Difference between revisions of "Hypothesis" - New World Encyclopedia

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A '''hypothesis''' is a suggested explanation of a [[phenomenon]] or reasoned proposal suggesting a possible correlation between multiple phenomena. The term derives from the ancient [[Greek language|Greek]], ''hypotithenai'' meaning "to put under" or "to suppose". The scientific method requires that one can [[testable | test]] a '''scientific hypothesis'''. Scientists generally base such hypotheses on previous [[observation]]s or on extensions of [[Theory|scientific theories]].
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A <b>hypothesis</b> in the empirical disciplines (e.g. [[physics]], [[chemistry]], and [[biology]]) is a proposition proposed to predict or explain a reoccurring phenomenon, and in the [[a priori and a posteriori|a priori]] disciplines (e.g. [[mathematics]], statistics, and [[logic]]) it is a proposition proposed as the basis of an [[argument]]. The term derives from the ancient [[Greek language|Greek]], ''hypotithenai'' meaning "to put under" or "to suppose." The nature of the hypothesis is a topic of study primarily reserved for [[philosophy of science]].
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==Usage==
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In early usage, scholars often referred to a clever idea or to a convenient mathematical approach that simplified cumbersome calculations as a ''hypothesis''. St. Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) gave a famous example of the older sense of the word in the warning issued to [[Galileo Galilei|Galileo]] in the early seventeenth century: that he must not treat the motion of the [[Earth|Earth]] as a reality, but merely as a hypothesis.
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During the eighteenth century, physicists (or “natural philosophers” as they were called) began to use the term ‘hypothesis’ in a pejorative sense, suggesting that hypothetico-deduction (explained later) was an inferior form of scientific reasoning. For example, [[Isaac Newton|Isaac Newton]] (1643-1727) made a famous phrase about the use of hypotheses in science in the General Scholium of his classic 1726 text <I>The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy</I>:
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<blockquote>
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I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for these properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy (Newton [1726] 1999, 943).
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</blockquote>
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In common usage in the twent-first century, a ''hypothesis'' refers to an educated guess about <I>why</I> some phenomenon or phenomenological regularity occurs. Hypotheses, in common usage, are provisional and not accepted as true until they are tested. Thus hypotheses are always <I>testable</I> claims. Actually, the requirement that hypotheses are testable is a tenet among philosophers of science as well, especially [[Karl Popper|Karl Popper]] (1902-1994) and [[Carl Gustav Hempel]] (1905-1997).
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For example, suppose that Tamara is in her home and she hears her car alarm sound. She immediately formulates two hypotheses. First, someone is stealing her car. Second, someone accidentally initiated the alarm (e.g. by standing too close to the car). Tamara favors the second hypothesis because she lives in a safe neighborhood. A <I>test</I> of Tamara’s hypothesis would be simple. All she would need to do is walk over to the window and look to see what happened. If she sees a bunch of teenagers near her car she can rest assured that her hypothesis was true. However, if instead she sees that her car is missing, then her first guess was probably right.
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==Types of Hypotheses==
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===Empirical Hypotheses===
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Hypotheses in empirical disciplines (e.g. [[physics]]) are propositions proposed to predict or explain regular phenomena. Using hypotheses to predict or explain regular phenomena is often called “the hypothetico-deductive method” in [[science]].
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An example of a famous hypothetico-deduction is Joseph John Thomson’s (1856-1940) hypothesis that [[cathode ray]]s are streams of subatomic negatively-charged particles that we now call [[electrons]]. Cathode rays are emanations from [[electric battery|electrodes]] in vacuum tubes that travel the length of the tube to hit a [[Periodic table, main group elements|phosphorous]]-coated screen and produce a luminous spot. Cathode ray tubes are used in most ordinary televisions. At any rate, several physicists in the late 1800s thought that cathode rays were uncharged streams of electromagnetic waves. In fact, in 1883 [[Heinrich Hertz]] (1857-1894) showed that cathode rays were not deflected by [[electricity|electrically]] charged metal plates, and in 1892 Hertz showed that cathode rays could penetrate thin metal foils, unlike any known particles.
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However, [[J.J. Thomson]] (1897) disagreed with Hertz and posited [[electron|electrons]] as the true components of cathode rays. In 1895 Jean Perrin (1870-1942) showed that electrically charged metal plates could deflect cathode rays, and Thomson confirmed Perrin’s result in 1897 by reproducing the experiment and measuring the magnitude of the miniscule deflection. Nevertheless, the controversial part of Thomson’s hypothesis was that cathode rays were composed of <I>particles</I> instead of waves.
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However, assuming that cathode rays were composed of particles, Thomson was able to predict and explain several strange but regular phenomena about cathode rays. For example, with the electron Thomson was able to explain how it is possible to measure a stable mass to electric charge ratio of cathode ray particles when passing it through a uniform magnetic field and why the mass-to-charge ratio was smaller than any known mass-to-charge ratio for atomic compounds.
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In 1906, J.J. Thomson was awarded the [[Nobel Prize]] in [[Physics]] for discovering the [[electron]] and introducing the field of [[particle physics|subatomic physics]]. Ironically, Thomson’s son George Paget Thomson was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1937 for showing that the electron is a wave. Nonetheless, this historical example shows how hypotheses in the empirical disciplines function to predict or explain regular phenomena.
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===A Priori Hypothesis===
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Hypotheses in [[a priori and a posteriori|a priori]] disciplines (e.g. [[mathematic]]s) have a different role. These sorts of hypotheses function as a conjectural basis of an [[argument]]. Hypotheses in this sense are usually claims that are temporarily assumed to be true for the sake of a proof because they are needed in the proof and the claim seems plausible. However, as soon as a contradiction or other absurdity is derived from the hypothesis, the hypothesis is rejected.
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For example, [[statistics|statisticians]] devise hypothesis tests regularly to test <i>null hypotheses</i> about statistical data. A null hypothesis is usually a hypothesis positing no difference in a certain parameter (e.g. statistical mean) of two or more populations of data. During statistical hypotheses tests, a null hypothesis is chosen and then a probabilistic calculation is made from the data about how likely it is that the null hypothesis is true (usually called a “P-value”). Given an antecedent cut-off point for unlikeliness (usually called the “significance level”), a statistician will reject the null hypothesis if the P-value falls below the significance level, but accept it otherwise.
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===Mixed Hypotheses===
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Philosophers tend to use both empirical and a priori hypotheses. For example, some [[metaphysics|metaphysicans]] (known as “[[Realism (philosophy)|metaphysical realists]]”) accept the hypothesis that properties and relations (sometimes jointly referred to as “universals”) exist because the hypothesis provides the simplest explanation for the <I>phenomena</I> of why humans experience similarities and why almost all human languages use type predicates (e.g. nouns).  
  
