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Revision as of 01:11, 28 March 2007


Battle of Midway
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II
SBDs approach the burning Mikuma (Center).
U.S. Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers at Midway
Date June 4–June 7, 1942
Location near Midway Island
Result Decisive American victory
Combatants
US flag 48 stars.svg
United States of America
Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
Empire of Japan
Commanders
Chester W. Nimitz
Frank J. Fletcher
Raymond A. Spruance
Isoroku Yamamoto
Chuichi Nagumo
Tamon Yamaguchi†
Strength
3 carriers,
~50 support ships,
233 carrier aircraft,
127 land-based aircraft
4 carriers,
7 battleships,
~150 support ships,
248 carrier aircraft,
16 floatplanes
Casualties
1 carrier sunk,
1 destroyer sunk,
307 killed
4 carriers sunk,
1 cruiser sunk,
228 aircraft destroyed,[1]3,057 killed
Pacific campaigns 1941-42
Pearl Harbor – Thailand – Malaya – Hong Kong – Philippines – Guam – Wake – Dutch East Indies – New Guinea – Singapore – Australia – Indian Ocean – Doolittle Raid – Solomons – Coral Sea – Midway


Pacific Ocean theater
Pearl HarborMidway – Solomons – Aleutians – Gilberts & Marshalls – Marianas & Palau –
Volcano Is & Ryukyu Is


The Battle of Midway was a pivotal naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II. It took place from June 4 to June 7, 1942, approximately one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea, about two months after the Japanese capture of Wake Island, and six months after the Empire of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor that had led to a formal state of war between the United States and Japan. During the battle, the United States Navy defeated a Japanese attack against Midway Atoll (located northwest of Hawaii) and destroyed four Japanese aircraft carriers and a heavy cruiser while losing a carrier and a destroyer.

The battle was a crushing defeat for the Japanese and is widely regarded as the most important naval battle of World War II. The battle permanently weakened the Japanese Navy, particularly the loss of over 200 naval aviators.[2] Strategically, the U.S. Navy was able to seize the initiative in the Pacific and go on the offensive.

The Japanese plan of attack, which included a secondary attack against the Aleutian Islands, was to lure America's few remaining carriers into a trap and sink them.[3] The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway Atoll to extend Japan's defensive perimeter farther from its home islands. This operation was considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa, as well as the invasion of Hawaii.[4]

Had the Japanese captured Midway, the northeastern Pacific Rim would have been essentially defenseless. Japanese success also would have removed the last capital ships in the U.S. Pacific Fleet, ensuring Japanese naval supremacy in the Pacific until perhaps late 1943. The Midway operation, like the attack on Pearl Harbor that had plunged the United States into war, was not part of a campaign for the conquest of the United States itself, but was aimed at its elimination as a strategic Pacific power, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was also hoped that another defeat would force the U.S. to negotiate an end to the Pacific War with conditions favorable for Japan.[5]

Strategic context

Japan had been highly successful in rapidly securing its initial war aims, including the reduction of the Philippines, the capture of Malaya and Singapore, and the securing of the vital resource areas in Java, Borneo, and Indonesia. As such, preliminary planning for a second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942. However, due to strategic differences between the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy, as well as infighting between the Navy's GHQ and Admiral Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet, the formulation of effective strategy was hampered, and the follow-on strategy was not finalized until April 1942.[6] Admiral Yamamoto succeeded in winning a bureaucratic struggle placing his operational concept — further operations in the Central Pacific — ahead of other contending plans. These included operations either directly or indirectly aimed at Australia, as well as into the Indian Ocean. In the end, Yamamoto's barely-veiled threat to resign unless he got his way succeeded in carrying his agenda forward.[7]

Yamamoto's primary strategic concern was the elimination of America's remaining carrier forces. This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo (April 18 1942) by USAAF B-25s staging off the carrier Hornet. The raid, while militarily negligible, was a severe psychological shock to the Japanese, and proved the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands.[8] Sinking America's aircraft carriers and seizing Midway, the only other strategic island besides Hawaii in the East Pacific, was seen as the only means of nullifying this threat. Yamamoto reasoned an operation against the main carrier base at Pearl Harbor would induce them to fight. However, given the strength of American land-based airpower on Hawaii, he judged the powerful American base could not be attacked directly.[9] Instead, he selected the atoll of Midway, at the extreme northwest end of the Hawai’ian Island chain, some 1300 miles (2100 km) from Oahu. Midway itself was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions; however, the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore strongly defend it.[10] (Its ultimate value in the submarine war should not be ignored.)

