Teleological ethics
The Greek word telos means goal, end, or purpose, and teleology is the study of goals, ends and purposes. An ethical theory is regarded as teleological to the extent that the normative properties (e.g. rightness, wrongness, virtue and praiseworthiness) with which it is concerned are explained and justified in terms of some purpose. For example, an ethical theory that maintains that the rightness of an action is one which achieves the goal of maximising happiness counts as a teleological theory. The two main types of theory brought under the rubric of teleological ethics are the varieties of ancient Greek virtue ethics and consequentialism. Aristotle’s ethics is the most influential example of a virtue ethical theory, and the most well known example of a consequentialist ethical theory is Classical Utilitarianism. Teleological ethics may be contrasted with non-teleological ethics, of which deontological theories provide the best-known example.
Teleological ethics: unpacking the distinction
Ethical theories are standardly divided into teleological and deontological theories. One common way of drawing the teleological / deontological distinction is in terms of how moral theories specify the relation between the two central concepts of ethics: the good and the right. A theory of value (a theory of the good) provides an account of what things are intrinsically good, or what states of affairs we would like to have realised. One of the most well known theories of value is hedonism, which maintains that only pleasue and pain are intrinsically good. The second component of a moral theory is the specification of how moral agents ought to respond to the valuable properties specified by the theory of value. This is most often understood in terms of a theory of right action, for modern ethical thinking has tended to focus centrally concerned with what is done, as over above, (e.g.) what sort of persons we should become.
On a standard classification, then, teleological theories are identified as those moralities that understand right action solely in terms of the promotion of good, whereas non-teleological theories, notably, deontological accounts, deny this. For example, Classical Utilitarianism counts as a teleological theory since it identifies right action with those actions which bring about an increase in the balance of pleasure over pain. whereas deontolgical theories deny this. A deontological morality maintains that some actions are right or wrong independently of the value of the consequences of the act. For example, a deontologist would argue that killing an innocent person is wrong independently of the value of consequences brought about by the action.
This classification, while commonly accepted, is misleading in two ways. Firstly, it is not necessary to restrict the teleological / non-teleological distinction to actions: states of character, motives, and moral rules, may also be treated teleologically, or non-teleologically. This entails that the proper contrast to teleological ethics is not deontological ethics; rather, deontological ethics refers to accounts of right action and therefore is best thought of as a subset of non-teleological accounts. Deontology is a non-teleological account of right action, and does not cover non-teleological accounts of (e.g.) virtuous character. Secondly, the relation between the theory of the right and the good is not quite as straightforward as might initially be thought. The above way of drawing the teleological / non-teleological distinction ignores significant differences between consequentialism and ancient virtue ethics, the two sorts of theories thought to be paradigmatically teleological.
Consequentialism is the thesis that normative properties such as rightness and wrongness depend on consequences. This presupposes a theory of value, but consequentialism is compatible with almost any theory of value. The most common variety of consequentialism is act consequentialism, which defines right action in terms of the value of the consequences brought about. Classical Utilitarianism is a clear example of act consequentialism. Act consequentialism (in its various forms) may be seen as a teleological moral theory because it defines the moral rightness of an action as dependent on the promotion of valuable states of affairs. More generally, act consequentialism says that the proper response to a value is to promote it, and therefore, the right action is one which brings about the greatest balance of good over bad. Other varieties of consequentialism are rule consequentialism, motive consequentialism, or even virtue consequentialism. In analogy with act consequentialism, virtue consequentialism says that a trait of character is a virtue if is brings about the best consequences. In general, any normative property admits of a consequentialist treatment.
One essential property of consequentialism is that is understands the relation between the normative property and the good articulated by the theory of value in instrumental terms. According to act consequentialism, right action has no intrinsic value but gains its value entirely from the value of the states of affairs brought about. On Classical Utilitarianism, for example, an action that keeps a promise is right only insofar as keeping the promise brings about the greatest balance of happiness. By contrast, in Ancient virtue theory the relation between the good, and the normative property (virtue) is not instrumental. In Aristotle’s virtue ethics, the goal of ethics is the good for man. This qualifies it as a teleological theory since it is concerned with the promotion of a certain end, or goal. Aristotle thinks that everyone aims for happiness or Eudaimonia and to this extent it may be natural to link up Aristotle’s theory with Utilitarianism. But there are two main differences between Aristotle’s virtue ethics and consequentialism. Firstly, in Aristotle’s theory goodness is attached to the flourishing of the human agent whereas for a consequentialist, goodness is indexed to the state of the world. Secondly, for Aristotle, the relation between virtues or excellences is not instrumental in achieving the good (as in virtue consequentialism described above). Virtue is not the means to perfection, but is identified with the perfection of a human being. On Aristotle’s view, right action is part of virtuous action, and hence Aristotle’s theory is not does not fit neatly within the standard taxonomy.
Ancient Greek ethical theories, such as Plato and Aristotle’s are classified as perfectionist moralities. Other influential forms of pefectionism include the Stoics, Nietzsche, and the modern Idealists such as Bradley. Perfectionist moral theories are teleological but they may not be consequentialist. Consequentialist perfectionism lists valuable states or activities such as knowledge, achievement and artistic creation, and understands right action in terms of the promotion of these values. Non-consequentialist forms of perfectionism do not understand right action as the promotion of these values. More commonly, as we have seen with Aristotle’s theory, non-consequentialist perfectionism will identify virtue with the perfection of some states or activities of the human being. One does not promote these values; rather these values are constituents of the good life. Right action is not instrumentally related to the promotion of value, but is itself a constituent of the virtuous life.
See Also
- Aristotle
- Consequentialism
- Deontology
- Virtue Ethics