==Usage==
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However, other metaphysicians (known as “[[Nominalism|nominalists]]”) reject the existence of universals because adopting the hypothesis leads to one or more <I>absurdities</I>. For instance, some nominalists think that the relationship between a particular thing and the property it instantiates (e.g. an orange and the [[color]] orange), sometimes called “exemplification,” is itself a relation and thus cannot be explained with metaphysical realism without circular reasoning.
In early usage, scholars often referred to a clever idea or to a convenient mathematical approach that simplified cumbersome calculations as a ''hypothesis''; when used this way, the word did not necessarily have any specific meaning. [[Robert Bellarmine|Cardinal Bellarmine]] gave a famous example of the older sense of the word in the warning issued to [[Galileo Galilei|Galileo]] in the early 17th century: that he must not treat the motion of the [[Earth]] as a reality, but merely as a hypothesis.
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===Causal v. Correlational Hypotheses===
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Yet another distinction in hypotheses—or at least empirical hypotheses—is between <I>causal</I> and merely <I>correlational</I> claims made in hypotheses. Namely, some hypotheses are meant to provide causal explanations of some particular phenomenological regularity, whereas other hypotheses are just meant to provide a means for predicting phenomenological regularities.
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For example, suppose that John’s knees hurt each time he jogs on the sidewalk. That is a regular phenomenon that deserves some sort of explanation. John’s hypothesis is that his shoes are worn. So he buys new shoes and sure enough his knees no longer hurt when he jogs.
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Now what John has done is coincidentally found a solution that correlates with the cause of his pain even though he has not identified the cause of his pain. As a physiologist might point out, the cause of John’s pain is probably poor shock absorption in his patello-femoral joint and subsequent excitation of nerve fibers. Thus John has stumbled upon a hypothesis that predicts the phenomenological regularity (worn shoes) although he has not discovered the hypothesis that accounts for the cause of the phenomenological regularity (worn knee joints and associated nerve firing).
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==Evaluating Hypotheses==
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Evaluating (empirical) hypotheses according to the hypothetico-deductive approach requires the use of a few methodological virtues. [[philosophy of science|Philosophers of science]] have debated these virtues for many years, but they are still worth mentioning:
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* Testability
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* Empirical Adequacy
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* Simplicity
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* Scope
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* Fruitfulness
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* Internal and External Consistency
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===Testability===
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<i>Testability</i> is the feature of hypotheses that makes them susceptible to rejection. [[Karl Popper]] (1959) claims that what makes a hypothesis <I>scientific</I> is its ability to be observationally tested, or as he puts it, [[Scientific Method|falsified]]. Thus a hypothesis must be testable in order to entertain it as a possible explanation of scientific phenomena.
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In science and other empirical disciplines, the hypothesis test is usually—but not always—empirical. In [[mathematics]] and other [[a priori and a posteriori|a priori]] disciplines, the test is conceptual (e.g. Does the hypothesis not imply an absurdity?). But some test is needed to identify a hypothesis. Otherwise, there would be no difference between a hypothesis and a mere belief.
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===Empirical Adequacy===
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<i>Empirical adequacy</i> is one of the oldest and most uncontroversial virtues used to evaluate hypotheses. A hypothesis is empirically adequate when it predicts or explains the phenomenological regularity that it was proposed to predict or explain. This means that an empirically adequate hypothesis is one that—together with certain auxiliary assumptions—deductively imply the phenomenological regularity as an observation.
  
