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'''Arnold Geulincx''' (1624-1669; used the pseudonym '''Philaretus''') was a Flemish philosopher and logician. He served as professor at the University of Leuven, Belgium for 12 years, and later professor at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands. Geulincx wrote all his works in Latin, and died before his principal books, namely ''Ethica'' and ''Metaphysica'' could be published. Despite professional and political pressure to do otherwise, he devoted a considerable amount of his time to [[Descartes]]' philosophy, though he had no reservations about reaching different conclusions. While still regarded as a minor figure by most historians of philosophy, interest in him is increasing, with the first major translation of one of his works appearing in 2006.
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'''Arnold Geulincx''' (1624-1669; used the pseudonym '''Philaretus''') was a Flemish philosopher and logician. He served as professor at the University of Leuven, Belgium for 12 years, and later professor at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands. Geulincx wrote all his works in [[Latin]], and died before his principal books, namely ''Ethica'' and ''Metaphysica'' could be published. Despite professional and political pressure to do otherwise, he devoted a considerable amount of his time to [[Descartes]]' philosophy, though he had no reservations about reaching different conclusions. While still regarded as a minor figure by most historians of philosophy, interest in him is increasing, with the first major translation of one of his works appearing in 2006.
  
 
==Life==
 
==Life==
  
Arnold Geulincx was born at baptized at Antwerp in 1624, the son of a moderately well-off messenger.  It is likely that his early education was a traditional one conducted by Augustine friars.  In 1641, the same year of the first publication of [[Decartes|Descartes']] landmark ''Meditations on First Philosophy'', Geulincx began studies at the University of Louvain. His two years of study there were formally centered on traditional [[Aristotle|Aristotlean]] logic, metaphysics and physics. Nevertheless, the university was not entirely strict on excluding other schools of thought, so Geulincx was exposed to Epicureanism, Stoicism and, most importantly, Cartesianism.
+
Arnold Geulincx was born at baptized at Antwerp in 1624, the son of a moderately well-off messenger.  It is likely that his early education was a traditional one conducted by Augustine friars.  In 1641, the same year of the first publication of [[Descartes|Descartes']] landmark ''Meditations on First Philosophy'', Geulincx began studies at the University of Louvain. His two years of study there were formally centered on traditional [[Aristotle|Aristotlean]] logic, [[metaphysics]] and physics. Nevertheless, the university was not entirely strict on excluding other schools of thought, so Geulincx was exposed to [[Epicureanism]], [[Stoicism]] and, most importantly, [[Cartesianism]].
  
After obtaining the degree of Licentiate in Arts in 1643, Geulincx studied theology, but began teaching philosophy in 1646. He did well at the university, but was deprived of his office in 1658 for reasons likely relating to a proposed position at the cathedral at Aix and his marriage to his cousin Susanna Strickers. Moving to Leiden, he acquired the degree of Doctor of Medicine (although he appeared to have little intention of practicing medicine). The university at Leiden allowed him to teach in a limited capacity, but formally discouraged anything other than orthodox scholasticism, for Geulincx's reputation as an advocate of the new philosophy was well-known.  Despite the restrictions on his teaching, it is significant that the university allowed a non-traditional thinker to have an offical position at all. In 1665, he was promoted to the position of professor extra ordinem.  Throughout this time, Geulincx was at work on his treatises on logic, metaphysics and ethics, but his death by the plague in 1669 meant that most of these were published posthumously.
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After obtaining the degree of Licentiate in Arts in 1643, Geulincx studied [[theology]], but began teaching [[philosophy]] in 1646. He did well at the university, but was deprived of his office in 1658 for reasons likely relating to a proposed position at the cathedral at Aix and his marriage to his cousin Susanna Strickers. Moving to Leiden, he acquired the degree of Doctor of Medicine (although he appeared to have little intention of practicing medicine). The university at Leiden allowed him to teach in a limited capacity, but formally discouraged anything other than orthodox scholasticism, for Geulincx's reputation as an advocate of the new philosophy was well-known.  Despite the restrictions on his teaching, it is significant that the university allowed a non-traditional thinker to have an offical position at all. In 1665, he was promoted to the position of professor extra ordinem.  Throughout this time, Geulincx was at work on his treatises on [[logic]], [[metaphysics]] and [[ethics]], but his death by the plague in 1669 meant that most of these were published posthumously.
  
