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In [[logic]], an '''argument''' is an attempt to demonstrate the [[truth]] of an assertion called a ''[[conclusion]]'', based on the truth of a set of assertions called ''[[premise]]s''.
 
The process of demonstration of [[deductive]] (see also [[deduction]]) and [[Induction (philosophy)|inductive]] reasoning shapes the argument, and presumes some kind of communication, which could be part of a written text, a speech or a conversation. 
 
  
== Overview ==
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An '''argument''' is an attempt to demonstrate the truth of an assertion called a ''conclusion'', based on the truth of a set of assertions called ''premises''. If the argument is successful, the conclusion is said to be proved. This article classifies arguments as either deductive or inductive. An argument always assumes a certain kind of dialogue, with one person presenting the argument, attempting to persuade an interlocutor. An argument could be part of a written text, a speech, or a conversation.
In ordinary, philosophical and scientific argumentation [[Abductive reasoning|abductive]] arguments and arguments by [[analogy]] are also commonly used. Arguments can be ''valid'' or ''invalid'', although how arguments are determined to be in either of these two categories can often itself be an object of much discussion. Informally one should expect that a valid argument should be ''compelling'' in the sense that it is capable of convincing someone about the truth of the conclusion. However, such a criterion for validity is inadequate or even misleading since it depends more on the skill of the person constructing the argument to manipulate the person who is being convinced and less on the argument itself.
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== Arguments ==
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In an argument, some statements are put forward as giving evidence for another statement. For example, the following is an argument:
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:She likes citrus fruit, so she probably likes kumquats. After all, kumquats are citrus fruits.
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Here the conclusion is “she probably likes kumquats.” The statements offered in support are “she likes citrus fruit” and “kumquats are citrus fruits.” These premises are asserted, without any additional argument or support. These premises may or may not be true. A statement is argued for if it is given other statements as support; it is asserted if it has no such support.
  
Less subjective criteria for validity of arguments are often clearly desirable, and in some cases we should even expect an argument to be [[rigorous]], that is, to adhere to precise rules of validity. This is the case for arguments used in mathematical proofs. Note that a rigorous proof does not have to be a [[formal proof]].
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Sometimes the premises actually provide no support for the conclusion. Consider this argument:
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:The quarter has come up heads six times, so the next flip will probably come up tails.
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The conclusion of this argument is “the next flip will probably come up tails.” The statement provided as evidence for this gives no support at all. The previous flips have no bearing on the next flip. Yet this is an argument because the premises were offered as evidence for the conclusion.
  
In ordinary language, people refer to the ''logic of an argument'' or use terminology that suggests that an argument is based on [[inference rule]]s of [[formal logic]]. Though arguments do use inferences that are indisputably purely logical (such as syllogisms), other kinds of inferences are almost always used in practical arguments.  For example, arguments commonly deal with [[causality]], [[probability]] and [[statistics]] or even specialized areas such as [[economics]]. In these cases, ''logic'' refers to the structure of the argument rather than to principles of pure logic that might be used in it.
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Some collections of statements may look like arguments without being arguments. For example, if one’s purpose is to explain or clarify a statement, one is not giving an argument:
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:The movie was good. It had a good script, good acting, and good cinematography.
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If my purpose in saying this is to explain why I liked the movie, I am not arguing. The second sentence is not given as evidence for or in support of the first sentence, but is meant to explain why I liked the movie. These same sentences may be used in an argument for the conclusion; if I’m trying to convince you that the movie was good, I might offer the quality of the writing, acting, and filming as evidence of the movie’s quality.
  
==Argument validity==
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== [[Deduction|Deductive]] Arguments ==
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A [[deduction|deductive]] argument uses the laws of [[logic]] to attempt to prove its conclusion. A deductive argument may be valid or invalid. If it is valid, it is logically impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. In a valid argument, the premises are said to imply the conclusion. In some ways this is a very strong requirement (much stronger than the ordinary use of the word imply would suggest). It is irrational to accept the premises of a deductive argument and not accept the conclusion. One is not merely invited to accept the conclusion as plausible if one accepts the premises, rather, one is compelled to accept it as true.
  