In common usage in the 21st century, a ''hypothesis'' refers to a provisional idea whose merit needs evaluation. For proper evaluation, the framer of a hypothesis needs to define specifics in operational terms. A hypothesis requires more work by the researcher in order to either confirm or disprove it. In due course, a confirmed hypothesis may become part of a [[theory]] or occasionally may grow to become a theory itself.  Normally, scientific hypotheses have the form of a [[mathematical model]].  Sometimes, but not always, one can also formulate them as [[existential quantification|existential statements]], stating that some particular instance of the phenomenon being studied has some characteristic and causal explanations, which have the general form of [[Universal quantification|universal statements]], stating that every instance of the phenomenon has a particular characteristic.  
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However, some notions of empirical adequacy extend far beyond the original regular phenomenon to all relevant and observable phenomena. Thus, for example, Thomson’s hypothesis about the existence of electrons should not only predict the behavior of cathode rays, but also other physical phenomena involving [[Electricity|electric currents]]. The exact meaning of ‘empirical adequacy’ has been debated among philosophers of science for years, leading some philosophers such as [[Thomas Samuel Kuhn|Thomas Kuhn]] (1922-1996), to claim that no physical theory has ever been empirically adequate.
  
Any useful hypothesis will enable [[prediction]]s, by [[reasoning]] (including [[deductive reasoning]]). It might predict the outcome of an experiment in a laboratory setting or the observation of a phenomenon in nature. The prediction may also invoke statistics and only talk about probabilities. [[Karl Popper]], following others, has argued that a hypothesis must be [[falsifiable]], and that a proposition or theory cannot be called scientific if it does not admit the possibility of being shown false. By this additional criterion, it must at least in principle be possible to make an observation that would disprove the proposition as false, even if one has not actually (yet) made that observation.  A falsifiable hypothesis can greatly simplify the process of testing to determine whether the hypothesis has instances in which it is false.
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===Simplicity===
  
It is essential that the outcome be currently unknown or reasonably under continuing investigation. Only in this case does the experiment, test or study potentially increase the probability of showing the truth of an hypothesis. If the researcher already knows the outcome, it is called a consequence — and the researcher should have already considered this while [[#Hypothesis development|formulating the hypothesis]]. If the predictions are not assessable by observation or by experience, the hypothesis is not yet useful, and must wait for others who might come afterward to make possible the needed observations. For example, a new technology or theory might make the necessary experiments feasible.
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<i>Simplicity</i> has been a desired feature of hypotheses ever since [[William of Ockham]] (c. 1295–1349) introduced the value of simplicity in his often-cited principle known as [[Ockham's razor|Ockham’s Razor]], which roughly states that hypotheses should be as ontologically parsimonious as possible. Dozens of important scientists throughout history have endorsed the use of simplicity in hypothesis construction. For example, [[Isaac Newton]]’s first rule for the study of natural philosophy (or physics) is the following:
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<blockquote>
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“No more causes of natural things should be admitted than are both true and sufficient to explain their phenomena” (Newton [1726] 1999, 794).
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</blockquote>
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Nevertheless, the ontological defense of simplicity became an unpopular position in the twentieth-century, largely because of how obviously complex nature has turned out to be. Instead, twentieth-century philosophers of science explored [[Epistemology|epistemological]] defenses of simplicity as a virtue of hypotheses. For example, [[Karl Popper]] (1959) argued that simpler hypotheses are more easily testable and thus have more empirical content and scientific value. In Popper’s words:
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<blockquote>
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“Simple statements, if knowledge is our object, are to be prized more highly than less simple ones <I>because they tell us more; because their empirical content is greater; and because they are better testable</I>” (Popper 1959, 142).
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</blockquote>
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Similarly, George Smith (2002) has argued that simplicity can be valuable in a scientific method known as <i>successive approximation through idealization</i>—a method first introduced by [[Isaac Newton]] ([1726] 1999).
  
