Difference between revisions of "A priori and a posteriori" - New World Encyclopedia

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:''This article is about the ''a posteriori'' in [[Epistemology]].  You may be looking for information about a posteriori [[constructed languages]].''
 
  
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'''A priori''' is a [[Latin]] phrase meaning "from the former" or less literally "before experience". In much of the modern Western tradition, the term ''a priori'' is considered to mean [[propositional knowledge]] that can be had without, or "prior to", experience. It is usually contrasted with ''[[empirical knowledge|a posteriori]]'' knowledge meaning "after experience", which requires experience (In [[law]], the term [[Ex post facto law|ex post facto]] replaces ''a posteriori'').
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The terms '''''a priori''''' ([[Latin]]; “from former”) and '''''a posteriori''''' (Latin; “from later”) refer primarily to species of [[propositional knowledge]]. ''A priori'' knowledge refers to knowledge that is justified independently of experience, i.e., knowledge that does not depend on experiential evidence or warrant. In contrast, ''a posteriori'' knowledge is justified by means of experience, and depends therefore on experiential evidence or warrant. The distinction between ''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'' knowledge may be understood as corresponding to the distinction between non-empirical and [[empirical knowledge]]. Mathematical knowledge is a paradigmatically ''a priori'', whereas, the truths of [[physics]], [[chemistry]], and [[biology]] are instances of ''a posteriori'' knowledge. This ''a priori'' / ''a posteriori'' distinction has been blurred by Catholic theologians such as [[Karl Rahner]] who have constructively adopted [[Immanuel Kant]]'s understanding of ''a priori'' in [[anthropology]] and [[theology]].  
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==The ''a priori'' / ''a posteriori'' distinction==
  
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For those within the mainstream of the tradition, [[mathematics]] and [[logic]] are generally considered ''a priori'' disciplines. Statements such as "2 + 2 = 4", for example, are considered to be "a priori", because they are [[thought]] to come out of reflection alone.
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The historical source for contemporary understanding of the ''a priori'' / ''a posteriori'' distinction is [[Kant]]’s ''Critique of Pure Reason''. Kant articulates the distinction as [[epistemology|epistemological]] in its nature, i.e., pertaining to knowledge. Since knowledge is understood as ranging over [[proposition]]s the ''a priori'' / ''a posteriori'' distinction refers to a division within the class of propositions known or capable of being known. If a proposition is capable of being known ''a priori'', then it may be known independently of experience. For example, your knowledge that bachelors are unmarried, that 5 + 2 = 7 and that the square on the hypotenuse of a right angled triangle equals the sum of the squares on the other two sides counts as ''a priori'' knowledge. By contrast, if a proposition is known or is capable of being known ''a posteriori'', then it is known as a result of experiential evidence. For example, your knowledge that there is a computer in front of you, that you ate breakfast this morning, that snow is white, that Indian elephants have smaller ears than African elephants, all count as ''a posteriori'' knowledge. The distinction between ''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'' corresponds to the distinction between empirical and non-empirical knowledge.  
  
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The natural and social sciences are usually considered ''a posteriori'' disciplines. Statements like "The sky is usually mostly blue", for instance, might be considered "a posteriori" knowledge.
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It is important to distinguish [1] the claim that a proposition is knowable without ''any'' experience from [2] that claim that experience is not necessary for the proposition to be known. The proposition that ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ is something known ''a priori'', but this is not to say that you could know this without any experience at all. Clearly this knowledge requires the conceptual and linguistic capacities involved in an understanding of English. Crucially, then, to say that a proposition is known ''a priori'' is not to endorse [1], but only to endorse [2]. A proposition is known ''a priori'' only if, in addition to any experience needed to have [[belief]]s at all, or to grasp the proposition that ''p'', your justification for believing that ''p'' does not depend on experience. So the claim that ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ does not depend on conducting a survey of all bachelors, although exposure to English is necessary for knowing it. Similarly, your knowledge that women are female human beings presupposes, but is not based on, experience, and counts as ''a priori'' knowledge.  
  
