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'''Reason''', in [[philosophy]], is the ability to form and operate upon concepts in [[abstraction]], in accordance with rationality and [[logic]]. Discussion and debate about the nature, limits, and causes of reason have been important through the history of philosophy. Discussion about reason especially concerns:
{{otheruses}}
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* (a) Its relationship to several other related [[concept]]s such as: [[language]], [[logic]], [[consciousness]], [[knowledge]], [[perception]], [[emotion]] and [[will]]. 
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* (b) Its role in determining what is [[truth|true]] and what is [[right]].
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* (c) Its origin.
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{{toc}}
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Reason, like [[consciousness]], with which it is also intimately connected, has traditionally been claimed as a distinctly human capacity, not to be found elsewhere in the animal world. However, recent studies in animal cognition show that animals are capable of some types of  on a lower level thinking similar to that of humans.
  
In [[philosophy]], '''reason''' is the ability to form and operate upon [[concept]]s in [[abstraction]], in accordance with [[rationality]] and [[logic]]—terms with which reason shares heritage. Reason, like [[consciousness]] with which it is also intimately connected, has traditionally been claimed as distinctly human, and not to be found elsewhere in the animal world. However, recent studies in [[Animal cognition|this area]] show that, in lower levels, animals are capable of some types of thinking similar to that of humans. Discussion and debate about the nature, limits and causes of reason have been important through the [[history of philosophy]]. Discussion about reason especially concerns:
+
==Etymology==
* (a) its relationship to several other related concepts: language, logic, [[consciousness]] etc,
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The English term “reason” is derived from the French word raison, from Latin rationem (ratio) "reckoning, understanding, motive, cause."  The concept of reason is connected to the concept of [[language]], as reflected in the meanings of the Greek word, "logos."  As ''reason, rationality, and logic'' are all associated with the ability of the human mind to predict effects as based upon presumed causes, the word "reason" also denotes a ground or basis for a particular argument, and hence is used synonymously with the word "cause."
* (b) its ability to help people decide what is [[true]], and
 
* (c) its origin.
 
  
Also see [[practical reason]] and [[speculative reason]].
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==Reason and Understanding==
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Reason is the means by which human beings achieve understanding by integrating perceptions received through the senses with concepts and associating them with knowledge already acquired.  Reason is also the process of evaluating and manipulating ideas and facts.
 +
 +
The fundamental attribute of reason is clarity, and the use of identifiable ideas, memories, emotions, and sensory input. Since reason is a means of achieving understanding, its method is significant.  Reason is organized, systematic, and a purposeful way of thinking. Reason also makes use of vehicles such as [[logic]], deduction, and induction to make sense of perceptions and knowledge.
  
The concept of reason is connected to the concept of [[language]], as reflected in the meanings of the Greek word "[[logos]]", later to be translated by Latin "ratio" and then French "raison", from which the English word derived.
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==Reason and Logic==
As ''reason, rationality, and logic'' are all associated with the ability of the human mind to [[prediction|predict]] effects as based upon presumed [[cause]]s, the word "reason" also denotes a ground or basis for a particular argument, and hence is used synonymously with the word "cause".
+
While reason is a type of thought, [[logic]] is a field of study which categorizes ways of justifying conclusions that are in accordance with reason. This distinction between reason and logic originates with the writings of [[Aristotle]]. Although the Greeks had no separate word for logic as opposed to language and reason, Aristotle's neologism "syllogism" (''syllogismos'') identified logic clearly for the first time as a distinct field of study. (When Aristotle referred to "the logical," the source of our word "logic," he was referring more broadly to reason or “the rational.”)
  
==Reason and logic==
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Although logic is an important aspect of reason, logic and reason are not synonymous. The modern tendency to prefer "hard logic," or "solid logic," has incorrectly led to the two terms occasionally being seen as essentially interchangeable, or to the conception that logic is the defining and pure form of reason.  
While reason is a type of thought, logic is a field of study which categorizes ways of justifying conclusions that are in accordance with reason.
 