The plan

A picture of Midway Atoll, taken several months before the battle.

Typical of Japanese naval plans during the Second World War, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's battle plan was quite complex.[11] Additionally, his designs were predicated on optimistic intelligence information suggesting that Enterprise and Hornet, forming Task Force 16, were the only carriers available to the U.S. Pacific forces at the time. Lexington had been sunk and Yorktown severely mauled (and believed sunk) at the Battle of the Coral Sea just a month earlier. Likewise, the Japanese were aware that Saratoga was undergoing repairs on the West Coast after taking torpedo damage from a submarine. As such, the Japanese believed they faced at most two American fleet carriers at the point of contact.

Yamamoto's decisive battle

More important, however, was Yamamoto's belief the Americans had been demoralized by their frequent defeats during the preceding six months. Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. Fleet into a fatally compromising situation.[12] As such, he dispersed his forces so their full extent (particularly his battleships) would be unlikely to be discovered by the Americans prior to battle. Unfortunately for the Japanese, their emphasis on stealth and dispersal meant none of their formations was mutually supporting. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting Main Body of battleships and cruisers would trail Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's carrier Striking Force by several hundred miles. Japan's heavy surface forces were intended to destroy whatever part of the U.S. Fleet might come to Midway's relief, once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun duel to be fought.[13] However, their distance from Nagumo's carriers would have grave implications during the battle, as most of the battleships could have provided valuable anti-aircraft coverage instead of being reserved for a surface duel that would never be fought. In addition, the battleships were escorted by cruisers, which possessed scout planes that would have been invaluable to Nagumo[14].

Aleutian diversion

Likewise, the Japanese operations aimed at the Aleutian Islands (Operation AL) removed yet more ships from the force that would strike at Midway. However, whereas prior histories of the battle have often characterized the Aleutians operation as a feint to draw American forces northwards, recent scholarship on the battle has shown Operation AL was no such thing. In fact, according to the original Japanese battle plan, AL was designed to be launched simultaneously with MI itself.[15] However, a 1-day delay in the sailing of Nagumo's task force had the effect of initiating Operation AL a day before its counterpart.[16] In any event, Operation AL was a misguided expenditure of offensive assets better applied in the central Pacific.

The military forces

Prelude to battle

U.S. forces

USS Yorktown at Pearl Harbor days before the battle.

In order to do battle with an enemy force anticipated to be composed of 4-5 carriers, Nimitz needed every available U.S. flight deck. He already had Vice Admiral William Halsey's two-carrier task force at hand — but Halsey himself was stricken with psoriasis, and had to be replaced with Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Halsey's escort commander).[17] Nimitz also hurriedly called back Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's task force from the South West Pacific Area. They reached Pearl Harbor just in time to provision and re-sortie. Saratoga was still under repair and Yorktown herself had been severely damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea, but Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked around the clock to patch up the carrier. Though several months of repairs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard was estimated for the Yorktown, 72 hours was enough to restore her to a battle-worthy (if still structurally compromised) aircraft carrier.[18] Her flight deck was patched, whole sections of internal beams were cut out and replaced, and several new squadrons (drawn from carrier Saratoga) were put aboard her. Admiral Nimitz showed total disregard for established procedure in getting his third and last available carrier ready for battle — repairs continued even as Yorktown sortied, with work crews from the repair ship Vestal, herself still damaged from the raid on Pearl Harbor six months earlier, still aboard. Just three days after pulling into drydock at Pearl Harbor, the ship was again under steam, as the ship's band played "California, Here I Come" [19]

Japanese forces

Meanwhile, as a result of their participation in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese aircraft carrier Zuikaku was in port in Kure (near Hiroshima), waiting for an air group to be brought to her to replace her destroyed planes. The heavily damaged Shōkaku was awaiting further repairs; she had suffered three bomb hits at Coral Sea and required months in drydock. Despite the likely availability of sufficient aircraft between the two ships to re-equip Zuikaku with a composite air group, the Japanese made no serious attempt to get her into the forthcoming battle. [20] Consequently, instead of bringing five intact heavy carriers into battle, Admiral Nagumo would now only have four: Kaga, with Akagi, forming Division 1; Hiryū and Sōryū, as the 2nd Division. At least part of this was a product of fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941, including pinprick raids on Darwin and Colombo.

