Difference between revisions of "Wahhabism" - New World Encyclopedia

From New World Encyclopedia
(Imported original work from writer Janani Witfield)
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The term "Wahhabi" (''Wahhābīya'') ("Wahhabism") is considered derogatory and rarely used by the people it is used to describe, who preferred to be called as "unitarians". <ref>Hardy, Roger. ''[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1571144.stm Analysis: Inside Wahhabi Islam]''. BBC News</ref> <ref>http://muslimmatters.org/2007/04/01/the-wahhabi-myth-debunking-the-bogeyman/</ref> Some use Wahhabism and [[Salafism]] interchangeably. <ref name=global>GlobalSecurity.org [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-salafi.htm Salafi Islam]</ref> Others consider Wahhabism to be an ultra-conservative form of Salafism.<ref>http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/04/AR2006090401107_2.html</ref><ref> John L. Esposito, What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam, p.50 </ref> Ingrid Mattson, a professor of Islamic Studies from Hartford Seminary, calls Wahhabism a reform movement, rather than a sect.<ref>http://archives.cnn.com/2001/COMMUNITY/10/18/mattson.cnna//</ref>
 
The term "Wahhabi" (''Wahhābīya'') ("Wahhabism") is considered derogatory and rarely used by the people it is used to describe, who preferred to be called as "unitarians". <ref>Hardy, Roger. ''[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1571144.stm Analysis: Inside Wahhabi Islam]''. BBC News</ref> <ref>http://muslimmatters.org/2007/04/01/the-wahhabi-myth-debunking-the-bogeyman/</ref> Some use Wahhabism and [[Salafism]] interchangeably. <ref name=global>GlobalSecurity.org [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-salafi.htm Salafi Islam]</ref> Others consider Wahhabism to be an ultra-conservative form of Salafism.<ref>http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/04/AR2006090401107_2.html</ref><ref> John L. Esposito, What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam, p.50 </ref> Ingrid Mattson, a professor of Islamic Studies from Hartford Seminary, calls Wahhabism a reform movement, rather than a sect.<ref>http://archives.cnn.com/2001/COMMUNITY/10/18/mattson.cnna//</ref>
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The orthodox Islamic movement Wahhabism is most considered with the strict observance of the laws of the Qur’an and the practices of the Prophet; Wahhabis believe the Muslim community should aim to become the living embodiment of God’s laws on Earth by following this strict religious practice (Bahgat, 2004).
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The movement spurns Bid’ah, which refers to any innovation separate from the doctrines and practices set out by the Qur’an or the Prophet Muhammad (Bahgat, 2004). Thus, Wahhabism holds the deviations in belief and practice of all other Muslims in contempt. Wahhabis are particularly vehement towards the Islamic mystics, the Sufis, for their attempts to experience God personally rather than through strict adherence to Islamic law (Lang, 2003).
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The term “Wahhabism” is considered derogatory to the followers of this movement, as Wahhabis prefer to see themselves as adherents of Islamic orthodoxy (Abou El Fadl, 2003). To these followers, Wahhabism is not a school of thought within Islam, but is Islam itself (Abou El Fadl, 2003).  Other Muslims are urged to embrace in Wahhabism an authentic Islam, the original Islam which existed in the time of the Prophet (Schwartz, 2002).
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The movement has been associated with ruthlessness; those who reject their strict orthodox practices and beliefs have been known to suffer the consequences (Lang, 2003).
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After the attacks on the Twin Towers on September 9, 2001, the Wahhabi sect was launched into prominence, as Islamist groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda have been heavily influenced by Wahhabi thought (Abou El Fadl, 2003, Haj, 2002, Lang, 2003). Followers of these Islamist groups believe the West has corrupted the Islamic world, and that existing governments must be destroyed to pave the way for a “purer” Islamic life (Lang, 2003).
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These beliefs harken back to the founding of Wahhabism and the hostile way in which this movement came to be entrenched in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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==History==
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Sunni Islam, the majority Islamic faith, is dominated by laws and legal schools, as Sunnis believe that God has set down laws by which humanity should live (Lang 2003). There are four great schools of religious law in Sunni Islam, including the Hanbali school. This school was named after Ibn Hanbal (A.D. 780 – 855), who believed that the law was a black and white concept that should be followed to the letter (Lang, 2003). Given its extreme nature compared to the other three modes of thought, this school might have died out had it not been for a certain scholar by name of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab (Lang, 2003).
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Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703 in the central Arabian region of Najd, which would eventually become known Saudia Arabia (Schwartz, 2002). Little is known about Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, but he is said to have held extremist religious views even in his youth. It is likely that early in his studies, a scholarly instructor introduced him the works of Ibn Taymiyyah, the 14th century Hanbali theologian (Waines, 2003).
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Ibn Taymiyyah put great emphasis on the societal values of solidarity and justice. He condemned Islamic mystics, Sufis, for straying away from the path of doctrines and rituals set out in the Qur’an, but he did not condemn Sufism absolutely (Waines, 2003). Instead, Ibn Taymiyyah saw rationality, law, and mystical intuition as all parts of one whole that required integration (Waines, 2003). The message of Ibn Taymiyyah would become much more radicalized in the message of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
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Following extensive travels through the Middle East in his early adulthood, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab returned to Najd to announce that Muslims everywhere should surrender to his vision of the authentic Islam as practiced during Prophet Muhammad’s time (Schwartz, 2002).
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His preaching can be summarized into three points: firstly, the action of ritual is more important than intentions; secondly, Muslims should not revere the dead; and finally, Muslims should not make intercessory prayers to God through the Prophet or saints (Schwartz, 2002). At the heart of the issue was his virulent opposition to any thought or action that mars the oneness of God (Robinson, 2006).
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He condemned prayers to God through honoring anyone other than God as idolatry, even though Muslims of the past, including the Prophet, had accepted this form of prayer (Schwartz, 2002). But Ibn Abd al-Wahhab abhorred the practice of reciting blessings on the Prophet during congregational prayers. In fact, he is said to have killed a blind man who insisted on praying to the Prophet at the conclusion of his call to prayer. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab fought all forms of worship to the Prophet, such as pilgrims’ practice of making hajj to visit the Prophet’s tomb in Medina, the Muslim celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, and the inscription of the Prophet’s name in mosques (Schwartz, 2002).
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Wahhabis explain their opposition to the traditional praise of the Prophet by saying this praise renders a human to God-like status (Schwartz, 2002). They compare Muslims’ praise of the Prophet to the Christian worship of Jesus, which is rejected by Muslims who see it as adding “partners” to God and destroying monotheistic belief in God’s unity. However, anti-Wahhabi scholars point out one can not be a Muslim without honoring the Prophet as the Muslim profession of faith and the call to prayer include two parts: “I affirm there is no God but Allah; and I affirm Muhammad is the Prophet of God” (Schwartz, 2002). 
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But in order for his doctrine of Islam to gain popularity, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had to downplay the Prophet’s personality and the Prophet’s dedication to compassion and mercy. In order to advance his puritanical vision, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had to fight against the Prophet’s status and the Ottoman Islam of the day, which was characterized by openness and creative flourishing (Schwartz, 2002).
