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| | :''This article is about the '''philosophical''' notion of Idealism. Idealism is also a term in [[Idealism in international relations theory|international relations theory]] and in [[Idealism (Christian eschatology)|Christian eschatology]].'' | | :''This article is about the '''philosophical''' notion of Idealism. Idealism is also a term in [[Idealism in international relations theory|international relations theory]] and in [[Idealism (Christian eschatology)|Christian eschatology]].'' |
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| − | '''Idealism''' is an approach to [[philosophy|philosophical enquiry]] which asserts that direct and immediate knowledge can only be had of ideas or mental pictures. Objects that are the basis of these ideas can only be known indirectly or mediately. As a foundation for [[cosmology]], or an approach to understanding the existence, idealism is often contrasted with ''[[materialism]]'', both belonging to the class of [[monism|monist]] as opposed to [[dualism|dualist]] or [[pluralism|pluralist]] [[ontology|ontologies]]. (Note that this contrast between idealism and materialism is approximately as to whether the [[substance]] of the [[world]] is at base [[mental]] or [[physical]] — it has nothing to do with thinking that things should be [[ideal]]ized, or with coveting goods.) | + | ''''Idealism'''' is a term used to describe a variety of philosophical positions. What unites these positions is the claim that at least large portions of reality (in particular, the experienced physical world) are metaphysically based in something mental (minds and their ideas or representations). |
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| − | The approach to idealism by [[Western world|Western]] philosophers has been different from that of Eastern thinkers. In much of Western thought (though not in such major Western thinkers as [[Plato]] and [[Hegel]]) ''the ideal'' relates to direct [[knowledge]] of [[subjective]] mental [[ideas]], or [[image]]s. It is then usually juxtaposed with ''[[realism]]'' in which the [[real]] is said to have [[absolute]] [[existence]] prior to and independent of our knowledge. [[Epistemology|Epistemological]] idealists might insist that the only things which can be directly ''known for certain'' are ideas. In Eastern thought, as reflected in [[Hindu idealism]], the concept of ''idealism'' takes on the meaning of [[consciousness]], essentially the living consciousness of an all-pervading ''[[God]]'', as the basis of all [[phenomena]]. A type of [[Asian]] idealism is [[Consciousness-only|Buddhist idealism]].
| + | ==Berkeley== |
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| − | ==History== | + | ==Kant== |
| − | '''Idealism''' names a number of philosophical positions with quite different tendencies and implications.
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| − | ===Idealism in the East=== | + | ==German Idealism== |
| − | Several [[Hinduism|Hindu traditions]] and [[History of Buddhist schools|schools of Buddhism]] can be accurately characterized as idealist. Some of the Buddhist schools are called "[[Consciousness-only]]" schools as they focus on consciousness without a God or soul.
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| − | ===Idealism in the West=== | + | ==Criticisms of Idealism== |
| − | ====Antiphon====
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| − | In his chief work ''Truth'', [[Antiphon (person)|Antiphon]] wrote: "[[Time]] is a [[thought]] or a [[measure]], not a [[substance]]". This presents time as an ideational, internal, mental operation, rather than a real, external object.
