Michels, Robert

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'''Robert Michels''' (January 9, 1876 – May 3, 1936) was a [[Germany|German]] [[sociology|sociologist]] who wrote on the political behavior of intellectual elites. He was a student of [[Max Weber]], and a spent time as a member of the German [[Socialism|Socialist Party]]. As a result he was unable to work in Germany, and moved to [[Italy]], where he became a revolutionary [[syndicalism|syndicalist]]. For a short time, he was also close to the Italian [[Fascism|Fascists]]. Michels is best known for his book ''Political Parties,'' which contains a description of the "iron law of oligarchy." Michels based this concept on his research and personal experience with various social institutions. He found that, regardless of the vision and goals of the organization, and its quality of leadership initially, inevitably every organization developed an elite who took full control over all its affairs. Michels attributed the development of such [[oligarchy|oligarchies]] as due not to personal flaws in those who took positions of leadership, but rather due to the nature of the [[social structure]]s themselves, which necessitated [[division of labor]] in order to be efficient and effective. Michels' suggestion to alleviate this problem was that organizations maintain a commitment to shared decision-making as well as open [[communication]] between the membership and the administration. However, a complete solution requires that those in leadership positions develop the heart and mind to live for the sake of others, adopting the attitude of a loving parent.
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==Biography==
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Robert Michels was born on January 9, 1876, in [[Cologne]], [[Germany]], into a wealthy bourgeois family. In keeping with the customs of the time, he spent terms at a number of universities: Munich, Leipzig, and Halle. He also spent part of his study years in [[London]] and [[Paris]].
  
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He wrote his thesis in Halle, on preparations for [[Louis XIV of France|Louis XIV]]'s attack on the Low Countries in 1680. Michels had previously tried officer training for a short time, so the military subject of his thesis came naturally to him.
  
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'''Robert Michels''' ([[9 January]] [[1876]], [[Cologne, Germany]] — [[3 May]] [[1936]], [[Rome, Italy]]) was a [[Germany|German]] [[sociologist]] who wrote on the political behavior of intellectual elites.  He is best known for his book ''[[Political Parties (book)|Political Parties]]'', which contains a description of the "[[iron law of oligarchy]]." He was a student of [[Max Weber]] and moved from the [[Socialist Party]] to become one of the Italian [[Fascists]].
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As a young man, Michels was a member of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). At that stage he was a radical critic of the SPD leadership from a [[syndicalism|syndicalist]] viewpoint. Michels criticized the SPD as "being too much concerned with winning seats in the Reichstag, too anxious to remain within the law, not militant enough in its opposition to the military dictatorship represented by the Kaiser." He left the party in 1907.  
  
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He moved to [[Italy]] where he became a revolutionary [[syndicalism|syndicalist]].
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Michels was a protégé of [[Max Weber]] (his writings on [[oligarchy]] resemble Weber's work on [[bureaucracy]]. Weber was a liberal, not a socialist. However, due to Michels' previous socialist affiliation, even Weber could not obtain a job for Michels in Germany. Finally, though, he found him a job in [[Italy]]. There, at the University of Turin, Michels taught [[economics]], [[political science]], and [[sociology]].
  
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==Biography==
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In 1914, he became the professor of economics at the University of Basel in [[Switzerland]], where he taught until 1926. His last years were spent in Italy teaching economics and the history of [[doctrine]]s at the University of Perugia. He died in [[Rome]] in 1936.
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Michels studied in [[England]], in [[Paris]] (at the [[University of Paris|Sorbonne]]), and at universities in [[Munich]], [[Leipzig]] (1897), [[Halle, Saxony-Anhalt|Halle]] (1898), and [[Turin]].  He became a [[Socialist]] while teaching at the [[University of Marburg]], and became active with the radical wing of the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany]]; he left the party in 1907.  At the [[University of Turin]], he taught [[economics]], [[political science]], and [[sociology]]. In [[1914]], he became the professor of economics at the [[University of Basel]]; where he taught until 1926. His last years were spent in [[Italy]] teaching economics and the history of [[doctrine]]s at the [[University of Perugia]].
 
  
 
==Work==
 
==Work==
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Michels wrote 30 books and more than 700 articles. His work on [[democracy]] in organizations that eventually developed into “[[oligarchy]] in organizations” is the alpine peak among them and the one to which present-day students of [[sociology]] and [[government]] are forced to return.
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===Preambles to the "Iron Law of Oligarchy"===
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Michels lived at a time when mass democracy and the political party were new political and social phenomena. Early on in his adult career, Michels himself was an active [[socialism|socialist]] and a member of the German Social Democratic Party.
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Michels' '''iron law of oligarchy''' can, in some senses, be seen as the product of his personal experiences as a socialist member of the German SDP. His "iron law" is based upon Michels' empirical study of the German SDP and a number of associated [[trade union]]s. He concluded from his studies that the German SDP, whilst proclaiming a "revolutionary" program and manifesto was quickly becoming part of the German "establishment."
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The reasons for this were:
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*In mass democracies, the individual is powerless on his/her own to have their voice heard and their demands met.
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*Subsequently there is, in mass democracies, a basic need for organization. To get their voice heard and their demands met, individuals must organize themselves collectively.
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*In the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries, trade unions, [[business]] [[corporation]]s, and political parties were the form this organization took.
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*However, these organizations have an inbuilt tendency towards [[oligarchy]]—that is, rule by a few or rule by an elite.
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*This elite tends to look after their own personal interests.
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*This elite within the political party uses its own set of knowledge and expertise to influence the decision-making process within the organization.
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*Subsequently, "ordinary members" of the organization may be effectively excluded from the decision-making processes of the organization.
  
