Difference between revisions of "Coercion" - New World Encyclopedia

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Philosophical discussion of coercion has focussed on three distinct concerns. (1) What is coercion? (2) Is coercion ever morally or legally justified? (3) Is a person morally responsible for an action done because of coercion?
  
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'''Coercion''' is the practice of compelling a person to involuntarily behave in a certain way (whether through action or inaction) by use of [[threat]]s, [[intimidation]] or some other form of pressure or force. Coercion may typically involve the actual infliction of physical or psychological harm in order to enhance the [[credibility]] of a threat. The threat of further harm may then lead to the [[co-operation|cooperation]] or [[obedience]] of the person being coerced.
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With respect to the first question, a person is coerced when he acts contrary to his preferences or will because of a threat administered by another agent.  
  
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The term is often associated with circumstances which involve the [[ethics|unethical]] use of threats or harm to achieve some objective. Coercion may also serve as a form of justification for a conclusion in a [[Argumentum ad baculum|logical fallacy or non-logical argument]].
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Interest in the second question arises particularly in the context of political philosophy and legal theory especially given that the state uses coercion in forcing compliance to its laws. The orthodox view on this question is that state coercion is justified insofar as it promotes (roughly) overall well being. Whether private uses of coercion are ever morally justified is a controversial matter.
  
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==Overview==
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With respect to the third question, coercion is widely thought to limit a person’s freedom without depriving her of free agency. Determining moral responsibility requires careful attention to the context of the act, and in particular, such factors as the severity of the threat and consequences of the coerced action.
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Any person’s set of feasible choices is obtained from the combination of two elements: the ''initial endowment'' (the perceived initial state of the world, which the chosen actions are going to affect) and the ''transformation rules'' (which state how any chosen action will change the initial endowment, according to the person’s perception).
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==Historical Overview==
  
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It follows that coercion could in principle take place by purposely manipulating either the transformation rules or the initial endowment (or both). In practice, however, the detailed choice reaction of a victim to a change in initial endowment is generally unpredictable. Hence effective coercion can only be carried out through manipulation of the transformation rules. This is done by the credible ''threat'' of some injury, conditional on the victim’s choice. Often, it involves the ''actual'' inflicting of injury in order to make the threat [[credible]], but it is the threat of (further) injury which brings about the change in transformation rules.  
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In Nicomachean Ethics III, [[Aristotle]] explores the conditions under which it is appropriate to hold a moral agent blameworthy or praiseworthy for particular actions. He argues that praise and blame are withheld from involuntary actions, that is, actions committed under force or as a result of ignorance (1110a-1111b4). On the grounds of a discussion of excuses and mitigating conditions, Aristotle formulates a general account of moral responsibility for action. A moral agent is an appropriate candidate for praise or blame if and only if his action was voluntarily done. A voluntary action is one which has its origin within the doer, and is done knowingly (1110a-1111b4).
  
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Coercion does not remove entirely the victim’s ability to choose, nor does it necessarily affect his or her ranking of potential alternatives. As Roman jurists used to say, ''coactus volui, tamen volui'' (I willed under coercion, but still I willed). In the terminology of [[rational choice]] theory, coercion does not remove a person’s [[objective function]], but only affects the [[constraints]] under which such function is maximised. Yet, the purpose of coercion is to substitute one’s aims to those of the victim. For this reason, many social philosophers have considered coercion as the polar opposite to [[Freedom (philosophy)|freedom]].
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The interest of [[Aristotle]]’s account for the current discussion is in his understanding of the force condition on moral [[responsibility]]. Aristotle provides two types of examples illustrating this condition. The first type includes a case in which a man is carried off by the wind; the second where is carried off by a band of (e.g.) robbers. These are cases in which the agent has no choice at all and would today be classified as cases of compulsion. Essentially, compulsion leaves the agent no choice. He is dragged off by physical force.  
  
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One must however distinguish various forms of coercion: first on the basis of the ''kind of injury'' threatened, second according to its ''aims'' and ''scope'', and finally according to its ''effects'', from which its legal, social, and ethical implications mostly depend.
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Aristotle illustrates the ‘force’ condition on responsibility with two further examples:
  
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==Means==
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“But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (such as if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having ones parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated as to whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary.” (The Nicomachean Ethics, Book III Moral Virtue: 48)
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Looking at the content of the threat, one can distinguish between physical, psychological and economic coercion.
 
  
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===Physical coercion===
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Aristotle’s verdict is that these actions—e.g. doing something base to save one’s children—are both voluntary and involuntary. In one respect, the person chooses to perform the action; but in another, he would not have done so had he not thought that the lives of his family members were in danger. Therefore, although action was voluntary, considered at the moment, it was not, in the abstract, voluntary.  
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Physical coercion is the most commonly considered form, where the content of the conditional threat is the use of force against the person, the dear ones or the property of the victim, An oft-used example is "putting a gun to someone's head" to compel action. Armed forces in many countries use [[firing squad]]s to maintain [[discipline]] and intimidate the masses or opposition into submission or silent compliance.
 
  
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However, there also are non-physical forms of coercion, where the threatened injury does not immediately imply the use of force.
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Such cases involve coercion. Acts done out of coercion are in the strict sense voluntary since a person ultimately has it in his power to choose to do or refrain from acting.
  
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===Psychological coercion===
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Is a person morally responsible for an action done out of coercion? Aristotle’s answer is this: it depends (though he does argue that certain actions such as matricide are never excusable no matter what the threat). There are no hard and fast rules for determining responsibility; it depends on the context.
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In psychological coercion, the threatened injury regards the victim’s relationships with other people. The most obvious example is ''[[blackmail]]'', where the threat consists of the dissemination of damaging information. But many other cases are possible, including purposeful threats of rejection from or disapproval by a peers group, or even mere anger or displeasure by a loved one. Another instance is [[coercive persuasion]].
 
  
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Psychological coercion – along with the other varieties - was extensively and systematically used by the government of the [[People’s Republic of China]] during the “Thought Reform” campaign of [[1951]]-[[1952]]. The process – carried out partly at “revolutionary universities” and partly within prisons – was investigated and reported upon by [[Robert Jay Lifton]], then Research Professor of Psychiatry at Yale University: see Lifton (1961). The techniques used by the Chinese authorities included standard [[group psychotherapy]], aimed at forcing the victims (who were generally intellectuals) to produce detailed and sincere ideological “confessions”. For instance, a professor of [[formal logic]] called Chin Yueh-lin – who was then regarded as China’s leading authority on his subject – was induced to write: “The new philosophy [of [[Marxism-Leninism]]], being scientific, is the supreme truth”. [Lifton (1961) p. 545].
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Saint Thomas Aquinas also discusses coercion in the context of a discussion of moral responsibility.  He understands coercion in terms of necessity, where a person is forced to act in a way such that he cannot do otherwise. Aquinas here seems to understand coercion in terms of compulsion—coercion is linked with a lack of choice and violence. Aquinas does recognise a distinction between compelled actions and those committed as a result of a threat.  According to Aquinas, people are not morally responsible for acts of compulsion although one is responsible for actions done in the face of some sever threat. This is because the latter does not strictly render the action involuntary—and so the person maintained the power of choice.
  
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====Usage====
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Aquinas argues that the state’s is justified in its use of coercion and compulsion in the form of violent force and fear. This is because it must aim to control the vicious and irrational in order to preserve a state of harmony for non-offenders. However, he maintains that the use of power and force is, in general, the right of the state and not of private groups or individuals. One significant exception is the case of ‘imperfect coercive power’ in which the head of the household–usually the father—is justified in delivering punishments that do not inflict irreparable harm. Aquinas therefore advocates the use of coercion/compulsion in the form of patriarchy in both state and private sphere.
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Some people speak of '''cultural coercion''' when the fear of falling out with the group may force people into wearing a certain style of dress, publicly reciting a [[creed]] or a pledge of allegiance they find ethically reprehensible, starting to smoke when they'd rather not, etc. Within the definitional framework adopted here, all such things amount to (psychological) coercion if and only if the fear of falling out with the group is the result of ''purposeful'' threats by someone. See [[Peer pressure]], [[Sociology of religion]], [[Pledge of Allegiance]].  
 
