Difference between revisions of "Causality" - New World Encyclopedia

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'''Causality''' is the relationship between cause and [[Result|effect]].<ref name="dict">[http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=Causality&x=35&y=25 Random House Unabridged Dictionary]</ref> The [[philosophy|philosophical]] concept of '''causality''' or '''causation''' refers to the set of all particular "causal" or "cause-and-effect" relations.{{Fact|date=December 2006}} Most generally, causation is a relationship that holds between [[phenomenon|event]]s, properties, [[variable]]s, or [[state (physics)|states of affairs]].
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'''Causality''' is one of the central notions in our conception of the world. We think of the things and events we experience as connected, and causal relations between them is perhaps the most important connection. Thoughts of causation are central to how we think about our own actions, thoughts, responsibilities and relationships. Yet, however common the notion of causation is in our thoughts, it proves to be very mysterious once we focus on it in an attempt to gain a better understanding of it.
  
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According to Sowa (2000),<ref name="Sowa">[http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/causal.htm Processes and Causality] by John F. Sowa, retrieved Dec. 5, 2006.</ref> up until the twentieth century, three assumptions described by Max Born in 1949 were dominant in the definition of causality:
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As a number of philosophers (including [[Nicolas Malebranche]] and [[David Hume]]) emphasized, it appears that we do not have any direct experience of causation. We see events follow one another, and often conclude that one caused the other, but it is not as though we perceive some sort of force passing from one to the other. Even in the case of our own actions, we are strikingly unable to explain how a decision to ask a question brings about motion in our bodies.
  
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#"Causality postulates that there are laws by which the occurrence of an entity B of a certain class depends on the occurrence of an entity A of another class, where the word entity means any physical object, [[phenomenon]], situation, or event. A is called the cause, B the effect.
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Even setting such [[epistemology|epistemological]] problems aside, we might wonder ''what it is we are saying'' when we say that one thing causes another. We seem to be saying more than that one thing follows the other, but what is that something more? It appears to involve some thought about other events of a similar type (for instance, in saying that a thrown rock broke a window, we appear to commit ourselves to the belief that there is some sort of general connection between throwing rocks and breaking windows), but it is not clear what that involvement amounts to.
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#"Antecedence postulates that the cause must be prior to, or at least simultaneous with, the effect.
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{{toc}}
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#"Contiguity postulates that cause and effect must be in spatial contact or connected by a chain of intermediate things in contact." (Born, 1949, as cited in Sowa, 2000)
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This article will present three major historical discussions of causation, some of the major contemporary theories about how to understand the notion, and conclude by briefly describing some philosophical puzzles that directly bear on which theory of causation we should accept. Issues about causation appear in every area of philosophy except logic, however, so a vast number of related issues will not be touched on here.
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Causality always implies at least some relationship of dependency between the cause and the effect. For example, deeming something a cause may imply that, [[ceteris paribus|all other things being equal]], if the cause occurs the effect does as well, or at least that the [[probability]] of the effect occurring increases.
 
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However, according to Sowa (2000), "relativity and quantum mechanics have forced physicists to abandon these assumptions as exact statements of what happens at the most fundamental levels, but they remain valid at the level of human experience."<ref name="Sowa" />
 
  
 
==Major historical accounts==
 
==Major historical accounts==
  
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Among contemporary philosophical discussions, few make more references to historical accounts than does that concerning causation. In particular, the contrast between Kant and Hume is often the starting point for investigations into the general nature of our concept of causation, and our knowledge of causal relations.
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Among contemporary philosophical discussions, few make more references to historical accounts than does that concerning causation. In particular, the contrast between Kant and Hume is often the starting point for investigations into the general nature of our concept of causation, and our knowledge of causal relations.
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===Aristotle===
 
  
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In his [[Metaphysics]] and [[Posterior Analytics]], [[Aristotle]] said: "All causes of things are beginnings; that we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause; that to know a thing's existence is to know the reason why it is". With this formulation, he set the guidelines for all the subsequent causal theories by specifying the number, nature, principles, elements, varieties, order of causes as well as the modes of causation. Aristotle's account of the causes of things may be qualified as the most comprehensive model up to now.
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===[[Aristotle]]===
  
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According to Aristotle's theory, all the possible causes fall into several wide groups, the total number of which amounts to the ways the question "why" may be answered; namely, by reference to the material worked upon (as by an artisan) or what might be called the ''substratum''; to the ''essence'', i.e., the pattern, the form, or the structure by reference to which the "matter" or "substratum" is to be worked; to the primary moving agent of ''change'' or the agent and its action; and to the goal, the plan, the end, or the good that the figurative artisan intended to obtain. As a result, the major kinds of causes come under the following divisions:
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[[Aristotle|Aristotle's]] well-known treatment of causation in his ''Physics'' set many of the terms (often literally) for arguments about causation over the next two millenia. To a modern reader, however, many of his claims about causation seem to fit poorly with our current use of the notion. It is useful to think of his claims about different 'causes' as claims about different bases of explanation of a thing's being the way that it is, of which our contemporary notion is a species.
  
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*The [[Material Cause]] is that "raw material" from which a thing is produced as from its parts, constituents, substratum, or materials. This rubric limits the explanation of cause to the parts (the factors, elements, constituents, ingredients) forming the whole (the system, structure, compound, complex, composite, or combination) (the part-whole causation).
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Aristotle distinguished four types of cause:
  
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*The [[Formal Cause]] tells us what, by analogy to the plans of an artisan, a thing is intended and planned to be. Any thing is thought to be determined by its definition, form (mold), pattern, essence, whole, synthesis, or archetype. This analysis embraces the account of causes in terms of fundamental principles or general laws, as the intended whole (macrostructure) is the cause that explains the production of its parts (the whole-part causation).
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*The 'Material Cause' is the "raw material" from which a thing is produced - its parts, constituents, substratum, or materials. This rubric limits the explanation of cause to the parts (the factors, elements, constituents, ingredients) forming the whole (the system, structure, compound, complex, composite, or combination) (the part-whole causation). For instance, the material causes of a human body would be a set of organs (skin, heart, bones, etc.). Importantly, each of these organs would in turn have material causes (types of tissue). This division can be continued down at least to the level of the basic elements.
  