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Ibn Abd al-Wahhab proceeded to take shocking actions to reform the faith. He ordered that graves of Muslim saints be dug up and scattered or even turned into latrines. He insisted that Muslims should do away with local religious and spiritual practices such as the celebration of river festivals and the visiting of hot springs, forests, mountains and caves for spiritual and physical health (Schwartz, 2002).
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He ordered the burning of books, saying the Qur’an offered more than enough reading material (Schwartz, 2002). Wahhabi preachers insist their followers rely only on the Qur’an rather than reading commentaries; they believe that trusting in a commentator might lead a person to follow the words of another human rather than the infallible word of God. One preacher has said that those who rely on commentaries are “like animals dragged along by ropes to their death” (Robinson, 2006).
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Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his followers also condemned music, claiming it led people to forget God and give themselves to sin. The Islamic mystic Sufis, however, used music as a way of giving themselves to the consciousness of God (Waines, 2003). Music was one of the crowning glories of Islam; for centuries, the stirring voices and sounds of instruments have carried Muslim seekers across the world to heights of ecstasy and rejoicing in the heart of their culture and religion (Schwartz, 2002).
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Among one of the Prophet’s popular sayings was that at the beginning of every century,
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Allah would send someone to revive the faith (Schwartz, 2002). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to renew the sura of the eighteen commands, which begins with the verse “Set not up with God any other God (O man) lest thee sit down reproved, forsaken” and closes with “And not set up with Allah any other god, lest thee be cast into hell, reproved, abandoned” (Haj, 2002).
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Beyond reaffirming the unity of Allah, the eighteen commands also affirm that the disciplined virtues of kindness, sound judgment, justice, generosity, responsibility, lovingness, modesty and truthfulness are important aspects of worship (Haj, 2002). Thus, Haj (2002) argues that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was one of many Muslim reformers at the time led by a sense of duty to preach and correct what he saw as immoral and incorrect practices proliferating within his communities.
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However, other scholars argue that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab could not be the person the Prophet Muhammad had foretold would come to revive the faith. They argue that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was not content to revive Islam, but wished to entirely reform the faith (Schwartz, 2002).
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Given that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrines were so far-removed from the Islam of the day, it was little surprise that the majority of Islamic scholars did not support him. These scholars attacked him and complained his theses went against the Qur’an and the four schools of Islam. His own brother, Suleyman, complained he was trying to add another pillar to the five pillars of Islam: the infallibility of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Abou El Fadl, 2003, Schwartz, 2002).
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Ibn Abd al-Wahhab responded by denouncing his detractors as idolators and apostates, and urged people to abandon the four traditional schools to follow him (Schwartz, 2002, Waines, 2003). He openly stated his belief that all Muslims had fallen into unbelief, and that if they did not follow the path of redemption he had laid out, they should be killed, their women kin should be raped, and their possessions taken from them (Schwartz, 2002). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab believed the lives of Shias, Sufis, and other supposedly unorthodox Muslims should be extinguished and that all other faiths should be humiliated and destroyed. This vengeful doctrine was to set the stage for two and a half centuries of Islamic fundamentalism and bloodshed (Schwartz, 2002).   
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Establishment of House of Al Sa’ud
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His last Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who resented and fought the rule of the Turks, soon raised the ire of the empire through his actions; for example, he ordered the stoning of a woman accused of fornication as a way of educating the public (Schwartz, 2002). His behaviour and preaching brought the Ottoman empire to issue a fatwa against him, calling for his arrest (Schwartz, 2002).
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In 1744, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought refuge in the village of Dariyah. This district was ruled by the rebel Muhammad ibn Sa’ud and his family, Al Sa’ud, which was responsible for organized banditry within Najd (Schwartz, 2002). The family ruled Dariyah according to its own whims and the village was a place of lawlessness when Ibn Abd al-Wahhab settled there. In 1747, he made a power-sharing agreement with the family; Ibn Abd al-Wahhab would become Dariyah’s religious authority, while the Al Sa’ud family would be responsible for the village’s political leadership (Schwartz, 2002).
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The Al Sa’ud family also benefited from the pact, as the Wahhabi movement and its extreme religious fervor helped to legitimize their rule (Bahgat, 2004, Lang, 2003). The fusion of religious and political control would come to represent the modern Saudi Arabia, as well as mark the break between the Islam of the past, in which traditional Muslim scholars focused on inward contemplation as opposed to focusing on gaining global and political power (Schwartz, 2002).
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Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his followers urged a “jihad,” or the struggle to promote the faith, against other Muslims, and thus, the Wahhabis began a blood-soaked crusade for expansion and domination (Lang, 2003). By 1788, the Wahhab-Sa’ud alliance controlled most of the Arabian peninsula (Schwartz, 2002).
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In 1801, the Wahhabis began a campaign to gain control over the two holy cities of Islam. They raided Mecca and Medina and stole holy books, works of art, and other gifts the city had accumulated over the last 1,000 years. While they controlled the Two Holy Places, they imposed Wahhabism upon the populace, destroyed shrines and cemetaries, closed off entrance to the holy city to Ottoman pilgrims, barred pilgrims from performing the hajj and murdered respected citizens in both holy cities (Schwartz, 2002).
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Through the 1820s to the 1860s, the Wahhabis launched attacks upon the Ottoman empire, urged on by Britain, which was eager to see the collapse of the Turkish empire and the distribution of its overseas possessions (Schwartz, 2002).
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The Wahhabis’ power grew and shrank by turns throughout the century, until in 1901, the latest representative of the Al Sa’ud and Wahhabi alliance decided to try and re-seize control over the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina. Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdur-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Al Sa’ud journeyed to Riyadh, where he murdered the city’s ruler and took over control of the country (Schwartz, 2002).
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Over the next twenty-five years, he went on to unify the Arabian peninsula through force (Lang, 2003). Wahhabism was the only official faith sanctioned in the state that would come to be formed there. To this day, no other religious establishment is allowed in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Lang, 2003). 
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Following the formation of the Saudi state, the Ikhwan Bedouin armies which had helped to create the kingdom continued to violently uphold the jihad doctrines of Wahhabism. These armies crossed the borders of neighbouring countries Iraq and Jordan and killed the harmless shepherds, families and livestock they found there (Lang, 2003).
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Although Islamic tradition and Arab customary law forbade this type of violence, the Ikhwan tribes forged on in their campaign of terror. The governments of Iraq and Jordan were finally able to curb the violence when they pursued the Ikhwan into Saudi Arabia during 1922 – 1925, forcing the Saudi Arabian government to disarm the ruthless tribes (Lang, 2003).
  