 
===The Iron Law of Oligarchy===
 
===The Iron Law of Oligarchy===
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The '''Iron law of oligarchy''' is a political theory, first developed by the [[Germany|German]] sociologist [[Robert Michels]] in his 1915 book, ''[[Political Parties (book)|Political Parties]]''. It states that all forms of [[organization]], regardless of how [[democratic]] or [[autocratic]] they may be at the start, will eventually and inevitably develop into [[oligarchy|oligarchies]].
 
  
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Robert Michels first developed the '''Iron Law of Oligarchy''' as a political theory in his 1911 ''Political Parties'' book. Michels gave his masterpiece the quite vapid title of ''Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie'' (1911) ("Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy"), but defined his subject more precisely in the subheading, ''Über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens'' ("On the Oligarchic Tendencies of Group Life").
  
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Robert Michels was disturbed to find that, [[paradox]]ically, the [[socialist parties]] of [[Europe]], despite their [[democratic]] [[ideology]] and provisions for [[mass participation]], seemed to be dominated by their leaders, just as the traditional [[conservative parties]].  
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Here, lies the theme of the book: all organizations, regardless of whether they have a democratic constitution or agenda, in practice develop into oligarchies.
  
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Studying [[political party|political parties]], he concluded that the problem lay in the very nature of [[organization]]s.  Modern democracy allowed the formation of organizations such as political parties, but as such organizations grew in complexity, they paradoxically became less and less democratic. Michels formulated the "Iron Law of Oligarchy": "Who says organization, says oligarchy."[http://www.faculty.rsu.edu/~felwell/Theorists/Weber/Whome.htm]
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Michels showed in detail how [[oligarchy]] develops out of a desire to be effective. For good reasons (the [[division of labor]]), the members look for leaders and organizers, these people specialize in various tasks, and their specialized knowledge and skill makes them indispensable—they can threaten resignation if the organization seems to be on the point of making a wrong decision.
  
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At the time Michels formulated his Law, he was an [[anarcho-syndicalism|anarcho-syndicalist]]. He later became an important ideologue of [[Mussolini]]'s [[fascism|fascist]] regime in [[Italy]].
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The "rank and file" (a significant phrase) leaves it to the officials: they do not attend meetings; in fact supporters often do not bother to join the organization, being confident that it is good hands. Members and supporters develop attitudes of gratitude and loyalty to the leaders, especially those who have suffered for the cause.  
  
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Michels stressed several factors that underly the "Iron Law of Oligarchy."
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Among the leaders, megalomania develops, and this reinforces their power:
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<blockquote>This overwhelming self-esteem on the part of the leaders diffuses a powerful suggestive influence, whereby the masses are confirmed in their admiration for their leaders, and it thus proves a source of enhanced power (Michels 1911).</blockquote>
  
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Any large organization, he pointed out, is faced with problems of coordination that can be solved only by creating a [[bureaucracy]]. A bureaucracy, by design, is hierarchically organized to achieve [[efficiency]] — many decisions have to be made daily which cannot efficiently be made by large numbers of people. The effective functioning of an organization therefore requires the concentration of much power in the hands of a few.[http://www.faculty.rsu.edu/~felwell/Theorists/Weber/Whome.htm]
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Once the organization becomes large enough to have income and accumulated funds, it appoints full-time officials and establishes [[newspaper]]s, training schools, and so on. This means that the party leaders have patronage: the power to appoint people to paid jobs.
  
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This process is further compounded as [[delegation]] is necessary in any large organization, as thousands - sometimes even hundreds of thousands - members cannot make decisions using [[participatory democracy]]; this has been dictated by the lack of [[technology|technological means]] that would allow large number of people to meet and debate, and also the issues related to the [[crowd psychology]]. The delegation however leads to [[specialization]]: the development of bases of knowledge, skills, and resources among a leadership, which further serves to alienate the leadership from the 'mass and rank' and entrenches the leadership in office.
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Michels attempted to address why power tends to fall in the hands of small groups of people in all organizations. He studied labor and [[socialism|socialist]] movements of his time, the early 1900s. As organizations expand in size and complexity, Michels concluded:
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<blockquote>…the need for effective leadership becomes more and more essential…. Size eventually renders collective decision making impractical because of both the number of issues and the need for the organization to appear united (Michels 1911).</blockquote>
  