== Types of hypothesis ==
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Despite these defenses, feminist philosophers of science have attacked traditionalists for being too vague about what counts as a “simpler” hypothesis and also the general worth of simpler hypotheses in <I>all</I> domains of science. One feminist philosopher, Helen Longino (1990) has argued that ontological heterogeneity is sometimes more valuable to the biological sciences than ontological simplicity. For example, in reproductive biology, a diverse array of reproductive mechanisms should be entertained in biological hypotheses to fully account for reproductive phenomena across living systems.
  
Propositions may come in the form of an assertion of a [[correlation]] between, or among, two or more things, but  without necessarily asserting a cause-and-effect relationship; for example: "When A changes, so does B."  Or, a proposition may take the form of asserting a [[causal]] relationship (such as "A ''causes'' B").  An example of a proposition that often but not necessarily involves an assertion of causation is: If a particular [[independent variable]] is changed there also a change in a certain [[dependent variable]]. This is also known as an "If and Then" statement, whether or not it asserts a direct cause-and-effect relationship. 
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===Scope===
  
A hypothesis about possible correlation does not stipulate the [[cause and effect]] ''per se'', only stating that 'A is related to B'. Causal relationships can be more difficult to verify than correlations, because quite commonly ''intervening'' variables are also involved which may give rise to the ''appearance'' of a possibly direct cause-and-effect relationship, but which upon further investigation turn out to be more directly caused by some other factor not mentioned in the proposition.  Also, a mere observation of a change in one variable, when correlated with a change in another variable, can actually mistake the effect for the cause, and ''vice-versa'' (i.e., potentially get the hypothesized cause and effect backwards).
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<i>Scope</i> is the feature of hypotheses that measures the number or diversity of phenomena a hypothesis predicts or explains. So to say that a hypothesis has wide scope is to say that it predicts (or explains) a lot of phenomena in one scientific field or it predicts (or explains) phenomena in different scientific fields. For example, Thomson’s hypothesis about the existence of electrons has wide scope because it explains the behavior of cathode rays in physics, [[chemical reaction|oxidation-reduction (or “redox”) reactions]] in chemistry, and even [[photosynthesis]] in biology. Sometimes scope is included in empirical adequacy.
  
Empirical hypotheses that experimenters have repeatedly verified may become sufficiently dependable that, at some point in time, they become considered as "proven". Scientists then term such hypotheses "[[law of nature|law]]s".  Alternately, researchers may instead refer to such repeatedly verified hypotheses simply as "adequately verified", or "dependable".
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===Fruitfulness===
  
==Evaluating hypotheses==
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<i>Fruitfulness</i> is the extent to which the acceptance of a hypothesis can positively impact scientific practice (Kuhn 1977). For instance, Thomson’s hypothesis about the existence of the electron was very fruitful and Thomson knew it would be when he proposed it. The acceptance of electrons, among other benefits, started the discipline of subatomic physics. This benefit alone was enough for Thomson’s contemporaries to seriously consider the hypothesis of the electron.
The [[hypothetico-deductive method]] demands [[falsifiability|falsifiable]] hypotheses, framed in such a manner that the scientific community can prove them false (usually by [[observation]]). (Note that, if confirmed, the hypothesis is not necessarily proven, but remains provisional.
 