 
==Beliefs==
 
==Beliefs==
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Wahhabism also denounces "the practice of unthinking adherence to the interpretations of scholars and the blind acceptance of practices that were passed on within the family or tribe. [[Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab]] believed in the responsibility of the individual Muslim to learn and obey the divine commands as they were revealed in the Quran and in the ''hadith''."<ref>Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. Third Edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004. Page.123.</ref>
 
Wahhabism also denounces "the practice of unthinking adherence to the interpretations of scholars and the blind acceptance of practices that were passed on within the family or tribe. [[Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab]] believed in the responsibility of the individual Muslim to learn and obey the divine commands as they were revealed in the Quran and in the ''hadith''."<ref>Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. Third Edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004. Page.123.</ref>
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==Wahhabism into the Twentieth Century and Beyond==
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After putting down the Ikhwan revolts, the Saudi government decided it needed to moderate its policies and actions in order to form political and social ties with the rest of the world. Since that time, the Saudi government has followed a path of relative moderation, forming alliances with countries such as the United States, who rely on the country’s oil supply (Lang, 2003). However, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. has never been formalized, as Wahhabi doctrine forbids such an alignment with a non-Muslim state (Lang, 2003).
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Although only 40 per cent of the Saudi population practices Wahhabism, Wahhabi doctrine continues to be firmly rooted within the kingdom. For example, all students are taught religion from the beginning of primary school, with the curriculum based only on Wahhabism, and libraries consist exclusively of Wahhabi texts (Schwartz, 2002).
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The Wahhabi clerics issue strict guidelines for sex, prohibit keeping pet dogs, prohibit women’s attendance at funerals, and insist that women veil themselves (Foer, 2002). The severity of these edicts is demonstrated by an occurrence in 2002, when a fire burst out in a public school in Mecca.
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According to witnesses of the fire, the Saudi religious police forcibly prevented female students from escaping the burning school because they were improperly covered. Some girls returned to the school to retrieve their veils, only to die within the blaze. In total, fourteen young girls burned to death or died from asphyxiation (Abou El Fadl, 2003). The incident provides a glimpse into the way in which the fundamental doctrines of Wahhabism have maintained their chokehold upon the kingdom.
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The royal government has either been unable or unwilling to restrict Wahhabi preaching within its borders; they have been equally unable to stop the flow of huge amounts of private Saudi money to fund Wahhabi missionary work abroad (Lang, 2003). With the help of this oil wealth funding, mosques and schools preaching Wahhabism have been built across the Islamic world from Iran to Pakistan, Europe and the U.S. (Foer, 2002, Lang, 2003, Robinson, 2006). Wahhabi mullahs are traveling to even remote regions of the world to urge people to abandon tribal traditions in favor of the stringent Wahhabi guidelines (Robinson, 2006).
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The Islam practiced in areas such as Pakistan, Jakarta and Senegal and Afghanistan developed from the vibrant fusion of local traditions with traditions gleaned from the central Arabic empire (Robinson, 2006). Now, Wahhabi beliefs are threatening that diversity of Islam, with Wahhabi mullahs claiming these local traditions deviate from the authentic Islam. In Pakistan, one example of powerful Wahhabi influence is seen in the way elders are replacing rustic tribal names such as “fig flower” and “beet root” with Arabic names, such as Shaykh Umar or Ibn Rusool (Robinson, 2006).
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But many of the traditional mullahs are not quietly accepting the Wahhabi foray into their countries; they are fiercely defending the tribal Islam rooted in their communities. Instead of using the painstakingly crafted arguments of Wahhabi mullah, traditional mullahs use the emotion at the heart of their tradition to appeal to local followers (Robinson, 2006).
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Deference for elders is of utmost importance in tribal communities and traditional mullahs point out that Wahhabis are guilty of the utmost disrespect because they do not follow the commentaries of the faith’s learned scholars. These mullahs paint the Wahhabis as foreigners who sacrificed the true vision of Islam for money (Robinson, 2006, Schwartz, 2002).