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| − | ====Plato==== | + | ==References== |
| − | {{main|Platonic idealism}}
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| − | [[Plato]] proposed an idealist theory as a solution to the [[problem of universals]]. A universal is that which all things share in virtue of having some particular property. So for example the wall, the moon and a blank sheet of paper are all white; ''white'' is the universal that all white things share. Plato argued that it is universals, [[The Forms]], or [[Platonic Ideals]] that are real, not specific individual things. Confusingly, because this idea asserts that these mental entities are ''real'', it is also called ''[[Platonic realism]]''; in this sense ''realism'' contrasts with ''[[nominalism]]'', the notion that mental abstractions are merely names without an independent existence. Nevertheless, it is a form of idealism because it asserts the primacy of the idea of universals over material things. <!-- More on maths here ? —>
| + | * Sprigge, T.L.S. (1998). "Idealism." In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved April 29, 2007, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N027SECT7. |
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| − | ====Plotinus====
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| − | [[Schopenhauer]] wrote of this [[Neoplatonist]] philosopher: "With [[Plotinus]] there even appears, probably for the first time in [[Western philosophy]], ''idealism'' that had long been current in the [[East]] even at that time, for it taught ([[Enneads]], iii, lib. vii, c.10) that the [[soul]] has made the [[world]] by stepping from [[eternity]] into [[time]], with the explanation: 'For there is for this [[universe]] no other place than the soul or [[mind]]' (neque est alter hujus universi locus quam anima), indeed the ideality of time is expressed in the words: 'We should not accept time outside the soul or mind' (oportet autem nequaquam extra animam tempus accipere)." (''Parerga and Paralipomena'', Volume I, "Fragments for the History of Philosophy," § 7)
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| − | ====Malebranche====
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| − | [[Malebranche]] a student of the Cartesian School of Rationalism disagreed that if the only things that we know for certain are the ideas within our mind, then the existence of the external world would be dubious and known only indirectly. He declared instead that the real external world is actually God. All activity only appears to occur in the external world. In actuality, it is the activity of God. For Malebranche, we directly know internally the ideas in our mind. Externally, we directly know God's operations. This kind of idealism led to the pantheism of [[Spinoza]].
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| − | ====George Berkeley====
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| − | [[George Berkeley|Bishop Berkeley]], in seeking to find out what we could know with certainty, decided that our knowledge must be based on our [[perception]]s. This led him to conclude that there was indeed no "real" knowable object behind one's perception, that what was "real" was the perception itself. This is characterised by Berkeley's slogan: "Esse est aut percipi aut percipere" or "To be is to be perceived or to perceive", meaning that something only exists, in the particular way that it is seen to exist, when it is being perceived (seen, felt etc.) by an observing subject.
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| − | This [[subjective idealism]] or [[dogmatic idealism]] led to his placing the full weight of [[theory of justification|justification]] on our perceptions. This left Berkeley with the problem, common to other forms of idealism, of explaining how it is that each of us apparently has much the same sort of perceptions of an object. He solved this problem by having [[God]] intercede, as the immediate cause of all of our perceptions.
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| − | [[Schopenhauer]] wrote: "Berkeley was, therefore, the first to treat the subjective starting-point really seriously and to demonstrate irrefutably its absolute necessity. He is the father of idealism...." (''Parerga and Paralipomena'', Vol. I, "Fragments for the History of Philosophy," § 12)
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| − | ====Arthur Collier====
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| − | [[Arthur Collier]] published the same assertions that were made by [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]]. However, there seemed to have been no influence between the two contemporary writers. Collier claimed that the represented image of an external object is the only knowable reality. Matter, as a cause of the representative image, is unthinkable and therefore nothing to us. An external world, as absolute matter, unrelated to an observer, does not exist for human perceivers. As an appearance in a mind, the universe cannot exist as it appears if there is no perceiving mind.
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| − | Collier was influenced by [[John Norris]]'s (1701) ''An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World''. The idealist statements by Collier were generally dismissed by readers who were not able to reflect on the distinction between a mental idea or image and the object that it represents.
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| − | ====Jonathan Edwards====
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| − | [[Jonathan Edwards]], an American theologian, went to [[Yale University]] in 1716 at the age of thirteen. After reading [[Locke]]'s doctrine of ideas, he kept a notebook entitled "Mind." In it, he wrote, at the age of fourteen, that the only things that are real are minds. He contended that [[matter]] exists only as an [[idea]] in a mind. Due to his theological manner of thinking, he asserted that space is God, due to its infinity. After adolescence, he never elaborated on these early idealistic notes.