  
As an example: someone who enters a new country and observes only white sheep might form the hypothesis that all sheep in that country are white. It can be considered a hypothesis, as it is falsifiable. Anyone could falsify the hypothesis by observing a single black sheep. Provided that the experimental uncertainties are small (for example, provided that one can fairly reliably distinguish the observed black sheep from (say) a goat), and provided that the experimenter has correctly interpreted the statement of the hypothesis (for example, does the meaning of "sheep" include rams?), finding a black sheep falsifies the "white sheep only" hypothesis. This sort of example probably provides the easiest way to understand the term "hypothesis".
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===Internal and External Consistency===
  
According to Schick and Vaughn (2002), researchers weighing up alternative hypotheses may take into consideration:
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The <i>internal consistency</i> of a hypothesis and the <i>external consistency</i> of a hypothesis with already accepted hypotheses (often called “theories” or “laws”) is usually given as a desirable feature of hypotheses. For one, if a hypothesis is not internally consistent (e.g. if it contains a [[logic|logical]] or analytic contradiction), then any observational consequence follows from the hypothesis as a matter of logic. This means that no observational test can confirm or conflict with the hypothesis.
  
* Testibility (compare falsifiability as discussed above)
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However, external consistency is usually seen as more controversial than internal consistency since the use of the virtue supposes that accepted hypotheses should have been accepted. But then if these hypotheses were accepted in part from external consistency, then external consistency as a virtue is circular and unhelpful in evaluating hypotheses. It is no surprise that feminist philosophers of science have questioned this virtue as well (Longino 1990).
* Simplicity (as in the application of "[[Occam's Razor]]", discouraging the postulation of excessive numbers of [[entity|entities]])
 
* Scope - the apparent application of the hypothesis to multiple cases of phenomena
 
* Fruitfulness - the prospect that a hypothesis may explain further phenomena in the future
 
* Conservatism - the degree of "fit" with existing recognised knowledge-systems
 
  
 
== Quotes ==
 
== Quotes ==
  
* ''"[[Gravity#Newton's reservations|Hypotheses non fingo]]"'' : "I feign no hypotheses" — Isaac Newton{{fn|1}}
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*"... a hypothesis is a statement whose ''truth'' is temporarily assumed, ''whose meaning is beyond all doubt''."—Albert Einstein (1918)
  
*"... a hypothesis is a statement whose ''truth'' is temporarily assumed, ''whose meaning is beyond all doubt''. ..." — Albert Einstein{{fn|2}}
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* "The supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience."—Albert Einstein (1933)
 
 
* "The supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience." — Albert Einstein (1933)
 
  
 
== See also ==
 
== See also ==
  
* [[Causality]]
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* [[Scientific Method]]
* [[Ecological fallacy]]
 
* [[Learning]]
 
* [[Logic]]
 
* [[Null hypothesis]]
 
* [[Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica]] for Newton's position on hypotheses
 
* [[Reductionism]]
 
* [[Research design]]
 
* [[Scientific method]]
 
* [[Statistical hypothesis testing]]
 
* [[Theory]]
 
* [[Thought experiment]]
 
* [[Null Hypothesis - The Journal of Unlikely Science]]
 
  
== Notes ==
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== References ==
  
{{fnb|1}}[[Isaac Newton]], ''Principia Mathematica''. A New Translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, translators. University of California Press [[1999]] ISBN 0-520-08817-4
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*Kuhn, Thomas. 1977. “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice.” in Thomas Kuhn, <I>The Essential Tension</I>. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 320-339.
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*Longino, Helen E. 1990. <I>Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry</I>. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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*Newton, Isaac. [1726] 1999. <I>The Principia, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy: A New Translation</I>. trans. I.B. Cohen and A. Whitman. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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*Popper, Karl. 1959. <I>The Logic of Scientific Discovery</I>. London: Hutchinson.
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*Smith, George. 2002. “The Methodology of the <I>Principia</I>” in I. Bernard Cohen and George E. Smith (eds.). <I>The Cambridge Companion to Newton</I>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 138-173.
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*Thomson, J.J. 1897. Cathode Rays. <I>Philosophical Magazine</I> Series 5, Vol. 44, No. 269: 293-317.
  
{{fnb|2}} Letter to Eduard Study from [[Albert Einstein]], [[September 25]],[[1918]] ''Collected Papers of Albert Einstein'', J.J. Stachel and Robert Schulmann, eds. Princeton University Press [[1987]]
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==External links==
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All links retrieved January 23, 2018.
  