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*The [[Efficient Cause]] is that external entity from which the change or the ending of the change first starts. It identifies 'what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed' and so suggests all sorts of agents, nonliving or living, acting as the sources of change or movement or rest. Representing the current understanding of causality as the relation of cause and effect, this analysis covers the modern definitions of "cause" as either the agent, agency, particular causal events, or the relevant causal states of affairs.
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*The 'Formal Cause' is the 'form' of a thing, in virtue of which it is the sort of thing it is. Any thing is thought to be determined by its definition, form (mold), pattern, essence, whole, synthesis, or [[archetype]]. For instance, the form of a human body would be the arrangement of the organs (muscle covering the bones, skin covering the muscle, etc.).
  
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*The [[Final Cause]] is that for the sake of which a thing exists, or is done - including both purposeful and instrumental actions. The final cause, or telos, is the purpose, or end, that something is supposed to serve; or it is that from which, and that to which, the change is. This analysis also covers modern ideas of mental causation involving such psychological causes as volition, need, motivation, or motives; rational, irrational, ethical - all that gives purpose to behavior.
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*The 'Efficient Cause' or 'Moving Cause' is that entity which brings a thing into being. This notion fits best with out contemporary notion of causation. For instance, the efficient causes of a human body would be its parents. The efficient cause of a sculpture would be the artist who created it.
  
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Additionally, things can be causes of one another, reciprocally causing each other, as hard work causes fitness, and vice versa - although not in the same way or by means of the same function: the one is as the beginning of change, the other is as its goal. (Thus Aristotle first suggested a reciprocal or circular causality - as a relation of mutual dependence, action, or influence of cause and effect.) Also; Aristotle indicated that the same thing can be the cause of contrary effects - as its presence and absence may result in different outcomes. In speaking thus he formulated what currently is ordinarily termed a "causal factor," e.g., atmospheric pressure as it affects chemical or physical reactions.
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*The 'Final Cause' is that for the sake of which a thing exists, or is done - including both purposeful and instrumental actions. The final cause, or telos, is the purpose, or end, that something is supposed to serve. For instance, the final cause of a hammer is to pound nails.  In the ''Nicomachean Ethics,'' Aristotle claimed that the final cause (or purpose) of humans is to act in accordance with [[virtue]], and to contemplate. The legitimacy of the notion of final causation in the natural sciences has been a subject of much debate - see, for instance, [[Spinoza]]'s attack on teleological explanation in the Appendix to part I of this ''Ethics.''
  
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Aristotle marked two modes of causation: proper (prior) causation and accidental (chance) causation. All causes, proper and incidental, can be spoken as potential or as actual, particular or generic. The same language refers to the effects of causes; so that generic effects assigned to generic causes, particular effects to particular causes, and operating causes to actual effects. It is also essential that ontological causality does not suggest the temporal relation of before and after - between the cause and the effect; that spontaneity (in nature) and chance (in the sphere of moral actions) are among the causes of effects belonging to the efficient causation, and that no incidental, spontaneous, or chance cause can be prior to a proper, real, or underlying cause ''per se''.
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===[[Hume]]===
  
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All investigations of causality coming later in history will consist in imposing a favorite hierarchy on the order (priority) of causes; such as "final > efficient > material > formal" (Aquinas), or in restricting all causality to the material and efficient causes or, to the efficient causality (deterministic or chance), or just to regular sequences and correlations of natural phenomena (the natural sciences describing ''how'' things happen rather than asking ''why'' they happen).
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The great Scottish philosopher [[David Hume]] discussed the notion of causation at length in his ''Treatise on Human Nature'' and ''Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.'' Beginning with the [[Empiricism|empiricist]] assumption that the content of all of our ideas had to be drawn from experience, Hume set out to determine what the content of our idea of causation is. One thing we normally take to be a central aspect of the idea, Hume claimed (drawing on the work of [[Malebranche]]), is the notion of necessary connection. If we believe that something A causes an effect B, we take B to have been a ''necessary'' consequence of A - given that A happened in the way it did, it was necessary the B should occur. This necessity is taken to be of a comparable strength to the connection between, for instance, 3+5 and 8.
  
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====Hume====
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Yet, turning to experience, Hume was unable to find any such necessary connection. In both the outer and inner worlds, all we experience is a succession of things - nowhere do we sense anything stronger than temporal connections between things. Where then does the thought of necessary connection come from? Hume claimed that our apparent experience of necessary connection was nothing other than the experience of a tendency of our own minds to anticipate consequences based on past associations. For instance, once we have experienced lightning followed by thunder a number of times, our minds begin to expect thunder every time we see lightning. We then simply confuse the inner sensation of our own expectation with an experience of connection - we effectively project a feature of our mind onto the objects.
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{{unreferenced|date=December 2006}}
 
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[[David Hume]] asserted that it was impossible to ''know'' that certain laws of cause and effect always apply - no matter how many times one observes them occurring. Just because the sun has risen every day since the beginning of the Earth does not mean that it will rise again tomorrow. However; it is impossible to go about one's life without assuming such connections, and the best that we can do is to maintain an open mind and never presume that we know any laws of causality for certain.  This analysis was used as an argument against [[metaphysics]], [[ideology]] and attempts to find theories for everything.  [[A.J. Ayer]] and [[Karl Popper]] both claimed that their respective principles of verification and falsifiability fitted Hume's ideas on causality.
 
  
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===Kant===
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Hume's analysis has been used as an argument against [[metaphysics]], [[ideology]] and attempts to find theories for everything. [[A.J. Ayer]] and [[Karl Popper]] both claimed that their respective principles of verification and falsifiability fitted Hume's ideas on causality.
  
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====Causality, determinism, and existentialism====
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===[[Kant]]===
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The [[determinism|deterministic]] world-view is one in which the [[universe]] is nothing more than a chain of events following one after another according to the law of cause and effect.  According to [[incompatibilism|incompatibilists]] holding this [[worldview]] there is no such thing as "[[free will]]", and therefore, no such thing as [[morality]].  However, [[compatibilism|compatibilists]] argue that determinism is compatible with, or even necessary for, free will.
 
  
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Learning to bear the burden of a meaningless universe, and justify one's own existence, is the first step toward becoming the "Übermensch" (English: "overman") that [[Nietzsche]] speaks of extensively in his philosophical writings. [[Existentialism|Existentialists]] have suggested that people have the courage to accept that while no meaning has been designed in the universe, we each can provide a meaning for ourselves.
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The most famous response to Hume's revisionist/skeptical views on our notion of causation comes from the German philosopher [[Kant|Immanuel Kant]]. In his ''Critique of Pure Reason'' and ''Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,'' Kant accepted Hume's claim that we could not draw the notion of causation from outer experience, but drew the opposite conclusion from Hume. Whereas Hume combined this claim with the claim that all the content of our ideas had to come from experience, Kant combined the claim with the claim that it is unquestionable that our notion of causation involves genuine necessary connection. From that, Kant concluded that the empiricist claim is false in this case, and that the concept of causation is ''a priori'' - not drawn from experience.
  