  
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Some people include [[deception]] in their definition of (psychological) coercion. Yet deception does not generally involve ''any'' threat at all, as it works by creating a mere ''false perception'' by the victim of his or her ''given'' transformation rules. Although its effects may sometimes be very similar to those of a conditional threat, it may hence be useful to treat deception as separate phenomenon.
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Later thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, in basic agreement with Aquinas, argued that coercion plays a central, justified and necessary part in the functioning of the state.  Hobbes holds (again in agreement with Aquinas) that acts performed under threat are strictly voluntary so that one is fully responsible for them. This implies, for example, that contracts signed because of fear are legitimate; the use of bargaining ‘’power’’ is a rational way of effecting contracts so long as it does not conflict with the rule of law.
  
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===Economic coercion===
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Hobbes’ countryman, John Locke, argued that although state use of coercion is necessary, this depends on the state’s control itself reflecting the consent of the people.  There is in his view, therefore, a fine line between law and tyranny. A tyrant’s use of coercion is unjustified; the state’s use of coercion is justified only insofar as it protects the majority rather than terrorises them.  
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Economic coercion is when a controller of a vital resource uses his advantage to compel a person to do something he would not do if this resource were not monopolized. If someone is the owner of the only water supply, then the owner can compel the thirsty person to pay an exhorbitant price for that water or have him perform enormous labor. This is also referred to as a form of [[exploitation]].
 
  
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Economic coercion requires [[market power]]. In the above example, the coercer's refusal to [[supply]] the coercee would be meaningless if the coercee had access to other independent sources of [[supply]]. But the coercer can turn his conditional refusal into a vital threat only because of his [[coercive monopoly]] over an essential resource, with no other substitutes. In a competitive marketplace, the possibility of economic coercion is much reduced as suppliers are compelled by competition to accept less money or labor for their goods.
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Immanuel Kant emphasises the use of state coercion in securing the rights and freedoms of the people. He argues that people are inclined to obey the law for two reasons: Firstly an ethical or rational motivation: one has a duty to obey the law so as to preserve an orderly society; secondly, a judicial motivation, which applies to those who do not have respect for the law but follow it to avoid punishment. Although Kant acknowledges that coercion impinges upon freedom, he maintains that when used in a proper manner by the state it also secures freedom. Impinging on the freedom of a few is justified to secure freedom for the majority.
  
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An analogous result can also be obtained through pure [[monopsony]] power (where there is only one buyer as opposed to one seller in a monopoly). To reverse the above example, suppose that there are numerous independent suppliers of water, who sell it at a [[competitive|competition]] [[market price]]. If someone can only sell potatoes (to get money to buy water), and there is only one potato buyer he can sell to, then the buyer's simple conditional refusal to buy his potatoes would be a death threat, just as before.   
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John Stuart Mill (see On Liberty) represents to some extent a departure from the concerns of his predecessors by focussing on unjustified forms of coercion. His central understanding of coercion appears closely tied to the notion of interference. State coercion / compulsion is justified in so far as it is used to protect the general population. However, the state (or anyone else for that matter) should not be allowed to force (rational) people to do what may in fact be in their own best interests. This would constitute an unacceptable interference and infringement on individual liberty. In this respect, Mill is an opponent of strong forms of paternalism.
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Mill discussion of coercion also includes the power of public opinion in forcing adherence to the law, such as, for example and that the stigma attached to law breaking and its punishments. For example, the threat of ruined reputation may itself be a coercive influence in its own right. Furthermore, and again in contrast with his predecessors, Mill recognises that civil institutions are just as capable of coercion as the state. He observes that the ‘despotism of custom’ has a strong hold over people in that they are frequently coerced to act in a certain way (against their inclinations) due to civil, social (and often religious) conventions and rules. His examples include the position of a wife in the family, who had at the time (19th Century Britain) very limited rights. Mill also presents the phenomenon of child labour as an example of coerciveness.  Mill therefore shows the extent to which coercion occurs in ways other than by direct state interference.
  
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The idea that monopoly control may facilitate coercion has been underlined by some business ethicists and economists. It shows that in some cases the social effects of market power goes beyond those on economic [[distribution (business)|distribution]] and [[efficiency (economics)]].
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==The Nature of Coercion==
  
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== Aims==
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While the notion of coercion has played a significant role in the history of legal and political philosophy—especially with reference to the state’s use of coercion in forcing compliance with its laws—sustained analysis of the concept itself is a relatively recent occurrence. However, in 20th century analytic philosophy, probably as a result of an increasing focus on human rights, the concept of coercion has received significant scholarly attention.  
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The aims of coercion can vary widely from totally "selfish" to totally ''altruistic'' ones: from attempts to gain personal wealth and power at the expense of others to efforts aimed at saving other people’s souls.
 
  
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===Predatory coercion===
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===Coercion and compulsion===
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The purely selfish kinds of coercion are a form of [[predatory behaviour]] by the coercing party, whose aim is to narrow down the scope of other people’s actions so as to make them instrumental to its own personal interests. According to many social philosophers, this sort of predatory behaviour would become the prevailing one under conditions of social [[Anomie|anarchy]].
 
  
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===Pedagogic and thought coercion===
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To begin, it is worthwhile recalling the distinction between coercion and compulsion. Compulsion works through direct force—recall Aristotle’s example of the man ‘’carried off‘’ by a band of robbers In contrast with compulsion, which deprives an agent of a choice, coercion does not. Coercion works through threat of some harm or negative consequence. Consider: “Your money or your life!” Acts done from compulsion are (almost) always excused, whereas, while actions done under coercion are often excused, they are certainly not always.
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At the other extreme of the spectrum one finds attempts to use coercion altruistically, as a pedagogical device to improve – in some supposedly objective sense – the way other people ''think'', with particular regard to their basic attitudes and values. Pedagogic coercion may be applied within a strictly educational context, and it is then mostly directed towards children. In this article, however, attention will focus on ''thought coercion'', i.e. the attempt to use coercion to affect the basic values of grown-up people in general.
 
  
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In all forms of ''thought coercion'' the immediate objective is to force other people to act ''as if'' their basic choice rules were identical to those of the coercing party. However, this mere conformity of “outward” behaviour is but a first step. The true and final aim of thought coercion is to induce a change in the victim’s objective function itself, i.e. the basic set of values and rules by which the victim determines his or her own choice among the alternatives of ''any'' feasible set. Thought coercion is thus generally meant to be only ''temporary''. Once the desired change in values has been brought about, the victim is expected to conform spontaneously, without any need for further coercion.
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Although there is a sharp distinction between compulsion and coercion above the two are often closely associated. Torture is a clear example: coercion (threats) is used to (e.g.) extract information; these threats are then backed up by physical inducements such as truth serum. The state too uses both coercion and force (to maintain law). The threat of state punishment (e.g. prison) is used to induce compliance.  However, state punishment may also involve compulsion as for example when someone’s property is forcibly confiscated.  
  