Japanese strategic scouting arrangements prior to the battle also fell into disarray. A picket line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position (thanks in part to Yamamoto's haste), which let the American carriers proceed to their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected.[21] A second attempt to use 4-engine reconnaissance seaplanes to scout Pearl Harbor prior to the battle (and thereby detect the absence or presence of the American carriers), known as "Operation K" , was also thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the refueling point — a hitherto deserted bay off of French Frigate Shoals — was occupied by American warships (because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March).[22] Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle. Japanese radio intercepts also noticed an increase in both American submarine activity and U.S. message traffic. This information was in Yamamoto's hands prior to the battle. However, Japanese operational plans were not changed in reaction to this.[23]

The American secret weapon

Admiral Nimitz had one priceless asset: U.S. cryptanalysts had broken the JN-25 naval code. Commander Joseph Rochefort and his team at HYPO were able not only to confirm Midway was the target of the impending Japanese strike, but to provide Nimitz with a complete IJN order of battle. (Japan's efforts to introduce a new codebook were delayed, giving HYPO crucial days; they were blacked out shortly before the attack began.[24]) As a result, the Americans entered the battle with a very good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. Nimitz was aware, for example, the vast numerical superiority of the Japanese fleet had been divided into no less than four task forces, and the escort for the main Carrier Striking Force was limited to just a few fast ships. For this reason, they knew the anti-aircraft guns protecting the carriers would be limited. As well, knowing the strength he faced, Nimitz calculated three carrier decks, plus Midway, to Yamamoto's four gave him rough parity. The Japanese, by contrast, remained almost totally in the dark about their opponents even after the battle began.[25]

The battle

Initial air attacks

Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo launched his initial attack wave of 108 aircraft at 04:30 on June 4. At the same time, he launched seven search aircraft (one of which was launched 30 minutes late), as well as combat air patrol (CAP) fighters. Due in part to Yamamoto's dispositions, Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy, with too few aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas, and laboring under poor weather conditions to the northeast and east of the task force.[26]

At 06:20, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S. base on Midway. Midway-based Marine fighter pilots, flying obsolescent Grumman F4F Wildcats and obsolete Brewster F2As, made a defense of Midway and suffered major losses. American anti-aircraft fire was accurate and intense, damaging many enemy aircraft.[27] The Japanese strike leader, recognizing the island's strike aircraft had already departed, signaled Nagumo another mission would be necessary to neutralize the island's defenses before troops could be landed on the 7th.[28]

Having taken off prior to the Japanese attack, American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet. These included six TBF Avengers in their first combat operation, and four B-26 Marauders (armed with torpedoes). The Japanese shrugged off these attacks with almost no losses, while destroying all but three of the American bombers.[29]

Hiryu under B-17 attack.

Admiral Nagumo, in accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine at the time, had kept half of his aircraft in reserve. These comprised two squadrons each of dive-bombers and torpedo bombers. The latter were armed with torpedoes for an antiship strike, should any American warships be located. The dive bombers were, as yet, unarmed.[30] As a result of the attacks from Midway, as well as the morning flight leader's recommendation regarding the need for a second strike, Nagumo at 07:15 ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with general purpose contact bombs for use on land targets. This had been underway for about 30 minutes, when at 07:40[citation needed] a scout plane from the cruiser Tone signaled the discovery of a sizable American naval force to the east. Nagumo quickly reversed his order, and asked the scout plane to ascertain the composition of the American force.[31]

Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand. Nagumo had an opportunity to immediately launch some or all of his reserve force against the American ships,[32] but had to act quickly as his Midway strike force would be returning shortly. They would be low on fuel, and carrying wounded crewmen, and would need to land promptly. Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would require at least 30–45 minutes to accomplish.[33] Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, he would be committing some of his reserve to battle without proper antiship armament. Japanese carrier doctrine preferred fully constituted strikes, and in the absence of a confirmation of whether the American force contained carriers, Nagumo's reaction was cautious.[34] In addition, the impending arrival of yet more American air strikes at 07:53 made Nagumo's window of decision quite short. In the end Nagumo made the fateful decision to wait for his first strike force to land, and then launch the reserve strike force (which would by then be properly armed).[35]

Attacks on the Japanese fleet

VT-6 TBDs on the USS Enterprise during the Battle of Midway.
Ensign George Gay (right), sole survivor of USS Hornet's VT-8, standing in front of his Douglas TBD Devastator, 4 June 1942.