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In light of the difficulty philosophers have pointed out in establishing the validity of causal relations, it might seem that the clearest plausible example of causation we have left is our own ability to be the cause of events. If this is so, then our concept of causation would not prevent seeing ourselves as moral agents.
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Kant believed that more needed to be said in order to respond to Hume, however. For an advantage of knowing that some concept was directly derived from experience was that this yielded the knowledge that we were justified in applying that concept to experience. As an example, we can be sure that we are not misguided in applying our concept 'cat' to the world, for the world is the place from which that concept came. However, if the concept of causation was not drawn from the world, then one might legitimately worry what bases we had for thinking it had anything to do with the world at all. We have not drawn our concept 'magic' directly from experience, for instance, and that is part of the reason why we are not justified in applying it in our experience of the world.
  
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==Logic==
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In response, Kant appealed to a different way in which we might be justified in applying a concept in experience; namely, if experience itself is only possible when that concept is employed. As an analogy, consider someone asking how, as a police officer, one is justified in enforcing the law. The answer is that enforcing the law is ''constitutive'' of being a police officer, so that there can be no question of the justification of doing such ''insofar as one is a police officer.'' Of course, there is the further question of whether one is justified in being a police officer, but that is a separate question. Carrying the analogy over, if application of the concept of causation is necessary in order to have experience, then one can only be unjustified in applying the concept if one is unjustified in having experience. Yet no one, not even Hume, ever questioned the justification of that.
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===Necessary and sufficient causes===
 
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:''A similar concept occurs in logic, for this see [[Necessary and sufficient conditions]]''
 
  
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Causes are often distinguished into two types: Necessary and sufficient.
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The major challenge for defenders of the Kantian line is then to show how application of the concept of causation is necessary for experience. Kant himself argued for this via the notion of an objective temporal sequence. More specifically, he claimed that experience requires experiencing things has having some temporal order other than the subjective order of one's own perceptions (for instance, the fact that I see one thing after another doesn't automatically entail that one thing happened after the other), but that the distinction between objective and subjective temporal orders requires the concept of causation.
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'''Necessary causes:'''<p>
 
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If ''x'' is a necessary cause of ''y''; then the presence of ''y'' necessarily implies that ''x'' preceded it. The presence of ''x'', however, does not imply that ''y'' will occur.<p>
 
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'''Sufficient causes:'''<p>
 
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If ''x'' is a sufficient cause of ''y'', then the presence of ''x'' necessarily implies the presence of ''y''. However, another cause ''z'' may alternatively cause ''y''. Thus the presence of ''y'' does not imply the presence of ''x''.<p>
 
  
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{{unreferenced|date=December 2006}}
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==Major theories==
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[[J. L. Mackie]] argues that usual talk of "cause", in fact, refers to [[INUS]] conditions (insufficient and non-redundant parts of unnecessary but sufficient causes).  For example; consider the short circuit as a cause of the house burning down.  Consider the collection of events, the short circuit, the proximity of flammable material, and the absence of firefighters. Considered together these are unnecessary but sufficient to the house's destruction (since many other collection of events certainly could have destroyed the house).  Within this collection; the short circuit is an insufficient but non-redundant part (since the short circuit by itself would not cause the fire, but the fire will not happen without it). So the short circuit is an INUS cause of the house burning down.
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===Regularity theories and the 'inus condition'===
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[[Hume]] is often taken as a proponent of an analysis of the notion of causation in terms of regularities. On such a view, to say that A causes B is just to say that A-type events are typically followed by B-type events.
  
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===Causality contrasted with conditionals===
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Such a view does not obviously fit with many paradigm instances of causation. For instance, it is often said that a fallen lamp caused the Chicago fire, but it is hardly the case that falling lamps typically cause major fires, or even fires at all. In other words, the regularity analysis would seem to discount some events as instances of causation that seemed to be clear instances. Conversely, there seem to be many regular conjunctions of types of events that we do not count as causation. For instance, the event of having a first birthday party might be regularly followed by taking one's first steps, but this is not because the party causes one to learn to walk.
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[[Conditional]] statements are '''not''' statements of causality. Since many different statements may be presented using "If...then..." in English, they are commonly confused; they are distinct, however.
 
  
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For example all of the following statements are true interpreting "If... then..." as the material conditional:
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An influential amendment to the regularity theory was suggested by John Mackie.<ref name="Mackie1"> John Mackie. (1974) ''The Cement of the Universe.'' Oxford: Clarendon Press.</ref> Mackie suggested that all causes must be 'inus condition's of their effects. 'Inus' is an acronym for "insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition." Say that a throwing a rock causes the window to break. Now, strictly speaking, throwing a rock is not sufficient to break a window - for instance, there has to be a lack of intermediate walls that would block the rock. But, combined with a set of background conditions (such as a lack of intermediate walls), throwing a rock is sufficient to break a window. Yet this whole set of conditions is not ''necessary'' for breaking a window - after all, one could also break a window by crushing it with an anvil from above.
  
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* ''If George Bush was president of the United States in 2004, then Germany is in Europe.''
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We can see how this amendment would help with the birthday party example. Of the various sufficient conditions for learning to walk, having a birthday party is just not a necessary component of any of them.
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* ''If George Washington was president of the United States in 2004, then Germany is in Europe.''
 
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* ''If George Washington was president of the United States in 2004, then Germany is not in Europe.''
 
  
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The first is true since both the [[Antecedent (logic)|antecedent]] and the [[consequent]] are true.  The second and third are both true because the antecedent is false.  Of course, none of these statements express a causal connection between the antecedent and consequent.
 
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The ordinary [[indicative conditional]] seems to have some more structure than the material conditional - for instance, none of the three statements above seem to be correct under an ordinary indicative reading, though the first is closest.  But the sentence
 
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* ''If Shakespeare didn't write Macbeth then someone else did.''
 
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seems to be true, even though there is no straightforward causal relation (in this hypothetical situation) between Shakespeare's not writing Macbeth and someone else's actually writing it.
 
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Another sort of conditional, known as the [[counterfactual conditional]] has a stronger connection with causality.  However, not even all counterfactual statements count as examples of causality.  Consider the following two statements:
 
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* ''If A were a triangle, then A would have three sides.''
 
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* ''If switch S were thrown, then bulb B would light.''
 