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[[Bureaucracy|Bureaucratization]] and [[specialization]] are the driving processes behind the Law. These create a specialized group of administrators in a [[hierarchical organization]]. Which, in turn, leads to the [[Rationalization (sociology)|rationalization]] and [[routinization]] of [[authority]] and [[decision making|decision-making]], a process first and perhaps best described by [[Max Weber]], and to a lesser and more cynical extent, by the [[Peter principle|Peter Principle]].  
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The "Iron Law of Oligarchy” suggests that organizations wishing to avoid oligarchy should take a number of precautionary steps:
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<blockquote>They should make sure that the rank and file remain active in the organization and that the leaders not be granted absolute control of a centralized administration. As long as there are open lines of communication and shared decision making between the leaders and the rank and file, an oligarchy cannot easily develop (Michels 1911).</blockquote>
  
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The organizational characteristics that promote oligarchy are reinforced by certain characteristics of both leaders and members of organizations. People achieve [[leadership]] positions precisely because they have unusual political skill; they are adept at getting their way and persuading others of the correctness of their views. Once they hold high office, their power and prestige is further increased. Leaders have access to, and control over, information and facilities that are not available to the rank-and-file. They control the information that flows down the channels of communication. Leaders are also strongly motivated to persuade the organization of the rightness of their views, and they use all of their skills, power and authority to do so.[http://www.faculty.rsu.edu/~felwell/Theorists/Weber/Whome.htm]
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Clearly, the problems of oligarchy, of the [[bureaucracy|bureaucratic]] depersonalization described by [[Max Weber|Weber]], and of personal [[alienation]] are all interrelated. If individuals are deprived of the power to make decisions that affect their lives in many or even most of the areas that are important to them, withdrawal into narrow [[ritual]]ism (over-conformity to rules) and apathy are likely responses.  
  
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By design of the organization, rank and file are less informed than their "superiors." Finally, from birth, people are taught to obey those in positions of authority. Therefore the rank and file tend to look to leaders for policy directives and are generally prepared to allow leaders to exercise their judgment on most matters.
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Such withdrawals seemed to constitute a chronic condition in some of the highly centralized socialist countries. However, there are many signs of public apathy in the [[United States]], too. For example, in 1964 about 70 percent of those eligible to vote in presidential elections did so. In succeeding elections this figure dropped, reaching only 50 percent in 1988.
  
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Leaders also have control over very powerful negative and positive sanctions to promote the behavior that they desire. They have the power to grant or deny raises, assign workloads, fire, demote and — that most gratifying of all sanctions — the power to promote. Most important, they tend to promote junior officials who share their opinions, with the result that the oligarchy becomes self-perpetuating. Therefore the very nature of large-scale organization makes oligarchy within these organizations inevitable. Bureaucracy, by design, promotes the centralization of power in the hands of those at the top of the organization. [http://www.faculty.rsu.edu/~felwell/Theorists/Weber/Whome.htm]
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Michels' theory is based on documented fact: no organization remains egalitarian in the long run. Every organization develops within itself an elite, comprising the leadership and executive staff. Only this elite has the specialized knowledge required to make the organization successful.
  
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Organizations come to be dominated by their elites, not by their members. The elite determines the organization's meetings, subjects, and speakers; it has control over the members' address register and can determine the contents of the members' journal. It can also, in all essentials, control the agenda at annual meetings and also frequently dictate the alternatives in voting. The organizational elite's perspective on life becomes, in time, different from that of the members, even if the leaders have themselves once been ordinary members (e.g., workers).
  
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The "iron law of oligarchy" states that all forms of [[organization]], regardless of how [[democratic]] or [[autocratic]] they may be at the start, will eventually and inevitably develop [[oligarchy|oligarchic]] tendencies, thus making true [[democracy]] practically and theoretically impossible, especially in large groups and complex organizations. The relative structural [[fluidity]] in a small-scale [[democracy]] succumbs to ''[[social viscosity]]'' in a large-scale organization. According to the "iron law," democracy and large-scale organization are incompatible.
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Michels pointed out that any large organization is faced with coordination problems that can only be solved by creating a bureaucracy. A bureaucracy is hierarchical in nature and therefore requires a concentration of much power in the hands of a few people. This led Michels to conclude that the "Iron Rule" is always true.
  
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The strength of Michels' analysis lies in his compilation of the factors affecting the power structure in an organization. He focused throughout on what [[sociology|sociologists]] call "structural factors," which, according to Michels, are in all essential attributes of the organizational structure, not [[personality]] traits in members and leaders, that push democratic organizations&mdash;parties, [[trade union]]s, popular movements, interest groups&mdash;towards oligarchy. He rejected the argument that it is the leaders' personal lust for power that underlies the trend towards rule of the few.
  