== External links ==
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*[http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/hypothesis Merriam-Webster Dictionary Entry on Hypothesis]
* [http://www.nuevoweb.com/tutorial/glossary.html Research and Evaluation Glossary]
 
  
*[http://www.swemorph.com/pdf/anaeng-r.pdf  Analysis and Synthesis - On Scientific Method, based on a study by Bernhard Riemann] From the [http://www.swemorph.com Swedish Morphological Society]
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===General Philosophy Sources===
  
== References ==
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
Schick, Theodore and Vaughn, Lewis: ''How to think about weird things: Critical thinking for a New Age'' Boston, 2002
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*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
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*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online]
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*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg]
  
[[Category:Scientific method]]
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[[Category:Philosophy]]
 
[[Category:Philosophy and religion]]
 
[[Category:Philosophy and religion]]
  
 
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Latest revision as of 15:44, 23 January 2018

A hypothesis in the empirical disciplines (e.g. physics, chemistry, and biology) is a proposition proposed to predict or explain a reoccurring phenomenon, and in the a priori disciplines (e.g. mathematics, statistics, and logic) it is a proposition proposed as the basis of an argument. The term derives from the ancient Greek, hypotithenai meaning "to put under" or "to suppose." The nature of the hypothesis is a topic of study primarily reserved for philosophy of science.

Usage

In early usage, scholars often referred to a clever idea or to a convenient mathematical approach that simplified cumbersome calculations as a hypothesis. St. Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) gave a famous example of the older sense of the word in the warning issued to Galileo in the early seventeenth century: that he must not treat the motion of the Earth as a reality, but merely as a hypothesis.

During the eighteenth century, physicists (or “natural philosophers” as they were called) began to use the term ‘hypothesis’ in a pejorative sense, suggesting that hypothetico-deduction (explained later) was an inferior form of scientific reasoning. For example, Isaac Newton (1643-1727) made a famous phrase about the use of hypotheses in science in the General Scholium of his classic 1726 text The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy:

I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for these properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy (Newton [1726] 1999, 943).

In common usage in the twent-first century, a hypothesis refers to an educated guess about why some phenomenon or phenomenological regularity occurs. Hypotheses, in common usage, are provisional and not accepted as true until they are tested. Thus hypotheses are always testable claims. Actually, the requirement that hypotheses are testable is a tenet among philosophers of science as well, especially Karl Popper (1902-1994) and Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-1997).

For example, suppose that Tamara is in her home and she hears her car alarm sound. She immediately formulates two hypotheses. First, someone is stealing her car. Second, someone accidentally initiated the alarm (e.g. by standing too close to the car). Tamara favors the second hypothesis because she lives in a safe neighborhood. A test of Tamara’s hypothesis would be simple. All she would need to do is walk over to the window and look to see what happened. If she sees a bunch of teenagers near her car she can rest assured that her hypothesis was true. However, if instead she sees that her car is missing, then her first guess was probably right.

Types of Hypotheses

Empirical Hypotheses

Hypotheses in empirical disciplines (e.g. physics) are propositions proposed to predict or explain regular phenomena. Using hypotheses to predict or explain regular phenomena is often called “the hypothetico-deductive method” in science.

An example of a famous hypothetico-deduction is Joseph John Thomson’s (1856-1940) hypothesis that cathode rays are streams of subatomic negatively-charged particles that we now call electrons. Cathode rays are emanations from electrodes in vacuum tubes that travel the length of the tube to hit a phosphorous-coated screen and produce a luminous spot. Cathode ray tubes are used in most ordinary televisions. At any rate, several physicists in the late 1800s thought that cathode rays were uncharged streams of electromagnetic waves. In fact, in 1883 Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894) showed that cathode rays were not deflected by electrically charged metal plates, and in 1892 Hertz showed that cathode rays could penetrate thin metal foils, unlike any known particles.

However, J.J. Thomson (1897) disagreed with Hertz and posited electrons as the true components of cathode rays. In 1895 Jean Perrin (1870-1942) showed that electrically charged metal plates could deflect cathode rays, and Thomson confirmed Perrin’s result in 1897 by reproducing the experiment and measuring the magnitude of the miniscule deflection. Nevertheless, the controversial part of Thomson’s hypothesis was that cathode rays were composed of particles instead of waves.

However, assuming that cathode rays were composed of particles, Thomson was able to predict and explain several strange but regular phenomena about cathode rays. For example, with the electron Thomson was able to explain how it is possible to measure a stable mass to electric charge ratio of cathode ray particles when passing it through a uniform magnetic field and why the mass-to-charge ratio was smaller than any known mass-to-charge ratio for atomic compounds.