Meanwhile, the Americans had already launched their carrier aircraft against the Japanese. Admiral Fletcher, in overall command on board Yorktown, and armed with PBY sighting reports from the early morning, ordered Spruance to launch against the Japanese as soon as was practical. At the urging of Halsey's Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning, Spruance commenced launching from his carriers Enterprise and Hornet at 07:00. Fletcher, upon completing his own scouting flights, followed suit at 08:00 from Yorktown.[36] However, American flight deck operations were not nearly as proficient as their enemy's at this point in the war, and the American squadrons were launched in piecemeal fashion, proceeding to the target in several different groups. This diminished the overall impact of the American attacks, and greatly increased their casualties. Nevertheless, these planes were gone before Nagumo's arrived; none of Nagumo's indecision, therefore, made any difference.

American carrier aircraft began attacking the Japanese carrier fleet at 09:20, with first Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8), followed by VT-6 (at 09:40) attacking without fighter support.[37] Every TBD of VT-8 was shot down, and of all the aircrew only one man survived Ensign George H. Gay, Jr. VT-6 nearly met the same fate, with no hits against the enemy to show for their efforts. The Japanese CAP (Combat Air Patrol), flying the much faster Mitsubishi Zero fighter, made short work of the slow, under-armed American torpedo planes. However, despite their terrible sacrifices, the American torpedo planes indirectly achieved two important results. First, they kept the Japanese off balance, with no ability to prepare and launch their own counterstrike. Second, their attacks had pulled the Japanese combat air patrol out of position — not in terms of altitude (as has commonly been described), but by laterally distorting the CAP coverage over the Japanese fleet.[38] The appearance of a third torpedo plane attack from the SE by VT-3 at 10:00 very quickly drew the majority of the Japanese CAP into the southeast quadrant of the fleet.[39]

By chance, at the same time VT-3 was sighted by the Japanese, two separate formations (comprising three squadrons total) of American SBD Dauntless dive-bombers were approaching the Japanese fleet from the northeast and southwest. These formations, despite having had difficulty in locating the Japanese carriers had now — by sheer luck and some good decision-making on the part of their respective squadron commanders — arrived in a perfect position to attack the Japanese.[40] Armed Japanese strike aircraft filled the hangar decks at the time of the fateful attack, fuel hoses snaking across the decks as refueling operations were hastily completed, and the constant change of ordnance meant that bombs and torpedoes were stacked around the hangars rather than being stowed safely in the magazines.[41] The Japanese carriers were in an extraordinarily vulnerable position.

However, contrary to some accounts of the battle, recent research has demonstrated that the Japanese were not prepared to launch a counterstrike against the Americans at the time they were decisively attacked.[42] Due to the constant flight deck activity associated with combat air patrol operations during the preceding hour, the Japanese had never had an opportunity to spot their reserve strike force for launch. The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either CAP fighters, or (in the case of Sōryū) strike fighters being spotted to augment the CAP.[43] Regardless, the moment of opportunity was exploited for all it was worth by the American bomber pilots.

Beginning at 10:22, Enterprise’s aircraft attacked Kaga, while to the south,Yorktown’s aircraft attacked carrier Sōryū, with Akagi being struck by several of Enterprise's bombers four minutes later. Simultaneously, VT-3 was targeting Hiryū, although the American torpedo aircraft again scored no hits. The dive-bombers, however, had better fortune. Within six minutes, the SBDs made their attack runs and left all three of their targets heavily ablaze. Akagi was hit by just one bomb, which was sufficient; it penetrated to the upper hangar deck and exploded among the armed and fueled aircraft there. One extreme near miss also slanted in and exploded underwater, bending the flight deck upward with the resulting geyser and causing crucial rudder damage.[44] Sōryū took three bomb hits in the hangar decks; Kaga took at least four and likely more. All three carriers were out of action, and would eventually be abandoned and scuttled.[45]

Subsequent to the air attacks, the American submarine Nautilus (SS-168) fired torpedoes at what her crew thought was the Sōryū, but which later research suggests was the Kaga. The Nautilus crew claimed that one torpedo hit the carrier, causing "flames". However, the surviving crew of the Kaga reported no torpedo hits after the air attack. Of the four torpedoes fired, one failed to run, two ran erratically, and the fourth was a 'dud,' impacting amidships and breaking in half.[46]