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These mullahs and other Muslim preachers urge their followers to accept the path of the “Greater Jihad.” Wahhabi clerics may preach the lesser jihad of war, death and blood, citing the Qur’an’s description of war against unbelievers to justify the killing of less observant Muslims and to an even greater extent, non-Muslims (Lang, 2003). But this path of jihad has long been abandoned by the majority of Muslims in favor of the “Greater Jihad,” the struggle to come closer to Allah through piety and devotion (Lang, 2003).
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While all of Islam accepts the unity of God and monotheism, not all of Islam recognizes the need for the religion to become one monolithic, static force, preserving the same beliefs and practices throughout its history (Esposito, 1988). Muslim preachers and followers across the world, from Saudi Arabia to Iran to Afghanistan to America, accept in their religion a diversity of interpretations and expression of faith; this diversity should continue to hold in the face of opposition, murder and terror in the cloak of orthodoxy. 
  
 
==Modern spread of Wahhabism==
 
==Modern spread of Wahhabism==
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There are also those who argue{{Who|date=September 2007}} that Saudi promotion of Wahhabism as part of a Sunni-Shi'a rivalry contributed to the development of the religious ideology of [[Al-Qaeda]].  Mattson points out that Saudi scholars of Wahhabism have denounced terrorism.<ref>http://archives.cnn.com/2001/COMMUNITY/10/18/mattson.cnna//</ref>
 
There are also those who argue{{Who|date=September 2007}} that Saudi promotion of Wahhabism as part of a Sunni-Shi'a rivalry contributed to the development of the religious ideology of [[Al-Qaeda]].  Mattson points out that Saudi scholars of Wahhabism have denounced terrorism.<ref>http://archives.cnn.com/2001/COMMUNITY/10/18/mattson.cnna//</ref>
  
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==Notes==
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{{reflist}}
  
  
==References==  
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==References==
* [[David Holden]] & Richard Johns, ''The House of Saud'', Pan, 1982, 0-330-26834-1
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*Abou El Fadl, K. (2003). The ugly modern and the modern ugly. Chapter from Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism, edited by Omid Safi. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
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*Bahgat, G. (2004). Saudi Arabia and the war on terrorism. Arab Studies Quarterly, 26. 
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*Esposito, J. Islam: the straight path. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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*Foer, F. (2002). Moral hazard. New Republic, 227.
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*Haj, S. (2002). Reordering Islamic orthodoxy: Muhhamad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab. Muslim World,92.
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*Lang, P. (2003). Wahhabism and jihad. America, 188.
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*Schwartz, S. (2002). The two faces of Islam: the house of Sa’ud from tradition to terror. NewYork: Doubleday.
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*Robinson, S. (2006). Infallible preachers. Christian Century, 123, 10 – 11.
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*Waines, D. (2003). An introduction to Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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* David Holden & Richard Johns, ''The House of Saud'', Pan, 1982, 0-330-26834-1
 
* Hamid Algar, ''Wahhabism : A Critical Essay'', Islamic Publications International, ISBN 1-889999-13-X
 
* Hamid Algar, ''Wahhabism : A Critical Essay'', Islamic Publications International, ISBN 1-889999-13-X
 
* Natana J. Delong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad'', Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-516991-3
 
* Natana J. Delong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad'', Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-516991-3
 
* [[Madawi Al-Rasheed]], ''A History of Saudi Arabia'', Cambridge University Press, 2002, ISBN 0-521-64412-7
 
* [[Madawi Al-Rasheed]], ''A History of Saudi Arabia'', Cambridge University Press, 2002, ISBN 0-521-64412-7
* Gerald De Gaury, [[Freya Stark]], ''Arabia Phoenix'', Kegan Paul International Limited, ISBN 0-7103-0677-6, ISBN-13, 9780710306777
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* Gerald De Gaury, Freya Stark, ''Arabia Phoenix'', Kegan Paul International Limited, ISBN 0-7103-0677-6, ISBN-13, 9780710306777
 
* Haneef James Oliver, "The 'Wahhabi' Myth", T.R.O.I.D. Publications, February 2004, ISBN 0-9689058-5-4
 
* Haneef James Oliver, "The 'Wahhabi' Myth", T.R.O.I.D. Publications, February 2004, ISBN 0-9689058-5-4
 
==Notes==
 
{{reflist}}
 
  
 
==External links==
 
==External links==

Revision as of 18:53, 17 September 2007


Wahhabism (Arabic: Al-Wahhābīyya الوهابية, Wahabism) is a branch of Sunni Islam practised by those who follow the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, after whom the movement is named. Ibn Abdul Wahhab, who reintroduced Shariah (Islamic law) to the Arabian peninsula, was influenced by the writings of scholars such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya. This theology is the dominant form found in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, as well as some pockets of Somalia, Algeria, Palestine and Mauritania.