In 1906, J.J. Thomson was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics for discovering the electron and introducing the field of subatomic physics. Ironically, Thomson’s son George Paget Thomson was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1937 for showing that the electron is a wave. Nonetheless, this historical example shows how hypotheses in the empirical disciplines function to predict or explain regular phenomena.

A Priori Hypothesis

Hypotheses in a priori disciplines (e.g. mathematics) have a different role. These sorts of hypotheses function as a conjectural basis of an argument. Hypotheses in this sense are usually claims that are temporarily assumed to be true for the sake of a proof because they are needed in the proof and the claim seems plausible. However, as soon as a contradiction or other absurdity is derived from the hypothesis, the hypothesis is rejected.

For example, statisticians devise hypothesis tests regularly to test null hypotheses about statistical data. A null hypothesis is usually a hypothesis positing no difference in a certain parameter (e.g. statistical mean) of two or more populations of data. During statistical hypotheses tests, a null hypothesis is chosen and then a probabilistic calculation is made from the data about how likely it is that the null hypothesis is true (usually called a “P-value”). Given an antecedent cut-off point for unlikeliness (usually called the “significance level”), a statistician will reject the null hypothesis if the P-value falls below the significance level, but accept it otherwise.

Mixed Hypotheses

Philosophers tend to use both empirical and a priori hypotheses. For example, some metaphysicans (known as “metaphysical realists”) accept the hypothesis that properties and relations (sometimes jointly referred to as “universals”) exist because the hypothesis provides the simplest explanation for the phenomena of why humans experience similarities and why almost all human languages use type predicates (e.g. nouns).

However, other metaphysicians (known as “nominalists”) reject the existence of universals because adopting the hypothesis leads to one or more absurdities. For instance, some nominalists think that the relationship between a particular thing and the property it instantiates (e.g. an orange and the color orange), sometimes called “exemplification,” is itself a relation and thus cannot be explained with metaphysical realism without circular reasoning.

Causal v. Correlational Hypotheses

Yet another distinction in hypotheses—or at least empirical hypotheses—is between causal and merely correlational claims made in hypotheses. Namely, some hypotheses are meant to provide causal explanations of some particular phenomenological regularity, whereas other hypotheses are just meant to provide a means for predicting phenomenological regularities.

For example, suppose that John’s knees hurt each time he jogs on the sidewalk. That is a regular phenomenon that deserves some sort of explanation. John’s hypothesis is that his shoes are worn. So he buys new shoes and sure enough his knees no longer hurt when he jogs.

Now what John has done is coincidentally found a solution that correlates with the cause of his pain even though he has not identified the cause of his pain. As a physiologist might point out, the cause of John’s pain is probably poor shock absorption in his patello-femoral joint and subsequent excitation of nerve fibers. Thus John has stumbled upon a hypothesis that predicts the phenomenological regularity (worn shoes) although he has not discovered the hypothesis that accounts for the cause of the phenomenological regularity (worn knee joints and associated nerve firing).

Evaluating Hypotheses

Evaluating (empirical) hypotheses according to the hypothetico-deductive approach requires the use of a few methodological virtues. Philosophers of science have debated these virtues for many years, but they are still worth mentioning:

  • Testability
  • Empirical Adequacy
  • Simplicity
  • Scope
  • Fruitfulness
  • Internal and External Consistency

Testability

Testability is the feature of hypotheses that makes them susceptible to rejection. Karl Popper (1959) claims that what makes a hypothesis scientific is its ability to be observationally tested, or as he puts it, falsified. Thus a hypothesis must be testable in order to entertain it as a possible explanation of scientific phenomena.

In science and other empirical disciplines, the hypothesis test is usually—but not always—empirical. In mathematics and other a priori disciplines, the test is conceptual (e.g. Does the hypothesis not imply an absurdity?). But some test is needed to identify a hypothesis. Otherwise, there would be no difference between a hypothesis and a mere belief.

Empirical Adequacy

Empirical adequacy is one of the oldest and most uncontroversial virtues used to evaluate hypotheses. A hypothesis is empirically adequate when it predicts or explains the phenomenological regularity that it was proposed to predict or explain. This means that an empirically adequate hypothesis is one that—together with certain auxiliary assumptions—deductively imply the phenomenological regularity as an observation.

However, some notions of empirical adequacy extend far beyond the original regular phenomenon to all relevant and observable phenomena. Thus, for example, Thomson’s hypothesis about the existence of electrons should not only predict the behavior of cathode rays, but also other physical phenomena involving electric currents. The exact meaning of ‘empirical adequacy’ has been debated among philosophers of science for years, leading some philosophers such as Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), to claim that no physical theory has ever been empirically adequate.