 
==Philosophy==
 
==Philosophy==
  
One of the major differences between contemporary logic and Aristotlean logic is that the former is thoroughly compositional - that is, it specifies logical elements that can be combined into more complex forms. The advantage of compositionality is that it allows greater logical power with fewer principles (in contrast to, for instance, the way that students of Aristotle's logic were simply required to memorize a list of valid argument forms).  Geulincx was one of the first philosophers to began pushing towards a compositional logic.  He claimed that a denial such as "It's not raining" is composed of an affirmation ("It's raining") and a negation. Geulincx also saw this as having consequences for what we would today consider the philosophy of propositional attitudes; specifically, that believing a denial requires all the conceptual apparatus required for believing the affirmation it has as a constituent.
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One of the major differences between contemporary [[logic]] and [[Aristotle|Aristotlean]] logic is that the former is thoroughly compositional - that is, it specifies logical elements that can be combined into more complex forms. The advantage of compositionality is that it allows greater logical power with fewer principles (in contrast to, for instance, the way that students of Aristotle's logic were simply required to memorize a list of valid argument forms).  Geulincx was one of the first philosophers to began pushing towards a compositional logic.  He claimed that a denial such as "It's not raining" is composed of an affirmation ("It's raining") and a negation. Geulincx also saw this as having consequences for what we would today consider the philosophy of propositional attitudes; specifically, that believing a denial requires all the conceptual apparatus required for believing the affirmation it has as a constituent.
  
Another noteworthy aspect of Geulincx's views on logic is his analysis of what it is for some claim to ''follow'' from another claim or set of claims.  In most contemporary discussions, this is said to happen when it is not possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. A main advantage of this definition is the way that it ties our intuitions about the inferential structure of an argument to our intuitions about the possibility of truth and falsity. One disadvantage is that it commits us to saying that (e.g.) "Cats are dogs, therefore squares have four sides" is a valid argument - since the conclusion is a necessary truth, it can be said to 'follow from' the obviously false conclusion.
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Another noteworthy aspect of Geulincx's views on logic is his analysis of what it is for some claim to ''follow'' from another claim or set of claims.  In most contemporary discussions, this is said to happen when it is not possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. A main advantage of this definition is the way that it ties our intuitions about the inferential structure of an argument to our intuitions about the possibility of truth and falsity. One disadvantage is that it commits us to saying that (e.g.) "Cats are dogs, therefore squares have four sides" is a valid argument - since the conclusion is a necessary truth, it can be said to 'follow from' the obviously false conclusion.
  
 
In light of such considerations, some philosophers have advanced an analysis of 'following from' that relies not so much on our intuitions concerning possible truth and falsity as on our intuitions concerning what it is for some claim to be 'contained' in another.  Geulincx was one of the earliest logicians to state such a view.  This view rules out the above absurd example, for, intuitively, no statement about squares is contained in the statement about cats being dogs.
 
In light of such considerations, some philosophers have advanced an analysis of 'following from' that relies not so much on our intuitions concerning possible truth and falsity as on our intuitions concerning what it is for some claim to be 'contained' in another.  Geulincx was one of the earliest logicians to state such a view.  This view rules out the above absurd example, for, intuitively, no statement about squares is contained in the statement about cats being dogs.
  
One of the mostly hotly debated issues in the wake of Descartes' mature philosophy was his view that the mind and body, despite being fundamentally different substances, are able to causally interact. Descartes' own position appears to be that we can deny neither the distinctness of the mind and body, nor the fact that they are in constant interaction, so we must simply live with our lack of understanding of how this interaction is possible. In a manner analogous with that of his contemporary [[Malebranche]], Geulincx argued against this on the basis of what he regarded as a basic metaphysical principle: that we are capable of bringing about an effect ''only if'' we understand how this effect is produced.  Since we lack any understanding of how a mental substance could affect a physical one, we are not capable of producing any change in physical substances. This leaves God as the sole causal power in the universe. Against Descartes, Geulincx held that our understanding of the principles of the physical world, however clear and distinct, can never rise above a series of hypotheses (this view being very much in keeping with the awakening of the scientific enlightenment).
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One of the mostly hotly debated issues in the wake of [[Descartes]]' mature philosophy was his view that the mind and body, despite being fundamentally different substances, are able to causally interact. Descartes' own position appears to be that we can deny neither the distinctness of the mind and body, nor the fact that they are in constant interaction, so we must simply live with our lack of understanding of how this interaction is possible. In a manner analogous with that of his contemporary [[Malebranche]], Geulincx argued against this on the basis of what he regarded as a basic metaphysical principle: that we are capable of bringing about an effect ''only if'' we understand how this effect is produced.  Since we lack any understanding of how a mental substance could affect a physical one, we are not capable of producing any change in physical [[substance]]s. This leaves God as the sole causal power in the universe. Against Descartes, Geulincx held that our understanding of the principles of the physical world, however clear and distinct, can never rise above a series of hypotheses (this view being very much in keeping with the awakening of the scientific enlightenment).
  