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'''Empirical''' or '''''a posteriori'' knowledge''' is [[propositional knowledge]] obtained by experience or sensorial information. It is contrasted with ''[[a priori|a priori knowledge]]'', or knowledge that is gained through the apprehension of [[innate idea]]s, "[[intuition]]," "pure [[reason]]," or other non-experiential sources.
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Although the primary usage of the terms ''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'' is with reference to knowledge and justification, philosophers sometimes also speak of ''a priori'' or ''a posteriori'' [[concept|concepts]]. It is reasonable to think that concepts are constituents of propositions, and are therefore neither true nor false, and so are not capable of being known. Reference to ''a priori'' concepts may then be naturally understood as those that have significance or meaning independently of experience and do not require experience for legitimatization. Similarly, ''a posteriori'' concepts are those that cannot be understood independently of particular experiences.
  
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The [[natural science|natural]] and [[social science]]s are usually considered ''[[a posteriori]]'', literally "after the fact," disciplines. [[Mathematics]] and [[logic]] are usually considered ''[[a priori]]'', "before the fact," disciplines.
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==Related distinctions==
  
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For example, "all things fall down" would be an empirical proposition about [[gravity]] that many of us believe we know; therefore we would regard it as an example of empirical knowledge. It is "[[empirical]]" because we have generally observed that things fall down, so there is no reason to believe this will change. This example also shows the difficulty of formulating knowledge claims. 
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The distinction between ''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'' knowledge must be separated from two other distinctions with which it is closely connected and sometimes confused. These are the metaphysical distinction between necessary and contingent truths and the [[semantics|semantic]] distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions.
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Outside of the [[Earth]]'s gravitational field, for example, things do not "fall down", as there is no "down".
 
  
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The vast bulk of the empirical knowledge that ordinary people possess is gained via a mixture of direct experience and the [[testimony]] of others about what they have experienced—iterated in an interesting way that is studied in the field of [[social epistemology]] as well as other fields. More complicated and organized methods of gaining empirical knowledge are the methods of [[science]]—see [[scientific method]]—which result in perhaps the best examples of rigorously codified, ''scientific'' empirical knowledge, namely, [[physics]].
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Historically, most philosophers have maintained that all ''a priori'' knowledge corresponds to knowledge of [[necessary truth]]s. A necessary truth is a proposition that cannot be false; it is true in all possible worlds. Mathematical truths such as ‘3 + 5 = 8’ are paradigmatic examples of necessary truths. By contrast, a [[contingent truth]] is a proposition that is true, as things are, but is conceivably false. For example, it seems contingently true that the population of New York is greater than five million. This proposition is said to be contingent because we can easily imagine it to be false. Whatever the initial plausibility of the claim that ''a priori'' knowledge is restricted to knowledge of necessary truths, this view has been challenged by some eminent contemporary philosophers.  
  
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[[David Hume]] considered all ''a posteriori'' knowledge to be a [[Matter of Fact]], and never explicitly utilised the term.
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[[Saul Kripke]] (1972) argues that some propositions known a priori are contingently true, while some propositions known a posteriori are necessarily true. As an example of the former, Kripke maintains that the proposition ‘S is one meter long’ is known ''a priori'', when S refers to the standard meter bar. Kripke argues that although this proposition is known ''a priori'' it is contingently true since the length of S might not have been one meter long. Kripke’s main examples of ''a posteriori'' necessary truths involve identity statements such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus.’ These issues are controversial, and continue to provoke widespread debate.
  