The term "Wahhabi" (Wahhābīya) ("Wahhabism") is considered derogatory and rarely used by the people it is used to describe, who preferred to be called as "unitarians". [1] [2] Some use Wahhabism and Salafism interchangeably. [3] Others consider Wahhabism to be an ultra-conservative form of Salafism.[4][5] Ingrid Mattson, a professor of Islamic Studies from Hartford Seminary, calls Wahhabism a reform movement, rather than a sect.[6]

The orthodox Islamic movement Wahhabism is most considered with the strict observance of the laws of the Qur’an and the practices of the Prophet; Wahhabis believe the Muslim community should aim to become the living embodiment of God’s laws on Earth by following this strict religious practice (Bahgat, 2004).

The movement spurns Bid’ah, which refers to any innovation separate from the doctrines and practices set out by the Qur’an or the Prophet Muhammad (Bahgat, 2004). Thus, Wahhabism holds the deviations in belief and practice of all other Muslims in contempt. Wahhabis are particularly vehement towards the Islamic mystics, the Sufis, for their attempts to experience God personally rather than through strict adherence to Islamic law (Lang, 2003).

The term “Wahhabism” is considered derogatory to the followers of this movement, as Wahhabis prefer to see themselves as adherents of Islamic orthodoxy (Abou El Fadl, 2003). To these followers, Wahhabism is not a school of thought within Islam, but is Islam itself (Abou El Fadl, 2003). Other Muslims are urged to embrace in Wahhabism an authentic Islam, the original Islam which existed in the time of the Prophet (Schwartz, 2002).

The movement has been associated with ruthlessness; those who reject their strict orthodox practices and beliefs have been known to suffer the consequences (Lang, 2003).

After the attacks on the Twin Towers on September 9, 2001, the Wahhabi sect was launched into prominence, as Islamist groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda have been heavily influenced by Wahhabi thought (Abou El Fadl, 2003, Haj, 2002, Lang, 2003). Followers of these Islamist groups believe the West has corrupted the Islamic world, and that existing governments must be destroyed to pave the way for a “purer” Islamic life (Lang, 2003).

These beliefs harken back to the founding of Wahhabism and the hostile way in which this movement came to be entrenched in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

History

Sunni Islam, the majority Islamic faith, is dominated by laws and legal schools, as Sunnis believe that God has set down laws by which humanity should live (Lang 2003). There are four great schools of religious law in Sunni Islam, including the Hanbali school. This school was named after Ibn Hanbal (A.D. 780 – 855), who believed that the law was a black and white concept that should be followed to the letter (Lang, 2003). Given its extreme nature compared to the other three modes of thought, this school might have died out had it not been for a certain scholar by name of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab (Lang, 2003).

Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703 in the central Arabian region of Najd, which would eventually become known Saudia Arabia (Schwartz, 2002). Little is known about Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, but he is said to have held extremist religious views even in his youth. It is likely that early in his studies, a scholarly instructor introduced him the works of Ibn Taymiyyah, the 14th century Hanbali theologian (Waines, 2003).

Ibn Taymiyyah put great emphasis on the societal values of solidarity and justice. He condemned Islamic mystics, Sufis, for straying away from the path of doctrines and rituals set out in the Qur’an, but he did not condemn Sufism absolutely (Waines, 2003). Instead, Ibn Taymiyyah saw rationality, law, and mystical intuition as all parts of one whole that required integration (Waines, 2003). The message of Ibn Taymiyyah would become much more radicalized in the message of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

Following extensive travels through the Middle East in his early adulthood, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab returned to Najd to announce that Muslims everywhere should surrender to his vision of the authentic Islam as practiced during Prophet Muhammad’s time (Schwartz, 2002).

His preaching can be summarized into three points: firstly, the action of ritual is more important than intentions; secondly, Muslims should not revere the dead; and finally, Muslims should not make intercessory prayers to God through the Prophet or saints (Schwartz, 2002). At the heart of the issue was his virulent opposition to any thought or action that mars the oneness of God (Robinson, 2006).

He condemned prayers to God through honoring anyone other than God as idolatry, even though Muslims of the past, including the Prophet, had accepted this form of prayer (Schwartz, 2002). But Ibn Abd al-Wahhab abhorred the practice of reciting blessings on the Prophet during congregational prayers. In fact, he is said to have killed a blind man who insisted on praying to the Prophet at the conclusion of his call to prayer. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab fought all forms of worship to the Prophet, such as pilgrims’ practice of making hajj to visit the Prophet’s tomb in Medina, the Muslim celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, and the inscription of the Prophet’s name in mosques (Schwartz, 2002).