In evaluating an argument, we consider separately the [[truth]] of the premises and the [[validity]] of the logical relationships between the premises, any intermediate assertions and the conclusion.  <!-- Edit out [[User:esrogs]]' contrib: based on disputed def of soundness. See [[User talk:Nortexoid#Soundness and validity]]:
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At the same time, it is in some ways a very weak requirement. Consider the following argument:
(If an argument has both a valid form and is based on true premises, it is termed ''sound''.) ---- [[User:Chalst|Charles Stewart]] 10:58, 24 Feb 2005 (UTC) —>  The main logical property of an argument that is of concern to us here is whether it is ''truth preserving'', that is ''if'' the premises are true, ''then'' so is the conclusion. We will usually abbreviate this property by saying simply that argument is ''valid''.  
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:All dogs are blue.
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:Nothing is blue except fish.
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:Therefore, all dogs are fish.
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This argument is valid since the conclusion follows logically from the premises. If the premises were true, the conclusion would be true as well. But the premises are not true, so the argument is not entirely successful. If an argument is valid and has true premises, it is called sound.
  
If the argument is valid, the premises together ''entail'' or ''imply'' the conclusion.
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A valid argument may be unsound even if it has a true conclusion. The following argument expressed this point:
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:All babies are illogical.
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:Nobody is despised who can manage a crocodile.
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:Illogical persons are despised.
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:Therefore, no baby can manage a crocodile.
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The conclusion is probably true, but at least some of the premises are certainly false. The first and third premises together prove that babies are despised, and this is surely false. If all babies are illogical (which is probably true), then at least some illogical persons are not despised. So the third premise is false (and perhaps the second premises too), but the conclusion is true.
  
The ways in which arguments go wrong tend to fall into certain patterns, called [[logical fallacy|logical fallacies]].  
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Thus, a valid argument can have a true conclusion but untrue premises. At the same time, it can never be the vice versa. Faced with a valid argument, if you don’t believe the conclusion you must reject one of the premises. For example:
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:Mammals do not lay eggs.
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:The platypus lays eggs.
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:Therefore, the platypus is not a mammal.
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Here the conclusion is false: the platypus is a mammal. Here the false premise is the first. Some mammals (specifically, the platypus and the echidna) do lay eggs.
  
Validity is a semantic characteristic of arguments; independently of this property, and more controversially, arguments should also be ''scrutinizable'', in the sense that the argument be open to public examination and ''systematic'' in the sense that the structural components of the argument have public legitimacy.
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In a sense, [[logic]] is the study of validity. A system of logic, such as syllogism, will give rules to allow one to deduce a conclusion from premises. If a system of logic is adequate, its rules are exactly the ones needed to prove every valid argument it can express without proving any invalid arguments.
  
== The mathematical paradigm ==
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== [[Induction (philosophy)|Inductive]] Arguments ==
In [[mathematics]], an argument can be formalized using [[Mathematical logic|symbolic logic]]. In that case, an argument is seen as an ordered list of statements, each one of which is either one of the ''premises'' or derivable from the combination of some subset of the preceding statements and one or more ''axioms'' using [[rules of inference]]. The last statement in the list is the ''conclusion''. Most arguments used in mathematical proof are rigorous, but not formal. In fact, strictly formal proofs of all but the most trivial assertions are extremely hard to construct and hard to understand without some assistance from a computer. One of the goals of [[automated theorem proving]] is to design computer programs to produce and check formal proofs.
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Strictly speaking, [[Induction (philosophy)|inductive]] arguments prove conclusions from premises that give special cases. For example:
A study of formal systems of mathematics together with semantic questions such as [[completeness]] and [[validity]] is often called [[metamathematics]]. Of particular note in this direction are the [[Gödel's incompleteness theorem]]s for first order theories of arithmetic.
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:Every major city that has adopted similar measures has ultimately repealed them after losing millions of dollars. If any city adopts a measure like this, it will likely face similar failure. We are not immune.
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There are many other kinds of inductive arguments as well. For example, an argument by analogy, in which the conclusion is argued for by presenting an example of something held to be similar, is not strictly an inductive argument, but for many purposes can be treated as one. In the preceding example, the general argument could be converted into an argument by analogy simply by changing the word ‘any’ to ‘our’, so the conclusion becomes this: “if our city adopts a measure like this, it will likely face similar failure.” Abductive argument, or reasoning to the best explanation, is another kind of non-deductive argument that is some ways similar to induction. Abductive arguments set out specific examples and then a general fact or principle that explains these examples.
  