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| − | ====Immanuel Kant====
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| − | [[Immanuel Kant]] held that the mind shapes the world as we perceive it to take the form of space-and-time. Kant focused on the idea drawn from British [[empiricism]] (and its philosophers such as [[John Locke|Locke]], [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]], and [[David Hume|Hume]]) that all we can know is the mental impressions, or ''[[phenomena]]'', that an outside world which may or may not exist independently creates in our minds; our minds can never perceive that outside world directly. Kant's postscript to this added that the mind is not a [[blank slate]] (contra [[John Locke]]), but rather comes equipped with categories for organising our sense impressions. This Kantian sort of idealism opens up a world of abstractions (i.e., the universal categories minds use to understand phenomena) to be explored by reason, but in sharp contrast to Plato's, confirms uncertainties about a (un)knowable world outside our own minds. We cannot approach the ''[[noumenon]]'', the "Thing in Itself" ([[German language|German]]: ''Ding an Sich'') outside our own mental world. (Kant's idealism goes by the counterintuitive name of ''[[transcendental idealism]]''.)
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| − | ====Fichte====
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| − | [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte|Johann Fichte]] denied Kant's noumenon, and made the claim that consciousness made its own foundation, that the mental ego of the self relied on no external, and that an external of any kind would be the same as admitting a real material. He was the first to make the attempt at a presuppositionless theory of knowledge, wherein nothing outside of thinking would be assumed to exist outside the initial analysis of concept. So that conception could be solely grounded in itself, and assume nothing without deduction from there first, what he called a [[Wissenschaftslehre]]. (This stand is very similar to [[Giovanni Gentile]]'s [[Actual Idealism]], except that Gentile's theory goes further by denying a ground for even an ego or self made from thinking.)
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| − | ====Hegel====
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| − | [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]], another philosopher whose system has been called ''idealism'', argued in his ''Science of Logic'' (1812-1814) that finite qualities are not fully "real," because they depend on other finite qualities to determine them. Qualitative ''infinity'', on the other hand, would be more self-determining, and hence would have a better claim to be called fully real. Similarly, finite natural things are less "real"—because they're less self-determining—than spiritual things like morally responsible people, ethical communities, and God. So any doctrine, such as materialism, that asserts that finite qualities or merely natural objects are fully real, is mistaken. Hegel called his philosophy ''[[absolute idealism]]'', in contrast to the "[[subjective idealism]]" of Berkeley and the "[[transcendental idealism]]" of Kant and Fichte, which were not based (like Hegel's idealism) on a critique of the finite. The "idealists" listed above whose philosophy Hegel's philosophy most closely resembles are Plato and Plotinus. None of these three thinkers associates their idealism with the epistemological thesis that what we know are "ideas" in our minds.
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| − | ====Schopenhauer====
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| − | In the first volume of his ''Parerga and Paralipomena'', [[Schopenhauer]] wrote his "Sketch of a [[History]] of the Doctrine of the [[Ideal]] and the [[Real]]". He defined the ideal as being mental pictures that constitute subjective [[knowledge]]. The ideal, for him, is what can be attributed to our own minds. The images in our head are what comprise the ideal. Schopenhauer emphasized that we are restricted to our own [[consciousness]]. The [[world]] that appears there is only a [[representation]] or mental picture of objects. We directly and immediately know only representations. All objects that are external to the mind are known indirectly through the mediation of our [[mind]].
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| − | Schopenhauer's history is an account of the [[concept]] of the "ideal" in its meaning as "ideas in a subject's mind." In this sense, "ideal" means "ideational" or "existing in the mind as an image." He does not refer to the other meaning of "ideal" as being qualities of the highest perfection and excellence.
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| − | ====British idealism====
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| − | [[British idealism]] enjoyed ascendancy in English-speaking philosophy in the later part of the 19th century. [[F. H. Bradley]] of [[Merton College]], [[Oxford university|Oxford]], saw reality as a [[monism|monistic]] whole, which is apprehended through "feeling", a state in which there is no distinction between the perception and the thing perceived. Bradley was the apparent target of [[G. E. Moore]]'s radical rejection of idealism.
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| − | [[J. M. E. McTaggart]] of [[University of Cambridge|Cambridge University]], argued that minds alone exist, and that they only relate to each other through love. [[Space]], [[time]] and material objects are for McTaggart unreal. He argued, for instance, in ''[[The Unreality of Time]]'' that it was not possible to produce a coherent account of a sequence of events in time, and that therefore time is an illusion.