  
This contrast between reason and [[logic]] thus extends back to the writings of Aristotle. Although the Greeks had no separate word for logic as opposed to language and reason, Aristotle's [[neologism]] "[[syllogism]]" (syllogismos) identified logic clearly for the first time as a distinct field of study. (When Aristotle referred to "the logical" the source of our word "logic" he was referring more broadly to reason or the rational.)
+
Animals and machines (including computers) can unconsciously perform logical operations, and many animals (including humans) can unconsciously associate different perceptions as causes and effects and then make decisions and even plans. "Reason" is the type of thinking which combines language, consciousness, and logic, something that at this time, only humans are known to be able to do.
  
Reason and logic can be thought to be distinct, although logic is one important aspect of reason. But the tendency to a preference for "hard logic," or "solid logic," in [[Modern Times (history)|modern times]] has incorrectly led to the two terms occasionally being seen as essentially [[synonym]]ous (see [[Reasoning]]) or perhaps more often logic is seen as the defining and pure form of reason.  
+
Although the relationship between reason and logic has been under discussion for a long time, the neurologist Terrence Deacon, following the tradition of [[Charles Peirce|Peirce]], has recently offered a useful new description in modern terms. Like many philosophers in the English tradition of [[Hobbes]], [[Locke]], and [[Hume]], he starts by distinguishing the type of thinking which is most essential to human rational thinking as a type of associative thinking. Reason by his account therefore requires associating perceptions in a way which may be arbitrary (or nominal, conventional, or "formal").  The image or "icon" of smoke may not only be related with the image of fire, but, for example, with the English word "smoke," or with any made-up [[symbol]] (not necessarily a spoken word). What is essentially rational, or at least essentially human, is however not the arbitrariness of symbols, but rather, how they are used.
  
However machines and animals can unconsciously perform logical operations, and many animals (including humans) can [[unconsciously]], associate different [[perceptions]] as [[cause and effect|causes and effects]] and then make [[decisions]] or even plans. Therefore, to have any distinct meaning at all, “reason” must be the type of thinking which links language, consciousness and logic, and at this time, only humans are known to combine these things.  
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== Speculative Reason and Practical Reason==
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<blockquote>"In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. But, in practice, there is." —Jan L. A. van de Snepscheut</blockquote>
  
Although this is an old discussion, the neurologist [[Terrence Deacon]], following the tradition of [[Charles Peirce|Peirce]], has recently given a useful new description in modern terms. Like many philosophers in the English traditions such as [[Hobbes]], [[Locke]] and [[Hume]], he starts by distinguishing the type of thinking which is most essential to human rational thinking as a type of [[Association (psychology)|associative thinking]]. Reason by his account therefore requires associating [[perception]]s in a way which may be arbitrary (or [[nominal]], [[Convention (norm)|conventional]] or "[[formal]]") - not just associating the [[image]] or "[[icon]]" of smoke and the [[image]] of fire, but, for example, the [[image]] of smoke and the English word "smoke", or indeed any made-up [[symbol]] (not necessarily a spoken word). What is essentially rational, or at least essentially human, is however not the arbitrariness of symbols, but how they are used. See below concerning Reason and Language.
+
"Speculative reason" or "pure reason" is theoretical (or logical, deductive) thought (sometimes called theoretical reason), as opposed to practical (active, willing) thought. "Practical reason" is the application of reason in deciding on a course of action, while speculative (or theoretical) reason is concerned with absolute and universal truths. For example, deciding exactly how to build a telescope is practical reason, whereas deciding between two theories of light and optics is speculative reason.
  
== Reason, truth, and “first principles” ==
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The distinction between practical and speculative reason was made by the ancient Greek philosophers  [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]], who distinguished between theory (''theoria,'' or a wide or clear vision of its structure) and practice (''praxis''), as well as productive knowledge (''techne'').
  