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In the first case it would not be correct to say that A's being a triangle ''caused'' it to have three sides, since the relationship between triangularity and three-sidedness is one of definition.  It is actually the three sides that determine A's state as a triangle. Nonetheless, even interpreted counterfactually, the first statement is true.
 
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==Theories==
 
 
===Counterfactual theories===
 
===Counterfactual theories===
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The philosopher [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]] notably suggested that all statements about causality can be understood as [[counterfactual]] statements.<ref name="Lewis1">Lewis, David. (1973) "Causality." ''The Journal of Philosophy'' 70:556-567.</ref><ref name="Lewis2">Lewis, David. (1979) "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow" ''Noûs'' 13: 445-476.</ref><ref name="Lewis3">Lewis, David. (2000) "Causation as Influence" ''The Journal of Philosophy'' 97: 182-197.</ref> So, for instance, the statement that John's smoking caused his premature death is equivalent to saying that had John not smoked he would not have prematurely died. (In addition, it need also be true that John did smoke and did prematurely die, although this requirement is not unique to Lewis' theory.)
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The philosopher David Lewis notably suggested that all statements about causality can be understood as counterfactual statements.<ref name="Lewis1">David Lewis, (1973) "Causality." ''The Journal of Philosophy'' 70: 556-567.</ref><ref name="Lewis2">David Lewis, (1979) "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow" ''Noûs'' 13: 445-476.</ref><ref name="Lewis3">Lewis, (2000) "Causation as Influence." ''The Journal of Philosophy'' 97: 182-197.</ref> So, for instance, the statement that John's smoking caused his premature death is equivalent to saying that had John not smoked he would not have prematurely died. (In addition, it need also be true that John did smoke and did prematurely die, although this requirement is not unique to Lewis' theory.) Cast in terms of possible worlds (a notion which Lewis did much to develop), we could also cast the claim that John's smoking caused his premature death as the claim that, in the nearest possible worlds where John smokes, he dies prematurely, and in the nearest possible worlds where he does not smoke, he does not die prematurely.
  
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One problem Lewis' theory confronts is [[causal preemption]]. Suppose that John did smoke and did in fact die as a result of that smoking. However, there was a murderer who was bent on killing John, and would have killed him a second later had he not first died from smoking.  Here we still want to say that smoking caused John's death. This presents a problem for Lewis' theory since, had John not smoked, he still would have died prematurely. Lewis himself discusses this example, and it has received substantial discussion (cf. <ref name="Bunzl">Bunzl, Martin. (1980) "Causal Preemption and Counterfactuals." ''Philosophical Studies'' 37: 115-124</ref><ref name="Ganeri">Ganeri, Jonardon, Paul Noordhof, and Murali Ramachandran.  (1996) "Counterfactuals and Preemptive Causation" ''Analysis'' 56(4): 219-225.</ref><ref name="Paul">Paul, L.A. (1998) "Problems with Late Preemption" ''Analysis'' 58(1): 48-53.</ref>).
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One problem Lewis' theory confronts is causal preemption. Suppose that John did smoke and did in fact die as a result of that smoking. However, there was a murderer who was bent on killing John, and would have killed him a second later had he not first died from smoking.  Here we still want to say that smoking caused John's death. This presents a problem for Lewis' theory since, had John not smoked, he still would have died prematurely. In terms of possible worlds, this means that it is ''false'' that in the nearest possible worlds where John doesn't smoke, he doesn't die prematurely. Lewis himself discusses this example, and it has received substantial discussion.<ref name="Bunzl">Martin Bunzl, (1980) "Causal Preemption and Counterfactuals." ''Philosophical Studies'' 37: 115-124</ref><ref name="Ganeri">Jonardon  Ganeri, Paul Noordhof, and Murali Ramachandran, (1996) "Counterfactuals and Preemptive Causation" ''Analysis'' 56(4): 219-225.</ref><ref name="Paul">L.A. Paul, (1998) "Problems with Late Preemption" ''Analysis'' 58(1): 48-53.</ref>.
  
 
===Probabilistic causation===
 
===Probabilistic causation===
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Interpreting causation as a [[Causal determinism|deterministic]] relation means that if ''A'' causes ''B'', then ''A'' must ''always'' be followed by ''B''. In this sense, war does not cause deaths, nor does [[Tobacco smoking|smoking]] cause [[cancer]]. As a result, many turn to a notion of probabilistic causation.  Informally, ''A'' probabilistically causes ''B'' if ''A'''s occurrence increases the probability of ''B''.  This is sometimes interpreted to reflect imperfect knowledge of a deterministic system but other times interpreted to mean that the causal system under study has an inherently chancy nature. Philosophers such as [[Hugh Mellor]]<ref>Mellor, D.H. (1995) ''The Facts of Causation'', Routledge, ISBN 0-415-19756-2</ref> have defined causation in terms of a cause preceding and increasing the probability of the effect. (Additionally, Mellor claims that cause and effect are both facts - not events - since even a non-event, such as the failure of a train to arrive, can cause effects such as my taking the bus.)
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In discussions of the regularity theory of causation, one issue that is brought to the front is how strict the regularities must be. One might tempted by thought that the regularities must be strict - that if A causes B, then all A-type events must be followed by some B-type event. But this is deeply problematic. In this sense, war does not cause deaths, nor does smoking cause [[cancer]]. As a result, many turn to a notion of probabilistic causation.  Informally, ''A'' probabilistically causes ''B'' if ''A'''s occurrence increases the probability of ''B.'' This is sometimes interpreted to reflect imperfect knowledge of a deterministic system but other times interpreted to mean that the causal system under study has an inherently chancy nature. Philosophers such as Hugh Mellor<ref>D. H. Mellor. (1995) ''The Facts of Causation.'' (Routledge, ISBN 0415197562)</ref> have analyzed the notion of causation in terms of a cause preceding and increasing the probability of the effect. One advantage of this approach is that it allows the full machinery of modern statistics to be brought in, allowing an impressive level of rigor.
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The establishing of cause and effect, even with this relaxed reading, is notoriously difficult, expressed by the widely accepted statement "[[Correlation implies causation (logical fallacy)|correlation does not imply causation]]". For instance, the observation that smokers have a dramatically increased lung cancer rate does not establish that smoking must be a ''cause'' of that increased cancer rate: maybe there exists a certain genetic defect which both causes cancer and a yearning for nicotine; or even perhaps nicotine craving is a symptom of very early-stage lung cancer which is not otherwise detectable.
 
