Difference between revisions of "Social mobility" - New World Encyclopedia

From New World Encyclopedia
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On the one side, in the latter part of the twentieth century, upward social mobility kept its correlation with education in most [[Europe]]an countries. Thus, they continued producing "meritocracies" where anybody with talent, education, and ambition could attain any social and economic apex, as opposed to "aristocracies" where blood-line was the main prerequisite for [[social status]]. The prevailing assumption in such societies has been that increased economic competition would cause employers to recruit on an increasingly meritocratic basis, with the result that the social advantages attached to factors such as class origin, gender, or ethnicity would decline in importance for upward mobility.
 
On the one side, in the latter part of the twentieth century, upward social mobility kept its correlation with education in most [[Europe]]an countries. Thus, they continued producing "meritocracies" where anybody with talent, education, and ambition could attain any social and economic apex, as opposed to "aristocracies" where blood-line was the main prerequisite for [[social status]]. The prevailing assumption in such societies has been that increased economic competition would cause employers to recruit on an increasingly meritocratic basis, with the result that the social advantages attached to factors such as class origin, gender, or ethnicity would decline in importance for upward mobility.
  
 +
On the other side, and somewhat surprisingly, in the [[United States]] and [[Great Britain]] these meritocratic trends actually produced a decline in social mobility (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). In the U.S., by the end of the twentieth century there was a higher correlation between parents' and children's income than in the 1980s (and an extra push for the offspring of higher-income, college graduate parents to go to college too), while the income gap between college graduates and non-graduates doubled between 1979 and 1997 (Barone, 2005). Thus, many believed that if these trends remain unchecked they could lead the U.S. toward something resembling a caste society, with the underclass mired ever more firmly at the bottom and the educated elite ever more firmly anchored at the top, in other words a [[class system]] based on education.
  
On the other side, and somewhat surprisingly, in the [[United States]] and [[Great Britain]] these meritocratic trends actually produced a decline in social mobility ( Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997 ). In the U.S., by the end of the twentieth century there was a higher correlation between parents' and children's income than in the 1980s ( discovering an extra family-generated push for offsprings of higher-income-college-graduated parents to go to college too ), while the income gap between college graduates and non-graduates doubled between 1979 and 1997 ( [[Barone]], 2005 ). Thus, many believed that if these trends remain unchecked they could lead the U.S. toward something resembling a caste society, with the underclass mired ever more firmly at the bottom and the educated elite ever more firmly anchored at the top, in other words a [[class system]] based on education.
+
The late twentieth-century belief that more education would make Britain more meritocratic and shatter the class system caused a huge expansion in [[higher education]], with the government determined to steer half the country's 18-30-year-olds into [[university|universities]]. The idea that we live in a "knowledge economy" strengthened that notion. However, trends show that education plays a smaller role in social mobility than it used to. Many employers seeking recruits for management jobs in fast-growing industries, such as leisure and retailing, as well as posts in public relations, sales, and customer care, wanted these new employees to be skilled in areas that formal education does not necessarily bring. What these posts required were skills in [[communication]], team-work, and personal attributes such as "good appearance," "good manners," "character," and "proper accent". These newly sought after attributes were more clearly linked to wealth and its accompanying educational attainment, with children from the poorer backgrounds trapped in the worst [[school]]s and less likely to continue their studies. Thus, the old class system has been reconstituted into a more or less meritocratic upper tier, with a lower tier defined principally by its failure to qualify for the upper tier (Jackson et. al., 2006)
 
 
The late twentieth-century belief that more education would make Britain more meritocratic and shatter the class system caused a huge expansion in [[higher education]], with the government determined to steer half the country's 18-30-year-olds into [[university|universities]]. The idea that we live in a "knowledge economy" strengthened that notion. However, trends show that education plays a smaller role in social mobility than it used to. Many employers seeking recruits for management jobs in fast-growing industries, such as leisure and retailing, as well as posts in public relations, sales, and customer care, wanted these new employees to be skilled in areas that formal education does not necessarily bring. What these posts required were skills in [[communication]], team-work, and personal attributes such as "good appearance," "good manners," "character," and "proper accent". These newly sought after attributes were more clearly linked to wealth and its accompanying educational attainment, with children from the poorer backgrounds trapped in the worst [[school]]s and less likely to continue their studies. Thus, the old class system has been reconstituted into a more or less meritocratic upper tier, with a lower tier defined principally by its failure to qualify for the upper tier ( [[Jackson, M.,Goldhorpe, J. and C. Mills]], 2006 )
 