Wahhabis explain their opposition to the traditional praise of the Prophet by saying this praise renders a human to God-like status (Schwartz, 2002). They compare Muslims’ praise of the Prophet to the Christian worship of Jesus, which is rejected by Muslims who see it as adding “partners” to God and destroying monotheistic belief in God’s unity. However, anti-Wahhabi scholars point out one can not be a Muslim without honoring the Prophet as the Muslim profession of faith and the call to prayer include two parts: “I affirm there is no God but Allah; and I affirm Muhammad is the Prophet of God” (Schwartz, 2002).

But in order for his doctrine of Islam to gain popularity, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had to downplay the Prophet’s personality and the Prophet’s dedication to compassion and mercy. In order to advance his puritanical vision, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had to fight against the Prophet’s status and the Ottoman Islam of the day, which was characterized by openness and creative flourishing (Schwartz, 2002).

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab proceeded to take shocking actions to reform the faith. He ordered that graves of Muslim saints be dug up and scattered or even turned into latrines. He insisted that Muslims should do away with local religious and spiritual practices such as the celebration of river festivals and the visiting of hot springs, forests, mountains and caves for spiritual and physical health (Schwartz, 2002).

He ordered the burning of books, saying the Qur’an offered more than enough reading material (Schwartz, 2002). Wahhabi preachers insist their followers rely only on the Qur’an rather than reading commentaries; they believe that trusting in a commentator might lead a person to follow the words of another human rather than the infallible word of God. One preacher has said that those who rely on commentaries are “like animals dragged along by ropes to their death” (Robinson, 2006).

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his followers also condemned music, claiming it led people to forget God and give themselves to sin. The Islamic mystic Sufis, however, used music as a way of giving themselves to the consciousness of God (Waines, 2003). Music was one of the crowning glories of Islam; for centuries, the stirring voices and sounds of instruments have carried Muslim seekers across the world to heights of ecstasy and rejoicing in the heart of their culture and religion (Schwartz, 2002).

Among one of the Prophet’s popular sayings was that at the beginning of every century, Allah would send someone to revive the faith (Schwartz, 2002). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to renew the sura of the eighteen commands, which begins with the verse “Set not up with God any other God (O man) lest thee sit down reproved, forsaken” and closes with “And not set up with Allah any other god, lest thee be cast into hell, reproved, abandoned” (Haj, 2002).

Beyond reaffirming the unity of Allah, the eighteen commands also affirm that the disciplined virtues of kindness, sound judgment, justice, generosity, responsibility, lovingness, modesty and truthfulness are important aspects of worship (Haj, 2002). Thus, Haj (2002) argues that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was one of many Muslim reformers at the time led by a sense of duty to preach and correct what he saw as immoral and incorrect practices proliferating within his communities.

However, other scholars argue that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab could not be the person the Prophet Muhammad had foretold would come to revive the faith. They argue that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was not content to revive Islam, but wished to entirely reform the faith (Schwartz, 2002).

Given that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrines were so far-removed from the Islam of the day, it was little surprise that the majority of Islamic scholars did not support him. These scholars attacked him and complained his theses went against the Qur’an and the four schools of Islam. His own brother, Suleyman, complained he was trying to add another pillar to the five pillars of Islam: the infallibility of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Abou El Fadl, 2003, Schwartz, 2002).

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab responded by denouncing his detractors as idolators and apostates, and urged people to abandon the four traditional schools to follow him (Schwartz, 2002, Waines, 2003). He openly stated his belief that all Muslims had fallen into unbelief, and that if they did not follow the path of redemption he had laid out, they should be killed, their women kin should be raped, and their possessions taken from them (Schwartz, 2002). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab believed the lives of Shias, Sufis, and other supposedly unorthodox Muslims should be extinguished and that all other faiths should be humiliated and destroyed. This vengeful doctrine was to set the stage for two and a half centuries of Islamic fundamentalism and bloodshed (Schwartz, 2002). Establishment of House of Al Sa’ud

His last Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who resented and fought the rule of the Turks, soon raised the ire of the empire through his actions; for example, he ordered the stoning of a woman accused of fornication as a way of educating the public (Schwartz, 2002). His behaviour and preaching brought the Ottoman empire to issue a fatwa against him, calling for his arrest (Schwartz, 2002).

In 1744, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought refuge in the village of Dariyah. This district was ruled by the rebel Muhammad ibn Sa’ud and his family, Al Sa’ud, which was responsible for organized banditry within Najd (Schwartz, 2002). The family ruled Dariyah according to its own whims and the village was a place of lawlessness when Ibn Abd al-Wahhab settled there. In 1747, he made a power-sharing agreement with the family; Ibn Abd al-Wahhab would become Dariyah’s religious authority, while the Al Sa’ud family would be responsible for the village’s political leadership (Schwartz, 2002).

The Al Sa’ud family also benefited from the pact, as the Wahhabi movement and its extreme religious fervor helped to legitimize their rule (Bahgat, 2004, Lang, 2003). The fusion of religious and political control would come to represent the modern Saudi Arabia, as well as mark the break between the Islam of the past, in which traditional Muslim scholars focused on inward contemplation as opposed to focusing on gaining global and political power (Schwartz, 2002).

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his followers urged a “jihad,” or the struggle to promote the faith, against other Muslims, and thus, the Wahhabis began a blood-soaked crusade for expansion and domination (Lang, 2003). By 1788, the Wahhab-Sa’ud alliance controlled most of the Arabian peninsula (Schwartz, 2002).