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In [[statistics]], it is generally accepted that observational studies (like counting cancer cases among smokers and among non-smokers and then comparing the two) can give hints, but can never ''establish'' cause and effect. The gold standard for causation here is the ''randomized experiment'': take a large number of people, randomly divide them into two groups, force one group to smoke and prohibit the other group from smoking, then determine whether one group develops a significantly higher lung cancer rate. Random assignment plays a crucial role in the inference to causation because, in the long run, it renders the two groups equivalent in terms of all other possible effects on the outcome (cancer) so that any changes in the outcome will reflect only the manipulation (smoking).  Obviously, for ethical reasons this [[experiment]] cannot be performed, but the method is widely applicable for less damaging experiments.  One limitation of experiments, however, is that whereas they do a good job of testing for the presence of some causal effect they do less well at estimating the size of that effect in a population of interest.  (This is a common criticism of studies of safety of food additives that use doses much higher than people consuming the product would actually ingest.)
 
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That said, under certain [[assumption]]s, parts of the causal structure among several variables ''can'' be learned from full [[covariance]] or [[case data]] by the techniques of [[path analysis (statistics)|path analysis]] and more generally, [[Bayesian network]]s. Generally these [[inference algorithm]]s search through the ''many'' possible causal structures among the [[variable]]s, and remove ones which are strongly incompatible with the observed [[correlation]]s. In general this leaves a set of possible causal relations, which should then be tested by designing appropriate [[experiment]]s. If experimental data is already available, the [[algorithm]]s can take advantage of that as well.  In contrast with Bayesian Networks, path analysis and its generalization, structural equation modeling, serve better to estimate a known causal effect or test a causal model than to generate causal hypotheses.
 
  
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For nonexperimental data, causal direction can be hinted if information about time is available.  This is because (according to many, though not all, theories) causes must precede their effects temporally.  This can be set up by simple linear regression models,  for instance, with an analysis of covariance in which baseline and follow up values are known for a theorized cause and effect. The addition of time as a variable, though not proving causality, is a big help in supporting a pre-existing theory of causal direction. For instance, our degree of confidence in the direction and nature of causality is much clearer with a longitudinal epidemiologic study than with a cross-sectional one.
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The probabilistic approach is not without problems, however. The birthday party example still works as a counterexample: a person's having a first birthday party raises the probability that he will learn to walk soon, but the party is not a cause of the learning to walk. Much of the work done on probabilistic analyses of causation has therefore been directed at finding ways to 'narrow on' in the relevant features.
  
−
===Derivation theories===
+
Another controversial feature of this analysis is that it makes no claims about temporal direction, for the notion of 'increased probability' is by itself insensitive to temporal facts. Some entity's having a funeral dramatically increases the likelihood that it was alive at some point, but in no sense can a funeral be a cause of being alive.
−
The Nobel Prize holder [[Herbert Simon]] and Philosopher [[Nicholas Rescher]]<ref name="SimRes">Simon, Herbert, and Rescher, Nicholas (1966) "Cause and Counterfactual." Philosophy of Science 33: 323–40.</ref> claim that the asymmetry of the causal relation is unrelated to the asymmetry of any mode of implication that contraposes.  Rather, a causal relation is not a relation between values of variables, but a function of one variable (the cause) on to another (the effect).  So, given a system of equations, and a set of variables appearing in these equations, we can introduce an asymmetric relation among individual equations and variables that corresponds perfectly to our commonsense notion of a causal ordering. The system of equations must have certain properties, most importantly, if some values are chosen arbitrarily, the remaining values will be determined uniquely through a path of serial discovery that is perfectly causal.  They postulate the inherent serialization of such a system of equations may correctly capture causation in all empirical fields, including physics and economics.
 
  
 
===Manipulation theories===
 
===Manipulation theories===
−
Some theorists have equated causality with manipulability.<ref name="Collingwood">Collingwood, R.(1940) ''An Essay on Metaphysics.'' Clarendon Press.</ref><ref name="Gasking">Gasking, D. (1955) "Causation and Recipes" ''Mind'' (64): 479-487.</ref><ref name="MenPrice">Menzies, P. and H. Price (1993) "Causation as a Secondary Quality" ''British Journal for the Philosophy of Science'' (44): 187-203.</ref><ref name="vonWright">von Wright, G.(1971) ''Explanation and Understanding.'' Cornell University Press.</ref> Under these theories, ''x'' causes ''y'' just in case one can change ''x'' in order to change ''y''.  This coincides with commonsense notions of causations, since often we ask causal questions in order to change some feature of the world.  For instance, we are interested in knowing the causes of crime so that we might find ways of reducing it.
+
Some theorists have equated causality with manipulability.<ref name="Collingwood">R. Collingwood. (1940) ''An Essay on Metaphysics.'' (Clarendon Press).</ref><ref name="Gasking">D. Gasking, (1955) "Causation and Recipes" ''Mind'' (64): 479-487.</ref><ref name="MenPrice">P. Menzies, and H. Price, (1993) "Causation as a Secondary Quality" ''British Journal for the Philosophy of Science'' (44): 187-203.</ref><ref name="vonWright">G. von Wright. (1971) ''Explanation and Understanding.'' (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.)</ref> Under these theories, ''x'' causes ''y'' just in case one can change ''x'' in order to change ''y.'' This coincides with commonsense notions of causations, since often we ask causal questions in order to change some feature of the world.  For instance, we are interested in knowing the causes of crime so that we might find ways of reducing it.
  
−
These theories have been criticized on two primary grounds. First, theorists complain that these accounts are [[circularity|circular]]. Attempting to reduce causal claims to manipulation requires that manipulation is more basic than causal interaction. But describing manipulations in non-causal terms has provided a substantial difficulty.
+
These theories have been criticized on two primary grounds. First, theorists complain that these accounts are circular. Attempting to reduce causal claims to manipulation requires that the notion of manipulation is more basic than that of causal interaction. But describing manipulations in non-causal terms has provided a substantial difficulty.
  
−
The second criticism centers around concerns of [[anthropocentrism]]. It seems to many people that causality is some existing relationship in the world that we can harness for our desires.  If causality is identified with our manipulation, then this intuition is lost.  In this sense, it makes humans overly central to interactions in the world.  
+
The second criticism centers around the many apparent instances of causation that are beyond any possible manipulation by us. For instance, we might claim that the Big Bang caused the spread of matter throughout the universe, even though this is something completely and necessarily beyond any human practical concerns.
  