The prevalent belief among mathematical authors is that ''valid arguments in mathematics are those that can be recognized as being in principle formalizable in the encompassing formal theory''.  It follows that the theory of valid arguments in mathematics is reducible to the theory of valid inferences in formal mathematical theories. A theory of validity of formal mathematical theories posits two distinct elements: [[syntax]] which gives the rules for when a formula is correctly constructed and [[semantics]] which is essentially a [[function (mathematics)|function]] from formulas to [[truth value]]s. An expression is said to be ''valid'' if the semantic function assigns the value ''true'' to it. A [[rule of inference]] is valid if and only if it is validity-preserving.  An argument is valid if and only if it utilizes valid rules of inference.  Note that in the case of mathematical semantics, both the syntax and semantics are mathematical objects.
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Notice that the conclusion is not guaranteed by the premises. Hence, this argument is technically invalid. But if the comparisons are apt (if the measure being proposed by this city is relevantly similar, if the city is relevantly similar to the other cities, and so on), the argument is quite compelling. Thus, validity is the wrong measure for inductive arguments. Instead, an inductive argument is said to be compelling or cogent. An argument that is compelling or cogent is able to rationally persuade the interlocutor of the conclusion.
  
In general usage, however, arguments are rarely formal or even have the [[rigor]] of mathematical proofs.
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This standard of rational persuasion is not as well-defined as it in the case of deductive arguments. In many cases it is clear that an argument has gone wrong. The persuasive power of many arguments is emotional or in some other way not rational. Such an argument is [[fallacy|fallacious]], and there are many common fallacies, which, once seen, lose their ability to deceive. It is not so easy to explain the standards of cogency, to explain how an argument goes right.
  
== Theories of arguments ==
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== [[Dialectic]] ==
Theories of arguments are closely related to theories of [[informal logic]]. Ideally, a theory of argument should provide some mechanism for explaining validity of arguments.
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The conclusion of a valid deductive argument is true if its premises are, so if one believes the premises of an argument, one must rationally believe the conclusion. Often arguments are between parties with different initial assumptions. In these cases, one party will present an argument whose premises he or she does not present as true, but as acceptable to the other party. The other party will counter with an argument from premises he or she thinks the other person believes to be true.
  
One natural approach would follow the mathematical paradigm and attempt to define validity in terms of [[semantics]] of the assertions in the  argument.  Though such an approach is appealing in its simplicity, the obstacles to proceeding this way are very difficult for anything other than purely logical arguments. Among other problems, we need to interpret not only entire sentences, but also components of sentences, for example noun phrases such as ''The present value of government revenue for the next twelve years''.
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For example, a [[theodicy]] might have different premises if its intended audience consisted of believing Christians than if its intended audience consisted of [[Agnosticism|agnostics]], [[Atheism|atheists]], or [[Buddhism|Buddhists]]. An argument’s strength often depends on selecting the right premises for the intended audience.
  