 
Given his view of God as the sole causal power, it is unsurprising that Geulincx's principles of ethical assessment are primarily concerned with intentions rather than actions.  For example, it is fundamentally a matter of God's will whether my arm reaches out and steals a wallet sitting on a table.  Nevertheless, it is in my power to ''intend'' to steal a wallet or not.  If my intentions are good, then I have not sinned.  Of course, God's running of the world generally lines up good intentions with good actions, but this is a fact external to ethical evaluation.
 
Given his view of God as the sole causal power, it is unsurprising that Geulincx's principles of ethical assessment are primarily concerned with intentions rather than actions.  For example, it is fundamentally a matter of God's will whether my arm reaches out and steals a wallet sitting on a table.  Nevertheless, it is in my power to ''intend'' to steal a wallet or not.  If my intentions are good, then I have not sinned.  Of course, God's running of the world generally lines up good intentions with good actions, but this is a fact external to ethical evaluation.
  
 
==References==
 
==References==
*Geulincx, Arnold. (2006) ''Arnold Geulincx' Ethics: With Samuel Beckett's Notes'', Brill Academic Publishers.
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*Chappell, V. C. (1992). ''Cartesian philosophers. Essays on early modern philosophers, v. 3.'' New York: Garland. ISBN 081530577X ISBN 9780815305774 ISBN 0815305761 ISBN 9780815305767
 +
*Geulincx, A., Beckett, S., Wilson, M., Ruler, J. A. v., & Uhlmann, A. (2006). ''Ethics''. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 9004154671 ISBN 9789004154674
 
*Geulincx, A. (1891–3) ''Opera philosophica,'' ed. J.P.N. Land, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 3 vols. Reprinted with some additions, Sämtliche Schriften, ed. H.J. De Vleeschauwer, Stuttgart Bad Canstatt: Frommann, 1965–8, 3 vols.
 
*Geulincx, A. (1891–3) ''Opera philosophica,'' ed. J.P.N. Land, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 3 vols. Reprinted with some additions, Sämtliche Schriften, ed. H.J. De Vleeschauwer, Stuttgart Bad Canstatt: Frommann, 1965–8, 3 vols.
 
*Land, J.P.N. (1891) "Arnold Geulincx and his works," ''Mind'' 16, 223-242.
 
*Land, J.P.N. (1891) "Arnold Geulincx and his works," ''Mind'' 16, 223-242.
 
*Verbeek, Theo (1998). "Geulincx, Arnold," In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
 
*Verbeek, Theo (1998). "Geulincx, Arnold," In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
*von Ruler, Han.  [http://www.geulincx.org/biography/index.html/ Biography of Geulincx at Guelincx.org]
 
  
 
==External Links==
 
==External Links==
*[http://www.geulincx.org/ Geulincx.org].
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*[http://www.geulincx.org/ Geulincx.org]. Retrieved September 16, 2007.
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Dualism] (See 'History' section)
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Dualism] (See 'History' section). Retrieved September 16, 2007.
 
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===General Philosophy Sources===
 
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]. Retrieved September 14, 2007.
[[Category:Flemish philosophers|Geulincx]]
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*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]. Retrieved September 14, 2007.
[[Category:1624 births|Geulincx]]
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*[http://www.epistemelinks.com/  Philosophy Sources on Internet EpistemeLinks]. Retrieved September 14, 2007.
[[Category:1669 deaths|Geulincx]]
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*[http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/gpi/index.htm Guide to Philosophy on the Internet]. Retrieved September 14, 2007.
[[Category:Philosophers of mind|Geulincx, Arnold]]
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*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online]. Retrieved September 14, 2007.
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*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg]. Retrieved September 14, 2007.
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[[category:Philosophy and religion]]
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[[Category:philosophy]]
  
 
{{Credit|75624267}}
 
{{Credit|75624267}}

Revision as of 01:33, 16 September 2007

Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669; used the pseudonym Philaretus) was a Flemish philosopher and logician. He served as professor at the University of Leuven, Belgium for 12 years, and later professor at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands. Geulincx wrote all his works in Latin, and died before his principal books, namely Ethica and Metaphysica could be published. Despite professional and political pressure to do otherwise, he devoted a considerable amount of his time to Descartes' philosophy, though he had no reservations about reaching different conclusions. While still regarded as a minor figure by most historians of philosophy, interest in him is increasing, with the first major translation of one of his works appearing in 2006.

Life

Arnold Geulincx was born at baptized at Antwerp in 1624, the son of a moderately well-off messenger. It is likely that his early education was a traditional one conducted by Augustine friars. In 1641, the same year of the first publication of Descartes' landmark Meditations on First Philosophy, Geulincx began studies at the University of Louvain. His two years of study there were formally centered on traditional Aristotlean logic, metaphysics and physics. Nevertheless, the university was not entirely strict on excluding other schools of thought, so Geulincx was exposed to Epicureanism, Stoicism and, most importantly, Cartesianism.