−
Some attempts to save manipulability theories are recent accounts that don't claim to reduce causality to manipulation. These account use manipulation as a sign or feature in causation without claiming that manipulation is more fundamental than causation.<ref name="Pearl">Pearl, Judea (2000) ''Causality'', Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-77362-8</ref><ref name="Woodward">Woodward, James (2003) ''Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation''.  Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-515527-0</ref>
+
Among philosophers, the response to these criticisms has been to see the appeal to manipulation as something other than an analysis of the notion. Instead, the appeal might rather show us something illuminating about the role that the concept of causation plays in our mental lives. These account use manipulation as a sign or feature in causation without claiming that manipulation is more fundamental than causation.<ref name="Pearl">Judea Pearl, (2000) ''Causality.'' (Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521773628)</ref><ref name="Woodward">James Woodward. (2003) ''Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.'' (Oxford University Press, ISBN 0195155270)</ref>
  
−
===Process theories===
+
==Special issues about causation==
−
Some theorists are interested in distinguishing between causal processes and non-causal processes (Russell 1948; Salmon 1984).<ref name="Salmon">Salmon, W. (1984) ''Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World''. Princeton University Press.</ref><ref name="Russell">Russell, B. (1948) ''Human Knowledge''. Simon and Schuster.</ref>  These theorists often want to distinguish between a process and a [[pseudo-process]].  As an example, a ball moving through the air (a process) is contrasted with the motion of a shadow (a pseudo-process).  The former is causal in nature while the latter is not.
+
Almost every major philosophical problem has something to do with causation. There are, however, a smaller set of problems that bear a tight relationship to how we should understand causation.
  
−
Salmon (1984)<ref name="Salmon" /> claims that causal processes can be identified by their ability to transmit an alteration over space and time.  An alteration of the ball (a mark by a pen, perhaps) is carried with it as the ball goes through the air.  On the other hand an alteration of the shadow (insofar as it is possible) will not be transmitted by the shadow as it moves along.  
+
===Backwards causation===
 +
In his discussion of causation, [[Hume]] stated that it was an independent necessary condition of causation that the cause temporally preceded the effect. As we saw, [[Kant]] also held there to be a very tight connection between causation and time (though, unlike Hume, he held that temporality was not built into the concept of causation). However, most contemporary theories are formulated in ways where this is not a necessary consequence - the notions of counterfactuals, regularities and probabilities can all be applied to pairs of events without regard to which came first.
  
−
These theorists claim that the important concept for understanding causality is not causal relationships or causal interactions, but rather identifying causal processes.  The former notions can then be defined in terms of causal processes.
+
The question is whether this is a problem for the modern theories, or a virtue. Intuitively, it might seem that all our thoughts about causation involve the cause preceding the effect.  However, we seem to have no deep difficulty in making sense out of stories of time-travel, in which something in the future changes something in the past. Further, recent developments in physics have begun to describe the structure of the universe in very strange ways, and it may be philosophically arrogant to claim that any physicist who proposes the possibility of backwards causation is speaking unintelligibly. (For more, see [[Time]]).
  
−
==Fields==
+
===Mind-body caustion===
−
===Science===
+
We naturally assume that our minds and bodies causally interact: decisions cause our legs to move, and hitting our toe causes the feeling of pain. However, these mental and physical events seem, at least at first glance, to be radically different kinds of entities. Because of that, many philosophers have doubted whether it is possible to give laws describing their connection. Other philosophers (such as [[Spinoza]], however, have claimed that it makes no sense to talk of causal connections that do not admit of some general intelligibility.
−
Using the [[scientific method]], scientists set up [[experiment]]s to determine causality in the physical world. Certain elemental forces such as [[gravity]], the strong and weak nuclear forces, and electromagnetism are said to be the four fundamental forces which are the causes of all other events in the universe. The issue of to what degree a scientific experiment is replicable, however, has been often raised but rarely addressed. The fact that no experiment is entirely replicable questions some core assumptions in science.  
+
(For more, see [[Philosophy of Mind]]).
  
−
In addition, many scientists in a variety of fields disagree that experiments are necessary to determine causality.  For example, the link between smoking and lung cancer is considered proven by health agencies of the United States government, but experimental methods (for example, randomized controlled trials) were not used to establish that link.  This view has been controversial.  In addition, many philosophers are beginning to turn to more relativized notions of causality.  Rather than providing a theory of causality in toto, they opt to provide a theory of causality in biology or causality in physics.
+
==Notes==
−
 
+
<references/>
−
====Physics====
 
−
{{main|Causality (physics)}}
 
−
Causality is hard to interpret to ordinary language from many different physical theories.  One problem is typified by the moon's [[gravity]]. It isn't accurate to say, "the moon exerts a gravitic pull and then the tides rise."  In [[Newtonian mechanics]] gravity, rather, is a law expressing a constant observable relationship among masses, and the movement of the tides is an example of that relationship. There are no discrete events or "pulls" that can be said to precede the rising of tides.  Interpreting gravity causally is even more complicated in [[general relativity]]. Another important implication of Causality in physics is its intimate connection to the [[Second Law of Thermodynamics]] (''see the [[fluctuation theorem]]''). [[Quantum mechanics]] is yet another branch of physics in which the nature of causality is somewhat unclear.
 
−
 
 
−
====Engineering====
 
−
A [[causal system]] is a [[system]] with output and internal states that depends only on the current and previous input values.  A system that has ''some'' dependence on input values from the future (in addition to possible past or current input values) is termed an '''acausal''' system, and a system that depends ''solely'' on future input values is an [[anticausal system]].
 
−
 
 
−
====Psychology====
 
−
 
 
−
:''Main article: [[Causality (Psychology)]].''
 
−
 
 
−
The above theories are attempts to define a [[reflective equilibrium|reflectively stable]] notion of causality.  This process uses our standard causal intuitions to develop a theory that we would find satisfactory in identifying causes.  Another avenue of research is to empirically investigate how people (and non-human animals) learn and reason about causal relations in the world.  This approach is taken by work in [[psychology]].
 
−
 
 
−
'''Attribution'''
 
−
 
 
−
[[Attribution theory]] is the [[theory]] concerning how people explain individual occurrences of causation. [[Attribution]] can be external (assigning causality to an outside agent or force - claiming that some outside thing motivated the event) or internal (assigning causality to factors within the person - taking personal [[Moral responsibility|responsibility]] or [[accountability]] for one's actions and claiming that the person was directly responsible for the event). Taking causation one step further, the type of attribution a person provides influences their future behavior.
 
−
 
 
−
The intention behind the cause or the effect can be covered by the subject of [[action (philosophy)]]. See also [[accident]]; [[blame]]; [[intent]]; and [[responsibility]].
 