  
 
===Transitional Societies===
 
===Transitional Societies===
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==Conclusion==
 
==Conclusion==
Social mobility is the movement of the members of a certain society within the social space mapped by status, occupation, income and similar factors. In a perfect world anybody's background would be of no importance, since everybody would be competing for jobs under the same conditions. We don't live in a perfect world, though. There are differences in the social circumstances of classes, of men and women, and people of different ethnic groups and occupational and hence, social background. It might be argued that individuals striving for higher status might find their aimed-at social status less pecuniary demanding that, perhaps, the one they started from ( e.g. blue collar vs. white collar, high-tech entrepreneur vs. university professor, etc. ). As all societies have been stratified and, hence, having a kind of "sieve" in place, sifting the individuals - allowing some to go up, keeping others in the lower strata - even in the periods of anarchy and disorganized vertical mobility, the parts of the the old regime "sieve" and the rapidly growing "new sieve" ( incidentally as tight as its predecessor ) keeps, in most cases, the society from perishing.  
+
Social mobility is the movement of the members of a certain society within the social space mapped by status, occupation, income, and similar factors. In a perfect world anybody's background would be of no importance, since everybody would be able to train and apply for any jobs that interested them. We don't live in a perfect world, though. There are differences in the social circumstances of classes, of men and women, of people from different ethnic groups, and from different occupational, and hence social, backgrounds. It might be argued that individuals striving for higher status might find their aimed-at social status less pecuniary demanding that, perhaps, the one they started from ( e.g. blue collar vs. white collar, high-tech entrepreneur vs. university professor, etc. ). As all societies have been stratified and, hence, having a kind of "sieve" in place, sifting the individuals - allowing some to go up, keeping others in the lower strata - even in the periods of anarchy and disorganized vertical mobility, the parts of the the old regime "sieve" and the rapidly growing "new sieve" ( incidentally as tight as its predecessor ) keeps, in most cases, the society from perishing.  
 
    
 
    
 
But, we also know that the traditional democracies - with the enshrined rights and freedom to all prerequisites of social mobility - are, apart from being law-abiding societies, also invariably leaders in economic prosperity and individual standards of living, stagnant or decreased mobility notwithstanding. As we noted in the introductory paragraph, perhaps by social-mobility-induced filling-up of individual occupations, these posts, in general, might become - because of much higher qualitative output - also more financial rewarding.   
 
But, we also know that the traditional democracies - with the enshrined rights and freedom to all prerequisites of social mobility - are, apart from being law-abiding societies, also invariably leaders in economic prosperity and individual standards of living, stagnant or decreased mobility notwithstanding. As we noted in the introductory paragraph, perhaps by social-mobility-induced filling-up of individual occupations, these posts, in general, might become - because of much higher qualitative output - also more financial rewarding.   
Line 60: Line 59:
  
 
==References==
 
==References==
Breen, R., [[National Patterns of Social Mobility 1970-1995 : Divergence or Convergence?]], Breen@datacomm.iue.it and Breen    ( 1998 )
+
Breen, Richard. [http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/yaish/npsm/Objectives.htm National Patterns of Social Mobility 1970-1995: Divergence or Convergence?]
  
 
Sorokin, P. 1959. ''Social and Cultural Mobility'' New York, NY:The Free Press. ISBN 0029302706  
 
Sorokin, P. 1959. ''Social and Cultural Mobility'' New York, NY:The Free Press. ISBN 0029302706  
  
Barone, M.,[[Is Social Mobility on the Decline?]], August 15,2005,'''Copyright 2005 Creators Syndicate'''
+
Barone, Michael. 2005. [http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/1019.html Is Social Mobility on the Decline?]
  