Already in classical times a conflict between the [[Platonism|Platonists]] and the [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelians]] developed about reason's role in confirming [[truth]]. Both Aristotle and Plato were aware of this as a question all philosophy must consider. On the one hand people use logical syllogisms such as [[deduction]] and [[inductive reasoning|induction]] in order to come to conclusions they feel are more infallible than our basic sense perceptions. On the other hand, if such conclusions are only built upon sense perceptions, then our most logical conclusions can never be said to be certain because they are built upon fallible perceptions (or fallible interpretations of perceptions). So given the impression that we are sometimes certain, as well as the desire to be certain, the question arises as to the source of our first principles. Is it only experience as claimed in “[[empiricism|empiricist]]” arguments (associated by some as being more Aristotelian, and more recently with British philosophers such as [[David Hume]]); or is there some other “faculty” from which we derive our consciousness of at least some “[[A priori and a posteriori (philosophy)|a priori]]” truths (a position called “[[idealist]]” and associated with Platonism); or are there certain undeniable axioms that form the base for all other faculties and experiences (a position supported by the [[Scottish School of Common Sense]] as exemplified by [[Thomas Reid]], and more recently by [[Objectivism (Ayn Rand)|Objectivism]])?
+
Speculative reason is contemplative, detached, and certain, whereas practical reason is engaged, involved, active, and dependent upon the specifics of the situation. Speculative reason provides the universal, necessary principles of [[logic]], such as the principle of [[contradiction]], which must apply everywhere, regardless of the specifics of the situation. Practical reason, on the other hand, is that power of the mind engaged in deciding what to do. It is also referred to as moral reason, because it involves action, decision, and particulars. Though many other thinkers have erected systems based on the distinction, two important later thinkers who have done so are [[Aquinas]] (who follows Aristotle in many respects) and [[Kant]].
  
In Greek, “[[first principles]]” are [[arche|arkhai]], starting points, and the faculty used to perceive them is sometimes referred to in Aristotle and Plato as “[[nous]]” which was close in meaning to “awareness” and therefore “consciousness”. This leaves open the question of whether we become aware by building up and comparing experiences, or some other way.
+
In [[cognition|cognitive]] research, "practical reason" is the process of ignoring unproductive (or undesirable) possibilities in favor of productive possibilities. It is considered a form of cognitive bias, because it is illogical.
  
Modern proponents of [[A priori and a posteriori (philosophy)|a priori]] reasoning, at least with regards to language, are [[Noam Chomsky]] and [[Steven Pinker]], to whom [[Merlin Donald]] and [[Terrence Deacon]] can be very usefully contrasted.
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== Reason, Truth, and “First Principles” ==
 +
In ancient [[Greek philosophy]] a conflict arose between the [[Platonism|Platonists]] and the [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelians]] over the role of  reason in confirming [[truth]]. Both [[Aristotle]] and [[Plato]] recognized this as one of the essential questions of philosophy. Human beings use logical syllogisms such as deduction and inductive reasoning to reach conclusions which they feel are more infallible than basic sense perceptions. However, if such conclusions are built only upon sense perceptions, even the most logical conclusions can never be said to be certain, because they are built upon fallible perceptions (or fallible interpretations of perceptions). It is clear that human beings desire to know things with certainty, and  that human beings are certain about some things.  These things which are known with certainty are referred to as “first principles.” 
  
== Reason, language and mimesis ==
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What is the source of these first principles? Is the source only experience, as claimed in "[[empiricism|empiricist]]" arguments (considered by some as being Aristotelian, and more recently associated with British philosophers such as [[David Hume]])? Or is there some other “faculty” from which we derive our consciousness of at least some "[[a priori]]" truths (a position called “[[idealism|idealist]]” and associated with Platonism)? Or are there certain undeniable axioms that form the base for all other faculties and experiences (a position supported by the Scottish School of Common Sense as exemplified by [[Thomas Reid]], and more recently by [[Ayn Rand|Objectivism]])?
  
The recent writings of Deacon and Donald fit into an older tradition which makes reason connected to [[language]], and [[mimesis]], but more specifically the ability to create [[language]] as part of an internal modelling of [[reality]] specific to humankind. Other results are consciousness, and [[imagination]] or [[fantasy]].  
+
<blockquote>In view of all these considerations, we arrive at the idea of a special science which can be entitled the Critique of Pure Reason. For reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of a priori knowledge. Pure reason is, therefore, that which contains the principles whereby we know anything absolutely a priori. An organon of pure reason would be the sum-total of those principles according to which all modes of pure a priori knowledge can be acquired and actually brought into being. The exhaustive application of such an organon would give rise to a system of pure reason. But as this would be asking rather much, and as it is still doubtful whether, and in what cases, any extension of our knowledge be here possible, we can regard a science of the mere examination of pure reason, of its sources and limits, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. ([[Immanuel Kant]], sec VII. "The Idea and Division of a Special Science," ''Critique of Pure Reason'')</blockquote>
  
Thomas Hobbes describes the creation of “Markes, or Notes of remembrance” (''[[Leviathan (book)|Leviathan]]'' Ch.4) as “[[speech]]” (allowing by his definition that it is not necessarily a means of communication or speech in the normal sense; he was presumably thinking of "speech" as an English version of "[[logos]]" in this description). In the context of a language, these marks or notes are called "[[Sign]]es" by Hobbes.
 