After obtaining the degree of Licentiate in Arts in 1643, Geulincx studied theology, but began teaching philosophy in 1646. He did well at the university, but was deprived of his office in 1658 for reasons likely relating to a proposed position at the cathedral at Aix and his marriage to his cousin Susanna Strickers. Moving to Leiden, he acquired the degree of Doctor of Medicine (although he appeared to have little intention of practicing medicine). The university at Leiden allowed him to teach in a limited capacity, but formally discouraged anything other than orthodox scholasticism, for Geulincx's reputation as an advocate of the new philosophy was well-known. Despite the restrictions on his teaching, it is significant that the university allowed a non-traditional thinker to have an offical position at all. In 1665, he was promoted to the position of professor extra ordinem. Throughout this time, Geulincx was at work on his treatises on logic, metaphysics and ethics, but his death by the plague in 1669 meant that most of these were published posthumously.

Philosophy

One of the major differences between contemporary logic and Aristotlean logic is that the former is thoroughly compositional - that is, it specifies logical elements that can be combined into more complex forms. The advantage of compositionality is that it allows greater logical power with fewer principles (in contrast to, for instance, the way that students of Aristotle's logic were simply required to memorize a list of valid argument forms). Geulincx was one of the first philosophers to began pushing towards a compositional logic. He claimed that a denial such as "It's not raining" is composed of an affirmation ("It's raining") and a negation. Geulincx also saw this as having consequences for what we would today consider the philosophy of propositional attitudes; specifically, that believing a denial requires all the conceptual apparatus required for believing the affirmation it has as a constituent.

Another noteworthy aspect of Geulincx's views on logic is his analysis of what it is for some claim to follow from another claim or set of claims. In most contemporary discussions, this is said to happen when it is not possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. A main advantage of this definition is the way that it ties our intuitions about the inferential structure of an argument to our intuitions about the possibility of truth and falsity. One disadvantage is that it commits us to saying that (e.g.) "Cats are dogs, therefore squares have four sides" is a valid argument - since the conclusion is a necessary truth, it can be said to 'follow from' the obviously false conclusion.

In light of such considerations, some philosophers have advanced an analysis of 'following from' that relies not so much on our intuitions concerning possible truth and falsity as on our intuitions concerning what it is for some claim to be 'contained' in another. Geulincx was one of the earliest logicians to state such a view. This view rules out the above absurd example, for, intuitively, no statement about squares is contained in the statement about cats being dogs.

One of the mostly hotly debated issues in the wake of Descartes' mature philosophy was his view that the mind and body, despite being fundamentally different substances, are able to causally interact. Descartes' own position appears to be that we can deny neither the distinctness of the mind and body, nor the fact that they are in constant interaction, so we must simply live with our lack of understanding of how this interaction is possible. In a manner analogous with that of his contemporary Malebranche, Geulincx argued against this on the basis of what he regarded as a basic metaphysical principle: that we are capable of bringing about an effect only if we understand how this effect is produced. Since we lack any understanding of how a mental substance could affect a physical one, we are not capable of producing any change in physical substances. This leaves God as the sole causal power in the universe. Against Descartes, Geulincx held that our understanding of the principles of the physical world, however clear and distinct, can never rise above a series of hypotheses (this view being very much in keeping with the awakening of the scientific enlightenment).

Given his view of God as the sole causal power, it is unsurprising that Geulincx's principles of ethical assessment are primarily concerned with intentions rather than actions. For example, it is fundamentally a matter of God's will whether my arm reaches out and steals a wallet sitting on a table. Nevertheless, it is in my power to intend to steal a wallet or not. If my intentions are good, then I have not sinned. Of course, God's running of the world generally lines up good intentions with good actions, but this is a fact external to ethical evaluation.

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Chappell, V. C. (1992). Cartesian philosophers. Essays on early modern philosophers, v. 3. New York: Garland. ISBN 081530577X ISBN 9780815305774 ISBN 0815305761 ISBN 9780815305767
  • Geulincx, A., Beckett, S., Wilson, M., Ruler, J. A. v., & Uhlmann, A. (2006). Ethics. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 9004154671 ISBN 9789004154674
  • Geulincx, A. (1891–3) Opera philosophica, ed. J.P.N. Land, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 3 vols. Reprinted with some additions, Sämtliche Schriften, ed. H.J. De Vleeschauwer, Stuttgart Bad Canstatt: Frommann, 1965–8, 3 vols.
  • Land, J.P.N. (1891) "Arnold Geulincx and his works," Mind 16, 223-242.
  • Verbeek, Theo (1998). "Geulincx, Arnold," In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge.

External Links

General Philosophy Sources

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