−
 
 
−
'''Causal powers'''
 
−
 
 
−
Whereas [[David Hume]] argued that causes are inferred from non-causal observations, [[Immanuel Kant]] claimed that people have innate assumptions about causes. Within psychology, Patricia Cheng (1997)<ref>Cheng, P.W. (1997). "From Covariation to Causation: A Causal Power Theory." Psychological Review 104: 367-405.</ref> attempted to reconcile the Humean and Kantian views. According to her power PC theory, people filter observations of events through a basic belief that causes have the power to generate (or prevent) their effects, thereby inferring specific cause-effect relations. The theory assumes probabilistic causation.
 
−
 
 
−
'''Causation and salience'''
 
−
 
 
−
Our view of causation depends on what we consider to be the relevant events. Another way to view the statement, "Lightning causes thunder" is to see both lightning and thunder as two perceptions of the same event, viz., an electric discharge that we perceive first visually and then aurally.
 
−
 
 
−
'''Naming and causality'''
 
−
 
 
−
While the names we give objects often refer to their appearance, they can also refer to an object's causal powers - what that object can ''do'', the effects it has on other objects or people. David Sobel and Alison Gopnik from the Psychology Department of UC Berkeley designed a device known as ''the blicket detector'' which suggests that "when causal property and perceptual features are equally evident, children are equally as likely to use causal powers as they are to use perceptual properties when naming objects".
 
−
 
 
−
===Humanities===
 
−
====History====
 
−
In the field of history, the term ''cause'' has at least two meanings, often mistakenly conflated.
 
−
*One meaning conforms to Aristotle's ''final'' cause — as a goal or purpose.  For example, the abolition of slavery became a Union goal or intended outcome for the American Civil War following the [[Emancipation Proclamation]]s and so was a cause or reason to continue the war. This meaning is ''not'' what is meant by the term ''causality''.
 
−
*Another meaning treats historic events as agents that bring about other historic events. This is a somewhat [[Plato]]nic and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegelian]] view that [[reification|reifies]] causes as [[ontology|ontological entities]] and the term ''causality'' is used sometimes in this manner. In this view, slavery is often said to have inevitably ''cause''d the American Civil War as a result. In Aristotelian terminology, this use of the term ''cause'' is closest to his ''efficient'' cause.
 
−
 
 
−
====Law====
 
−
:''Main article'': [[causation (law)]]
 
−
According to [[law]] and [[jurisprudence]], '''legal cause''' must be demonstrated in order to hold a [[defendant]] liable for a [[crime]] or a [[tort]] (ie. a civil wrong such as negligence or trespass). It must be proven that causality, or a 'sufficient causal link' relates the defendant's actions to the criminal event or damage in question.
 
−
 
 
−
====Religion and theology====
 
−
'''Cosmological argument'''
 
−
 
 
−
One of the classic [[arguments for the existence of God]] is known as the "[[Cosmological argument]]" or "First cause" argument. It works from the premise that every natural event is the effect of a cause.  If this is so, then the events that caused today's events must have had causes themselves, which must have had causes, and so forth.  If the chain never ends, then one must uphold the hypothesis of an "actual infinite", which is often regarded as problematic, see [[Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel]]. If the chain does end, it must end with a non-natural or supernatural cause at the start of the natural world — e.g. a creation by God.
 
−
 
 
−
Sometimes the argument is made in [[eternity|non-temporal]] terms. The chain doesn't go back in time, it goes downward into the ever-more enduring facts, and thus toward the [[eternity|timeless]].
 
−
 
 
−
Two questions that can help to focus the argument are:
 
−
 
 
−
# What is an event without cause?
 
−
# How does an event without a cause occur?
 
−
 
 
−
Critics of this argument point out [[Cosmological argument#Critique of the cosmological argument|problems]] with it.
 
−
 
 
−
A question related to this argument is which came first, [[The chicken or the egg]]?
 
−
 
 
−
'''Karma'''
 
−
 
 
−
[[Karma]] is the belief held by some major religions that originated from either [[dharmic religion]], or is influenced by dharmic religion, which holds that a person's actions cause certain effects in the current life and/or in future [[reincarnation|life]], positively or negatively.
 
−
 
 
−
For example, if a person always does good deeds then it is believed that he or she will be "rewarded" for his or her behavior with fortunate events such as avoiding fatal accident or winning the lottery. If he or she always commits antagonistic behaviors, then it is believed that he will be punished with unfortunate events.
 
−
 
 
−
'''Hinduism'''
 
−
 
 
−
The [[Upanishads]] (namely [[Chandogya Upanishad]], [[Sarva Sara Upanishad]] and [[Mandukya Upanishad]]) and some other texts (namely [[Brahma Sutras]], [[Yoga Vashishta]], [[Avadhuta Gita]] and [[Astavakra Gita]]) mention causality. However, causality therein is limited to explanations of the creation of the universe. The idea of causality is not itself the subject of study in these scriptures.
 
−
 
 
−
The ancient scriptures and commentaries on these scriptures have the following common themes with regard to causation:
 
−
* "Cause is the effect concealed, effect is the cause revealed" which is also expressed as "Cause is the effect unmanifested, effect is the cause manifested" <ref>[http://www.ramakrishnavivekananda.info/vivekananda/complete_works.htm Complete Works] of Swami Vivekananda and [[Yoga Vashishta]].</ref>
 
−
* Effect is same as cause only <ref>Sankaracharya's commentary on [[Bhagvad Gita]]</ref>.
 
−
 
 
−
 
 
−
'''Reverse causality'''
 
−
 
 
−
Some [[new religious movement|modern religious movements]] have postulated along the lines of philosophical [[idealism]] that causality is actually reversed from the direction normally presumed.{{who}} According to these groups, causality does not proceed inward, from external random causes toward effects on a perceiving individual, but rather outward, from a perceiving individual's causative mental requests toward responsive external physical effects that only seem to be independent causes. These groups have accordingly developed new causality principles such as the doctrine of [[responsibility assumption]].
 
−
 
 
−
[[Destiny]] might be considered reverse causality in that a cause is predated by an effect; e.g., "I found a twenty dollar bill on the ground because later I would need it."
 