  
[[David Hume]], following [[John Locke]] (and [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]]), who followed Hobbes, emphasized the importance of associative thinking.
+
In Greek philosophy, “first principles” were “''arkhai'',” starting points, and the faculty used to perceive them was sometimes referred to in Aristotle and Plato as “''nous'',” which was close in meaning to “awareness” and therefore “consciousness.” The question of whether we become aware of “arkhai” by building up and comparing experiences, or in some other way, was left unanswered.
  
Concerning mimesis and fantasy being important in defining reason, see for example Aristotle's [[Poetics (Aristotle)|Poetics]], [[De Anima]], [[On Dreams]], and [[On Memory|On Memory and Recollection]] (and for example the Introduction by Michael Davis, printed with the 2002 translation by him and [[Seth Benardete]] of the Poetics), Jacob Klein’s ''A Commentary on the Meno'' Ch.5, and [[Tolkien]]'s essay "On Fairy Stories".
+
Modern proponents of [[a priori]] reasoning, at least with regards to language, are Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker, to whom Merlin Donald and Terrence Deacon can be contrasted.
  
== Reason, truth, and emotion or passion ==
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== Reason, Language and [[Mimesis]] ==
In literature, reason is often opposed to [[emotions]] or [[feelings]], and desires, drives or passions. Others see reason as the servant or tool of these things — the means of sorting out our desires and then getting what we want. Some would say however that many of the key philosophers of history (e.g. [[Plato]], [[Rousseau]], [[David Hume|Hume]], [[Nietzsche]]) have combined both views - making rational thinking not only a tool of desires, but also something which is itself desired, not only because of its usefulness in satisfying other desires.  
+
The recent writings of Merlin Donald and Terrence Deacon fit into an older tradition which makes reason connected to [[language]], and mimesis, but more specifically the ability to create language as part of an internal modeling of reality specific to humankind. Other results are consciousness and imagination.  
  
At the same time, reason sometimes clearly seems to come into conflict with some desires (even while not being in conflict with others) giving us the impression that reason is separate from emotion. Only in humans, choices are sometimes made on the basis of an association of ideas which is an artificially constructed model, rather than an un-inspected association based on raw experience, and this “feels” different from when one is won over by a passion supported by raw “feeling”. The opposite is also unique – we sometimes feel that a passion has won over our [[decision-making]] “unjustly”, despite having lost its argument, or perhaps (in the case, for example, of a [[reflex]] action) not even having been a subject of argument before the action took place.
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Thomas Hobbes describes the creation of “Markes, or Notes of remembrance” (''Leviathan'' Ch.4) as “speech” (allowing by his definition that it is not necessarily a means of communication or speech in the normal sense; in this description he was presumably thinking of "speech" as an English version of "logos"). In the context of a language, these marks or notes are called "Signes" by Hobbes.
  
The question of whether reason is in fact driven by emotions is important for philosophers because reason is seen by almost all philosophers as being the way that we come to know the [[truth]], and we see the truth as something which exists outside of our own [[consciousness]]. If reason is driven by emotions, then how can we ever know that we are not deceiving ourselves about what is true by denying undesirable information in favor of a more pleasing construct of our world?
+
[[David Hume]], following [[John Locke]] (and [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]]), who followed Hobbes, emphasized the importance of associative thinking.
  