One major difficulty of pursuing this approach is that determining an appropriate semantic domain is not an easy task, raising numerous thorny [[ontological]] issues. It also raises the discouraging prospect of having to work out acceptable semantic theories before being able to say anything useful about understanding and evaluating arguments.  For this reason the purely semantic approach is usually replaced with other approaches that are more easily applicable to practical discourse.
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==See also==
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*[[Fallacy]]
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*[[Deduction]]
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*[[Induction (philosophy)]]
  
For arguments regarding topics such as probability, economics or physics, some of the semantic problems can be conveniently shoved under the rug if we can avail ourselves of a [[model (abstract)|model]] of the phenomenon under discussion. In this case, we can establish a limited semantic interpretation using the terms of the model and the validity of the argument is reduced to that of the abstract model. This kind of reduction is used in the natural sciences generally, and would be particularly helpful in arguing about social issues if the parties can agree on a model. Unfortunately, this prior reduction seldom occurs, with the result that arguments about social policy rarely have a satisfactory resolution.  
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== References ==
 
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* Audi, Robert. 1998. ''Epistemology''. Second edition, 2002. London: Routledge. ISBN 0415281091
Another approach is to develop a theory of argument [[pragmatics]], at least in certain cases where argument and social interaction are closely related. This is most useful when the goal of logical argument is to establish a mutually satisfactory resolution of a difference of opinion between individuals.
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* Austin, J. L. ''How to Do things with Words''. Second edition, 1975. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0674411528
 
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* Chesñevar, Carlos, Ana Maguitman and Ronald Loui. 2000. "Logical Models of Argument." ''ACM Computing Surveys'' 32(4): 337-383.
==Argumentative dialogue==
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* Grice, H. P. "Logic and Conversation" from ''The Logic of Grammar''. Dickenson, 1975.
Arguments as discussed in the preceding paragraphs are static, such as one might find in a textbook or research article. They serve as a published record of justification for an assertion. Arguments can also be interactive, in which the proposer and the interlocutor have a more symmetrical relationship. The premises are discussed, as well the validity of the intermediate inferences.  For example, consider the following exchange, illustrated by the [[No true Scotsman]] fallacy:
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* Poincaré, Henri. 1952. ''Science and Hypothesis''. Mineola, N.Y. Dover Publications. ISBN 0486602214
 
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* Eemeren, Frans van and Rob Grootendorst. 1984. ''Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions''. Foris Publications. ISBN 9067650188
: Argument: "No Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge."  
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* Popper, Karl R. ''Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach''. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. ISBN 0198750242
: Reply: "But my friend Angus likes sugar with his porridge."
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* Stebbing, L. S. 1948. ''A Modern Introduction to Logic''. Methuen and Co., 1953.
: Rebuttal: "Ah yes, but no true Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge."  
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* Walton, Douglas. ''Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation''. Cambridge, 1998.
 
 
In this dialogue, the proposer first offers a premise, the premise is challenged by the interlocutor, and finally the proposer offers a modification of the premise. This exchange could be part of a larger discussion, for example a murder trial, in which the defendant is a Scotsman, and it had been established earlier that the murderer was eating sugared porridge when he or she committed the murder.  
 
 
 
In argumentative dialogue, the rules of interaction may be negotiated by the parties to the dialogue, although in many cases the rules are already determined by social mores. In the most symmetrical case, argumentative dialogue can be regarded as a process of discovery more than one of justification of a conclusion. Ideally, the goal of argumentative dialogue is for participants to arrive jointly at a conclusion by mutually accepted inferences. In some cases however, the validity of the conclusion is secondary. For example; emotional outlet, scoring points with an audience, wearing down an opponent or lowering the sale price of an item may instead be the actual goals of the dialogue. Walton distinguishes several types of argumentative dialogue which illustrate these various goals:
 
* Personal quarrel.  
 
* Forensic debate.
 
* Persuasion dialogue.
 
* Bargaining dialogue.
 
* Action seeking dialogue.
 
* Educational dialogue.
 