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The modern perusal of ''a posteriori'' thought began with [[Immanuel Kant]] in a reactionary movement to Hume's sceptical approach to knowledge in his ''[[Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding]]''.  Kant, in adding the distinction between synthetic and analytic truths to the distinction between ''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'' knowledge, created four categories of knowledge (one of which, the [[analytic]] ''[[a posteriori]]'', is never possible). Thus, for Kant, the only type of ''a posteriori'' knowledge is the [[synthetic]] ''a posteriori''.  Because of this, Kant proposes that ''a posteriori'' propositions are, as a set, contingent, because ''a posteriori'' propositions all depend on external conditions, which may change in time, making the proposition false (e.g. "My dog is a puppy" has a truth value only ascertained by external verification).
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The ''a priori'' / ''a posteriori'' distinction is also sometimes aligned with the semantic distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. A number of philosophers have held that ''a priori'' knowledge is restricted to knowledge of analytic propositions, and ''a posteriori'' knowledge to synthetic propositions (see the entry on the [[analytic-synthetic distinction]]). An analytic proposition is roughly, a proposition true by meaning alone, whereas, generally, the truth or falsity of a synthetic proposition does not depend on meaning. [[Kant]] (1781) famously challenged the alignment of ''a priori'' with analytic and ''a posteriori'' with synthetic, arguing that truths of arithmetic and geometry are synthetic propositions, which are capable of being known ''a priori''.  
  
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[[Saul Kripke]] contends that the category of analytic ''a posteriori'' truths is nonempty, including, among other things, identity claims such as "Water is H<sub>2</sub>O" and "Hesperus is Phosphorus."
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Lastly, it is important to note that the distinction between ''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'' knowledge does not correspond to the distinction between innate and acquired knowledge. Innateness focuses on the genetic question of how a belief is acquired, whereas the ''a priori'' / ''a posteriori'' distinction concerns the nature of the epistemic warrant in support of a proposition. It seems possible for a belief to be innate and yet be justified ''a posteriori''; and conversely, for a belief to be acquired by means of learning whilst being justified ''a priori''. The truth of [[Fermat’s last theorem]], for example, is something known ''a priori'', but is not innate knowledge.
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==Philosophical thought==
 
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One of the fundamental questions in [[epistemology]] is whether there is any non-trivial a priori knowledge. Generally speaking [[continental rationalism | rationalists]] believe that there is, while [[empiricism | empiricists]] believe that all knowledge is ultimately derived from some kind of experience (usually external), or else is in some sense trivial.
 
  
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The use of the term gained foothold through [[Continental rationalism|rationalist]] thinkers, such as [[René Descartes]] and [[Gottfried Leibniz]], who argued that knowledge is gained through reason, not experience. Descartes  considered the knowledge of the self, or ''[[cogito ergo sum]]'', to be a priori, because he thought that one needn't refer to past experience to consider one's own existence.
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==Blurring the distinction==
  
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[[John Locke]], in believing that reflection is a part of experience, gave a platform by which the entire notion of the "a priori" might be abandoned.
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Some [[Catholicism|Catholic]] theologians such as [[Karl Rahner]] have gone beyond the [[Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] distinction of ''a priori'' and ''a posteriori''. According to the [[epistemology]] of Kant, when ''a posteriori'' "impressions" from objects are processed by a subject's ''a priori'' "forms of intuition" and "forms of the understanding," the subject's knowledge about the objects is established. But, this epistemology cannot let the subject know [[God]], [[immortality]], freedom, and "things-in-themselves," given the limited nature of the ''a priori'' "forms" or structures of the subject's capacity to know. Hence Kant's basic denial of natural [[theology]] and the initially negative Catholic reaction to Kant. But Karl Rahner and others in Catholicism in the twentieth century have taken Kant's understanding of ''a priori'' as an opportunity for a renewal of natural theology. According to Rahner, the elements that are ''a priori'' are God-given and therefore far broader than the Kantian "forms," and they are not only in subjects but also in objects. So, knowledge of a knowing subject is always at the same time a knowledge about objects including God. This way, the ''a priori'' / ''a posteriori'' distinction has been blurred.
  