Japanese counterattacks

USS Yorktown is hit by an aerial torpedo

Hiryū, now the sole surviving Japanese flight deck, wasted little time in counterattacking. The first strike of Japanese dive-bombers badly damaged the Yorktown, yet her engineers patched her up so quickly that the second strike of torpedo bombers mistook her for an intact carrier. Despite Japanese hopes to even the battle by eliminating two carriers with two strikes, Yorktown absorbed both Japanese attacks, the second attack believing mistakenly that Yorktown had already been sunk and that they were attacking Enterprise. She was now out of the battle, but Task Force 16's two carriers had escaped undamaged as a result. (Yorktown would later be sunk, during salvage efforts, by torpedoes from a Japanese submarine on June 7. The same torpedo salvo would also sink the destroyer Hammann.)

News of the two strikes, with the reports that each had sunk an American carrier, greatly improved the morale of the crewmen of the Carrier Striking Force. The surviving aircraft from all four aircraft carriers in the Carrier Striking Force landed on Hiryū. There they were prepared for a strike against what was believed to be the American fleet's only remaining aircraft carrier.

When American scout aircraft subsequently located Hiryū later in the afternoon, Enterprise launched a final strike of dive bombers against the last Japanese carrier that left her ablaze, despite being defended by a strong defensive CAP of over a dozen Zero fighters (Lundstrom). Without RADAR directed defenses, Japanese ships were revealed to be quite vulnerable to high altitude dive bomber attack, regardless of CAP disposition (LeCompte). Hornet's strike, launching late due to a communications error, concentrated on the remaining surface ships but failed to score any hits.

As darkness fell, both sides took stock, and made tentative plans for continuing the action. Admiral Spruance was now in tactical command of the American forces as Admiral Fletcher had been obliged to abandon the derelict Yorktown. Spruance knew that he had won a great victory, but he was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained at hand, and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. Consequently, he decided to retire east during the evening, so as to not run into a night action with Japanese surface forces that might still be in the area. In the early morning hours, he returned to the west to be in a position to cover Midway should an invasion develop in the morning.[47]

For his part, Yamamoto initially decided to continue the effort, and sent his remaining surface forces searching eastward for the American carriers. Simultaneously, a cruiser raiding force was detached to bombard the island that very night. Eventually, however, the night waned without any sign of the Americans, and at 02:55 Yamamoto ordered his various forces to retire to the west.[48]

While beating its retreat in close column at night, the Japanese cruiser bombardment force suffered a further trial. A sighting of the American submarine Tambor forced the cruiser formation to initiate radical evasive manoeuvers. Mogami failed to adjust its course correctly for a column turn, and rammed the port quarter of her sistership Mikuma. Over the following two days, first Midway and then Spruance's carriers launched several successive strikes against the stragglers. Mikuma was eventually sent to the bottom, while Mogami managed to successfully fend off the bombers, and lived to fight another day. US Marine Captain Richard E. Fleming was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his attack on the Mikuma.

Aftermath

After scoring a clear victory, American forces retired. Japan's loss of half of their fleet carriers (Kaga, Akagi, Sōryū, and Hiryū) stopped the expansion of the Japanese Empire in the Pacific. Only Zuikaku and Shōkaku were left available for offensive actions, as the other two CVs that Japan possessed, Junyo and Hiyo, were too slow and unreliable for anything but defensive warfare.

With the US Navy now having clawed its way back to a rough parity of fleet carriers, the Americans could contemplate taking to the offensive for the first time in the war. Shortly thereafter, the Americans would invade Guadalcanal, initiating the attritional struggle in the Solomon Islands that would permanently wreck the Japanese Navy and its elite naval air groups.

Allegations of War crimes

Three U.S. airmen, Ensign Wesley Osmus (pilot, Yorktown), Ensign Frank O'Flaherty (pilot, Enterprise) and Aviation Machinist's Mate B.F. (or (B. P.) Gaido (radio-gunner of O'Flaherty's SBD) were captured by the Japanese during the battle. Osmus was held on the destroyer Arashi, with O'Flaherty and Gaido on the cruiser Nagara (or destroyer Makigumo, sources vary), and it is alleged that they were later killed.[49] The report filed by Admiral Nagumo states of Ensign Osmus; "He died on 6 June and was buried at sea." and does not mention the death of either Enterprise POW. [50] The practice of burying the remains of the enemy at sea was common among all navies involved.