==Reason and faith, especially in the “Greater West”==
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== Reason, [[Truth]], and Emotion or Passion ==
In [[theology]], reason, as distinguished from [[faith]], is the human critical faculty exercised upon religious truth whether by way of discovery or by way of explanation. Some commentators have claimed that [[Western civilization]] can be almost defined by its serious testing of the limits of tension between “unaided” reason and [[faith]] in "[[revelation|revealed]]" truths - figuratively summarised as [[Athens]] and [[Jerusalem]], respectively. [[Leo Strauss]] spoke of a "Greater [[Western world|West]]" which included all areas under the influence of the tension between Greek rationalism and [[Abrahamic]] revelation, including the [[Muslim]] lands. He was particularly influenced by the great [[Islamic philosophy|Muslim philosopher]] [[Farabi|Al-Farabi]]. In order to consider to what extent [[Eastern philosophy]] might have partaken of these important tensions, it is perhaps best to consider whether [[dharma]] or [[tao]] may be equivalent to [[Nature]] (by which we mean ''[[physis]]'' in Greek).
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In literature, reason is often placed in opposition to emotions, feelings, desires, drives or passions. Others make reason the servant or tool of emotion and desire, a means of comprehending desire and discovering how to fulfill it.  Some philosophers including  [[Plato]], [[Rousseau]], [[David Hume|Hume]], and [[Nietzsche]] combined both views, making rational thinking not only a servant of desire, but also something which is desired in itself.
  
The limits within which reason may be used have been laid down differently in different churches and periods of thought: on the whole, modern religion tends to allow to reason a wide field, reserving, however, as the sphere of faith the ultimate ([[supernatural]]) truths of theology.
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The question of whether reason is in fact driven by emotions is important in philosophy, because reason is seen by almost all philosophers as the means by which we come to know the [[truth]], and truth as something objective which exists outside of human [[consciousness]]. If reason is affected by emotions, how can we be certain that we are not deceiving ourselves by ignoring undesirable information, or by misinterpreting information in accordance with our unconscious desires?
  
==Reason as an intrinsic part of nature==
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Sometimes reason clearly seems to come into conflict with certain human desires. Human beings sometimes make choices on the basis of an association of ideas which is an artificially constructed model, rather than an association based on raw experience or passion. Examples are compliance with civil laws or social customs, or the acceptance of religious precepts and discipline.
[[Wilhelm Reich]], the controversial Austrian psychiatrist and naturalist, followed in [[Hegel]]'s footsteps in perceiving reason not reduced to analytic deduction or mechanistic one-dimensional induction, but as being a primal part of the depth structure of nature itself; "a trait that pulsated from the heart of nature and was thus manifested in all living things"<ref>[[Robert S. Corrington|Corrington, Robert S.]], ''Wilhelm Reich. Psychoanalyst and Radical Naturalist''. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2003 pp.128-129</ref>. Viewed in these terms ''reason'' becomes an [[ontology|ontological]] term rather than an epistemological one. That is, reason is understood here as having an objective existence apart from its relation to the mental operations of any observers.
 
  
==References==
+
==Reason and [[Faith]], especially in the “Greater West”==
<references/>
+
In [[theology]], reason, as distinguished from [[faith]], is the human critical faculty exercised upon religious truth, whether by way of discovery or by way of explanation. Some commentators have claimed that Western civilization can be almost defined by the tension between “unaided” reason and faith in "revealed" truths, figuratively represented as [[Athens]] and [[Jerusalem]], respectively. [[Leo Strauss]] spoke of a "Greater West" which included all areas under the influence of the tension between Greek rationalism and Abrahamic revelation, including the [[Islam|Muslim]] lands. Strauss was particularly influenced by the great [[Islamic philosophy|Muslim philosopher]] [[Al-Farabi]].
* [[George Lakoff]] and [[Mark Johnson (professor)|Mark Johnson]] (1999). ''Philosophy In The Flesh''. Basic Books.
+
 
 +
The limits within which reason may be used have been prescribed differently in different religious traditions and during different periods of thought. Modern religious thought tends to allow to reason a wide field, reserving as the domain of faith the ultimate (supernatural) truths of theology.
 +
 
 +
==Reason as an Intrinsic Part of Nature==
 +
Wilhelm Reich, the controversial Austrian psychiatrist and naturalist, followed in [[Hegel]]'s footsteps in perceiving reason not as a reduction to analytic deduction or mechanistic one-dimensional induction, but as being a primal part of the depth structure of nature itself; "a trait that pulsated from the heart of nature and was thus manifested in all living things."<ref>Robert S. Corrington and Wilhelm Reich, ''Psychoanalyst and Radical Naturalist'' (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 128-129.</ref> Viewed in these terms ''reason'' becomes an [[ontology|ontological]] term rather than an epistemological one. Reason is understood here as having an objective existence apart from its relation to the mental operations of any observer.
  