Jackson, M.,Goldhorpe,J.,and C. Mills, '''Education, Employers and Class Mobility''', Elsevier, 2006
+
Jackson, Michelle, Goldthorpe, J., and Mills, C. 2006. "Education, Employers and Class Mobility," in Leicht, Kevin (ed.) ''Research in Social Stratification and Mobility'' Elsevier.
  
 
==External links==
 
==External links==

Revision as of 22:34, 6 May 2006


Definition

Social mobility is the degree to which, in a given society, an individual's social status can change throughout the course of his or her life, or the degree to which that individual's offspring and subsequent generations move up and down the class system. It is, in other words, the movement (or circulation) of individuals, families or groups within a social space mapped by status, occupation, income, and similar variables through which members of a society may be defined.

There are two types of social mobility, horizontal and vertical. Horizontal social mobility (Sorokin, 1959) or "shifting" means the transition of an individual from one social group to another, situated on the same level, such as from one factory to another in the same occupational status, from one family to another (through marriage), from one citizenship to another, or from any one place to another. In all these cases, "shifting" may take place without any noticeable change of the social position in the vertical direction of the shiftee. By vertical social mobility (Sorokin, 1959) is meant the transition of an individual from one social stratum to another. In this case, there are two directions: upward and downward mobility.

According to the degree or the ease of the circulation, it is possible to make distinction between immobile (or closed) societies and mobile societies, where the transition from one social stratum to another has minimum resistance. An important caveat: There has scarcely ever existed a society whose strata were absolutely closed, just as there has hardly ever existed a society where the vertical mobility was absolutely free of obstacles.

Positive and Negative Aspects

Social mobility is normally discussed in a positive light, but it is a two-sided phenomenon. Unlike absolute economic prosperity and individual standard of living, relative social class is a zero-sum game: where there is upward mobility, there is also downward mobility. A revolution, which restructure the social class structure, opens previously barred positions to some while at the same time removing wealth and position from those previously in power. Thus, a high rate of social mobility can increase stress due to insecurity, since it is equally likely that one will move down the social scale. Also, individuals who move rapidly from one social situation to a very different one often feel out of place, experiencing anxiety when facing unfamiliar standards of conduct.

On the positive side of vertical mobility is the generally expected result that individuals have the opportunity to make the best use of their talents and abiltities, and thus make greater contributions to society as a whole. Immigrants from poorer, less technologically advanced countries find opportunities that were not available in their country of origin and so benefit from social mobility. Similarly, people moving from poor, rural areas to richer cities find jobs that pay more and have higher social status.

There is a catch in it, though. Although societies with low or nonexistent social mobility might afford free individuals opportunities to amass wealth, wealth itself very rarely can "buy" entry into a higher social class. In feudal Japan and Confucius-era China, wealthy merchants occupied the lowest ranks in society. In pre-revolutionary France, a nobleman, however poor, was from the "second estate" of society and thus superior, at least in theory, to a wealthy merchant (from the "third estate"). A similar situation exists in Saudi Arabia and neighboring sultanates: a commoner cannot become head of state nor can he hold any high or important position in the government. He can become rich, though.

In market societies like the modern United States, class and economic wealth are strongly correlated and, therefore, often conflated. In some societies, on the other hand, they are time-lagged factors at play. Usually, membership in a high social class provides more opportunities for wealth and political power, and therefore economic fortune is often a lagging indicator of social class. In newly-formed societies, with little or no established tradition, (such as the American West in the nineteenth century) the reverse is true: Made wealth precipitates the elite of future generations.

The relationship between social mobility and the rigidity of class structure is also not simple. While it might appear that social mobility leads to breakdown of a class system, resulting in a more egalitarian society, this is not always the case. Individual mobility can lead to those individuals who have risen to higher positions in society then acting to enforce class differences. Revolutions may be times of greatest social mobility and radical change in the class system. After the revolution, however, is a different story: successful revolutions are often followed by minimal social mobility as the new leadership solidifies its position.

Examples of Social Mobility and Immobility

Examples of closed, or socially immobile, societies are feudal and caste societies. In Hindu society, under the caste system, only with rare exceptions could individuals leave the caste into which they were born, regardless of wealth or merit. But even in such a society, there have been individuals born in a lower caste, for example the son of Mahatma Gandhi, who suceeded in entering the top, Brahmin, caste. In societies which used slavery, mobility was nonexistent for the enslaved individuals, although the rest of society could have any amount of mobility.