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| − | American philosopher [[Josiah Royce]] described himself as an [[objective idealism|objective idealist]].
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| − | <!-- relationship with Husserl, phenomenology, existentialism, post modernism —>
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| − | ====Karl Pearson====
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| − | In ''[[The Grammar of Science]]'', Preface to the 2nd Edition, 1900, [[Karl Pearson]] wrote, "There are many signs that a sound idealism is surely replacing, as a basis for natural philosophy, the crude [[materialism]] of the older physicists." This book influenced [[Albert Einstein|Einstein]]'s regard for the importance of the observer in scientific measurements. In § 5 of that book, Pearson asserted that "...science is in reality a classification and analysis of the contents of the [[mind]]...." Also, "...the field of science is much more [[consciousness]] than an external world."
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| − | ===Criticism of Idealism===
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| − | ====Immanuel Kant====
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| − | Kant in the 2nd edition (1787) of his Critique of Pure Reason wrote a section called Refutation of Idealism to distinguish his transcendental idealism versus Berkeley's Dogmatic Idealism. In addition to this refutation in both the 1780 & 1787 editions the section "Paralogisms of Pure Reason" is an implict critque of Descartes Problematic Idealism viz. the Cogito. He says that just from "the spontaneity of thought" (cf Descartes Cogito) it is not possible to infer the 'I' as an object; he never explicitly said words to the effect "Descartes was wrong like Russell or Nietszche after him." Nietzsche makes this precise point 100 years later in his Book ''Beyond Good and Evil.''
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| − | ====Søren Kierkegaard====
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| − | Kierkegaard attacked Hegel's idealist philosophy in several of his works, but most succinctly in ''[[Concluding Unscientific Postscript]]'' (1846). In the ''Postscript'', Kierkegaard, as the pseudonymous philosopher Johannes Climacus, argues that a logical system is possible but an existential system is impossible. Hegel argues that once one has reached an ultimate understanding of the logical structure of the world, one has also reached an understanding of the logical structure of [[God]]'s mind. Climacus claims Hegel's [[absolute idealism]] mistakenly blurs the distinction between existence and thought. Climacus also argues that our mortal nature places limits on our understanding of reality. As Climacus argues: ''"So-called systems have often been characterized and challenged in the assertion that they abrogate the distinction between good and evil, and destroy freedom. Perhaps one would express oneself quite as definitely, if one said that every such system fantastically dissipates the concept existence. ... Being an individual man is a thing that has been abolished, and every speculative philosopher confuses himself with humanity at large; whereby he becomes something infinitely great, and at the same time nothing at all."''
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| − | ====Friedrich Nietzsche====
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| − | <!--Can someone properly explain what Nietzsche is criticising about idealism rather than just quoting — Dood if you understood this paragraph you would not ask this question "tautological premises and/or beggin the question—finish reading this paragraph and it will explain everything"—>Friedrich Nietzsche was the first to mount a logically serious criticism of Idealism that has been popularised by [[David Stove]] (see below). He pre-empts Stove's GEM by arguing that Kant's argument for his trancendental idealism rests on a tautology and/or begging the question. therefore is an invalid, improper argument.
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| − | In his book ''Beyond Good and Evil'', Part 1 On the Prejudice of Philosophers Section 11, he ridicules [[Kant]] for admiring himself because he had undertaken and (thought he) succeeded in tackling "the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics."
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| − | Quoting [[Nietzsche]]'s prose:
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| − | :"But let us reflect; it is high time to do so. 'How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?' Kant asked himself-and what really is his answer? 'By virtue of a faculty' - but unfortunately not in five words,...The honeymoon of German philosophy arrived. All the young theologians of the Tübingen seminary went into the bushes all looking for 'faculties.'...'By virtue of a faculty' - he had said, or at least meant. But is that an answer? An explanation? Or is it not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? 'By virtue of a faculty,' namely the virtus dormitiva, replies the doctor in Moliére."