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Whether and under what conditions this final aim can in fact be stably achieved is a difficult question, and it will be considered in the section devoted to the effects of coercion. Here it is necessary to point out that, whatever its effectiveness, thought coercion has in fact been used very extensively throughout history.
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===Nozick’s analysis of coercion===
  
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====Religious coercion====
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So much then for the distinction between coercion and compulsion; what about the nature of coercion itself?  In significant measure the current state of understanding of coercion is due to Robert Nozick’s landmark work Coercion and the writings it inspired. Nozick’s analysis has been enormously influential—accepted in large measure by almost all significant contributors to the debate.
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The most ancient, extensive and durable kind of thought coercion has concerned [[religion]]. Religious coercion is a subset of predatory coercion, in which the selfish entity is a supernatural one.  The threat typically manifests as a promise by the entity to respond to incorrect behavior with '''damnation'''—eternal discomfort.  This coercion has taken the form of religious [[discrimination]] and [[persecution]], including forced conversions, and on many occasions it has led to [[religious wars]].  
 
  
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[[Christianity]]'s early persecution by [[Rome]] had in fact political rather than strictly religious objectives. But its subsequent expansion was associated with a substantial amount of purely religious coercion, mainly by Christians against members of other religions and [[heretics]]. Moreover, Christianity’s tendency to strong and systematic religious coercion – particularly but not only by the [[Roman Catholic Church]] – has long outlived its first few centuries, and has only been finally checked – though by no means extinguished - by the emergence of modern [[liberal democracy|liberal democracies]], with their principle of firm separation between Church and State.
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Nozick analyses coercion as follows: Person P coerces Q into not doing (refraining from doing) act A if and only if: (1). P (the coercer) threatens to bring about some consequence if Q (the coercee) does A; Q understands this threat; (2) Action A, as a result of the threatened consequence, is made substantially less eligible as a course of conduct for Q than A ‘’without’’ this threatened consequence;  (3) P’s threat is credible; (4) Q does not do A; (5). At least part of Q's reason for not doing A is to avoid the consequence that P has threatened to bring about (adapted from Ryan, 1980: 483, Nozick, 1969: 441-445).
  
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====Ideological coercion====
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One further feature of Nozick’s analysis, not directly encapsulated in the above analysis is the notion of a baseline (Nozick, 1969: 447). This concept is introduced in order to capture the sense in which the coerced individual becomes worse off than he would have been. In most cases it is relatively clear to see how this works. For example, in the “your money or your life” case, threat has made the person’s normal course of events worse than they should have been. However, as Nozick himself realised, the phrase ‘normal course of events’ is not unproblematic. Consider for example a case in which a slave owner, who regularly beats his slave, offers to refrain from beating him if he agrees to do X. Given that being beaten is part of the ‘normal course of events’ the offer will not count as coercive because the slave will be better off as a result of the offer. On this point, Alan Wertheimer argues that regular unjustified beatings are not ‘normal’. So he moralises the concept of coercion itself by employing the notion of rights in his formulation of a baseline.
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''Ideological coercion'' is the use of thought coercion in the attempt to modify people’s [[social philosophy|social]] and [[political philosophy]]. This is of course quite different from plain propaganda, or even the simple persecution of political opponents, because its objective is to force individual ideological conversions. Unlike religious coercion, it is a quite recent phenomenon, confined to some of the [[totalitarian]] regimes of the [[twentieth century]].
 
  
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The most notable single example of ideological coercion was the already mentioned Chinese “Thought Reform” campaign of 1951-52, which signalled itself for both thoroughness and number of people involved. Yet, it must be noticed that by [[1966]] the Chinese authorities found it necessary to follow that up with a new – albeit slightly milder – campaign, as part of the [[Maoist]] “Cultural Revolution” of [[1966]]-[[1968]].
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One way of characterising coercion would be to establish whether it deviates from reasonable expectations in a normal course of events, whether it deviates from the norms of expectability, and in effect make the recipient worse off than they ought to be.  In Alan Wertheimer’s groundbreaking Coercion (1987) he argues for a normative baseline (taken from Nozick) that would establish whether coercion has taken place. As not all threats are coercive, in order for a threat to be characterised as coercive it needs to make the coercee’s situation worse than it ought to be if the demand is denied.  The use of the baseline is what Wertheimer referred to as the proposal prong of his two-pronged approach to coercion.
  
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Starting from the [[Soviet]] purges of the Thirties, similar “brainwashing” techniques were intermittently and less systematically used by most [[Communist]] regimes of the twentieth century. By contrast, the [[Fascist]] and [[Nazism|Nazi]] regimes of [[Italy]] and [[Germany]] tended to confine their coercive activities to purely [[political]] aims, without any serious attempt to force the ideological conversion of their opponents. The use of (physical) ideological coercion was however theorised by some Fascist philosophers, like [[Giovanni Gentile]] and Jared Harfield.
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Thee central features of this analysis are the following: firstly coercion uses of threats rather than physical force; secondly, coercion’s taking place is dependent on whether the coercer’s threat is credible to the coercee (even if the coercer is bluffing, the crucial factor is whether the coercee believes the threat to be credible); thirdly, the coercee has to accept the proposal in order for coercion to take place; if he does not accept the proposal, then coercion, strictly, has not occurred. In this way, Nozick builds in a success condition into his analysis.  
  
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===Disciplinary coercion===
 
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Somewhere in the middle between predatory and pedagogic coercion one finds the forms of coercion that are used as the main coordination tools of command systems. These are organisations that use coercion to enforce on their members patterns of division of labour aimed at reaching the organisation’s goals, which for a variety of reasons may not always be consistent with each member’s personal aims. The most typical example of a command system is a military organisation, but any large production team may easily fall into this category.
 
  
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Through the punishment system of disciplinary coercion, each individual member is typically forced into altruistic behaviour in the interest of the whole group. This is why this kind of coercion is not predatory, and – unlike thought coercion – may often be accepted in advance by the members of the group.
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Each of these features may be questioned. On the first point, can coercion proceed by means of offers rather than threats? (Threats and offers are both proposals.) Consider the following example:
  
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==Scope==
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If a man is drowning in a lake and another man offers to help him only if he gives him all his money, then the drowning man’s situation is indeed not worse off, as one would presume that he would rather have his life than his money, and the offer of the second man has actually increased the drowning man’s options. Another example of the same sort would be that of the millionaire who offers to pay for the life saving operation of a poor woman’s child only if the woman agrees to be his mistress.
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The scope of coercion has to do with who uses a conditional threat against whom. It is closely linked with some of the other aspects already surveyed above, and may be of paramount importance in determining coercion’s effects and implications.
 
  
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===Specific coercion===
 
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Specific or ''personal'' coercion is the most commonly considered kind. It takes place when the conditional threat is decided upon by one particular individual or small group, and/or directed against some other individual or small group. All forms of predatory and thought coercion fall into this category.
 
  
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=== Unspecific coercion===
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Is this an example of a coercive offer? According to Feinberg the answer is ‘yes’: there is no relevant difference between the above scenario and typical cases of coercion. Both use superior power and may be assimilated to the “your money or your life” type case. So coercion may proceed by means of offers or threats; therefore, Nozick’s analysis must be supplemented.
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Under unspecific or ''impersonal'' coercion the conditional threats come from well-known and socially accepted general rules – rather than any individual or sub-group – and are directed against anybody in the stated conditions, according to clearly stated principles of due process. In practice, the narrowing down of individual choice may be here principally aimed at reducing the incidence of specific coercion, rather than forcing on everybody some special sub-set of positive goals. More generally, unspecific coercion may be the form taken by disciplinary coercion, and this appears to be in fact the case within the most effective command systems of the modern world.  
 
  
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Unspecific coercion is thus the same thing as the [[rule of law]] in its widest sense. This must not however be confused with the ''monopoly of coercion by the State''. First, State coercion may very easily be arbitrary – indeed technically very ''specific'', according to the above definition. Second, there are well-documented historical examples of (small) societies that have practiced unspecific coercion ''without'' the help of State institutions – like [[Iceland]] in the early [[Middle Ages]]. The identification between State and law is but a special ''normative'' principle introduced by (public) Roman law, which according to some, like [[Maitland]], was for this very reason to be treated as the quintessential “law of tyranny”.
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David Zimmerman argues that these are examples of exploitation, rather than of coercion.  Although the man in the above example and the millionaire take advantage of their respective situations they are opportunistic and not coercive. According to Zimmerman, in order for these to be coercive actions, they would have had to manufacture the situations (e.g. paying someone to throw the man in the lake); only then will these cases qualify as coercive offers.
  