 
==See also==
 
==See also==
 
{{Wiktionary|reason}}
 
{{Wiktionary|reason}}
* [[Conscience]]
 
 
* [[Deism]]
 
* [[Deism]]
 
* [[Empiricism]]
 
* [[Empiricism]]
* [[Fantasy]]
 
* [[Inquiry]]
 
 
* [[Logic]]
 
* [[Logic]]
 
* [[Language]]
 
* [[Language]]
* [[Mimesis]]
 
 
* [[Mind]]
 
* [[Mind]]
* [[Nous]]
 
* [[Rationality]]
 
* [[Reason (magazine)|Reason magazine]]
 
{{enlightenment}}
 
  
[[Category:Epistemology]]
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==Notes==
[[Category:Belief]]
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<references/>
[[Category:Logic]]
+
 
[[Category:Thought]]
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==References==
[[Category:Virtues]]
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* Blattberg, Charles. ''From pluralist to patriotic politics: putting practice first''. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. ISBN 0198296886
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* Kant, Immanuel. ''Critique of pure reason''. New York: Modern Library, 1958. ISBN 0486432548
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* Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. ''Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought''. New York: Basic Books, 1999. ISBN 0465056733
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* Taylor, Charles. ''Explanation and practical reason.'' ''WIDER working papers'', WP 72. Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1989.
  
[[ar:عقل (فلسفة)]]
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==External Links==
[[ca:Raó]]
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All links retrieved December 7, 2022.
[[da:Ræsonnere]]
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* Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
[[de:Vernunft]]
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** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/ Practical Reason].
[[el:Λογική]]
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** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason-med/ Medieval Theories of Practical Reason].
[[es:Razón (filosofía)]]
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===General Philosophy Sources===
[[eo:Racio]]
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy].
[[fr:Raison]]
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*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy].
[[ko:이성]]
+
*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online].
[[ia:Ration]]
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*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg].
[[it:Ragione]]
 
[[nl:Rede]]
 
[[ja:理性]]
 
[[pl:Rozum]]
 
[[pt:Razão]]
 
[[ru:Разум]]
 
[[sq:Arsyeja]]
 
[[simple:Reason]]
 
[[sr:Разум]]
 
[[fi:Järki]]
 
[[sv:Förnuft]]
 
[[vi:Lý tính]]
 
  
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[[category:Philosophy and religion]]
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[[Category:philosophy]]
  
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Latest revision as of 01:41, 8 December 2022

Reason, in philosophy, is the ability to form and operate upon concepts in abstraction, in accordance with rationality and logic. Discussion and debate about the nature, limits, and causes of reason have been important through the history of philosophy. Discussion about reason especially concerns:

Reason, like consciousness, with which it is also intimately connected, has traditionally been claimed as a distinctly human capacity, not to be found elsewhere in the animal world. However, recent studies in animal cognition show that animals are capable of some types of on a lower level thinking similar to that of humans.

Etymology

The English term “reason” is derived from the French word raison, from Latin rationem (ratio) "reckoning, understanding, motive, cause." The concept of reason is connected to the concept of language, as reflected in the meanings of the Greek word, "logos." As reason, rationality, and logic are all associated with the ability of the human mind to predict effects as based upon presumed causes, the word "reason" also denotes a ground or basis for a particular argument, and hence is used synonymously with the word "cause."

Reason and Understanding

Reason is the means by which human beings achieve understanding by integrating perceptions received through the senses with concepts and associating them with knowledge already acquired. Reason is also the process of evaluating and manipulating ideas and facts.

The fundamental attribute of reason is clarity, and the use of identifiable ideas, memories, emotions, and sensory input. Since reason is a means of achieving understanding, its method is significant. Reason is organized, systematic, and a purposeful way of thinking. Reason also makes use of vehicles such as logic, deduction, and induction to make sense of perceptions and knowledge.

Reason and Logic

While reason is a type of thought, logic is a field of study which categorizes ways of justifying conclusions that are in accordance with reason. This distinction between reason and logic originates with the writings of Aristotle. Although the Greeks had no separate word for logic as opposed to language and reason, Aristotle's neologism "syllogism" (syllogismos) identified logic clearly for the first time as a distinct field of study. (When Aristotle referred to "the logical," the source of our word "logic," he was referring more broadly to reason or “the rational.”)