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| − | In addition to the Idealism of [[Kant]], [[Nietzsche]] in the same book attacks the idealism of [[Schopenhauer]] and [[Descartes]] via a similar argument to Kant's orginal critique of [[Descartes]]. Quoting [[Nietzsche]]:
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| − | :There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are "immediate certainties"; for example, "I think," or as the superstition of Schopenhauer put it, "I will"; as though knowledge here got hold of its objects purely and nakedly as "the thing in itself," without any falsification on the part of either the subject or the object. But that "immediate certainty," as well as "absolute knowledge" and the "thing in itself," involved a ''contradictio in adjecto'', (contradiction between the noun and the adjective) I shall repeat a hundred times; we really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words!
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| − | ====G. E. Moore====
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| − | The first criticism of Idealism that falls within the analytic philosophical framework is by one of its co-founders [[G. E. Moore|Moore]]. This 1903 seminal article, ''The Refutation of Idealism''. This one of the first demonstrations of Moore's commitment to analysis as the proper philosophical method.
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| − | Moore proceeds by examining the Berkeleian aphorism ''esse est percipi'': "to be is to be perceived". He examines in detail each of the three terms in the aphorism, finding that it must mean that the object and the subject are ''necessarily'' connected. So, he argues, for the idealist, "yellow" and "the sensation of yellow" are necessarily identical - to be yellow is necessarily to be experienced as yellow. But, in a move similar to the [[open question argument]], it also seems clear that there is a difference between "yellow" and "the sensation of yellow". For Moore, the idealist is in error because "that ''esse'' is held to be ''percipi'', solely because what is experienced is held to be identical with the experience of it".<!-- This could be improved by someone with a better background in Moore - please help! —>
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| − | Though this refutation of idealism was the first strong statement by analytic philosophy against its idealist predecessors this argument did not show that the GEM (in post Stove vernacular, see below) is logically invalid. Arguments advanced by Nietzsche (prior to Moore), Rusell (just after Moore) & 80 years later Stove put a nail in the coffin for the "master" argument supporting idealism.
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| − | ====Bertrand Russell====
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| − | Despite his hugely popular book ''The Problems of Philosophy'' (this book was in its 17th printing by 1943)which was written for a general audience rather than academia; few ever mention Russell's critique even though he completely anticipates [[David Stove]]'s GEM both in form and content (see below for David Stove's GEM). In chapter 4 (Idealism) highlights Berkeley's tautological premise for advancing idealism.
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| − | Quoting Russell's prose (1912:42-43):
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| − | :"If we say that the things known must be in the mind, we are either un-duly limiting the mind's power of knowing, or we are uttering a mere tautology. We are uttering a mere tautology if we mean by 'in the mind' the same as by 'before the mind', i.e. if we mean merely being apprehended by the mind. But if we mean this, we shall have to admit that what, in this sense, is in the mind, may nevertheless be not mental. Thus when we realize the nature of knowledge, Berkeley's argument is seen to be wrong in substance as well as in form, and his grounds for supposing that 'idea'-i.e. the objects apprehended-must be mental, are found to have no validity whatever. Hence his grounds in favour of the idealism may be dismissed."
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| − | ====A.C. Ewing====
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| − | Published in 1933 A.C. Ewing according to David Stove mounted the first full length book critique of Idealism, entitled ''Idealism; a critical survey''. Stove does not mention that Ewing anticipated his GEM.
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| − | ====David Stove====
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| − | The [[Australia]]n philosopher [[David Stove]] argued in typically acerbic style that idealism rested on what he called "the worst argument in the world". His critique of Idealism is perhaps the most devastating critique of subjective idealism in philosophy. From a logical point of view his critique is no different from Russell or Nietzsche's - but Stove has been more widely cited and most clearly highlighted the mistake of idealist proponents. He named the form of this argument - invented by Berkeley - "the GEM". Berkeley claimed that "(the mind) is deluded to think it can and does conceive of bodies existing unthought of, or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or exist in, itself". Stove argued that this claim proceeds from the tautology that nothing can be thought of without its being thought of, to the conclusion that nothing can exist without its being thought of.