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An example that Michels used in his book was [[Germany]]'s [[Social Democratic Party of Germany|Social Democratic Party]].
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They are good democrats running ever smaller democratic organizations. In other words, Michels cleanses the debate from the vulgar argument that trade union leaders and party politicians are driven by the desire for power. Accordingly, he effects the same kind of clean-up job that Max Weber did when he demonstrated that [[capitalism]] could not be explained by the personal greed of businessmen, and that bureaucracy cannot be deduced from the officiousness of civil servants (Michels 1911, XX).
  
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The size and complexity of a group or organization is important to the Iron Law as well. During the [[1970s]] and early [[1980s]], the [[Green Party of Germany]] made a conscious effort to try and break the Iron Law. Anyone could be or could remove a party official. There were no permanent offices or officers. Even the smallest, most routine decisions could be put up for discussion and to a vote. When the party was small, these anti-oligarchic measures enjoyed some success. But as the organization grew larger and the party became more successful, the need to effectively compete in [[election]]s, raise funds, run large rallies and [[demonstration]]s and work with other political parties once elected, led the Greens to adapt more conventional structures and practices.
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==Flirtation with Mussolini’s Fascism==
  
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In 1928, Michels accepted a chair of [[politics]] from [[Benito Mussolini|Mussolini]]'s government, specifically established to promote [[fascism]]. In his later writings, Michels sometimes underlined the advantages of such a regime:
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<blockquote>By its nature, the rule of the elite will be frank, clear, concrete, direct. The elite does not exercise its function by means of tortuous intrigues and of "connections" dear to majoritarian and democratic regimes. Nor is it inevitably prey to lack of clarity, to vacillation, indecision, and to foolish and insipid compromises (Michels 1949, 121). </blockquote>
  
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But his “true colors” came up in the following excerpt:
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<blockquote>In democracy…various elites…struggle for power. From this derives…lack of stability…an expenditure of time, a slowing down of necessary training for those who intend to acquire governmental competence. But on the other hand the democratic system offers a certain guarantee to the members of the various elites of the repetition…of their turn at the helm of the state. But, be it said parenthetically, these manifold minor elites inevitably become bitter enemies of every government conquered and held by a single strong elite of anti-democratic tendencies. For the latter has an almost permanent character and is based on a principle which prolongs the usual expectation sine die, actually excluding the majority of the elites from political power. And without the least intention of harming anybody we will say, ''Hinc illae lacrimae'' ("Hence these tears") (Michels 1949, 119). </blockquote>
  
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==Writings of Michels==
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==Michel’s legacy==
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*''Syndicalisme & socialisme ...''  (1908)
 
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*''Proletariato e la borghesia nel movimento socialista italiano'' (1908; 1975)
 
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*''Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie. Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens'' (1911, 1925; 1970). Translated, as ''Sociologia del partito politico nella democrazia moderna : studi sulle tendenze oligarchiche degli aggregati politici'', from the German original by Dr. [[Alfredo Polledro]], revised and expanded (1912).  Translated, from the Italian, by [[Eden Paul|Eden]] and [[Cedar Paul]] as ''[[Political Parties (book)|Political Parties]]: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy'' ([[Hearst's International Library Co.]], 1915; [[Free Press]], 1949; [[Dover Publications]], 1959); republished with an introduction by [[Seymour Martin Lipset]] ([[Crowell-Collier]], 1962; [[Transaction Publishers]], 1999, ISBN 0765804697)
 
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*''Grenzen der Geschlechtsmoral''.  Italian translation, ''Morale sessuale; versione dal tedesco del dott'' revised and expanded by [[Alfredo Polledro]] ([[Fratelli Bocca]], 19-?).  Translated as ''[[Sexual Ethics]]: A Study of Borderland Questions'' ([[Walter Scott]], [[George Allen & Unwin]], [[Charles Scribner's Sons]], 1914); republished with a new introduction by [[Terry R. Kandal]] (Transaction Publishers, 2001-2, ISBN 0765807432)
 
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*''Probleme der Sozialphilosophie'' (1914)
 
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*''Imperialismo italiano, studi politico-demografici'' (1914)
 
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*''Amour et chasteté; essais sociologiques'' (1914)
 
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*''Organizzazione del commercio estero'' (1925)
 
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*''Sozialismus und fascismus in Italien'' (1925)
 
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*''Storia critica del movimento socialista italiano : dagli inizi fino al 1911'' ([[La Voce]], 1926)
 
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*''Corso di sociologia politica'' (1927). Translated, and introduced by [[Alfred de Grazia]], as ''First lectures in political sociology'' ([[University of Minnesota]] Press, 1949; [[Arno Press]], 1974, ISBN 0405055153)
 
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*''Sittlichkeit in ziffern? Kritik der moralstatistik'' (1928)
 
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*''Patriotismus, prolegomena zu seiner soziologischen analyse'' (1929)
 
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*''Einfluss der faschistischen Arbeitsverfassung auf die Weltwirtschaft'' (1929)
 