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==Effects==
 
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The effects of coercion may differ substantially according to its type and scope. Here they will be considered from the legal, psychological, social and ethical points of view.
 
  
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===Legal effects===
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==Coercion and moral rightness==
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In most legal systems, the use of ''physical'' specific coercion by private individuals is a [[criminal offence]] in all cases not involving self defence.
 
  
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The picture is less simple for ''psychological'' specific coercion, owing to the general difficulty in finding clear evidence for it. In most systems psychological coercion is treated as a criminal offence when it is aimed at ''extortion'', as is typical of blackmail. It is also punished when it leads to ''undue influence'', defined as a master-slave relationship.
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While the previous section discussed the nature of coercion itself, this section considers two central ethical questions surrounding the concept of coercion.  
  
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Finally, ''economic'' coercion is generally unlawful under most systems of anti-trust legislation, where it can amount to either a criminal offence – as under the Sherman Act of the US – or an administrative offence liable to a mere fine – as under EU legislation on the abuse of a dominant position. It is important however to remember that [[trade unions]] and other groups of organised workers are mostly exempted from this general principle for acts of economic coercion (like strikes) against their employers.
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===Is Coercion Wrong?===
  
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Legal methods themselves may employ coercion, such as when a lawsuit is threatened if a person does not comply with the wishes of the plaintiff.
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Intuitively, coercion would seem to involve a moral wrong. This is so, at least in the most commonly considered cases such as “your money or your life!” However, state coercion has been and continues to be firmly entrenched in almost every nation. Governments use coercion in order to maintain law and order. The penal system is a system of threats and inducements. But if state coercion is justified, then coercion cannot always be wrong.
  
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====Exculpation and nullity====
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One reason why acts of coercion may seem wrong is that they limit somebody’s freedom.  However, as the above discussion of Aristotle, Aquinas and Hobbes highlights, describing the sense in which this is so is not altogether straightforward. After all, and unlike compulsion, coercion still involves a choice. For Aquinas and Hobbes, this indicates that the coercee is still acting as a free agent. The answer must be that coercion forces one to make a choice that would not ordinarily have to be made. And this is a limitation on somebody’s freedom.
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Specific coercion may be used as a legal defence in criminal cases for acts committed under threat of injury. Similarly, one may claim the legal nullity of a [[contract]] signed under duress.  
 
  
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In both cases, however, the question arises of whether a "[[reasonable person]]" would have perceived a threat, and reacted in the same way. Moreover, under most modern legal systems ''disciplinary'' coercion cannot be claimed as an exculpating circumstance for [[war crimes]] committed under unlawful orders.
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However, as evidenced by the penal system, state coercion limits particular freedoms in order to enhance overall freedom. For example, insofar as the state endorses capital punishment, citizens are faced with a supreme threat should they perform certain unwanted actions. However, the fact that they are deterred from (coerced into not) doing these, secures the freedom of other citizens to walk their streets in safety. On this point, Kant acknowledged that coercion impinges upon freedom, but argues that when used in a proper manner by the state it also secured freedom, and that therefore the hindrance of freedom of a few is justified to secure greater freedom. Furthermore, it is sometimes said (Grant Lamond) that state has the right to coerce, whereas others do not; that in a certain sense people give over their freedom to the state (or even school, or church) to be protected.   Libertarians such as Nozick and Mill argue state interference with personal liberty should be as minimal as possible.
  
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===Psychological effects: the effectiveness of thought coercion===
 
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As already stated, thought coercion – either religious or ideological – is defined by its ultimate end to alter the fundamental values and beliefs of its victims. To ask whether this can in fact be done is to put a fundamental and age-old question: can [[conscience]] be coerced?
 
  
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At the beginning of the sixth century, in a famous letter to the Jews of [[Genoa]], the [[Goths|Gothic]] king [[Theodoric the Great]], who was an [[Arian]] Christian, wrote: “...We cannot command the religion of our subjects, since no-one can be forced to believe against his will”: Hodgkin (1886) p. 219. This idea that conscience ''cannot'' in fact be coerced originated among the [[Stoic]] philosophers of ancient [[Greece]], and resurfaced many centuries later during and after the European [[Renaissance]], as one of the basic tenets of classic (or Whig) [[liberalism]].
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===The legal justification of coercion===
  
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The opposite view was however the dominant one within what [[Karl Popper]] (1945) has called the [[Platonic]] tradition, which included among other things both mainstream Christianity and [[Hegel]]’s philosophy, with its later polar developments of [[Marxism]] and [[Fascism]].
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J.S. Mill and Robert Nozick argue that state intervention should be a purely protective measure. According to Nozick’s Libertariansim state coercion is justified only insofar as it conforms to the ‘harm principle’.  In other words, the use of coercion is justified by the state when it prevents harm; similarly, the use of force is justified if it punishes those that cause harm.
  
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Yet, though these opposite answers may lead to divergent ethical and political prescriptions, the question itself is about a matter of mere psychological fact, which can be addressed empirically, looking at experience. Lifton (1961) on Chinese thought reform is one of the very few such works, and its findings are thus highly relevant here. Very broadly and on the whole, these findings were that on most victims the impact of thought reform tended to be temporary. In the short run it might be considerable, even leading to something close to a profound religious experience – particularly in subjects of relatively younger age (under thirty). But after a few years, and left to themselves, the victims tended to question the principles they had been indoctrinated with, reverting in most cases to their former values and convictions.  
+
Libertarianism is opposed to paternalism in the following way. For a libertarian, coercion is justified only if it prevents harm to others; however, one is free to do as one likes with one’s ‘’own’’ health, life, liberty, property and possessions. Therefore, outlawing gambling or prostitution illegal, would be, on the libertarian view, an unjustified use of state coercion—it would be using penal threats to coerce people into refraining from “victimless crimes”, i.e. acts that harm no one other than the agent of the act.  
  
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If correct, these findings would suggest that thought coercion cannot generally achieve its ultimate goal to ''permanently'' affect people’s basic values. In the Chinese case, this prediction came soon true, with the unorthodox outcomes of the “[[Hundred Flowers Campaign|Hundred Flowers]]” episode of 1957. More generally, one would hence be led to expect that – far from being temporary – thought coercion would have to become a ''stable'' feature of society, in order to produce any long-lasting result. And indeed – as seen above – such predicted tendency to repeat and institutionalise itself appears to be borne out by the historical record of thought coercion in both Communist regimes and the Catholic Church.
+
This view is not restricted to Libertarians. Even non-Libertarian thinkers accept that the use of coercion by the state is justified only as a protective measure. For example, Alan Wertheimer argues that coercion is justified in so far as it protects individual rights; in all other cases coercion involves only violating somebody’s rights.  
  
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===Social effects: coercion and progress===
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Furthermore, whereas Nozick and Mill advocated the use of coercion (to some extent) by the state, they did not believe it to ever be justified when used in private.  Many would disagree with this, as for example, if a man arrives home to find a burglar threatening to rape his wife, and the man threatens to shoot the burglar of he does not leave and the burglar complies, he has, at least by Nozick’s definition, been coerced into leaving the house and not raping the man’s wife (Ryan, 1980: 483). This is clearly a case in which the private use of coercion seems justified and furthermore the motivation was to protect what one has a right to protect.
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====Whig-liberal tradition====
 
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According to the Whig-liberal tradition, due to the Scottish moral philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, widespread specific coercion has the general effect of limiting society’s ability to find new and better ways of doing things: see e.g. Hayek (1960). This follows from the view of social culture as the outcome of an [[evolutionary process]] of adaptation and selection through trial and error. Since specific coercion restricts the range of potential choices to the whims of only a few individuals, it narrows down society’s chances to experiment and select new solutions, and hence its ability to adapt. Thus, it is predicted that ''in the long run'' the most successful societies would mainly be those where the incidence of specific coercion was less.
 