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| − | The following is Stove's homely version of Berkeley's GEM (1991:139):
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| − | 1) You cannot have trees-without-the-mind in mind, without having them in mind.
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| − | 2) Therefore, you cannot have trees-without-the-mind in mind.
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| − | 1) Is a tautology (self-referential statement); therefore the premise of this argument is trivially true.
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| − | 2) Is not a trivially true conclusion. The logic flowing from 1) to 2) is invalid as tautological premises can bring only tautological conclusions
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| − | Refer to Stove's 1991 book ''The Plato Cult & Other Philosophical Follies'' chapter 6 ''Idealism: A Victorian Horror Story'' for numerous elicidations and numerous GEM's quoted from the history of philosophy and GEM's reconstructed in syllogistic form.
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| − | For readers familiar with Nietzsche, Russell and Stove's criticism of Idealism it is clear that Stove's GEM merely repackages Rusell's precise points and borrowing Nietzsche's polemics against idealism.
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| − | ====John Searle====
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| − | In ''[[The Construction of Social Reality]]'' [[John Searle]] offers an attack on some versions of idealism. Searle conveniently summarises two important arguments for idealism. The first is based on our perception of reality:
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| − | :''1. All we have access to in perception are the contents of our own experiences''
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| − | :''2. The only epistemic basis we can have for claims about the external world are our perceptual experiences''
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| − | therefore,
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| − | :''3. the only reality we can meaningfully speak of is the reality of perceptual experiences (''The Construction of Social Reality'' p. 172)''
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| − | Whilst agreeing with (2), Searle argues that (1) is false, and points out that (3) does not follow from (1) and (2).
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| − | The second argument for idealism runs as follows:
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| − | :''Premise: Any cognitive state occurs as part of a set of cognitive states and within a cognitive system''
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| − | :''Conclusion 1: It is impossible to get outside of all cognitive states and systems to survey the relationships between them and the reality they are used to cognize''
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| − | :''Conclusion 2: No cognition is ever of a reality that exists independently of cognition (''The Construction of Social Reality'' p. 174)''
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| − | Searle goes on to point out that conclusion 2 simply does not follow from its precedents.
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| − | ====Alan Musgrave====
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| − | [[Alan Musgrave]] in an article titled ''Realism and Antirealism'' in R. Klee (ed), ''Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science'', Oxford, 1998, 344-352 - later re-titled to ''Conceptual Idealism and Stove's GEM'' in A. Musgrave, Essays on Realism and Rationalism, Rodopi, 1999 also in M.L. Dalla Chiara et. al. (eds), ''Language, Quantum, Music'', Kluwer, 1999, 25-35 - [[Alan Musgrave]] argues in addition to Stove's GEM, Conceptual Idealists compound their mistakes with use/mention confusions and proliferation of unnecessary hyphenated entities.
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| − | stock examples of use/mention confusions:
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| − | :Santa Claus (the person) does not exist.
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| − | :'Santa Claus' (the name/concept/fairy tale) does exist; because adults tell children this every christmas season.
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| − | The distinction in philosophical circles is highlighted by putting quotations around the word when we want to refer only to the name and not the object.
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| − | stock examples of hyphenated entities:
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| − | :things-in-itself ([[Immanuel Kant]])
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| − | :things-as-interacted-by-us ([[Arthur Fine]])
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| − | :Table-of-commonsense (Sir [[Arthur Eddington]])
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| − | :Table-of-physics (sir [[Arthur Eddington]])
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| − | :Moon-in-itself
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| − | :Moon-as-howelled-by-wolves
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| − | :Moon-as-conveived-by-Aristotelians
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| − | :Moon-as-conveived-by-Galileans
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| − | Hyphenated entities are "warning signs" for conceptual idealism according to Musgrave is because they over emphasis the epistemic (ways on how people come to learn about the world) activities and will more likely commit errors in use/mention. These entities do not exist (strictly speaking and are [[ersatz]] entities) but highlight the numerous ways in which people come to know the world.