Modern western democracies are characterized by much more intensive vertical mobility. In democratic societies, the social position of an individual, at least theoretically, is not determined by his birth; all positions are open to everybody who can get them; there are no judicial or religious obstacles to climbing (or going down) the social ladder. Official, or legally recognized, class designations do not exist, and it is possible, although rare, for individuals to move from poverty to wealth or political prominence within one generation. The case of Andrew Carnegie, who arrived in the United States as a poor immigrant and later became a steel tycoon is well known. Pierre Bérégovoy, who started work at the age of 16 as a metal worker and became Prime Minister of France, is another example. Nevertheless, such examples tend to be the exception rather than the rule. While a few individual members of the working class, or even immigrants, may manage to achieve positions of wealth or power, the overwhelming majority do not. Indeed, since there are more bosses than workers, it is impossible for the majority of workers to rise out of their social class.

It should also be noted that in some democratic societies, such as Britain and Japan, an interesting combination of horizontal immobility has been observed. In these cases, horizontal immobility resulted from staying with one employer to show loyalty or stability for instance, often led to limited vertical upward mobility.

Basic Theories, Trends, and International Comparison

In modern industrial societies with a democratic tradition, including the parliamentary "monarchies" such as Britain, Denmark, and Japan, are open to social mobility, there are at least two periods in which seemingly contradictory trends and, thus, changes in social mobility took place.

Post-War Industrialization 1950-1970

In the period from the end of the Second World War until the 1970s, all industrialized nations showed declining income inequality. Changes in the occupational structure, involving a decrease in the number of unskilled or manual jobs and a corresponding increase in the relative number of professional and white-collar occupations, permitted greater social mobility. Chances for upward mobility in this era increased steadily with increased education. This held for all countries that devised a good educational system, including tertiary education, open to all social strata ( Gazenboom, Luijkx and Treiman, 1989 ).

It was found that only 8 percent of those with less than five years of formal education moved up a long distance from their social origins, whereas 53 percent of those with some postgraduate work experienced significant upward mobility. On the other side, men with an intermediate amount of education (at least 8 years of compulsory education but without finishing college), experienced considerable downward mobility from their social origins, of whatever level. In other words, the positions with best rewards and highest rank were those requiring the most extensive training and/or talent. So, a sufficient determinant of rank appeared to be talent and expertise acquired through the educational channels.

Finally, it can be argued, since historical, cultural, political, and institutional aspects are likely to shape mobility patterns, that, in the industrialized societies during this period, the range of opportunities for upward mobility has been roughly equal for people of all class origins.

Post-Industrial Societies after 1970

On the one side, in the latter part of the twentieth century, upward social mobility kept its correlation with education in most European countries. Thus, they continued producing "meritocracies" where anybody with talent, education, and ambition could attain any social and economic apex, as opposed to "aristocracies" where blood-line was the main prerequisite for social status. The prevailing assumption in such societies has been that increased economic competition would cause employers to recruit on an increasingly meritocratic basis, with the result that the social advantages attached to factors such as class origin, gender, or ethnicity would decline in importance for upward mobility.

On the other side, and somewhat surprisingly, in the United States and Great Britain these meritocratic trends actually produced a decline in social mobility (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). In the U.S., by the end of the twentieth century there was a higher correlation between parents' and children's income than in the 1980s (and an extra push for the offspring of higher-income, college graduate parents to go to college too), while the income gap between college graduates and non-graduates doubled between 1979 and 1997 (Barone, 2005). Thus, many believed that if these trends remain unchecked they could lead the U.S. toward something resembling a caste society, with the underclass mired ever more firmly at the bottom and the educated elite ever more firmly anchored at the top, in other words a class system based on education.