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[[David Hume]] considered all a priori knowledge to be a [[Relation of Ideas]], mentioning it several times in his ''[[Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding]]''.
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== References ==
  
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Modern use of ''a priori'' began with [[Immanuel Kant]] who offered the distinction between [[synthetic proposition|synthetic]] and [[analytic proposition|analytic]] truths to supplement the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. He argues that propositions known ''a priori'' are necessarily true, while propositions known ''a posteriori'' are [[modal logic|contingent]], because ''a priori'' knowledge has always been true, according to Kant (e.g. two plus two equals four). ''A posteriori'' propositions will depend on external conditions, which may change in time, making the proposition false (e.g. ''[[Jean Chrétien]] is [[Prime Minister of Canada|Canada's Prime Minister]]'', which was once true but is now false).
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*Kant, Immanuel. ''Critique of Pure Reason''. Translated by N. K. Smith. London: Macmillan, 1929.
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*Kripke, Saul. ''Naming and Necessity''. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.
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*Rahner, Karl. ''A Rahner Reader''. Edited by Gerald A. McCool. New York: Crossroad, 1989.
  
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[[Saul Kripke]], ''criticizing'' Kant in ''[[Naming and Necessity]]'' ([[1980]]), argues that aprioricity is an ''[[epistemology|epistemological]]'' property, and should not be conflated with the separate, ''[[metaphysics|metaphysical]]'' matter of [[necessity]]. In support of this argument he offers several pleas to intuition. First he argues that an a posteriori truth can be known contingently: for instance, that "[[Hesperus]] is [[Phosphorus (morning star)|Phosphorus]]". (Known as the "evening star" and the "morning star" respectively, we now know that both are names for the planet [[Venus (planet)|Venus]]). They are both necessarily the same (see [[rigid designation]]), but known ''[[a posteriori]]''. Also, he argues, it is possible to have contingent a priori propositions. For example, in Paris there is a bar that formerly served as the standard for the [[metre]]. The accompanying proposition, "That bar is one metre long", is [[contingent]] since we could have taken another length to define the metre. However, it is known ''a priori'', because one metre was defined as the length of that bar, so the bar must have been one metre long (at the time it served as the standard) - it is a [[tautology]].
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== Further Reading ==
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*Bealer, George. 1999. “The A Priori,” in ''The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology''. Edited by John Greco and Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 243-70.
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[[Bertrand Russell]], in ''[[The Problems of Philosophy]]'', considered ''a priori'' knowledge to be the relation between [[universals]]. "2 + 2 = 4," for example, is an ''a priori'' principle that shows the relationship between "2", "+", "=", and "4", all universals according to Russell.
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*Casullo, Albert. 1992. “A priori/a posteriori,” in ''A Companion to Epistemology''. Edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 1-3.
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*Feigel, H. and W. Sellars (eds.). ''New Readings in Philosophical Analysis''. Prentice Hall, 1972.
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Major contemporary philosophers of ''a priori'' thought include [[Alfred Ayer]], [[Roderick Chisholm]] and [[W.V.O. Quine]].
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*Hamlyn, D. W. 1967. “A Priori and A Posteriori,” in ''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', vol. 1. Edited by Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company & The Free Press. pp. 140-44.
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*Moser, Paul (ed.). 1987. ''A Priori Knowledge''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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== See also ==
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*Plantinga, Alvin. 1993. “A Priori Knowledge,” in ''Warrant and Proper Function''. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 102-21.
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*[[A posteriori]]
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*Quine, W. V. 1963. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in ''From a Logical Point of View'', 2nd ed. New York: Harper and Row. pp. 20-46.
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*[[Analytic proposition]]
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*Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1969. ''On Certainty''. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, translated by D. Paul and Anscombe. New York: Harper and Row.
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*[[Synthetic proposition]]
 
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*[[Epistemology]]
 
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*[[List of Latin phrases]]
 
  
 
== External links ==
 
== External links ==
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All links retrieved June 13, 2023.
  
