by the theory of value. This is most often understood in terms of a theory of right action, for modern ethical thinking has tended to focus centrally concerned with what is done, as over above, (e.g.) what sort of persons we should become. (See entry on Virtue Ethics)

On a standard taxonomy, moral theories may be classified according to how they specify the relation between the theory of value and the theory of right action. The Greek word telos means goal, end, or purpose; teleology is the study of goals, ends and purposes; teleological ethical theories, therefore, emphasise that morality is oriented toward bringing about a certain goal. Consequentialism is one important sort of teleological moral theory. Consequentialism in its most general form is the claim that a normative property (such as ‘rightness’, ‘wrongness’ ‘virtuousness’ etc) depends on the value of consequences. More particularly, according to act consequentialism the rightness of an action derives from the value of the consequences, that is, what is brought about by the action. Act consequentialism holds that the right act for a particular agent is the one that produces the greatest balance of good over bad. Rule consequentialism justifies moral rules according to the value that the rules tend to promote. Motive consequentialism is the thesis that the moral qualities of an action depend on the overall consequences of actions done from a particular motive. This article will focus most centrally on act consequentialism.

Interpretations of what is to be included under the rubric of consequentialism are not entirely standard in the philosophical literature. One significant area of disagreement is whether consequentialism must be regarded as an agent neutral theory. Agent neutrality is the thesis that when comparisons are made as to the overall goodness or badness of actions, this judgment must be made from an objective perspective, without taking the agent’s particular circumstances into account. This is important insofar a most consequentialists would want to differentiate their theory from ethical egoism, which has a superficially similar structure to consequentialism as outline above. Ethical egoism may be understood as the moral theory according to which right actions are those that bring about the greatest overall good for the agent him or herself. The ethical egoist does not consider the best state of the world overall, but the best state of the world from his perspective. In this article, I shall assume that a moral theory that does not include the thesis of agent neutrality is nonetheless legitimately classified as consequentialist moral theory.

CLASSICAL UTLITARIANISM AND CONSEQUENTIALISM:

The most well known example of a consequentialist ethical theory is Classical Utilitarianism, as articulated in the seminal writings of Bentham and Mill. Consequentialism may be helpfully understood in terms of its relation to Classical Utilitarianism. Classical Utilitarianism is hedonistic act consequentialism. This means that Classical Utilitarianism is a consequentialist ethical theory that endorses hedonism as a theory of value, and focuses on actions (as opposed to rules, motives, character traits). This is clearly evident in Principle of Utility, which Mill articulates as follows:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.

The Hedonism of Classical Utilitarianism has always been controversial, and many philosophers have rejected Hedonism as a theory of value without rejecting the insight the morality ought to be concerned with promoting valuable states of affairs. Philosophers have then tended to articulate alternative accounts of value, without abandoning the consequentialism in Classical Utilitarianism. More generally, the varieties of consequentialism are helpfully understood as revisions of Classical Utilitarianism in an attempt to accommodate its basic insight whilst avoiding the objections to which Classical Utilitarianism seems susceptible.

All Utilitarian theories are versions of consequentialism, since consequentialism is one element of Utilitarianism. However, Utilitarianism is sometimes understood as a brand of consequentialism which endorses theory of value that is specifically concerned with the welfare of individual human beings. On this definition, Utilitarianism is welfarist consequentialism. Some welfarist theories are subjectivist, including Hedonism and desire and preference satisfaction theories. Other welfarist theories are objective, including G.E. Moore’s Ideal Utilitarianism. Perfectionist Consequentialist theories would not, on this definition count as forms of Utilitarianism. But this usage is not standard across the philosophical literature.

OBJECTIONS TO CONSEQUENTIALISM

Consequentialism is in conflict with ordinary moral thinking in a number of ways.

Firstly, consequentialism seems unable to accommodate justice and rights. In J.J.C Smart’s (1978) formulates the problem for consequentialism with respect to justice as follows: “The most poignant sort of case, of course, is that of the punishment of an innocent man. Suppose that in order to prevent a riot in which thousands would certainly be killed a sheriff were to frame and execute an innocent man. On utilitarian principles would not the sacrifice of one life in order to save thousands be justified?” (Smart’s discussion is with particular reference to Utilitarianism, but Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism.) If the sheriff frames the stranger he will bring about more good consequences than bad consequences. We may simply stipulate that this is so. According to consequentialism, therefore, this is the right action to perform. However, an innocent man does not deserve to be punished. So, it seems, consequentialism does not accommodate justice.