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*''Italien von heute ; politische und wirtschaftliche Kulturgeschichte von 1860 bis 1930'' (1930)
 
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*''Introduzione alla storia delle dottrine economiche e politiche'' (1932)
 
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*''Boicottaggio, saggio su un aspetto delle crisi'' (1934)
 
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*''Boycottage international'' (1936)
 
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*''Verelendungstheorie; Studien und Untersuchungen zur internationalen Dogmengeschichte der Volkswirtschaft'', witha foreword by [[Heinz Maus]] (1970)
 
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*''Elite e/o democrazia'' ([[G. Volpe]], 1972)
 
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*''Antologia di scritti sociologici''; edited by [[Giordano Sivini]] (1980)
 
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*''Works on paper, 1918-1930'' ([[Barbara Mathes Gallery]], 1984)
 
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*''Critique du socialisme : contribution aux débats du début du XXè siècle''; articles selected and presented by [[Pierre Cours-Salies]] and [[Jean-Marie Vincent]] ([[Editions Kimé]], 1992, ISBN 2908212439)
 
  
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Michels is counted among the four greatest in political sociology in the Latin school, the other three being [[Gaetano Mosca]], [[Georges Sorel]], and [[Vilfredo Pareto]]. In many ways, Michels stands out as the first cosmopolitan sociologist among his contemporary shining stars of the new science: [[Émile Durkheim]] in [[France]], [[Max Weber]] in [[Germany]], Vilfredo Pareto in [[Italy]] and [[W. I. Thomas]] in the [[United States]].
  
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==References==
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There is a kind of tragic despair about Michels' presentation. Freedom-loving [[socialism|socialists]] are inspired to seek social innovations that avoid the fate of [[oligarchy]]. Intellectuals in popular movements outside the socialist tradition are also called upon, after reading Michels' work, to search for mechanisms that ward off or mitigate the oligarchic tendencies in their organizations.
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*"Robert Michels And the "Iron Law of Oligarchy"," chapter 12 of ''Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social Structures'' by [[Seymour Lipset Martin]]
 
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*''Entwicklung zum faschistischen Führerstaat in der politischen philosophie von Robert Michels'' by [[Frank Pfetsch]] (1965)
 
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*''Robert Michels; vom sozialistisch-syndikalistischen zum faschistischen Credo'' by [[Wilfried Röhrich]] ([[Duncker & Humblot]], 1971, ISBN 3428026101).
 
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*''Organizzazione, partito, classe, politica e legge ferrea dell'oligarchia in Roberto Michels'' by [[Giorgio Sola]] (1972)
 
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*''Sociology and estrangement: three sociologists of Imperial Germany'' by [[Arthur Mitzman]] ([[Alfred A. Knopf|Knopf]], 1973, ISBN 0394446046).  Republished with a new introduction by the author ([[Transaction Books]], 1987, ISBN 0887386059).
 
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*''The anti-democratic sources of elite theory : [[Pareto]], [[Mosca]], Michels by [[Robert A. Nye]] ([[Semi Automatic Ground Environment|SAGE]], 1977, ISBN 0803998724).
 
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*''Dilemmi della democrazia moderna : Max Weber e Robert Michels'' by [[Francesco Tuccari]] ([[Laterza]], 1993, ISBN 8842042439)
 
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*''Intelectuales, masas y élites : una introducción a Mosca, Pareto y Michels'' by [[María de los Angeles Yannuzzi]] ([[UNR Editora]], 1993, ISBN 9506730415).
 
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*''Robert Michels : die Herausbildung der modernen politischen Soziologie im Kontext von Herausforderung und Defizit der Arbeiterbewegung'' by [[Joachim Hetscher]] (1993)
 
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*''Robert Michels und das eherne Gesetz der Oligarchie'' by Gustav Wagner in "Wer wählt, hat seine Stimme abegeben" Graswurzel Revolution pp. 28
 
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*''Robert Michels und das eherne Gesetz der Oligarchie'' by Gustav Wagner in ''"Wer wählt, hat seine Stimme abgegeben"'' Graswurzel Revolution pp. 28
 
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*[http://www.faculty.rsu.edu/~felwell/Theorists/Weber/Whome.htm Verstehen: Max Weber's Home Page] By [[Frank W. Elwell]]. 'Oligarchy' section describes the Law. Last accessed on 27 May 2006.
 
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*Michels, Robert. 1915. ''Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy.''  Translated into English by [[Eden Paul]] and [[Cedar Paul]]. New York: The Free Press.
 
  
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While Michels favored [[fascism]] for Italy he may have thought that in other circumstances [[democracy|democratic]] forms would reduce the evils of oligarchy. Similarly, Weber seems to have favored a combination of British and American institutions to secure good political leadership for Germany. The point made by Michels is not to secure genuine democracy (whatever that may be), but to achieve good leadership.
  