Impact

Although the battle has often been called "the turning point of the Pacific", it clearly did not win the Pacific War overnight for the Americans.[51] The Japanese navy continued to fight ferociously, and it would be many more months before the U.S. would move from a state of naval parity to that of increasingly clear supremacy. Nor, given the vast disparity in economic strength between the two combatants, is it even remotely likely that the Americans would have lost the war against Japan had they lost the battle.[52] Thus, Midway was not "decisive" in the same sense as Salamis or Trafalgar. However, victory at Midway gave the U.S. the opportunity to seize the strategic initiative, inflicted irreparable damage on the Japanese carrier force, and shortened the war in the Pacific.[53]

Just two months later, the US took the offensive and attacked Guadalcanal, catching the Japanese off-balance. Given a defeat at Midway, the US may not have struck at such an early date, or had the same degree of success. Securing Allied supply lines to Australia and the Indian Ocean in this time frame, along with the heavy attrition inflicted on the Japanese during the Guadalcanal campaign, had far-reaching effects on the course of the war. Its effect on the length is debatable, given the Pacific Fleet's Submarine Force having brought Japan's economy essentially to a stop by January 1945.[54]

While Midway did not see the destruction of Japanese naval aviation, it did deal it a heavy blow. The pre-war Japanese training program produced pilots of exceptional quality, but at a painfully slow rate.[55] This small group of elite aviators were combat hardened veterans. At Midway, the Japanese lost as many of these pilots in a single day as their pre-war training program produced in a year.[56] In the subsequent battles around Guadalcanal in late 1942, such as Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, Japanese naval aviation was ground down by attrition despite roughly equal losses on both sides, because Japan could not quickly replace the ships, pilots, and sailors. Although wartime Japanese training programs produced pilots, they were insufficiently trained as the war continued, an imbalance that became worse as increasingly potent US fighters became available that clearly outmatched Japanese aircraft. By mid-1943, the losses at Midway and in the Solomons had decimated Japanese naval aviation.[57] Worse for the Japanese, their habit of leaving expert pilots in combat was detrimental to the training of their forces. The US Navy, by contrast, rotated its best aviators home on a regular basis to teach pilot trainees the techniques they would use to defeat Japan.

Even more important was the irredeemable loss of four of Japan's fleet carriers.[58] These ships would not be replaced, unit for unit, until early in 1945.[59] In the same span of time, the U.S. Navy commissioned more than two dozen fleet and light fleet carriers, and numerous escort carriers.[60] Thus, Midway permanently damaged the Japanese Navy's striking power, and measurably shortened the period during which the Japanese carrier force could fight on advantageous terms. The loss of operational capability during this critical phase of the campaign ultimately proved disastrous; Imperial Japan could have executed much grander, and perhaps more successful, operations against the U.S. counter-offensive being marshalled.

Mikuma shortly before sinking.

The importance of the Battle of Midway can also be assessed by considering the hypothetical scenario of an American defeat and the destruction of the US aircraft carrier fleet. With only two carriers (Saratoga and Wasp) available, the U.S. would have been forced onto the strategic defensive for at least the remainder of 1942. The Japanese could have continued their advance on the New Hebrides and cut off communication with Australia, and completed their conquest of New Guinea. Furthermore, a catastrophic failure at Midway might have resulted in the removal of key figures like Nimitz and Spruance from their positions. Offensive operations in the Pacific might have been delayed until as late as mid-1943, when Essex and Independence-class carriers became available in appreciable numbers.

A hypothetically longer Pacific war does raise the question of the role the Soviet Union would have played in Japan's demise, and whether the USSR would have gained a postwar presence in a partitioned Japan, similar to Germany. The actual implications of an American defeat are unknowable, but there is little question losing at Midway would have narrowed U.S. options dramatically, at least in the short term.[61] A defeat at Midway, by implicitly jeopardizing Hawaii and Pearl Harbor, might have put the "Germany First" priority of Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs in grave political peril.[62] Had the United States been obliged to focus its efforts on Japan, American intervention in Europe might well have been delayed, with incalculable implications for Germany and the Soviet Union.