Although logic is an important aspect of reason, logic and reason are not synonymous. The modern tendency to prefer "hard logic," or "solid logic," has incorrectly led to the two terms occasionally being seen as essentially interchangeable, or to the conception that logic is the defining and pure form of reason.

Animals and machines (including computers) can unconsciously perform logical operations, and many animals (including humans) can unconsciously associate different perceptions as causes and effects and then make decisions and even plans. "Reason" is the type of thinking which combines language, consciousness, and logic, something that at this time, only humans are known to be able to do.

Although the relationship between reason and logic has been under discussion for a long time, the neurologist Terrence Deacon, following the tradition of Peirce, has recently offered a useful new description in modern terms. Like many philosophers in the English tradition of Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, he starts by distinguishing the type of thinking which is most essential to human rational thinking as a type of associative thinking. Reason by his account therefore requires associating perceptions in a way which may be arbitrary (or nominal, conventional, or "formal"). The image or "icon" of smoke may not only be related with the image of fire, but, for example, with the English word "smoke," or with any made-up symbol (not necessarily a spoken word). What is essentially rational, or at least essentially human, is however not the arbitrariness of symbols, but rather, how they are used.

Speculative Reason and Practical Reason

"In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. But, in practice, there is." —Jan L. A. van de Snepscheut

"Speculative reason" or "pure reason" is theoretical (or logical, deductive) thought (sometimes called theoretical reason), as opposed to practical (active, willing) thought. "Practical reason" is the application of reason in deciding on a course of action, while speculative (or theoretical) reason is concerned with absolute and universal truths. For example, deciding exactly how to build a telescope is practical reason, whereas deciding between two theories of light and optics is speculative reason.

The distinction between practical and speculative reason was made by the ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle, who distinguished between theory (theoria, or a wide or clear vision of its structure) and practice (praxis), as well as productive knowledge (techne).

Speculative reason is contemplative, detached, and certain, whereas practical reason is engaged, involved, active, and dependent upon the specifics of the situation. Speculative reason provides the universal, necessary principles of logic, such as the principle of contradiction, which must apply everywhere, regardless of the specifics of the situation. Practical reason, on the other hand, is that power of the mind engaged in deciding what to do. It is also referred to as moral reason, because it involves action, decision, and particulars. Though many other thinkers have erected systems based on the distinction, two important later thinkers who have done so are Aquinas (who follows Aristotle in many respects) and Kant.

In cognitive research, "practical reason" is the process of ignoring unproductive (or undesirable) possibilities in favor of productive possibilities. It is considered a form of cognitive bias, because it is illogical.

Reason, Truth, and “First Principles”

In ancient Greek philosophy a conflict arose between the Platonists and the Aristotelians over the role of reason in confirming truth. Both Aristotle and Plato recognized this as one of the essential questions of philosophy. Human beings use logical syllogisms such as deduction and inductive reasoning to reach conclusions which they feel are more infallible than basic sense perceptions. However, if such conclusions are built only upon sense perceptions, even the most logical conclusions can never be said to be certain, because they are built upon fallible perceptions (or fallible interpretations of perceptions). It is clear that human beings desire to know things with certainty, and that human beings are certain about some things. These things which are known with certainty are referred to as “first principles.”

What is the source of these first principles? Is the source only experience, as claimed in "empiricist" arguments (considered by some as being Aristotelian, and more recently associated with British philosophers such as David Hume)? Or is there some other “faculty” from which we derive our consciousness of at least some "a priori" truths (a position called “idealist” and associated with Platonism)? Or are there certain undeniable axioms that form the base for all other faculties and experiences (a position supported by the Scottish School of Common Sense as exemplified by Thomas Reid, and more recently by Objectivism)?