  
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However, this only applies to ''specific'' coercion. By contrast, it is argued that ''unspecific'' coercion – brought about by the rule of law – does not in itself hinder adaptation in any important way, because it is as uniform and predictable as the constraints following from natural laws. Moreover, the rule of law is the only available way to curb specific coercion. Hence, far from being a hindrance, unspecific coercion is in this view a necessary condition for human progress.
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Other examples of coercion motivated for the protection of oneself, loved ones or others include some forms of non-violent protest (such as sit-ins where one refuses to move unless certain demands are met, or Ghandi’s hunger strike), or instances of ‘tough love’ whereby a parent coerces their drug addicted child into going to rehabilitation by threatening to cut them off if they do don’t. It could be argued that because there is no legitimate threat in the first example, and that in the second the threat is not one of force, and that threats involving money or resources or even emotional support are not coercive, but would rather be described by the related terms of black mail or manipulation.
  
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====Platonic tradition====
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Still others would maintain that what some would call justified coercion is not coercion at all, Grant Lamond for example suggests that the coercer’s intentions are vital and that the coercer has to make a proposal that deliberately disadvantages the coercee.  Therefore while state coercion may still be called justified coercion (as it could be argued that for the thief it is disadvantageous for them not to steal), the example of tough love used above would not be considered coercive because the coercer’s intention was not to disadvantage the other, but rather to advantage them.  
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Needless to say, those who believe they already know what is best for society, and thus feel no need to rely on any evolutionary process, do not share the Whig-liberal negative view of the social effects of specific coercion. They often opt instead for a so-called [[social engineering]] approach, whereby a [[command]] system steered by a few competent individuals – and buttressed up by quite specific coercion – is assumed to be the most “rational” way to ensure social progress.  
 
  
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The earliest formulation of this alternative view is found in [[Plato]]’s ''Republic''. In modern times the idea re-surfaced during the French Revolution, thanks to Rousseau’s famous distinction between the will of all and a supposed “’’general will’’”, which – unlike the former – was defined as embodying the objective “good” for society. According to Rousseau and his followers, social progress required that those who are somehow inspired by the “general will” should be entitled to enforce it through revolutionary coercion on the will of all. Later on, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this French revolutionary principle – though not of course its specific way to identify the “general will” – percolated into first [[Socialist]] and then [[Fascist]] political thinking.
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Disagreement arises as to what extent the intervention and use of coercive measures by the state are justified.  Furthermore, the state itself is not always just. While it is easy to see why the threat of enforcement of certain laws is generally considered good, governments are rarely (if ever) perfectly just, and some are decidedly unjust, therefore the coercive nature of their rule can not be seen as ‘justified coercion’, but rather as tyranny and maintaining order through terror and the imposition of unjust laws, thereby causing the majority of the population to act against their will, rather than the few morally depraved.  Locke and Mill (section 2), both pointed out the dangers of coercion if used incorrectly by the state.
  
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===Ethical effects: coercion and freedom===
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===Coercion and moral responsibility===
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To most people, the ethical implications of individual predatory coercion are straightforward. In recent times, some have attempted to extend a similar ethical judgement to non-predatory forms of coercion by individuals. Thus, for instance, the [[Taking Children Seriously]] movement has criticised pedagogic coercion by adults, including parents, on children, holding that it is possible and desirable to act with a child in such a way that all activities are consensual.
 
  
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The ethical standing of wider forms of supposedly “altruistic” specific coercion – like political and thought coercion – is however much more controversial, along lines relating to the assumed relationship between coercion and [[Freedom (philosophy)|freedom]], which is often regarded as an ethical value in itself.
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On Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility there is no hard and fast rule for determining whether a person who has acted from coercion is blameworthy. It is important to notice that since coerced acts are always strictly voluntary, they are never automatically disqualified from responsibility. Responsibility depends on facts about the situation such as the gravity of the threat and the nature of the coerced act. For example, Aristotle holds it absurd that one could be coerced into killing one’s mother.
  
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====Coercion as the negation of freedom====
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Most contemporary philosophers would agree with Aristotle, that coercion excuses at least some of the time.  However, they have sought a specification of the conditions under which it does so. According to Harry Frankfurt, “a coercive threat arouses in its victim a desire—i.e., to avoid the penalty—so powerful that it will move him to perform the required action whether he wants to perform it or considers that it would be reasonable for him to do so” (1988: p. 78). Most philosophers reject Frankfurt’s analysis—at least as specifying a necessary condition for coercion—on the grounds that there are less extreme cases in which a person’s will is hardly over-ridden, and yet she can be said to have been coerced. In other words, Frankfurt’s analysis picks out certain extreme cases, but fails to accommodate others.
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The Whig-liberal tradition has led to the well-known notion of (negative) freedom as lack of specific coercion. According to this view, any form of specific coercion is then unethical in itself as an injury to freedom, quite apart from its damaging effects on social progress. Indeed, the ethical value of (negative) freedom is grounded on the idea that conscience cannot be coerced, and is thus the ultimate standard of morality. It hence follows that – from an ethical point of view – coercion cannot even be regarded as a lesser evil: since it cannot produce conscientious behaviour, it can never bring about the fulfilment of ''any'' ethical value.
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Frankfurt’s view attempts to locate the conditions of moral responsibility for coercion in structural features of the coercee’s will. In particular, a person is coerced insofar as his will is overridden by a powerful desire arising from the coercive threat. However, many other theorists have insisted that this is incomplete: features of the ‘’environment’’ in which the agent acts are crucial in determining responsibility.
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One of the most important aspects in attributing blame is whether the act or acts committed bring about harm to others; and if this could reasonably have been avoided by the coercee. Moreover, the strength of the threat, as well as severity of the consequences of non-compliance, in relation to the result (harm) of the demanded action must be weighed.  For example, one may be excused for (e.g.) stealing a car under the threat of being killed, but not if one were merely threatened with a slap on the wrist. It is generally agreed that a person is not responsible for an action insofar he or she is unaware of negative consequences of committing the coerced act.  Though the laws of most countries accept coercion as an excusing factor, the individual circumstances in each case are usually needed to ascertain culpability.  
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====Coercion as a source of freedom====
 
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However, the basing of all ethical values on conscience has also produced a diametrically opposed view. Developing the Socratic idea that moral evil is a result of ignorance, the Stoic philosophers had argued that one’s “true” conscience – and hence virtue – could only be attained by freeing oneself from irrationality and passions, through the stern self-control that is typical of wise men. This principle was then fitted into the Christian framework of original sin and the need for “outside” redemption, to produce the idea that on many occasions external specific coercion could and should take the place of self-control in setting ordinary people free from their sinful tendencies. Almost paradoxically, personal spiritual freedom came thus to be often based on specific thought coercion by the inspired few,
 
  
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This alternative approach has percolated far beyond the religious field, and is shared to-day by all those who think they have a privileged access to “true” conscience, thanks to divine revelation, superior “scientific” knowledge or some other special circumstance. Apart from religious principles, the “true” conscience involved may be class-consciousness, patriotism, altruism, “social” values, political correctness or any other strongly held ethical world-view. The common element is the firm belief that coercion – ranging from legal State-coercion to terrorism – can and should be used to realize “true” freedom for all.
 