A structurally very similar problem arises with respect to consequentialism and rights. The concept of a ‘right’ has to do with protecting a person’s important interests. Rights place limits on how an individual may be treated, regardless of the good purposes that might be accomplished” (Rachels 2003, p. 108). Once again, a consequentialist moral theory is apparently committed to the claim that nothing that is ultimately prohibited, so long as the good consequences of this action outweigh the bad. Rape, torture, and all manner of horrific acts may in principle be required whenever the overall consequences are good enough.

Another problem for consequentialism is accounting for the existence of special ties of obligation. Special obligations include those acquired by entering into contracts, obligations acquired in virtue of occupying a certain occupational role, and family ties. For example, a teacher is obligated to certain sorts of actions related to satisfying occupational duties, and these actions are required of him or her only because of the special duties incumbent on a teacher. Similarly, a mother or father is usually thought to be obligated to her or his children in a way she or he is not obligated to other people’s children. These are sometime called agent-relative duties. Consequentialism, however, is usually understood to be an agent neural moral theory, and so, one is obligated to bring about good for those who would benefit from it most, irrespective of their relationship to oneself. This consequence is at odds with ordinary thinking in that it seems that a person reasonably displays concern for her family that she does not display for others. But consequentialism requires one to promote the good in general, and does therefore not accommodate the common sense intuition that special obligations generate special duties, and that (e.g.) a father is required to do things for his own family that he is not required to do for people in general.

On a closely related point, W.D. Ross has argued that if breaking a promise brings about slightly more happiness, then the Classical Utilitarian must prescribe that the promise is to be broken. Imagine that you’ve made a promise to give me a ride to the airport. However, at the last moment someone asks you to come away for the weekend, making it impossible to give me the ride. Imagine that there would be a slightly greater balance of gain for everyone concerned – you really are a bundle of fun – if you broke your promise. Ross’s point is that consequentialism says you should break your promise even if the gain is only slightly more. But this seems to imply that consequentialism cannot accommodate the point that one is obligated by the promise, and a slight gain in overall pleasure does not seem to trump this obligation.

Another important objection to consequentialism is that it is too demanding as a moral theory. To understand this objection, it is necessary to spend a moment considering some key features of our common moral beliefs. In ordinary morality, there is a distinction between what we are morally required to do (or not do) and what is good or morally significant to do, but what is not strictly required. For example, ‘Thou shall not murder’ entails that we are required to refrain from intentionally killing innocent people. By contrast, acts of charity are morally praiseworthy, but we are not, it is usually thought, strictly required to be charitable. Rather, charity is something that goes beyond the bounds of duty. One would not normally be blamed for failing to give to charity, although one would be morally praised for acts of charity. Actions that are morally admirable to do but not strictly required of us are called supererogatory actions.

The problem for consequentialism is that it eliminates the distinction between actions that are morally required of us and morally supererogatory actions. The Consequentialist criterion (in its barest formulation) for right action is maximisation of a specified value: one is doing the right thing only insofar as one is maximising the good. However, we often take ourselves to be acting in a way that is morally permissible even when it clearly is not one which brings about the most good. Spending money on a holiday, for example, seems to be a candidate for a morally permissible action although there are other courses of action that would serve a much greater good overall. For instance, giving the money to an agency like the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) may help to save lives, a much greater good than a few days spent lazing about on a beach. If we are doing the right thing only if we are maximising the good, it seems that almost all of our actions are wrong. Critics contend that entails that consequentialism is too demanding as a moral theory. It does not seem right to say that one is doing wrong by going out for dinner on Friday night, or sitting around chatting with friends.

Consequentialist replies to objections

The conflict between the prescriptions of a moral theory and our ordinary way of thinking raises a question about how moral theories are to be evaluated. If a moral theory conflicts with our commonsense, pre-reflective morality, it could be that the theory is wrong or our moral convictions are wrong (or both). Do we revise our practices, our morality, to accord with the theory? Or do we reject the theory, and try to find another one that fits better with our moral convictions? The responses consequentialists are inclined to give to the above objections may be interpreted within this framework.