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| − | In Sir Arthur Eddington's case use/mention confusions compounded his problem when he thought he was sitting at two different tables in his study (table-of-commonsense and table-of-physics). In fact Eddington was sitting at one table but had two different perspectives or ways of knowing about that one table.
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| − | [[Richard Rorty]] and [[Postmodernist]] Philosohpy in general have been attacked by Musgrave for commiting use/mention confusions. Musgrave argues that these confusions help proliferate GEM's in our thinking and serious thought should avoid GEM's.
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| − | ===Idealism in religious thought===
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| − | Not all [[religion]] and belief in the [[supernatural]] is, strictly speaking, anti-materialist in nature. While many types of religious belief are indeed specifically idealist, for example, [[Hinduism|Hindu]] beliefs about the nature of the [[Brahman]], [[Zen]] Buddhism stands in the middle way of [[dialectics]] between idealism and materialism, and mainstream [[Christianity|Christian]] doctrine affirms the importance of the materiality of [[Christ]]'s human body and the necessity of self-restraint when dealing with the material world.
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| − | The [[theology]] of [[Christian Science]] is explicitly idealist: it teaches that all that exists is God and God's ideas; that the world as it appears to the senses is a distortion of the underlying spiritual reality.
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| − | Several modern religious movements and texts, for example the organizations within the [[New Thought Movement]], the [[Unity Church]] and the book, ''[[A Course in Miracles]]'', may be said to have a particularly idealist orientation. In ''[[A Course in Miracles]]'' the body and the senses are said to do nothing. All of our perceptions including the body and the sense organs are projected thought within the mind which only appear to function. One analogy is the movie screen. There is an appearance of characters sensing and reacting to one another when this is simply a projection.
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| − | The West is inundated with physicalistic monism. There is widespread belief that everything will be explained in terms of matter/energy by science. Since we are constantly taught this it may make the idea of mentalistic monism hard to grasp. One way to begin to grasp the idea is through analogy. The movie screen analogy was given above. If we next consider "Star Trek's holodeck" it takes us a step further as what appear to be physical objects are not. Next consider the movie "The Matrix". In "The Matrix" even people's bodies and identities are projected. Then replace the machine with a vast and powerful mind. A last analogy is our dreams at night. We seem to be in a world filled with other objects and other people and yet there is nothing physical. Projection makes perception. Although this is not a strict philosophical argument it does allow us to begin to think along these lines.
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| − | More accurately, Idealism is based on the root word "Ideal," meaning a perfect form of, and is most accurately described as a belief in perfect forms of virtue, truth, and the absolute. Idea-ism may be a more appropriate term for the definitions listed above. There is a clear distinction between an idea and an ideal (i.e. Websters Dictionary says "conforming exactly to an ideal, law, or standard: perfect.").
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| − | idealism in comparison to pragmatism
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| − | ==Other uses==
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| − | In general parlance, "idealism" or "idealist" is also used to describe a person having high [[ideal (ethics)|ideals]], sometimes with the connotation that those ideals are unrealisable or at odds with "practical" life.
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| − | The word "ideal" is commonly used as an adjective to designate qualities of perfection, desirability, and excellence. This is foreign to the epistemological use of the word "idealism" which pertains to internal [[mental]] [[representations]]. These internal ideas represent objects that are assumed to exist outside of the mind.
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| − | ==See also==
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| − | *[[A Course In Miracles]]
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| − | *[[J. M. E. McTaggart|McTaggart, John]] ''The Unreality of Time'', available at [[wikisource:The Unreality of Time]]
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| − | *[[Solipsism]], which is related to epistemological idealism
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| − | *[[Practical idealism]]
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| − | *[[Transcendental idealism]]
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| − | *[http://www.spirituality.com/dt/toc_sh.jhtml Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures by Mary Baker Eddy]: idealism in religious thought
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| − | ==Reference==
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| − | Francis Johnson, Philosophy Professor
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| − | (University of Texas)
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| − | {{Philosophy navigation}}
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| | [[Category:Idealism| ]] | | [[Category:Idealism| ]] |