In view of all these considerations, we arrive at the idea of a special science which can be entitled the Critique of Pure Reason. For reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of a priori knowledge. Pure reason is, therefore, that which contains the principles whereby we know anything absolutely a priori. An organon of pure reason would be the sum-total of those principles according to which all modes of pure a priori knowledge can be acquired and actually brought into being. The exhaustive application of such an organon would give rise to a system of pure reason. But as this would be asking rather much, and as it is still doubtful whether, and in what cases, any extension of our knowledge be here possible, we can regard a science of the mere examination of pure reason, of its sources and limits, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. (Immanuel Kant, sec VII. "The Idea and Division of a Special Science," Critique of Pure Reason)


In Greek philosophy, “first principles” were “arkhai,” starting points, and the faculty used to perceive them was sometimes referred to in Aristotle and Plato as “nous,” which was close in meaning to “awareness” and therefore “consciousness.” The question of whether we become aware of “arkhai” by building up and comparing experiences, or in some other way, was left unanswered.

Modern proponents of a priori reasoning, at least with regards to language, are Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker, to whom Merlin Donald and Terrence Deacon can be contrasted.

Reason, Language and Mimesis

The recent writings of Merlin Donald and Terrence Deacon fit into an older tradition which makes reason connected to language, and mimesis, but more specifically the ability to create language as part of an internal modeling of reality specific to humankind. Other results are consciousness and imagination.

Thomas Hobbes describes the creation of “Markes, or Notes of remembrance” (Leviathan Ch.4) as “speech” (allowing by his definition that it is not necessarily a means of communication or speech in the normal sense; in this description he was presumably thinking of "speech" as an English version of "logos"). In the context of a language, these marks or notes are called "Signes" by Hobbes.

David Hume, following John Locke (and Berkeley), who followed Hobbes, emphasized the importance of associative thinking.

Reason, Truth, and Emotion or Passion

In literature, reason is often placed in opposition to emotions, feelings, desires, drives or passions. Others make reason the servant or tool of emotion and desire, a means of comprehending desire and discovering how to fulfill it. Some philosophers including Plato, Rousseau, Hume, and Nietzsche combined both views, making rational thinking not only a servant of desire, but also something which is desired in itself.

The question of whether reason is in fact driven by emotions is important in philosophy, because reason is seen by almost all philosophers as the means by which we come to know the truth, and truth as something objective which exists outside of human consciousness. If reason is affected by emotions, how can we be certain that we are not deceiving ourselves by ignoring undesirable information, or by misinterpreting information in accordance with our unconscious desires?

Sometimes reason clearly seems to come into conflict with certain human desires. Human beings sometimes make choices on the basis of an association of ideas which is an artificially constructed model, rather than an association based on raw experience or passion. Examples are compliance with civil laws or social customs, or the acceptance of religious precepts and discipline.

Reason and Faith, especially in the “Greater West”

In theology, reason, as distinguished from faith, is the human critical faculty exercised upon religious truth, whether by way of discovery or by way of explanation. Some commentators have claimed that Western civilization can be almost defined by the tension between “unaided” reason and faith in "revealed" truths, figuratively represented as Athens and Jerusalem, respectively. Leo Strauss spoke of a "Greater West" which included all areas under the influence of the tension between Greek rationalism and Abrahamic revelation, including the Muslim lands. Strauss was particularly influenced by the great Muslim philosopher Al-Farabi.

The limits within which reason may be used have been prescribed differently in different religious traditions and during different periods of thought. Modern religious thought tends to allow to reason a wide field, reserving as the domain of faith the ultimate (supernatural) truths of theology.

Reason as an Intrinsic Part of Nature

Wilhelm Reich, the controversial Austrian psychiatrist and naturalist, followed in Hegel's footsteps in perceiving reason not as a reduction to analytic deduction or mechanistic one-dimensional induction, but as being a primal part of the depth structure of nature itself; "a trait that pulsated from the heart of nature and was thus manifested in all living things."[1] Viewed in these terms reason becomes an ontological term rather than an epistemological one. Reason is understood here as having an objective existence apart from its relation to the mental operations of any observer.

See also

Notes

  1. Robert S. Corrington and Wilhelm Reich, Psychoanalyst and Radical Naturalist (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 128-129.

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Blattberg, Charles. From pluralist to patriotic politics: putting practice first. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. ISBN 0198296886
  • Kant, Immanuel. Critique of pure reason. New York: Modern Library, 1958. ISBN 0486432548
  • Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought. New York: Basic Books, 1999. ISBN 0465056733
  • Taylor, Charles. Explanation and practical reason. WIDER working papers, WP 72. Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1989.

External Links

All links retrieved December 7, 2022.

General Philosophy Sources

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