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[[Category:Epistemology]]
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*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/apriori.htm A Priori and A Posteriori in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
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[[Category:Kantianism]]
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-judgment/ Kant’s Theory of Judgment in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosopy]
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[[Category:Philosophical logic]]
 
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[[Category:Latin logical phrases]]
 
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[[Category:Latin philosophical phrases|A priori]]
 
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==See also==
 
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* ''[[A priori]]''
 
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* [[Empiricism]]
 
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* [[Epistemology]]
 
  
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[[Category:Latin philosophical phrases|A posteriori]]
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===General Philosophy Sources===
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[[Category:Epistemology]]
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
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*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online]
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*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
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*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg]
  
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[[Category:Philosophy]]
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[[Category:Philosophy and religion]]
 
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Latest revision as of 07:08, 13 June 2023


The terms a priori (Latin; “from former”) and a posteriori (Latin; “from later”) refer primarily to species of propositional knowledge. A priori knowledge refers to knowledge that is justified independently of experience, i.e., knowledge that does not depend on experiential evidence or warrant. In contrast, a posteriori knowledge is justified by means of experience, and depends therefore on experiential evidence or warrant. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge may be understood as corresponding to the distinction between non-empirical and empirical knowledge. Mathematical knowledge is a paradigmatically a priori, whereas, the truths of physics, chemistry, and biology are instances of a posteriori knowledge. This a priori / a posteriori distinction has been blurred by Catholic theologians such as Karl Rahner who have constructively adopted Immanuel Kant's understanding of a priori in anthropology and theology.

The a priori / a posteriori distinction

The historical source for contemporary understanding of the a priori / a posteriori distinction is Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Kant articulates the distinction as epistemological in its nature, i.e., pertaining to knowledge. Since knowledge is understood as ranging over propositions the a priori / a posteriori distinction refers to a division within the class of propositions known or capable of being known. If a proposition is capable of being known a priori, then it may be known independently of experience. For example, your knowledge that bachelors are unmarried, that 5 + 2 = 7 and that the square on the hypotenuse of a right angled triangle equals the sum of the squares on the other two sides counts as a priori knowledge. By contrast, if a proposition is known or is capable of being known a posteriori, then it is known as a result of experiential evidence. For example, your knowledge that there is a computer in front of you, that you ate breakfast this morning, that snow is white, that Indian elephants have smaller ears than African elephants, all count as a posteriori knowledge. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori corresponds to the distinction between empirical and non-empirical knowledge.

It is important to distinguish [1] the claim that a proposition is knowable without any experience from [2] that claim that experience is not necessary for the proposition to be known. The proposition that ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ is something known a priori, but this is not to say that you could know this without any experience at all. Clearly this knowledge requires the conceptual and linguistic capacities involved in an understanding of English. Crucially, then, to say that a proposition is known a priori is not to endorse [1], but only to endorse [2]. A proposition is known a priori only if, in addition to any experience needed to have beliefs at all, or to grasp the proposition that p, your justification for believing that p does not depend on experience. So the claim that ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ does not depend on conducting a survey of all bachelors, although exposure to English is necessary for knowing it. Similarly, your knowledge that women are female human beings presupposes, but is not based on, experience, and counts as a priori knowledge.

Although the primary usage of the terms a priori and a posteriori is with reference to knowledge and justification, philosophers sometimes also speak of a priori or a posteriori concepts. It is reasonable to think that concepts are constituents of propositions, and are therefore neither true nor false, and so are not capable of being known. Reference to a priori concepts may then be naturally understood as those that have significance or meaning independently of experience and do not require experience for legitimatization. Similarly, a posteriori concepts are those that cannot be understood independently of particular experiences.

Related distinctions

The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge must be separated from two other distinctions with which it is closely connected and sometimes confused. These are the metaphysical distinction between necessary and contingent truths and the semantic distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions.