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==External links==
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Michels showed that the problem of loss of good leadership lies not just in the self-centered nature of the leaders themselves, but in the very structures of social organization. He suggested that the inevitability of oligarchy might be curtailed by the maintenance of open [[communication]] between leaders and others, as well as commitment to shared decision-making. The complete solution to this problem, however, which Michels could not uncover, requires the involvement of leaders who truly live for the sake of others. Such leaders, with the attitude of a true parent toward all the members, would be able to develop [[social structure]]s that support the continuation of good leadership.
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*[http://www.bookrags.com/biography-robert-michels/ Biography of Robert Michels] at [[BookRags.com]]
 
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*[http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/michels/ Robert Michels index], a site featuring a [[PDF]] of ''[[Political Parties]]''.  
 
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*[http://www2.pfeiffer.edu/~lridener/courses/MICHELSR.HTML Robert Michels - Oligarchy] taken from [[Oscar Grusky]] and [[George A. Miller]], ''The Sociology of Organizations: Basic Studies'' ([[Free Press]], 1970, pp. 25-43). Reprints from ''Political Parties''.
 
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*[http://www.questia.com/library/sociology-and-anthropology/sociologists-and-anthropologists/robert-michels.jsp Books and Articles on: Robert Michels] at [[Questia]].
 
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*[http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.p?ref=/flashback/flashback-jos062603.asp O’Sullivan’s First Law]
 
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*[http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/michels/polipart.pdf Political Parties in PDF]
 
  
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==Publications==
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*Michels, Robert. 1911. ''Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie. Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens.''
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*Michels, Robert. 1914. ''Grenzen der Geschlechtsmoral.''
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*Michels, Robert. 1925. ''Sozialismus und fascismus in Italien.''
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*Michels, Robert. 1927. ''Corso di sociologia politica.''
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*Michels, Robert. 1949. ''First Lectures in Political Sociology.'' Trans. Alfred De Grazia. University of Minnesota Press.
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*Michels, Robert. 1970. ''Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie: Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens.''
  
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==References==
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*Hetscher, Joachim. 1993. ''Robert Michels: die Herausbildung der modernen politischen Soziologie im Kontext von Herausforderung und Defizit der Arbeiterbewegung.''
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*Nye, Robert A. 1977. ''The Anti-democratic Sources of Elite Theory: Pareto, Mosca, Michels.'' Sage Publications. ISBN 0803998724
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*Pfetsch, Frank. 1965. ''Entwicklung zum faschistischen Führerstaat in der politischen philosophie von Robert Michels.''
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* Röhrich, Wilfreid. 1971. ''Robert Michels; vom sozialistisch-syndikalistischen zum faschistischen Credo.'' Duncker & Humblot.
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*Volpe, G. 1972. ''Elite e/o democrazia.''
  
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==External links==
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All links retrieved December 15, 2022.
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*[http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/michels/polipart.pdf ''Political Parties'' in PDF]
  
  
 
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Latest revision as of 01:43, 16 December 2022


Robert Michels (January 9, 1876 – May 3, 1936) was a German sociologist who wrote on the political behavior of intellectual elites. He was a student of Max Weber, and a spent time as a member of the German Socialist Party. As a result he was unable to work in Germany, and moved to Italy, where he became a revolutionary syndicalist. For a short time, he was also close to the Italian Fascists. Michels is best known for his book Political Parties, which contains a description of the "iron law of oligarchy." Michels based this concept on his research and personal experience with various social institutions. He found that, regardless of the vision and goals of the organization, and its quality of leadership initially, inevitably every organization developed an elite who took full control over all its affairs. Michels attributed the development of such oligarchies as due not to personal flaws in those who took positions of leadership, but rather due to the nature of the social structures themselves, which necessitated division of labor in order to be efficient and effective. Michels' suggestion to alleviate this problem was that organizations maintain a commitment to shared decision-making as well as open communication between the membership and the administration. However, a complete solution requires that those in leadership positions develop the heart and mind to live for the sake of others, adopting the attitude of a loving parent.

Biography

Robert Michels was born on January 9, 1876, in Cologne, Germany, into a wealthy bourgeois family. In keeping with the customs of the time, he spent terms at a number of universities: Munich, Leipzig, and Halle. He also spent part of his study years in London and Paris.

He wrote his thesis in Halle, on preparations for Louis XIV's attack on the Low Countries in 1680. Michels had previously tried officer training for a short time, so the military subject of his thesis came naturally to him.

As a young man, Michels was a member of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). At that stage he was a radical critic of the SPD leadership from a syndicalist viewpoint. Michels criticized the SPD as "being too much concerned with winning seats in the Reichstag, too anxious to remain within the law, not militant enough in its opposition to the military dictatorship represented by the Kaiser." He left the party in 1907.

Michels was a protégé of Max Weber (his writings on oligarchy resemble Weber's work on bureaucracy. Weber was a liberal, not a socialist. However, due to Michels' previous socialist affiliation, even Weber could not obtain a job for Michels in Germany. Finally, though, he found him a job in Italy. There, at the University of Turin, Michels taught economics, political science, and sociology.