The late twentieth-century belief that more education would make Britain more meritocratic and shatter the class system caused a huge expansion in higher education, with the government determined to steer half the country's 18-30-year-olds into universities. The idea that we live in a "knowledge economy" strengthened that notion. However, trends show that education plays a smaller role in social mobility than it used to. Many employers seeking recruits for management jobs in fast-growing industries, such as leisure and retailing, as well as posts in public relations, sales, and customer care, wanted these new employees to be skilled in areas that formal education does not necessarily bring. What these posts required were skills in communication, team-work, and personal attributes such as "good appearance," "good manners," "character," and "proper accent". These newly sought after attributes were more clearly linked to wealth and its accompanying educational attainment, with children from the poorer backgrounds trapped in the worst schools and less likely to continue their studies. Thus, the old class system has been reconstituted into a more or less meritocratic upper tier, with a lower tier defined principally by its failure to qualify for the upper tier (Jackson et. al., 2006)

Transitional Societies

Many of the countries that converted to a market-based economic system in the latter part of the twentieth century have experienced an alarming increase in income inequality: a widening gap between the haves and have-nots. This is particularly noticeable in all countries of the former Soviet Union. When everybody, with the exception of the "apparatchiks" (bureaucrats or functionaries of the Communist Party apparatus), was equally poor relative to Western societies, it was bad, but bearable. The new market-based social mobility encouraged entrepreneurs of all kinds. It was expected that this should lead to a more equitable society. Instead, however, widespread insecurity and anxiety developed, due to widespread corrupt, unethical, and even criminal behavior on the part of the "nouveau-riche" ruling class that filled the gap following the breakdown of the previous system.

Conclusion

Social mobility is the movement of the members of a certain society within the social space mapped by status, occupation, income, and similar factors. In a perfect world anybody's background would be of no importance, since everybody would be able to train and apply for any jobs that interested them. We don't live in a perfect world, though. There are differences in the social circumstances of classes, of men and women, of people from different ethnic groups, and from different occupational, and hence social, backgrounds. It might be argued that individuals striving for higher status might find their aimed-at social status less pecuniary demanding that, perhaps, the one they started from ( e.g. blue collar vs. white collar, high-tech entrepreneur vs. university professor, etc. ). As all societies have been stratified and, hence, having a kind of "sieve" in place, sifting the individuals - allowing some to go up, keeping others in the lower strata - even in the periods of anarchy and disorganized vertical mobility, the parts of the the old regime "sieve" and the rapidly growing "new sieve" ( incidentally as tight as its predecessor ) keeps, in most cases, the society from perishing.

But, we also know that the traditional democracies - with the enshrined rights and freedom to all prerequisites of social mobility - are, apart from being law-abiding societies, also invariably leaders in economic prosperity and individual standards of living, stagnant or decreased mobility notwithstanding. As we noted in the introductory paragraph, perhaps by social-mobility-induced filling-up of individual occupations, these posts, in general, might become - because of much higher qualitative output - also more financial rewarding.

New York Times columnist David Brooks points out that since 1993, we have seen declines in violent crimes, family violence, teenage births, abortions, child poverty, drunken driving, teenage sex, teenage suicide and divorce. Also apparent are increases in test scores and membership in voluntary associations and he concludes: "...meritocracy may mean less mobility, but that is bearable if America is becoming more virtuous...."

From all of this it follows that a sound moral foundations, law abiding societal behavior, successful educational system open in the whole spectrum for everybody ( no matter from which social strata the students come ), quality of legal framework and law enforcement capability, respect for human rights, freedom of religion and credibility of the legal institution should, at the end, take care of any social mobility vs. meritocracy fluctuations. These attributes should, first of all, bring the sustainable growth growth of societal prosperity and well-being, which is, after all, the ultimate goal of every society.

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

Breen, Richard. National Patterns of Social Mobility 1970-1995: Divergence or Convergence?

Sorokin, P. 1959. Social and Cultural Mobility New York, NY:The Free Press. ISBN 0029302706

Barone, Michael. 2005. Is Social Mobility on the Decline?

Jackson, Michelle, Goldthorpe, J., and Mills, C. 2006. "Education, Employers and Class Mobility," in Leicht, Kevin (ed.) Research in Social Stratification and Mobility Elsevier.

External links

The New York Times offers a graphic about social mobility, overall trends, income elasticity and country by country. European nations such as Denmark and France, are ahead of the US. [1]


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