Discovery

U.S. vessels

Due to the extreme depth of the ocean in the area of the battle (more than 17,000 feet/5200 m), researching the battlefield has presented extraordinary difficulties. However, on May 19, 1998, Robert Ballard and a team of scientists & Midway veterans (including Japanese participants) located and photographed Yorktown. The ship was remarkably intact for a vessel that sank in 1942; much of the original equipment, and even the original paint scheme were still visible.

Japanese vessels

Ballard's subsequent search for the Japanese carriers was ultimately unsuccessful. In September 1999, a joint expedition between Nauticos Corp. and the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office searched for the Japanese aircraft carriers. Using advanced renavigation techniques in conjunction with the ship's log of the submarine USS Nautilus, the expedition located a large piece of wreckage, which was subsequently identified as having come from the upper hangar deck of carrier Kaga.[63] The main wreck, however, has yet to be located.

In film

Taking off survivors from Yorktown, Hammann was mistakenly struck by a torpedo from I-168.

The Battle of Midway has been featured in several motion pictures. The first film about the battle was directed by John Ford, who used color motion picture from U.S. Navy of the actual battle, releasing an award-winning documentary called The Battle of Midway in 1942. Subsequently, the movie Midway, directed by Jack Smight, was released in 1976. This film generally portrayed the events fairly accurately, although it was criticized for suffering from several flaws, including a preposterous romance, the presence of American F4U Corsair fighters (which were not operational at the time of the battle), inaccurate warship models, and the promotion of Hypo's Commander Rochefort to Fleet Intelligence Officer. In addition, the 1976 movie vividly depicts Grumman F6F Hellcat carrier landings, whereas the battle involved its predecessor, the Grumman F4F Wildcat, which strongly resembles the Hellcat but is distinguishable during landings due to the Wildcat's narrow-track landing gear. The Hellcat did not become operational until 1943.

Trivia

  • This major defeat for Japan came six months after the beginning of open warfare against the United States. That is almost exactly the maximum amount of time that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto predicted he would have the advantage over the enemy before the tide would turn in its favor.

Notes

  1. Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 92.
  2. Dull, The Imperial Japanese Navy: A Battle History, p. 166; Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin, pp. 519-523; Prange, Miracle at Midway p. 395; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 416-430
  3. H.P. Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin; Lundstrom, First South Pacific Campaign; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 19-38
  4. For a detailed discussion of anticipated follow-on Hawai’ian operations, see Parshall & Tully, pp. 43-45, & Stephan, Hawaii under the Rising Sun.
  5. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 33
  6. Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 13-15, 21-23; Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin, pp. 39-49; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 22-38
  7. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 33; Prange, Miracle at Midway, p.23
  8. Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 22-26
  9. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 33
  10. Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, pp. 66-67; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 33-34
  11. Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 375-379, Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, pp. 110-117; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 52
  12. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 53, derived from Japanese War History Series (Senshi Sōshō), Volume 43 ('Midowei Kaisen'), p. 118
  13. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 51, 55;
  14. Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin
  15. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 43-45, derived from Senshi Sōshō, p. 196
  16. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 43-45, derived from Senshi Sōshō, pp. 119-121.
  17. Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 80-81; Cressman et al., A Glorious Page in Our History, p. 37
  18. Cressman et al., A Glorious Page in Our History, pp. 37-45; Lord, Incredible Victory, pp. 37-39
  19. Lord, Incredible Victory, p.39
  20. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 65-67
  21. Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, p. 351; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 98-99
  22. Lord, Incredible Victory, pp. 37-39; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 99; Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets
  23. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 102-104
  24. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets; Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin.
  25. Lord, Incredible Victory; Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin.
  26. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 107-112; 132-133
  27. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 200-204
  28. Lord, Incredible Victory, p. 110; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 149
  29. Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 207-212; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 149-152
  30. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 130-132
  31. Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 216-217; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 159-161
  32. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 165-170
  33. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 121-124
  34. Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 217-218, 372-373; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 170-173
  35. Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 231-237; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 170-173
  36. Cressman et al., A Glorious Page in Our History, pp. 84-89; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 215-216; 226-227
  37. Cressman et al., "A Glorious Page in Our History," pp. 91-94
  38. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 215-216; 226-227
  39. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 226-227
  40. Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 259-261, 267-269; Cressman et al., A Glorious Page in Our History, pp. 96-97; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 215-216; 226-227
  41. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 250
  42. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 229-231. Derived from (Senshi Sōshō), Volume 43, pp. 372-378, and the tabulated air group records (kōdōchōshos) of the Japanese carriers contained in "Midway Operation: DesRon 10,Mine Sweep Div 16,CV Akagi, CV Kaga, CVL Sōryū, and CVL Hiryū." Extract Translation from DOC No.160985B—MC 397.901.
  43. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 231, derived from Senshi Sosho, pp. 372-378.
  44. Other sources claim a stern hit, but Shattered Sword, p. 253-354; 256-259 makes a case for a water burst, due to rudder damage from an HE (non-armor-piercing) bomb.
  45. Recent scholarship has shown that all four Japanese carriers were scuttled, not just Akagi and Hiryū. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 330-353
  46. Lord, Incredible Victory p. 213; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 302-303
  47. Prange, Miracle at Midway, p. 324
  48. Prange, Miracle at Midway, p. 320; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 345
  49. Robert E. Barde, "Midway: Tarnished Victory", Military Affairs, v. 47, no. 4 (December 1983), pp. 188-192
  50. Nagumo's Midway report from ibiblio.org
  51. Dull, p. 166; Prange, p. 395
  52. Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, pp. 522-523; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 416-430
  53. U.S. Naval War College Analysis, p. 1; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 416-430
  54. Blair, Silent Victory.
  55. Peattie, Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941, pp. 181-184, 191-192
  56. Peattie, Sunburst, pp. 131-134
  57. Peattie, Sunburst, pp. 176-186; Eric Bergerud, Fire in the Sky, p. 668.
  58. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 416-421
  59. Shinano, commissioned on 19 November 1944, was only the fourth fleet carrier commissioned by Japan during the war, after Taihō, Unryū, and Amagi.
  60. See http://www.hazegray.org/danfs/carriers/ for a listing of all American carriers commissioned during the war. Also refer to http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm for a tabulation of aggregate carrier and carrier aircraft levels between the USN and IJN if the U.S. had lost at Midway.
  61. Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, pp. 519-523; Prange,Miracle at Midway 396-397; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 424-430
  62. Weinberg, World at Arms p. 339
  63. Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 491-493

