Psychologism
Psychologism is a philosophical position that tries to reduce a diverse forms of knowledge including concepts and principles of logic and mathematics to states of mind or phenomena in mind. It takes psychology as the fundamental discipline which can explain and give justification to knowledge in philosophy.
Historical background
Studies of the mind had traditionally been a part of the subjects of philosophy since antiquity. Modern philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant and others made considerable contributions to the studies of mind within their own philosophical frameworks. Natural sciences, which had been natural philosophy, gradually developed as independent disciplines. Around late nineteenth century, empirical studies of mind such as experimental psychology became a solid independent discipline. Wilhelm Wundt, Hermann Ebbinghaus, Franz Brentano, Carl Stumpf, Theodor Lipps and others contributed the development of psychology and they made significant influences on philosophy. Franz Brentano in particular gave a direct impact on Husserl. Husserl formulated early stage of his philosophy within Brentano’s framework.
It was generally understood that the term psychologism was first used by J. E. Erdmann, a Hegelian, when he criticized the position of Friedrich Eduard Beneke in 1866. Beneke and Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) made a psychological interpretation of Kant, and received ideas from empiricism, particularly from Locke. They argued that: psychology was the fundamental discipline upon which all philosophical disciplines such as logic, ethics, metaphysics, and others are built; principles of logic and mathematics are reducible to psychological phenomena. Hegelians criticized their position as a superficial reading of Kant.
Beneke and Fries refused speculative metaphysics of German idealism and took a positivist approach in philosophy. They held that introspection to mental phenomena can explain philosophical knowledge including logic.
Frege’s Criticism
John Stuart Mill argued, in his System of Logic, that propositions in mathematics are generalization of experiences. Empiricists argued that mathematical concepts do not have their independent existence and they are inductively derived from human experience. Concept of numbers, for example, is generated by acts of counting. Philosophers of psychologism held the idea of psychological origin of mathematical concepts. Frege, in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Foundations of Arithmetic), severely criticised this claim, arguing that universality of mathematics are derived not from commonality of mental experiences but from its logical characteristics. Frege further tried to derive mathematical principles from logic and set theory.
Husserl’s criticism
In Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891), Husserl tried to derive the principles of arithmetic from psychological phenomena. Frege criticized Husserl’s position as psychologism. To answer Frege’s criticism, Husserl re-examined his position and gave up his earlier claims. Husserl departed from psychologism and delivered through criticism against it in his Logical Investigations. Husserl argued that logical principles are a priori truth and they cannot be reduced to natural facts, and psychologism entailed skepticism and relativism. Husserl’s turn from his ealier psychologism was important since it led him to the idea of phenomenology, which became one of major philosophical movements in the twentieth century.
Contemporary psychologism
Under the influence of Frege, Wittgenstein, and G. E. Moore, Analytic philosophy developed without falling into psychologism. With a recent trend of a collaboration of philosophy with cognitive sciences, computer sciences, and brain physiology, some analytic philosophers take a position of psychologism.
ReferencesISBN links support NWE through referral fees
- Mill, John Stuart, A System of Logic, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002, ISBN 1-4102-0252-6
- Frege, Gottlob and J. L. Austin The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number, Northwestern University Press, 1980. ISBN 978-0810106055
- Kush, Martin. Psychologism (Philosophical Issues in Science), Routledge, 1995. ISBN 978-0415125543
- Cavallin, Jens. and J. Cavallin Content and Object: Husserl, Twardowski and Psychologism, Springer, 2006. ISBN 978-0792347347
- Jacquette, Dale Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism: Critical and Historical Readings on the Psychological Turn in Philosophy, Springer, 2003. ISBN 978-1402013379
External links
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