In 1801, the Wahhabis began a campaign to gain control over the two holy cities of Islam. They raided Mecca and Medina and stole holy books, works of art, and other gifts the city had accumulated over the last 1,000 years. While they controlled the Two Holy Places, they imposed Wahhabism upon the populace, destroyed shrines and cemetaries, closed off entrance to the holy city to Ottoman pilgrims, barred pilgrims from performing the hajj and murdered respected citizens in both holy cities (Schwartz, 2002).

Through the 1820s to the 1860s, the Wahhabis launched attacks upon the Ottoman empire, urged on by Britain, which was eager to see the collapse of the Turkish empire and the distribution of its overseas possessions (Schwartz, 2002).

The Wahhabis’ power grew and shrank by turns throughout the century, until in 1901, the latest representative of the Al Sa’ud and Wahhabi alliance decided to try and re-seize control over the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina. Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdur-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Al Sa’ud journeyed to Riyadh, where he murdered the city’s ruler and took over control of the country (Schwartz, 2002).

Over the next twenty-five years, he went on to unify the Arabian peninsula through force (Lang, 2003). Wahhabism was the only official faith sanctioned in the state that would come to be formed there. To this day, no other religious establishment is allowed in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Lang, 2003).

Following the formation of the Saudi state, the Ikhwan Bedouin armies which had helped to create the kingdom continued to violently uphold the jihad doctrines of Wahhabism. These armies crossed the borders of neighbouring countries Iraq and Jordan and killed the harmless shepherds, families and livestock they found there (Lang, 2003).

Although Islamic tradition and Arab customary law forbade this type of violence, the Ikhwan tribes forged on in their campaign of terror. The governments of Iraq and Jordan were finally able to curb the violence when they pursued the Ikhwan into Saudi Arabia during 1922 – 1925, forcing the Saudi Arabian government to disarm the ruthless tribes (Lang, 2003).

Beliefs

Wahhabi theology treats the Qur'an and Hadith as fundamental texts, interpreted upon the understanding of the first three generations of Islam and further explained by many various commentaries including that of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab. His book called Kitab al-Tawhid ("Book of Monotheism"), and the works of the earlier scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) are fundamental to Wahabism.

Ibn Abdul-Wahhab went so far as to declare jihad against Muslims who practiced so-called acts of polytheism. Ibn Abdul-Wahhab's views were opposed to those of the mainstream Muslim scholars of Mecca and Medina of that time. For example, he called intermediation of Muhammad an act of polytheism.

Wahhabis see their role as restoring Islam from what they perceive to be polytheism and innovations, superstitions, deviances, heresies and idolatries. There are many practices that they believe are contrary to Islam, such as:

  • Listening to music in praise of Muhammad
  • Praying to God while visiting tombs (praying near Muhammad's tomb is also considered polytheism by the Wahhabis)
  • Blindly following any madhhabs (schools of thought) of Islamic jurisprudence in their legal expertise, "except for one who is under necessity and can not reach the Sunnah".[7]
  • Using non-literal explanations of God's attributes exclusively in preference to literal explanations.
  • Celebrating the Mawlid (birthday of Muhammad)
  • Supposed or actual innovations (bid'ah) in matters of religion (e.g. new supplementary methods of worship or laws not sanctioned by the Qur’an or Sunnah)

Wahhabism also denounces "the practice of unthinking adherence to the interpretations of scholars and the blind acceptance of practices that were passed on within the family or tribe. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab believed in the responsibility of the individual Muslim to learn and obey the divine commands as they were revealed in the Quran and in the hadith."[8]

Wahhabism into the Twentieth Century and Beyond

After putting down the Ikhwan revolts, the Saudi government decided it needed to moderate its policies and actions in order to form political and social ties with the rest of the world. Since that time, the Saudi government has followed a path of relative moderation, forming alliances with countries such as the United States, who rely on the country’s oil supply (Lang, 2003). However, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. has never been formalized, as Wahhabi doctrine forbids such an alignment with a non-Muslim state (Lang, 2003).

Although only 40 per cent of the Saudi population practices Wahhabism, Wahhabi doctrine continues to be firmly rooted within the kingdom. For example, all students are taught religion from the beginning of primary school, with the curriculum based only on Wahhabism, and libraries consist exclusively of Wahhabi texts (Schwartz, 2002).

The Wahhabi clerics issue strict guidelines for sex, prohibit keeping pet dogs, prohibit women’s attendance at funerals, and insist that women veil themselves (Foer, 2002). The severity of these edicts is demonstrated by an occurrence in 2002, when a fire burst out in a public school in Mecca.

According to witnesses of the fire, the Saudi religious police forcibly prevented female students from escaping the burning school because they were improperly covered. Some girls returned to the school to retrieve their veils, only to die within the blaze. In total, fourteen young girls burned to death or died from asphyxiation (Abou El Fadl, 2003). The incident provides a glimpse into the way in which the fundamental doctrines of Wahhabism have maintained their chokehold upon the kingdom. The royal government has either been unable or unwilling to restrict Wahhabi preaching within its borders; they have been equally unable to stop the flow of huge amounts of private Saudi money to fund Wahhabi missionary work abroad (Lang, 2003). With the help of this oil wealth funding, mosques and schools preaching Wahhabism have been built across the Islamic world from Iran to Pakistan, Europe and the U.S. (Foer, 2002, Lang, 2003, Robinson, 2006). Wahhabi mullahs are traveling to even remote regions of the world to urge people to abandon tribal traditions in favor of the stringent Wahhabi guidelines (Robinson, 2006).