  
 
==Examples of coercion in media==
 
==Examples of coercion in media==
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==References==
 
==References==
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Anderson, Scott A. (undated), "Towards a Better Theory of Coercion, and a Use for It", The University of Chicago (URL: http://ptw.uchicago.edu/Anderson02.pdf)
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Carr, Craig L. (1988). “Coercion and Freedom.” American Philosophical Quarterly 25: pp. 59-67.
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Edmundson, William (1995). “Is Law Coercive?” Legal Theory 1: pp. 81-111.
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Feinberg, Joel (1986). Harm to Self. (New York: Oxford University Press): especially chs. 23-24.
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Feinberg, Joel (DATE?).  Coercion. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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Fowler, Mark (1982). “Coercion and Practical Reason.” Social Theory and Practice 8: pp. 329-355.
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Frankfurt, Harry (1988 [1973]). “Coercion and Moral Responsibility.” In The Importance of What We Care About. (New York: Cambridge University Press). First published in Essays on Freedom of Action. Edited by Ted Honderich. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul): pp. 65-86.
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Lamond, Grant (2000). “The Coerciveness of Law.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20: pp. 39-62.
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McCloskey, H. J. (1980). “Coercion: Its Nature and Significance.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 18: pp. 335-352.
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Mill, John Stuart (1909-14 [1859]). On Liberty. Vol. XXV, Part 2. The Harvard Classics. Edited by Charles W. Eliot. (New York: P.F. Collier & Son).
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Nozick, Robert (1969). “Coercion.” In Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel. Edited by Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton White. (New York: St. Martin's Press): pp. 440-472.
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Ryan, Cheyney C. (1980). “The Normative Concept of Coercion.” Mind 89: pp. 481-498
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Warner, Stuart. D. (April 1989).  “Review of Coercion, by Alan Wertheimer” Ethics, Vol.99,No.3. pp642-644.
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Wertheimer, Alan (1987). Coercion. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
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Zimmerman, David (1981). “Coercive Wage Offers.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10: 121-145.
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*Anderson, Scott A. (undated), "Towards a Better Theory of Coercion, and a Use for It", The University of Chicago [http://ptw.uchicago.edu/Anderson02.pdf]
 
*Anderson, Scott A. (undated), "Towards a Better Theory of Coercion, and a Use for It", The University of Chicago [http://ptw.uchicago.edu/Anderson02.pdf]
 
*Hayek, Friedrich A. (1960) ''The Constitution of Liberty'', University of Chicago Press.
 
*Hayek, Friedrich A. (1960) ''The Constitution of Liberty'', University of Chicago Press.

Revision as of 14:58, 21 November 2007

For other uses, see Coercion (disambiguation).

Philosophical discussion of coercion has focussed on three distinct concerns. (1) What is coercion? (2) Is coercion ever morally or legally justified? (3) Is a person morally responsible for an action done because of coercion?

With respect to the first question, a person is coerced when he acts contrary to his preferences or will because of a threat administered by another agent.

Interest in the second question arises particularly in the context of political philosophy and legal theory especially given that the state uses coercion in forcing compliance to its laws. The orthodox view on this question is that state coercion is justified insofar as it promotes (roughly) overall well being. Whether private uses of coercion are ever morally justified is a controversial matter.

With respect to the third question, coercion is widely thought to limit a person’s freedom without depriving her of free agency. Determining moral responsibility requires careful attention to the context of the act, and in particular, such factors as the severity of the threat and consequences of the coerced action.

Historical Overview

In Nicomachean Ethics III, Aristotle explores the conditions under which it is appropriate to hold a moral agent blameworthy or praiseworthy for particular actions. He argues that praise and blame are withheld from involuntary actions, that is, actions committed under force or as a result of ignorance (1110a-1111b4). On the grounds of a discussion of excuses and mitigating conditions, Aristotle formulates a general account of moral responsibility for action. A moral agent is an appropriate candidate for praise or blame if and only if his action was voluntarily done. A voluntary action is one which has its origin within the doer, and is done knowingly (1110a-1111b4).

The interest of Aristotle’s account for the current discussion is in his understanding of the force condition on moral responsibility. Aristotle provides two types of examples illustrating this condition. The first type includes a case in which a man is carried off by the wind; the second where is carried off by a band of (e.g.) robbers. These are cases in which the agent has no choice at all and would today be classified as cases of compulsion. Essentially, compulsion leaves the agent no choice. He is dragged off by physical force.

Aristotle illustrates the ‘force’ condition on responsibility with two further examples:

“But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (such as if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having ones parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated as to whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary.” (The Nicomachean Ethics, Book III Moral Virtue: 48)

Aristotle’s verdict is that these actions—e.g. doing something base to save one’s children—are both voluntary and involuntary. In one respect, the person chooses to perform the action; but in another, he would not have done so had he not thought that the lives of his family members were in danger. Therefore, although action was voluntary, considered at the moment, it was not, in the abstract, voluntary.

Such cases involve coercion. Acts done out of coercion are in the strict sense voluntary since a person ultimately has it in his power to choose to do or refrain from acting.

Is a person morally responsible for an action done out of coercion? Aristotle’s answer is this: it depends (though he does argue that certain actions such as matricide are never excusable no matter what the threat). There are no hard and fast rules for determining responsibility; it depends on the context.

Saint Thomas Aquinas also discusses coercion in the context of a discussion of moral responsibility. He understands coercion in terms of necessity, where a person is forced to act in a way such that he cannot do otherwise. Aquinas here seems to understand coercion in terms of compulsion—coercion is linked with a lack of choice and violence. Aquinas does recognise a distinction between compelled actions and those committed as a result of a threat. According to Aquinas, people are not morally responsible for acts of compulsion although one is responsible for actions done in the face of some sever threat. This is because the latter does not strictly render the action involuntary—and so the person maintained the power of choice.

Aquinas argues that the state’s is justified in its use of coercion and compulsion in the form of violent force and fear. This is because it must aim to control the vicious and irrational in order to preserve a state of harmony for non-offenders. However, he maintains that the use of power and force is, in general, the right of the state and not of private groups or individuals. One significant exception is the case of ‘imperfect coercive power’ in which the head of the household–usually the father—is justified in delivering punishments that do not inflict irreparable harm. Aquinas therefore advocates the use of coercion/compulsion in the form of patriarchy in both state and private sphere.

Later thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, in basic agreement with Aquinas, argued that coercion plays a central, justified and necessary part in the functioning of the state. Hobbes holds (again in agreement with Aquinas) that acts performed under threat are strictly voluntary so that one is fully responsible for them. This implies, for example, that contracts signed because of fear are legitimate; the use of bargaining ‘’power’’ is a rational way of effecting contracts so long as it does not conflict with the rule of law.

Hobbes’ countryman, John Locke, argued that although state use of coercion is necessary, this depends on the state’s control itself reflecting the consent of the people. There is in his view, therefore, a fine line between law and tyranny. A tyrant’s use of coercion is unjustified; the state’s use of coercion is justified only insofar as it protects the majority rather than terrorises them.

Immanuel Kant emphasises the use of state coercion in securing the rights and freedoms of the people. He argues that people are inclined to obey the law for two reasons: Firstly an ethical or rational motivation: one has a duty to obey the law so as to preserve an orderly society; secondly, a judicial motivation, which applies to those who do not have respect for the law but follow it to avoid punishment. Although Kant acknowledges that coercion impinges upon freedom, he maintains that when used in a proper manner by the state it also secures freedom. Impinging on the freedom of a few is justified to secure freedom for the majority.

John Stuart Mill (see On Liberty) represents to some extent a departure from the concerns of his predecessors by focussing on unjustified forms of coercion. His central understanding of coercion appears closely tied to the notion of interference. State coercion / compulsion is justified in so far as it is used to protect the general population. However, the state (or anyone else for that matter) should not be allowed to force (rational) people to do what may in fact be in their own best interests. This would constitute an unacceptable interference and infringement on individual liberty. In this respect, Mill is an opponent of strong forms of paternalism.