  
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst identify various stages of argumentative dialogue. These stages can be regarded as an argument protocol. In a somewhat loose interpretation, the stages are as follows:
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==External Links==
* Confrontation: Presentation of the problem, such as a debate question or a political disagreement
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All links retrieved November 5, 2021.
* Opening: Agreement on rules, such as for example, how evidence is to be presented, which sources of facts are to be used, how to handle divergent interpretations, determination of closing conditions.
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*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/argument.htm Argument], The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
* [[Argumentation]]: Application of logical principles according to the agreed-upon rules
 
* Closing: This occurs when the termination conditions are met. Among these could be for example, a time limitation or the determination of an arbiter.
 
  
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide a detailed list of rules that must be applied at each stage of the protocol.  Moreover, in the account of argumentation given by these authors, there are specified roles of protagonist and antagonist in the protocol which are determined by the conditions which set up the need for argument.
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===General Philosophy Sources===
 
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*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
Many cases of argument are highly unsymmetrical, although in some sense they are dialogues. A particularly important case of this is [[political argument]].
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*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
 
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*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online]
Much of the recent work on argument theory has considered argumentation as an integral part of language and perhaps the most important function of language ([[Grice]], [[Searle]], [[J. L. Austin|Austin]], [[Popper]]). This tendency has removed argumentation theory away from the realm of pure formal logic.
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*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg]  
 
 
One of the original contributors to this trend is the philosopher [[Chaim Perelman]], who together with [[Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca]], introduced the French term ''La nouvelle rhetorique'' in 1958 to describe an approach to argument which is not reduced to application of formal rules of inference.  Perelman's view of argumentation is much closer to a juridical one, in which rules for presenting evidence and rebuttals play an important role.  Though this would apparently invalidate semantic concepts of truth, this approach seems useful in situations in which the possibility of reasoning within some commonly accepted model does not exist or this possibility has broken down because of ideological conflict.  Retaining the notion  enunciated in the introduction to this article that ''logic'' usually refers to the structure of argument, we can regard the logic of rhetoric as a set of protocols for argumentation.
 
 
 
== Other theories ==
 
In recent decades one of the more influential discussions of philosophical arguments is that by [[Nicholas Rescher]] in his book ''[[The Strife of Systems]]''.  Rescher models [[philosophical problem]]s on what he calls [[aporia]] or an [[aporetic cluster]]: a set of statements, each of which has initial plausibility but which are jointly inconsistent.  The only way to solve the problem, then, is to reject one of the statements.  If this is correct, it constrains how philosophical arguments are formulated.
 
 
 
== References ==
 
* Rober Audi, ''Epistemology'', Routledge, 1998. Particularly  relevant is Chapter 6, which explores the relationship between knowledge, inference and argument.
 
*J. L. Austin '' How to Do things with Words'', Oxford University Press, 1976.
 
* H. P. Grice, ''Logic and Conversation'' in ''The Logic of Grammar'', Dickenson, 1975.
 
* R. A. DeMillo, R. J. Lipton and A. J. Perlis, ''Social Processes and Proofs of Theorems and Programs'', Communications of the ACM, Vol. 22, No. 5, 1979.  A classic article on the social process of acceptance of proofs in mathematics. 
 
* [[Yu. Manin]], ''A Course in Mathematical Logic'', Springer Verlag, 1977. A mathematical view of logic. This book is different from most books on mathematical logic in that it emphasizes the mathematics of logic, as opposed to the formal structure of logic.
 
* Ch. Perelman and L Olbrechts-Tyteca, ''The New Rhetoric'', Notre Dame, 1970. This classic was originally published in French in 1958.
 
* [[Henri Poincaré]], ''Science and Hypothesis'', Dover Publications, 1952
 
* Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, ''Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions'',  Foris Publications, 1984.
 