The Islam practiced in areas such as Pakistan, Jakarta and Senegal and Afghanistan developed from the vibrant fusion of local traditions with traditions gleaned from the central Arabic empire (Robinson, 2006). Now, Wahhabi beliefs are threatening that diversity of Islam, with Wahhabi mullahs claiming these local traditions deviate from the authentic Islam. In Pakistan, one example of powerful Wahhabi influence is seen in the way elders are replacing rustic tribal names such as “fig flower” and “beet root” with Arabic names, such as Shaykh Umar or Ibn Rusool (Robinson, 2006). But many of the traditional mullahs are not quietly accepting the Wahhabi foray into their countries; they are fiercely defending the tribal Islam rooted in their communities. Instead of using the painstakingly crafted arguments of Wahhabi mullah, traditional mullahs use the emotion at the heart of their tradition to appeal to local followers (Robinson, 2006).

Deference for elders is of utmost importance in tribal communities and traditional mullahs point out that Wahhabis are guilty of the utmost disrespect because they do not follow the commentaries of the faith’s learned scholars. These mullahs paint the Wahhabis as foreigners who sacrificed the true vision of Islam for money (Robinson, 2006, Schwartz, 2002).

These mullahs and other Muslim preachers urge their followers to accept the path of the “Greater Jihad.” Wahhabi clerics may preach the lesser jihad of war, death and blood, citing the Qur’an’s description of war against unbelievers to justify the killing of less observant Muslims and to an even greater extent, non-Muslims (Lang, 2003). But this path of jihad has long been abandoned by the majority of Muslims in favor of the “Greater Jihad,” the struggle to come closer to Allah through piety and devotion (Lang, 2003).

While all of Islam accepts the unity of God and monotheism, not all of Islam recognizes the need for the religion to become one monolithic, static force, preserving the same beliefs and practices throughout its history (Esposito, 1988). Muslim preachers and followers across the world, from Saudi Arabia to Iran to Afghanistan to America, accept in their religion a diversity of interpretations and expression of faith; this diversity should continue to hold in the face of opposition, murder and terror in the cloak of orthodoxy.

Modern spread of Wahhabism

In 1924, the al-Saud dynasty (who were influenced by the teachings of Abdul Wahhab) conquered Mecca and Medina, the Muslim holy cities. This gave them control of the Hajj, the annual pilgrimage, and the opportunity to preach their version of Islam to the assembled pilgrims. However, Wahhabism was a minor current within Islam until the discovery of oil in Arabia, in 1938. Vast oil revenues gave an immense impetus to the spread of conservative Islamic theology. Saudi laypeople, government officials and clerics have donated many tens of millions of US dollars to create religious schools, newspapers and outreach organizations.[citation needed]

This theology spread into Oman during the 18th century where it played a role in the internal disputes and succession struggles of the country. Ultimately however, its influence lessened over time despite early success. Its alliance with the House of Saud became strained after the September 11, 2001 attacks and suicide bombings in Riyadh in May, 2003.[9][10]

Influence on other groups

Some[attribution needed] argue that Hassan al-Banna, the Egyptian founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, was influenced by the Wahhabis, although he was a traditional Sunni. The Muslim Brotherhood claimed to be purifying and restoring Islam, a theme which ran through Abdul Wahhab's preaching, but its goal was to unify Muslims of different madhhabs to restore the Caliphate or Islamic law in Egypt. When the Muslim Brotherhood was banned in various Middle Eastern countries, Saudi Arabia gave refuge to Brotherhood exiles. However Salafis in Saudi Arabia reject the Muslim Brotherhood and other ideas they believe contravene Salafist theology.[11]

There are also those who argue[attribution needed] that Saudi promotion of Wahhabism as part of a Sunni-Shi'a rivalry contributed to the development of the religious ideology of Al-Qaeda. Mattson points out that Saudi scholars of Wahhabism have denounced terrorism.[12]

Notes


References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Abou El Fadl, K. (2003). The ugly modern and the modern ugly. Chapter from Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism, edited by Omid Safi. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
  • Bahgat, G. (2004). Saudi Arabia and the war on terrorism. Arab Studies Quarterly, 26.
  • Esposito, J. Islam: the straight path. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Foer, F. (2002). Moral hazard. New Republic, 227.
  • Haj, S. (2002). Reordering Islamic orthodoxy: Muhhamad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab. Muslim World,92.
  • Lang, P. (2003). Wahhabism and jihad. America, 188.
  • Schwartz, S. (2002). The two faces of Islam: the house of Sa’ud from tradition to terror. NewYork: Doubleday.
  • Robinson, S. (2006). Infallible preachers. Christian Century, 123, 10 – 11.
  • Waines, D. (2003). An introduction to Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


  • David Holden & Richard Johns, The House of Saud, Pan, 1982, 0-330-26834-1
  • Hamid Algar, Wahhabism : A Critical Essay, Islamic Publications International, ISBN 1-889999-13-X
  • Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-516991-3
  • Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press, 2002, ISBN 0-521-64412-7
  • Gerald De Gaury, Freya Stark, Arabia Phoenix, Kegan Paul International Limited, ISBN 0-7103-0677-6, ISBN-13, 9780710306777
  • Haneef James Oliver, "The 'Wahhabi' Myth", T.R.O.I.D. Publications, February 2004, ISBN 0-9689058-5-4

External links

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