Historically, most philosophers have maintained that all a priori knowledge corresponds to knowledge of necessary truths. A necessary truth is a proposition that cannot be false; it is true in all possible worlds. Mathematical truths such as ‘3 + 5 = 8’ are paradigmatic examples of necessary truths. By contrast, a contingent truth is a proposition that is true, as things are, but is conceivably false. For example, it seems contingently true that the population of New York is greater than five million. This proposition is said to be contingent because we can easily imagine it to be false. Whatever the initial plausibility of the claim that a priori knowledge is restricted to knowledge of necessary truths, this view has been challenged by some eminent contemporary philosophers.

Saul Kripke (1972) argues that some propositions known a priori are contingently true, while some propositions known a posteriori are necessarily true. As an example of the former, Kripke maintains that the proposition ‘S is one meter long’ is known a priori, when S refers to the standard meter bar. Kripke argues that although this proposition is known a priori it is contingently true since the length of S might not have been one meter long. Kripke’s main examples of a posteriori necessary truths involve identity statements such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus.’ These issues are controversial, and continue to provoke widespread debate.

The a priori / a posteriori distinction is also sometimes aligned with the semantic distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. A number of philosophers have held that a priori knowledge is restricted to knowledge of analytic propositions, and a posteriori knowledge to synthetic propositions (see the entry on the analytic-synthetic distinction). An analytic proposition is roughly, a proposition true by meaning alone, whereas, generally, the truth or falsity of a synthetic proposition does not depend on meaning. Kant (1781) famously challenged the alignment of a priori with analytic and a posteriori with synthetic, arguing that truths of arithmetic and geometry are synthetic propositions, which are capable of being known a priori.

Lastly, it is important to note that the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge does not correspond to the distinction between innate and acquired knowledge. Innateness focuses on the genetic question of how a belief is acquired, whereas the a priori / a posteriori distinction concerns the nature of the epistemic warrant in support of a proposition. It seems possible for a belief to be innate and yet be justified a posteriori; and conversely, for a belief to be acquired by means of learning whilst being justified a priori. The truth of Fermat’s last theorem, for example, is something known a priori, but is not innate knowledge.

Blurring the distinction

Some Catholic theologians such as Karl Rahner have gone beyond the Kantian distinction of a priori and a posteriori. According to the epistemology of Kant, when a posteriori "impressions" from objects are processed by a subject's a priori "forms of intuition" and "forms of the understanding," the subject's knowledge about the objects is established. But, this epistemology cannot let the subject know God, immortality, freedom, and "things-in-themselves," given the limited nature of the a priori "forms" or structures of the subject's capacity to know. Hence Kant's basic denial of natural theology and the initially negative Catholic reaction to Kant. But Karl Rahner and others in Catholicism in the twentieth century have taken Kant's understanding of a priori as an opportunity for a renewal of natural theology. According to Rahner, the elements that are a priori are God-given and therefore far broader than the Kantian "forms," and they are not only in subjects but also in objects. So, knowledge of a knowing subject is always at the same time a knowledge about objects including God. This way, the a priori / a posteriori distinction has been blurred.

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by N. K. Smith. London: Macmillan, 1929.
  • Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.
  • Rahner, Karl. A Rahner Reader. Edited by Gerald A. McCool. New York: Crossroad, 1989.

Further Reading

  • Bealer, George. 1999. “The A Priori,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Edited by John Greco and Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 243-70.
  • Casullo, Albert. 1992. “A priori/a posteriori,” in A Companion to Epistemology. Edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 1-3.
  • Feigel, H. and W. Sellars (eds.). New Readings in Philosophical Analysis. Prentice Hall, 1972.
  • Hamlyn, D. W. 1967. “A Priori and A Posteriori,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 1. Edited by Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company & The Free Press. pp. 140-44.
  • Moser, Paul (ed.). 1987. A Priori Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Plantinga, Alvin. 1993. “A Priori Knowledge,” in Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 102-21.
  • Quine, W. V. 1963. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. New York: Harper and Row. pp. 20-46.
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1969. On Certainty. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, translated by D. Paul and Anscombe. New York: Harper and Row.

External links

All links retrieved June 13, 2023.

General Philosophy Sources

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