* [[K. R. Popper]] ''Objective Knowledge; An Evolutionary Approach'', Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
 
* [[L. S. Stebbing]], ''A Modern Introduction to Logic'', Methuen and Co., 1948. An account of logic that covers the classic topics of logic and argument while carefully considering modern developments in logic.
 
* Douglas Walton, ''Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation'', Cambridge, 1998
 
* Carlos Chesñevar, Ana Maguitman and Ronald Loui, ''Logical Models of Argument'', ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 32, num. 4, pp.337-383, 2000.
 
 
 
==See also==
 
 
*[[Logical fallacy]]
 
*[[Nonargument]]
 
  
[[Category:Logic]]
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[[Category:Philosophy]]
[[Category:Philosophical terminology]]
 
[[Category:Arguments]]
 
 
[[Category:Philosophy and religion]]
 
[[Category:Philosophy and religion]]
  
 
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Revision as of 22:50, 5 November 2021


An argument is an attempt to demonstrate the truth of an assertion called a conclusion, based on the truth of a set of assertions called premises. If the argument is successful, the conclusion is said to be proved. This article classifies arguments as either deductive or inductive. An argument always assumes a certain kind of dialogue, with one person presenting the argument, attempting to persuade an interlocutor. An argument could be part of a written text, a speech, or a conversation.

Arguments

In an argument, some statements are put forward as giving evidence for another statement. For example, the following is an argument:

She likes citrus fruit, so she probably likes kumquats. After all, kumquats are citrus fruits.

Here the conclusion is “she probably likes kumquats.” The statements offered in support are “she likes citrus fruit” and “kumquats are citrus fruits.” These premises are asserted, without any additional argument or support. These premises may or may not be true. A statement is argued for if it is given other statements as support; it is asserted if it has no such support.

Sometimes the premises actually provide no support for the conclusion. Consider this argument:

The quarter has come up heads six times, so the next flip will probably come up tails.

The conclusion of this argument is “the next flip will probably come up tails.” The statement provided as evidence for this gives no support at all. The previous flips have no bearing on the next flip. Yet this is an argument because the premises were offered as evidence for the conclusion.

Some collections of statements may look like arguments without being arguments. For example, if one’s purpose is to explain or clarify a statement, one is not giving an argument:

The movie was good. It had a good script, good acting, and good cinematography.

If my purpose in saying this is to explain why I liked the movie, I am not arguing. The second sentence is not given as evidence for or in support of the first sentence, but is meant to explain why I liked the movie. These same sentences may be used in an argument for the conclusion; if I’m trying to convince you that the movie was good, I might offer the quality of the writing, acting, and filming as evidence of the movie’s quality.

Deductive Arguments

A deductive argument uses the laws of logic to attempt to prove its conclusion. A deductive argument may be valid or invalid. If it is valid, it is logically impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. In a valid argument, the premises are said to imply the conclusion. In some ways this is a very strong requirement (much stronger than the ordinary use of the word imply would suggest). It is irrational to accept the premises of a deductive argument and not accept the conclusion. One is not merely invited to accept the conclusion as plausible if one accepts the premises, rather, one is compelled to accept it as true.

At the same time, it is in some ways a very weak requirement. Consider the following argument:

All dogs are blue.
Nothing is blue except fish.
Therefore, all dogs are fish.

This argument is valid since the conclusion follows logically from the premises. If the premises were true, the conclusion would be true as well. But the premises are not true, so the argument is not entirely successful. If an argument is valid and has true premises, it is called sound.

A valid argument may be unsound even if it has a true conclusion. The following argument expressed this point:

All babies are illogical.
Nobody is despised who can manage a crocodile.
Illogical persons are despised.
Therefore, no baby can manage a crocodile.

The conclusion is probably true, but at least some of the premises are certainly false. The first and third premises together prove that babies are despised, and this is surely false. If all babies are illogical (which is probably true), then at least some illogical persons are not despised. So the third premise is false (and perhaps the second premises too), but the conclusion is true.