Simplicity

Simplicity has been a desired feature of hypotheses ever since William of Ockham (c. 1295–1349) introduced the value of simplicity in his often-cited principle known as Ockham’s Razor, which roughly states that hypotheses should be as ontologically parsimonious as possible. Dozens of important scientists throughout history have endorsed the use of simplicity in hypothesis construction. For example, Isaac Newton’s first rule for the study of natural philosophy (or physics) is the following:

“No more causes of natural things should be admitted than are both true and sufficient to explain their phenomena” (Newton [1726] 1999, 794).

Nevertheless, the ontological defense of simplicity became an unpopular position in the twentieth-century, largely because of how obviously complex nature has turned out to be. Instead, twentieth-century philosophers of science explored epistemological defenses of simplicity as a virtue of hypotheses. For example, Karl Popper (1959) argued that simpler hypotheses are more easily testable and thus have more empirical content and scientific value. In Popper’s words:

“Simple statements, if knowledge is our object, are to be prized more highly than less simple ones because they tell us more; because their empirical content is greater; and because they are better testable” (Popper 1959, 142).

Similarly, George Smith (2002) has argued that simplicity can be valuable in a scientific method known as successive approximation through idealization—a method first introduced by Isaac Newton ([1726] 1999).

Despite these defenses, feminist philosophers of science have attacked traditionalists for being too vague about what counts as a “simpler” hypothesis and also the general worth of simpler hypotheses in all domains of science. One feminist philosopher, Helen Longino (1990) has argued that ontological heterogeneity is sometimes more valuable to the biological sciences than ontological simplicity. For example, in reproductive biology, a diverse array of reproductive mechanisms should be entertained in biological hypotheses to fully account for reproductive phenomena across living systems.

Scope

Scope is the feature of hypotheses that measures the number or diversity of phenomena a hypothesis predicts or explains. So to say that a hypothesis has wide scope is to say that it predicts (or explains) a lot of phenomena in one scientific field or it predicts (or explains) phenomena in different scientific fields. For example, Thomson’s hypothesis about the existence of electrons has wide scope because it explains the behavior of cathode rays in physics, oxidation-reduction (or “redox”) reactions in chemistry, and even photosynthesis in biology. Sometimes scope is included in empirical adequacy.

Fruitfulness

Fruitfulness is the extent to which the acceptance of a hypothesis can positively impact scientific practice (Kuhn 1977). For instance, Thomson’s hypothesis about the existence of the electron was very fruitful and Thomson knew it would be when he proposed it. The acceptance of electrons, among other benefits, started the discipline of subatomic physics. This benefit alone was enough for Thomson’s contemporaries to seriously consider the hypothesis of the electron.

Internal and External Consistency

The internal consistency of a hypothesis and the external consistency of a hypothesis with already accepted hypotheses (often called “theories” or “laws”) is usually given as a desirable feature of hypotheses. For one, if a hypothesis is not internally consistent (e.g. if it contains a logical or analytic contradiction), then any observational consequence follows from the hypothesis as a matter of logic. This means that no observational test can confirm or conflict with the hypothesis.

However, external consistency is usually seen as more controversial than internal consistency since the use of the virtue supposes that accepted hypotheses should have been accepted. But then if these hypotheses were accepted in part from external consistency, then external consistency as a virtue is circular and unhelpful in evaluating hypotheses. It is no surprise that feminist philosophers of science have questioned this virtue as well (Longino 1990).

Quotes

  • "... a hypothesis is a statement whose truth is temporarily assumed, whose meaning is beyond all doubt."—Albert Einstein (1918)
  • "The supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience."—Albert Einstein (1933)

See also

  • Scientific Method

References
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  • Kuhn, Thomas. 1977. “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice.” in Thomas Kuhn, The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 320-339.
  • Longino, Helen E. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Newton, Isaac. [1726] 1999. The Principia, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy: A New Translation. trans. I.B. Cohen and A. Whitman. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Popper, Karl. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.
  • Smith, George. 2002. “The Methodology of the Principia” in I. Bernard Cohen and George E. Smith (eds.). The Cambridge Companion to Newton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 138-173.
  • Thomson, J.J. 1897. Cathode Rays. Philosophical Magazine Series 5, Vol. 44, No. 269: 293-317.

External links

All links retrieved January 23, 2018.

General Philosophy Sources

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