Revisionism

Some hard line consequentialists argue that moral common sense is mistaken and ought to be revised. Smart expresses this view as follows:

“Admittedly utilitarianism does have consequences which are incompatible with the common moral consciousness, but I tended to take the view “so much the worse for the common moral consciousness”. That is, I was inclined to reject the common methodology of testing general ethical principles by seeing how they square with our feelings in particular instances.” (J.J.C Smart)

With respect to the case in which an innocent man was framed in order to avert a riot in which many more people would be killed, a consequentialist might point out that all options are terrible in this sort of scenario and insofar as our common sense moral judgments dictate that framing an innocent man ought not to be done, there is no reason to suppose that these common sense judgments are to be preferred over the result given by consequentialism. Similarly, with respect to the problem that consequentialist is committed to saying that since almost all our actions (including watching TV) fail to maximize utility, almost all our actions are wrong, some philosophers are inclined to accept this consequence. Peter Singer is probably the most influential defender of this sort of position.

This sort of hard line commitment to the revision of our moral practices is probably not the most popular response taken by consequentialists. Most philosophers are uncomfortable with a large-scale revisionism of our moral practices as a result of a moral theory. As a result, they attempt to modify the theory to bring closer to ordinary moral thinking on certain key matters. The philosophical literature on consequentialism is enormous, proliferating with attempts to avoid the problems outlined above, and others, and bring consequentialism more into line with moral common sense. Only two of the most influential strategies of reply will be articulated below.

1. RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM

One common move in bringing consquentialism more in line with ordinary moral thinking is to specify the relation between consequences and right action indirectly. Classical Utilitarianism defines rightness directly. An act is right if and only if it increases aggregate happiness. Direct act consequentialism says that the moral rightness of an action depends on the consequences of that very action. By contrast, indirect act consequentialism says that the moral rightness of an act depends on the consequences of something else, such as motives or rules. (The direct / indirect distinction may be applied to any normative property.)

One influential form of indirect consequentialism is rule utilitarianism. According to rule utilitarianism, the moral rightness of an act depends on its conformity with a rule, which itself is justified because it produces the best consequences overall. So rule consequentialism defines right action indirectly in terms of rules that tend to promote the non-moral good. In order to ascertain whether an action is right, one has to take into account the consequences of following the rule against which the action is assessed. In this respect, Rule Utilitarianism is indirect act consequentialism because it makes the rightness of an action dependent on the results of following a rule, rather than the action itself. A right action is one which conforms to a rule, which is justified because the consequences of following this rule are better than the consequences of following alternative rules.

Rule Consequentialism seems to be able to answer the objections from rights and justice outlined above. With respect to the framing of an innocent man in order to prevent a riot, a rule Utilitarian will reason that a society in which people adhere to the rule ‘don’t punish the innocent’ is bound to be better that a society in which this rule is not followed. The rule ‘don’t punish the innocent’ produces greater overall good. Punishing the innocent man is wrong because it does not accord with the rule which would bring about the best consequences overall. Secondly, the rule consequentialist may accommodate intuitions about special obligations by arguing that the consequences of following these sorts of rules will tend to be better than those generated by not adhering to agent relative duties. It seems reasonable to think that rule consequentialism will generate moral prescriptions quite closely in accordance with those of common sense.

Justification and Deliberation

A second popular consequentialist response to the above objections is to distinguish between a criterion of rightness and a decision procedure. This line of response goes back to Mill’s Utilitarianism, and his response to the objection that “There is not enough time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing any line of conduct on the general happiness.” Mill’s reply is to say that the “… there is ample time, namely, the whole past duration of the human species”. Ordinary morality may then be used as rules of thumb, guidelines that will help us in navigating through our daily lives.

This is important because it opens up a gap between how we ought to think in contexts of moral deliberation, and those properties of individual acts, which confer rightness or wrongness on the action. If the principle of Utility is a criterion of rightness, and not a decision procedure, then Utilitarianism does not entail that one ought (always) to try to calculate the greatest utility of one’s action. It will often be better to act in accordance with moral rules rather than trying to calculate the expected outcome of one’s action.

This move may easily be transferred into the more general Consequentialist theories. If consequentialism is meant to be a theory of justification, rather than an account of deliberation, then it is quite coherent for a consequentialist to maintain that the best way of doing the right thing is not to calculate consequences but follow other policies. This provides a clear response to the problem of special obligations in that the best way of achieving the consequentialist objective might very well be to act in terms of our special obligations and continue to deliberate in accordance with ordinary moral thinking. This point is nicely illustrated by Austin, when he writes of the Utilitarian: “Though he approves with love because it accords with his principle, he is far from maintaining the general good ought to be the motive of the lover. It was never contended or conceived by a sound, orthodox utilitarian, that the lover should kiss his mistress with an eye to the common weal’ [cited in Petit 1997, p. 235].