Mill discussion of coercion also includes the power of public opinion in forcing adherence to the law, such as, for example and that the stigma attached to law breaking and its punishments. For example, the threat of ruined reputation may itself be a coercive influence in its own right. Furthermore, and again in contrast with his predecessors, Mill recognises that civil institutions are just as capable of coercion as the state. He observes that the ‘despotism of custom’ has a strong hold over people in that they are frequently coerced to act in a certain way (against their inclinations) due to civil, social (and often religious) conventions and rules. His examples include the position of a wife in the family, who had at the time (19th Century Britain) very limited rights. Mill also presents the phenomenon of child labour as an example of coerciveness. Mill therefore shows the extent to which coercion occurs in ways other than by direct state interference.

The Nature of Coercion

While the notion of coercion has played a significant role in the history of legal and political philosophy—especially with reference to the state’s use of coercion in forcing compliance with its laws—sustained analysis of the concept itself is a relatively recent occurrence. However, in 20th century analytic philosophy, probably as a result of an increasing focus on human rights, the concept of coercion has received significant scholarly attention.

Coercion and compulsion

To begin, it is worthwhile recalling the distinction between coercion and compulsion. Compulsion works through direct force—recall Aristotle’s example of the man ‘’carried off‘’ by a band of robbers In contrast with compulsion, which deprives an agent of a choice, coercion does not. Coercion works through threat of some harm or negative consequence. Consider: “Your money or your life!” Acts done from compulsion are (almost) always excused, whereas, while actions done under coercion are often excused, they are certainly not always.

Although there is a sharp distinction between compulsion and coercion above the two are often closely associated. Torture is a clear example: coercion (threats) is used to (e.g.) extract information; these threats are then backed up by physical inducements such as truth serum. The state too uses both coercion and force (to maintain law). The threat of state punishment (e.g. prison) is used to induce compliance. However, state punishment may also involve compulsion as for example when someone’s property is forcibly confiscated.

Nozick’s analysis of coercion

So much then for the distinction between coercion and compulsion; what about the nature of coercion itself? In significant measure the current state of understanding of coercion is due to Robert Nozick’s landmark work Coercion and the writings it inspired. Nozick’s analysis has been enormously influential—accepted in large measure by almost all significant contributors to the debate.

Nozick analyses coercion as follows: Person P coerces Q into not doing (refraining from doing) act A if and only if: (1). P (the coercer) threatens to bring about some consequence if Q (the coercee) does A; Q understands this threat; (2) Action A, as a result of the threatened consequence, is made substantially less eligible as a course of conduct for Q than A ‘’without’’ this threatened consequence; (3) P’s threat is credible; (4) Q does not do A; (5). At least part of Q's reason for not doing A is to avoid the consequence that P has threatened to bring about (adapted from Ryan, 1980: 483, Nozick, 1969: 441-445).

One further feature of Nozick’s analysis, not directly encapsulated in the above analysis is the notion of a baseline (Nozick, 1969: 447). This concept is introduced in order to capture the sense in which the coerced individual becomes worse off than he would have been. In most cases it is relatively clear to see how this works. For example, in the “your money or your life” case, threat has made the person’s normal course of events worse than they should have been. However, as Nozick himself realised, the phrase ‘normal course of events’ is not unproblematic. Consider for example a case in which a slave owner, who regularly beats his slave, offers to refrain from beating him if he agrees to do X. Given that being beaten is part of the ‘normal course of events’ the offer will not count as coercive because the slave will be better off as a result of the offer. On this point, Alan Wertheimer argues that regular unjustified beatings are not ‘normal’. So he moralises the concept of coercion itself by employing the notion of rights in his formulation of a baseline.

One way of characterising coercion would be to establish whether it deviates from reasonable expectations in a normal course of events, whether it deviates from the norms of expectability, and in effect make the recipient worse off than they ought to be. In Alan Wertheimer’s groundbreaking Coercion (1987) he argues for a normative baseline (taken from Nozick) that would establish whether coercion has taken place. As not all threats are coercive, in order for a threat to be characterised as coercive it needs to make the coercee’s situation worse than it ought to be if the demand is denied. The use of the baseline is what Wertheimer referred to as the proposal prong of his two-pronged approach to coercion.

Thee central features of this analysis are the following: firstly coercion uses of threats rather than physical force; secondly, coercion’s taking place is dependent on whether the coercer’s threat is credible to the coercee (even if the coercer is bluffing, the crucial factor is whether the coercee believes the threat to be credible); thirdly, the coercee has to accept the proposal in order for coercion to take place; if he does not accept the proposal, then coercion, strictly, has not occurred. In this way, Nozick builds in a success condition into his analysis.


Each of these features may be questioned. On the first point, can coercion proceed by means of offers rather than threats? (Threats and offers are both proposals.) Consider the following example:

If a man is drowning in a lake and another man offers to help him only if he gives him all his money, then the drowning man’s situation is indeed not worse off, as one would presume that he would rather have his life than his money, and the offer of the second man has actually increased the drowning man’s options. Another example of the same sort would be that of the millionaire who offers to pay for the life saving operation of a poor woman’s child only if the woman agrees to be his mistress.


Is this an example of a coercive offer? According to Feinberg the answer is ‘yes’: there is no relevant difference between the above scenario and typical cases of coercion. Both use superior power and may be assimilated to the “your money or your life” type case. So coercion may proceed by means of offers or threats; therefore, Nozick’s analysis must be supplemented.

David Zimmerman argues that these are examples of exploitation, rather than of coercion. Although the man in the above example and the millionaire take advantage of their respective situations they are opportunistic and not coercive. According to Zimmerman, in order for these to be coercive actions, they would have had to manufacture the situations (e.g. paying someone to throw the man in the lake); only then will these cases qualify as coercive offers.


Coercion and moral rightness

While the previous section discussed the nature of coercion itself, this section considers two central ethical questions surrounding the concept of coercion.

Is Coercion Wrong?

Intuitively, coercion would seem to involve a moral wrong. This is so, at least in the most commonly considered cases such as “your money or your life!” However, state coercion has been and continues to be firmly entrenched in almost every nation. Governments use coercion in order to maintain law and order. The penal system is a system of threats and inducements. But if state coercion is justified, then coercion cannot always be wrong.

One reason why acts of coercion may seem wrong is that they limit somebody’s freedom. However, as the above discussion of Aristotle, Aquinas and Hobbes highlights, describing the sense in which this is so is not altogether straightforward. After all, and unlike compulsion, coercion still involves a choice. For Aquinas and Hobbes, this indicates that the coercee is still acting as a free agent. The answer must be that coercion forces one to make a choice that would not ordinarily have to be made. And this is a limitation on somebody’s freedom.

However, as evidenced by the penal system, state coercion limits particular freedoms in order to enhance overall freedom. For example, insofar as the state endorses capital punishment, citizens are faced with a supreme threat should they perform certain unwanted actions. However, the fact that they are deterred from (coerced into not) doing these, secures the freedom of other citizens to walk their streets in safety. On this point, Kant acknowledged that coercion impinges upon freedom, but argues that when used in a proper manner by the state it also secured freedom, and that therefore the hindrance of freedom of a few is justified to secure greater freedom. Furthermore, it is sometimes said (Grant Lamond) that state has the right to coerce, whereas others do not; that in a certain sense people give over their freedom to the state (or even school, or church) to be protected. Libertarians such as Nozick and Mill argue state interference with personal liberty should be as minimal as possible.


The legal justification of coercion

J.S. Mill and Robert Nozick argue that state intervention should be a purely protective measure. According to Nozick’s Libertariansim state coercion is justified only insofar as it conforms to the ‘harm principle’. In other words, the use of coercion is justified by the state when it prevents harm; similarly, the use of force is justified if it punishes those that cause harm.