See also

Portal:Military of the United States
Military of the United States Portal
  • Pacific Battles of the Second World War
  • Midway order of battle

Sources and further reading

Books

  • Cook, Theodore F., Jr. (2000). "Our Midway Disaster", in Robert Cowley (ed.): What if?. London: Macmillan. ISBN 0-333-75183-3.  Counterfactual fiction has the Japanese winning.
  • Fuchida, Mitsuo and Masatake Okumiya (1955). Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy's Story. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-372-5.  A Japanese account, colored by hindsight and sometimes inaccurate.
  • Hanson, Victor D. (2001). Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power. Doubleday. ISBN 0-385-50052-1. 
  • Hara, Tameichi (1961). Japanese Destroyer Captain. ISBN 0-345-27894-1.  First-hand account by Japanese captain, often inaccurate.
  • Kahn, David. The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet. Scribner. ISBN 0-684-83130-9.  Significant section on Midway
  • Kernan, Alvin (2005). The Unknown Battle of Midway. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-10989-X.  An account of the blunders that led to the near total destruction of the American torpedo squadrons, and of what the author calls a cover-up by naval officers after the battle.
  • Lord, Walter (1967). Incredible Victory. Burford. ISBN 1-58080-059-9.  Focuses primarily on the human experience of the battle.
  • Lundstrom, John B. (2005 (New edition)). First Team And the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-472-8. 
  • Lundstrom, John B. (2005 (New edition)). The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, Maryland, U.S.A.: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 159114471X. 
  • Morison, Samuel E. (1949). Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions: May 1942–August 1942.  (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 4) official US history.
  • Parshall, Jonathan and Tully, Anthony (2005). Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books. ISBN 1-57488-923-0.  Uses recent Japanese sources.
  • Prange, Gordon W. and Goldstein, Donald M., and Dillon, Katherine V. (1982). Miracle at Midway. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-07-050672-8.  The standard academic history of the battle based on massive research into American and Japanese sources.
  • Weinberg, Gerhard L. (1994). A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge U P. 
  • Wilmott, H.P. (1983). The Barrier and the Javelin. United States Naval Institute Press.  Broad-scale history of the naval war with detailed accounts of order of battle and dispositions.

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