In 1914, he became the professor of economics at the University of Basel in Switzerland, where he taught until 1926. His last years were spent in Italy teaching economics and the history of doctrines at the University of Perugia. He died in Rome in 1936.

Work

Michels wrote 30 books and more than 700 articles. His work on democracy in organizations that eventually developed into “oligarchy in organizations” is the alpine peak among them and the one to which present-day students of sociology and government are forced to return.

Preambles to the "Iron Law of Oligarchy"

Michels lived at a time when mass democracy and the political party were new political and social phenomena. Early on in his adult career, Michels himself was an active socialist and a member of the German Social Democratic Party.

Michels' iron law of oligarchy can, in some senses, be seen as the product of his personal experiences as a socialist member of the German SDP. His "iron law" is based upon Michels' empirical study of the German SDP and a number of associated trade unions. He concluded from his studies that the German SDP, whilst proclaiming a "revolutionary" program and manifesto was quickly becoming part of the German "establishment."

The reasons for this were:

  • In mass democracies, the individual is powerless on his/her own to have their voice heard and their demands met.
  • Subsequently there is, in mass democracies, a basic need for organization. To get their voice heard and their demands met, individuals must organize themselves collectively.
  • In the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries, trade unions, business corporations, and political parties were the form this organization took.
  • However, these organizations have an inbuilt tendency towards oligarchy—that is, rule by a few or rule by an elite.
  • This elite tends to look after their own personal interests.
  • This elite within the political party uses its own set of knowledge and expertise to influence the decision-making process within the organization.
  • Subsequently, "ordinary members" of the organization may be effectively excluded from the decision-making processes of the organization.

The Iron Law of Oligarchy

Robert Michels first developed the Iron Law of Oligarchy as a political theory in his 1911 Political Parties book. Michels gave his masterpiece the quite vapid title of Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie (1911) ("Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy"), but defined his subject more precisely in the subheading, Über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens ("On the Oligarchic Tendencies of Group Life").

Here, lies the theme of the book: all organizations, regardless of whether they have a democratic constitution or agenda, in practice develop into oligarchies.

Michels showed in detail how oligarchy develops out of a desire to be effective. For good reasons (the division of labor), the members look for leaders and organizers, these people specialize in various tasks, and their specialized knowledge and skill makes them indispensable—they can threaten resignation if the organization seems to be on the point of making a wrong decision.

The "rank and file" (a significant phrase) leaves it to the officials: they do not attend meetings; in fact supporters often do not bother to join the organization, being confident that it is good hands. Members and supporters develop attitudes of gratitude and loyalty to the leaders, especially those who have suffered for the cause.

Among the leaders, megalomania develops, and this reinforces their power:

This overwhelming self-esteem on the part of the leaders diffuses a powerful suggestive influence, whereby the masses are confirmed in their admiration for their leaders, and it thus proves a source of enhanced power (Michels 1911).

Once the organization becomes large enough to have income and accumulated funds, it appoints full-time officials and establishes newspapers, training schools, and so on. This means that the party leaders have patronage: the power to appoint people to paid jobs.

Michels attempted to address why power tends to fall in the hands of small groups of people in all organizations. He studied labor and socialist movements of his time, the early 1900s. As organizations expand in size and complexity, Michels concluded:

…the need for effective leadership becomes more and more essential…. Size eventually renders collective decision making impractical because of both the number of issues and the need for the organization to appear united (Michels 1911).

The "Iron Law of Oligarchy” suggests that organizations wishing to avoid oligarchy should take a number of precautionary steps:

They should make sure that the rank and file remain active in the organization and that the leaders not be granted absolute control of a centralized administration. As long as there are open lines of communication and shared decision making between the leaders and the rank and file, an oligarchy cannot easily develop (Michels 1911).

Clearly, the problems of oligarchy, of the bureaucratic depersonalization described by Weber, and of personal alienation are all interrelated. If individuals are deprived of the power to make decisions that affect their lives in many or even most of the areas that are important to them, withdrawal into narrow ritualism (over-conformity to rules) and apathy are likely responses.

Such withdrawals seemed to constitute a chronic condition in some of the highly centralized socialist countries. However, there are many signs of public apathy in the United States, too. For example, in 1964 about 70 percent of those eligible to vote in presidential elections did so. In succeeding elections this figure dropped, reaching only 50 percent in 1988.

Michels' theory is based on documented fact: no organization remains egalitarian in the long run. Every organization develops within itself an elite, comprising the leadership and executive staff. Only this elite has the specialized knowledge required to make the organization successful.

Organizations come to be dominated by their elites, not by their members. The elite determines the organization's meetings, subjects, and speakers; it has control over the members' address register and can determine the contents of the members' journal. It can also, in all essentials, control the agenda at annual meetings and also frequently dictate the alternatives in voting. The organizational elite's perspective on life becomes, in time, different from that of the members, even if the leaders have themselves once been ordinary members (e.g., workers).