Thus, a valid argument can have a true conclusion but untrue premises. At the same time, it can never be the vice versa. Faced with a valid argument, if you don’t believe the conclusion you must reject one of the premises. For example:

Mammals do not lay eggs.
The platypus lays eggs.
Therefore, the platypus is not a mammal.

Here the conclusion is false: the platypus is a mammal. Here the false premise is the first. Some mammals (specifically, the platypus and the echidna) do lay eggs.

In a sense, logic is the study of validity. A system of logic, such as syllogism, will give rules to allow one to deduce a conclusion from premises. If a system of logic is adequate, its rules are exactly the ones needed to prove every valid argument it can express without proving any invalid arguments.

Inductive Arguments

Strictly speaking, inductive arguments prove conclusions from premises that give special cases. For example:

Every major city that has adopted similar measures has ultimately repealed them after losing millions of dollars. If any city adopts a measure like this, it will likely face similar failure. We are not immune.

There are many other kinds of inductive arguments as well. For example, an argument by analogy, in which the conclusion is argued for by presenting an example of something held to be similar, is not strictly an inductive argument, but for many purposes can be treated as one. In the preceding example, the general argument could be converted into an argument by analogy simply by changing the word ‘any’ to ‘our’, so the conclusion becomes this: “if our city adopts a measure like this, it will likely face similar failure.” Abductive argument, or reasoning to the best explanation, is another kind of non-deductive argument that is some ways similar to induction. Abductive arguments set out specific examples and then a general fact or principle that explains these examples.

Notice that the conclusion is not guaranteed by the premises. Hence, this argument is technically invalid. But if the comparisons are apt (if the measure being proposed by this city is relevantly similar, if the city is relevantly similar to the other cities, and so on), the argument is quite compelling. Thus, validity is the wrong measure for inductive arguments. Instead, an inductive argument is said to be compelling or cogent. An argument that is compelling or cogent is able to rationally persuade the interlocutor of the conclusion.

This standard of rational persuasion is not as well-defined as it in the case of deductive arguments. In many cases it is clear that an argument has gone wrong. The persuasive power of many arguments is emotional or in some other way not rational. Such an argument is fallacious, and there are many common fallacies, which, once seen, lose their ability to deceive. It is not so easy to explain the standards of cogency, to explain how an argument goes right.

Dialectic

The conclusion of a valid deductive argument is true if its premises are, so if one believes the premises of an argument, one must rationally believe the conclusion. Often arguments are between parties with different initial assumptions. In these cases, one party will present an argument whose premises he or she does not present as true, but as acceptable to the other party. The other party will counter with an argument from premises he or she thinks the other person believes to be true.

For example, a theodicy might have different premises if its intended audience consisted of believing Christians than if its intended audience consisted of agnostics, atheists, or Buddhists. An argument’s strength often depends on selecting the right premises for the intended audience.

See also

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Audi, Robert. 1998. Epistemology. Second edition, 2002. London: Routledge. ISBN 0415281091
  • Austin, J. L. How to Do things with Words. Second edition, 1975. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0674411528
  • Chesñevar, Carlos, Ana Maguitman and Ronald Loui. 2000. "Logical Models of Argument." ACM Computing Surveys 32(4): 337-383.
  • Grice, H. P. "Logic and Conversation" from The Logic of Grammar. Dickenson, 1975.
  • Poincaré, Henri. 1952. Science and Hypothesis. Mineola, N.Y. Dover Publications. ISBN 0486602214
  • Eemeren, Frans van and Rob Grootendorst. 1984. Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions. Foris Publications. ISBN 9067650188
  • Popper, Karl R. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. ISBN 0198750242
  • Stebbing, L. S. 1948. A Modern Introduction to Logic. Methuen and Co., 1953.
  • Walton, Douglas. Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation. Cambridge, 1998.

External Links

All links retrieved November 5, 2021.

  • Argument, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

General Philosophy Sources

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