Libertarianism is opposed to paternalism in the following way. For a libertarian, coercion is justified only if it prevents harm to others; however, one is free to do as one likes with one’s ‘’own’’ health, life, liberty, property and possessions. Therefore, outlawing gambling or prostitution illegal, would be, on the libertarian view, an unjustified use of state coercion—it would be using penal threats to coerce people into refraining from “victimless crimes”, i.e. acts that harm no one other than the agent of the act.

This view is not restricted to Libertarians. Even non-Libertarian thinkers accept that the use of coercion by the state is justified only as a protective measure. For example, Alan Wertheimer argues that coercion is justified in so far as it protects individual rights; in all other cases coercion involves only violating somebody’s rights.

Furthermore, whereas Nozick and Mill advocated the use of coercion (to some extent) by the state, they did not believe it to ever be justified when used in private. Many would disagree with this, as for example, if a man arrives home to find a burglar threatening to rape his wife, and the man threatens to shoot the burglar of he does not leave and the burglar complies, he has, at least by Nozick’s definition, been coerced into leaving the house and not raping the man’s wife (Ryan, 1980: 483). This is clearly a case in which the private use of coercion seems justified and furthermore the motivation was to protect what one has a right to protect.

Other examples of coercion motivated for the protection of oneself, loved ones or others include some forms of non-violent protest (such as sit-ins where one refuses to move unless certain demands are met, or Ghandi’s hunger strike), or instances of ‘tough love’ whereby a parent coerces their drug addicted child into going to rehabilitation by threatening to cut them off if they do don’t. It could be argued that because there is no legitimate threat in the first example, and that in the second the threat is not one of force, and that threats involving money or resources or even emotional support are not coercive, but would rather be described by the related terms of black mail or manipulation.

Still others would maintain that what some would call justified coercion is not coercion at all, Grant Lamond for example suggests that the coercer’s intentions are vital and that the coercer has to make a proposal that deliberately disadvantages the coercee. Therefore while state coercion may still be called justified coercion (as it could be argued that for the thief it is disadvantageous for them not to steal), the example of tough love used above would not be considered coercive because the coercer’s intention was not to disadvantage the other, but rather to advantage them.

Disagreement arises as to what extent the intervention and use of coercive measures by the state are justified. Furthermore, the state itself is not always just. While it is easy to see why the threat of enforcement of certain laws is generally considered good, governments are rarely (if ever) perfectly just, and some are decidedly unjust, therefore the coercive nature of their rule can not be seen as ‘justified coercion’, but rather as tyranny and maintaining order through terror and the imposition of unjust laws, thereby causing the majority of the population to act against their will, rather than the few morally depraved. Locke and Mill (section 2), both pointed out the dangers of coercion if used incorrectly by the state.

Coercion and moral responsibility

On Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility there is no hard and fast rule for determining whether a person who has acted from coercion is blameworthy. It is important to notice that since coerced acts are always strictly voluntary, they are never automatically disqualified from responsibility. Responsibility depends on facts about the situation such as the gravity of the threat and the nature of the coerced act. For example, Aristotle holds it absurd that one could be coerced into killing one’s mother.

Most contemporary philosophers would agree with Aristotle, that coercion excuses at least some of the time. However, they have sought a specification of the conditions under which it does so. According to Harry Frankfurt, “a coercive threat arouses in its victim a desire—i.e., to avoid the penalty—so powerful that it will move him to perform the required action whether he wants to perform it or considers that it would be reasonable for him to do so” (1988: p. 78). Most philosophers reject Frankfurt’s analysis—at least as specifying a necessary condition for coercion—on the grounds that there are less extreme cases in which a person’s will is hardly over-ridden, and yet she can be said to have been coerced. In other words, Frankfurt’s analysis picks out certain extreme cases, but fails to accommodate others.

Frankfurt’s view attempts to locate the conditions of moral responsibility for coercion in structural features of the coercee’s will. In particular, a person is coerced insofar as his will is overridden by a powerful desire arising from the coercive threat. However, many other theorists have insisted that this is incomplete: features of the ‘’environment’’ in which the agent acts are crucial in determining responsibility.

One of the most important aspects in attributing blame is whether the act or acts committed bring about harm to others; and if this could reasonably have been avoided by the coercee. Moreover, the strength of the threat, as well as severity of the consequences of non-compliance, in relation to the result (harm) of the demanded action must be weighed. For example, one may be excused for (e.g.) stealing a car under the threat of being killed, but not if one were merely threatened with a slap on the wrist. It is generally agreed that a person is not responsible for an action insofar he or she is unaware of negative consequences of committing the coerced act. Though the laws of most countries accept coercion as an excusing factor, the individual circumstances in each case are usually needed to ascertain culpability.


Examples of coercion in media

  • In the first season of 24, Jack Bauer was coerced into assisting a political assassination, by threat of harm to his wife and daughter.
  • By threat of blackmail, the five main characters in The Usual Suspects are coerced into paying back a debt to Keyser Soze.
  • In The Empire Strikes Back, Lando Calrissian is coerced by Darth Vader into double crossing Han Solo, as bait to trap Luke Skywalker.
  • In the Alex Rider spy novel series, Alex is coerced into becoming a spy for MI6, by threat of him losing his guardian and being sent to an institution.

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

Anderson, Scott A. (undated), "Towards a Better Theory of Coercion, and a Use for It", The University of Chicago (URL: http://ptw.uchicago.edu/Anderson02.pdf)

Carr, Craig L. (1988). “Coercion and Freedom.” American Philosophical Quarterly 25: pp. 59-67.

Edmundson, William (1995). “Is Law Coercive?” Legal Theory 1: pp. 81-111.

Feinberg, Joel (1986). Harm to Self. (New York: Oxford University Press): especially chs. 23-24.

Feinberg, Joel (DATE?). Coercion. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Fowler, Mark (1982). “Coercion and Practical Reason.” Social Theory and Practice 8: pp. 329-355.

Frankfurt, Harry (1988 [1973]). “Coercion and Moral Responsibility.” In The Importance of What We Care About. (New York: Cambridge University Press). First published in Essays on Freedom of Action. Edited by Ted Honderich. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul): pp. 65-86.

Lamond, Grant (2000). “The Coerciveness of Law.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20: pp. 39-62.

McCloskey, H. J. (1980). “Coercion: Its Nature and Significance.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 18: pp. 335-352.

Mill, John Stuart (1909-14 [1859]). On Liberty. Vol. XXV, Part 2. The Harvard Classics. Edited by Charles W. Eliot. (New York: P.F. Collier & Son).

Nozick, Robert (1969). “Coercion.” In Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel. Edited by Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton White. (New York: St. Martin's Press): pp. 440-472.

Ryan, Cheyney C. (1980). “The Normative Concept of Coercion.” Mind 89: pp. 481-498

Warner, Stuart. D. (April 1989). “Review of Coercion, by Alan Wertheimer” Ethics, Vol.99,No.3. pp642-644.

Wertheimer, Alan (1987). Coercion. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Zimmerman, David (1981). “Coercive Wage Offers.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10: 121-145.

  • Anderson, Scott A. (undated), "Towards a Better Theory of Coercion, and a Use for It", The University of Chicago [1]
  • Hayek, Friedrich A. (1960) The Constitution of Liberty, University of Chicago Press.
  • Hodgkin, Thomas (1886) (trans.) Letters of Cassiodorus, London: H. Frowde.
  • Lifton, Robert J. (1961) Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, Penguin Books.
  • Popper, Karl R. (1945) The Open Society and Its Enemies
  • Rhodes, Michael R. (2000), "The Nature of Coercion", Journal of Value Inquiry, 34 (2/3)
  • Rothbard, Murray N. (1982), "F. A. Hayek and the Concept of Coercion", in The Ethics of Liberty, Humanities Press [2]

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