Michels pointed out that any large organization is faced with coordination problems that can only be solved by creating a bureaucracy. A bureaucracy is hierarchical in nature and therefore requires a concentration of much power in the hands of a few people. This led Michels to conclude that the "Iron Rule" is always true.

The strength of Michels' analysis lies in his compilation of the factors affecting the power structure in an organization. He focused throughout on what sociologists call "structural factors," which, according to Michels, are in all essential attributes of the organizational structure, not personality traits in members and leaders, that push democratic organizations—parties, trade unions, popular movements, interest groups—towards oligarchy. He rejected the argument that it is the leaders' personal lust for power that underlies the trend towards rule of the few.

They are good democrats running ever smaller democratic organizations. In other words, Michels cleanses the debate from the vulgar argument that trade union leaders and party politicians are driven by the desire for power. Accordingly, he effects the same kind of clean-up job that Max Weber did when he demonstrated that capitalism could not be explained by the personal greed of businessmen, and that bureaucracy cannot be deduced from the officiousness of civil servants (Michels 1911, XX).

Flirtation with Mussolini’s Fascism

In 1928, Michels accepted a chair of politics from Mussolini's government, specifically established to promote fascism. In his later writings, Michels sometimes underlined the advantages of such a regime:

By its nature, the rule of the elite will be frank, clear, concrete, direct. The elite does not exercise its function by means of tortuous intrigues and of "connections" dear to majoritarian and democratic regimes. Nor is it inevitably prey to lack of clarity, to vacillation, indecision, and to foolish and insipid compromises (Michels 1949, 121).

But his “true colors” came up in the following excerpt:

In democracy…various elites…struggle for power. From this derives…lack of stability…an expenditure of time, a slowing down of necessary training for those who intend to acquire governmental competence. But on the other hand the democratic system offers a certain guarantee to the members of the various elites of the repetition…of their turn at the helm of the state. But, be it said parenthetically, these manifold minor elites inevitably become bitter enemies of every government conquered and held by a single strong elite of anti-democratic tendencies. For the latter has an almost permanent character and is based on a principle which prolongs the usual expectation sine die, actually excluding the majority of the elites from political power. And without the least intention of harming anybody we will say, Hinc illae lacrimae ("Hence these tears") (Michels 1949, 119).

Michel’s legacy

Michels is counted among the four greatest in political sociology in the Latin school, the other three being Gaetano Mosca, Georges Sorel, and Vilfredo Pareto. In many ways, Michels stands out as the first cosmopolitan sociologist among his contemporary shining stars of the new science: Émile Durkheim in France, Max Weber in Germany, Vilfredo Pareto in Italy and W. I. Thomas in the United States.

There is a kind of tragic despair about Michels' presentation. Freedom-loving socialists are inspired to seek social innovations that avoid the fate of oligarchy. Intellectuals in popular movements outside the socialist tradition are also called upon, after reading Michels' work, to search for mechanisms that ward off or mitigate the oligarchic tendencies in their organizations.

While Michels favored fascism for Italy he may have thought that in other circumstances democratic forms would reduce the evils of oligarchy. Similarly, Weber seems to have favored a combination of British and American institutions to secure good political leadership for Germany. The point made by Michels is not to secure genuine democracy (whatever that may be), but to achieve good leadership.

Michels showed that the problem of loss of good leadership lies not just in the self-centered nature of the leaders themselves, but in the very structures of social organization. He suggested that the inevitability of oligarchy might be curtailed by the maintenance of open communication between leaders and others, as well as commitment to shared decision-making. The complete solution to this problem, however, which Michels could not uncover, requires the involvement of leaders who truly live for the sake of others. Such leaders, with the attitude of a true parent toward all the members, would be able to develop social structures that support the continuation of good leadership.

Publications

  • Michels, Robert. 1911. Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie. Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens.
  • Michels, Robert. 1914. Grenzen der Geschlechtsmoral.
  • Michels, Robert. 1925. Sozialismus und fascismus in Italien.
  • Michels, Robert. 1927. Corso di sociologia politica.
  • Michels, Robert. 1949. First Lectures in Political Sociology. Trans. Alfred De Grazia. University of Minnesota Press.
  • Michels, Robert. 1970. Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie: Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens.

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Hetscher, Joachim. 1993. Robert Michels: die Herausbildung der modernen politischen Soziologie im Kontext von Herausforderung und Defizit der Arbeiterbewegung.
  • Nye, Robert A. 1977. The Anti-democratic Sources of Elite Theory: Pareto, Mosca, Michels. Sage Publications. ISBN 0803998724
  • Pfetsch, Frank. 1965. Entwicklung zum faschistischen Führerstaat in der politischen philosophie von Robert Michels.
  • Röhrich, Wilfreid. 1971. Robert Michels; vom sozialistisch-syndikalistischen zum faschistischen Credo. Duncker & Humblot.
  • Volpe, G. 1972. Elite e/o democrazia.

External links

All links retrieved December 15, 2022.


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