  
 
==References==
 
==References==
−
<references/>
 
  
−
===See also===
+
*Abdoullaev, A. (2000) "The Ultimate of Reality: Reversible Causality." in ''Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy,'' Boston: Philosophy Documentation Centre, internet site, [http://www.bu.edu/wcp/MainMeta.htm]. ''Paideia Project''. Retrieved May 5, 2008.
−
* Spirtes, Peter, Clark Glymour and Richard Scheines ''Causation, Prediction, and Search'', MIT Press, ISBN 0-262-19440-6
+
*Bunzl, Martin. (1980) "Causal Preemption and Counterfactuals." ''Philosophical Studies'' 37: 115-124
−
* Abdoullaev, A. (2000)''The Ultimate of Reality: Reversible Causality'', in Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston: Philosophy Documentation Centre, internet site, Paideia Project On-Line: http://www.bu.edu/wcp/MainMeta.htm
+
*Collingwood, R. (1940) ''An Essay on Metaphysics.'' London: Clarendon Press.
−
* Green, Celia (2003). ''The Lost Cause: Causation and the Mind-Body Problem''.  Oxford: Oxford Forum. ISBN 0-9536772-1-4 Includes three chapters on causality at the microlevel in physics.
+
*Ganeri, Jonardon, Paul Noordhof, and Murali Ramachandran. (1996) "Counterfactuals and Preemptive Causation." ''Analysis' 56(4): 219-225.
−
 
+
*Gasking, D. (1955) "Causation and Recipes." ''Mind'' (64): 479-487.
−
{{col-begin}}
+
*Green, Celia (2003). ''The Lost Cause: Causation and the Mind-Body Problem.'' Oxford: Oxford Forum. ISBN 0953677214 Includes three chapters on causality at the microlevel in physics.
−
{{col-break}}
+
*Lewis, David. (1973) "Causality." ''The Journal of Philosophy'' 70: 556-567.
−
* [[Adverse effect (medicine)]]
+
*Lewis, David. (1979) "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow." ''Noûs'' 13: 445-476.
−
* [[Aetiology]]
+
*Lewis, David. (2000) "Causation as Influence." ''The Journal of Philosophy'' 97: 182-197.
−
* [[Causality loop]]
+
*Mackie, John. (1974) ''The Cement of the Universe.'' Oxford: Clarendon Press.
−
* [[Causal Markov condition]]
+
*Mellor, D. H. (1995) ''The Facts of Causation.'' Routledge. ISBN 0415197562
−
* [[Clinical trial]]
+
*Menzies, P. and H. Price. (1993) "Causation as a Secondary Quality." ''British Journal for the Philosophy of Science'' 44: 187-203.
−
* [[Cognitive dissonance]]
+
*Paul, L.A. (1998) "Problems with Late Preemption." ''Analysis'' 58.(1): 48-53.
−
* [[Condition of possibility]]
+
*Pearl, Judea (2000) ''Causality.'' Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521773628
−
* [[Correlation does not imply causation]]
+
*Spirtes, Peter, Clark Glymour and Richard Scheines. ''Causation, Prediction, and Search.'' MIT Press, ISBN 0262194406
−
* [[Culture-specific syndrome]]
+
*von Wright, G. (1971) ''Explanation and Understanding.'' Itaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
−
* [[Determinism]]
+
*Woodward, James (2003) ''Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.'' Oxford University Press, ISBN 0195155270
−
* [[Evidence-based medicine]]
 
−
* [[Experimental design]]
 
−
{{col-break}}
 
−
* [[Flexner Report]]
 
−
* [[Force Dynamics]]
 
−
* [[Free will]]
 
−
* [[Granger causality]]
 
−
* [[Iatrogenesis]]
 
−
* [[Linear regression]]
 
−
* [[Medical error]]
 
−
* [[Mill's Methods]]
 
−
* [[Miracle]]
 
−
* [[Nocebo]]
 
−
* [[Placebo (origins of technical term)]]
 
−
* [[Post hoc ergo propter hoc]]
 
−
{{col-break}}
 
−
* [[Proximate causation]]
 
−
* [[Randomness]]
 
−
* [[Rubin Causal Model]]
 
−
* [[Scientific control]]
 
−
* [[Self-fulfilling prophecy]]
 
−
* [[Stigmata]]
 
−
* [[Sugar pill]]
 
−
* [[Suggestibility]]
 
−
* [[Suggestion]]
 
−
* [[Thomas theorem]]
 
−
* [[Unintended consequence]]
 
−
{{col-end}}
 
  
 
==External links==
 
==External links==
−
===Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy===
+
All links retrieved April 25, 2013.
 +
'''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'''
 
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-backwards/ Backwards Causation]
 
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-backwards/ Backwards Causation]
 
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/ Probabilistic Causation]
 
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/ Probabilistic Causation]
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* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-medieval/ Medieval Theories of Causation]
 
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-medieval/ Medieval Theories of Causation]
 
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/ The Metaphysics of Causation]
 
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/ The Metaphysics of Causation]
−
 
+
===General Philosophy Sources===
−
===General===
+
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy].
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* [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-37 ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas'':] Causation
+
*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy].
−
* [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-40 ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas'':] Causation in Law
+
*[http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/gpi/index.htm Guide to Philosophy on the Internet].
−
* [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-38 ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas'':] Causation in History
+
*[http://www.bu.edu/wcp/PaidArch.html Paideia Project Online].
−
 
+
*[http://www.gutenberg.org/ Project Gutenberg].
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+
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[[Category:Philosophy and religion]]
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[[category:Philosophy and religion]]
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[[Category:philosophy]]
  
 
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Revision as of 22:37, 25 April 2013

Causality is one of the central notions in our conception of the world. We think of the things and events we experience as connected, and causal relations between them is perhaps the most important connection. Thoughts of causation are central to how we think about our own actions, thoughts, responsibilities and relationships. Yet, however common the notion of causation is in our thoughts, it proves to be very mysterious once we focus on it in an attempt to gain a better understanding of it.

As a number of philosophers (including Nicolas Malebranche and David Hume) emphasized, it appears that we do not have any direct experience of causation. We see events follow one another, and often conclude that one caused the other, but it is not as though we perceive some sort of force passing from one to the other. Even in the case of our own actions, we are strikingly unable to explain how a decision to ask a question brings about motion in our bodies.

Even setting such epistemological problems aside, we might wonder what it is we are saying when we say that one thing causes another. We seem to be saying more than that one thing follows the other, but what is that something more? It appears to involve some thought about other events of a similar type (for instance, in saying that a thrown rock broke a window, we appear to commit ourselves to the belief that there is some sort of general connection between throwing rocks and breaking windows), but it is not clear what that involvement amounts to.

This article will present three major historical discussions of causation, some of the major contemporary theories about how to understand the notion, and conclude by briefly describing some philosophical puzzles that directly bear on which theory of causation we should accept. Issues about causation appear in every area of philosophy except logic, however, so a vast number of related issues will not be touched on here.

Major historical accounts

Among contemporary philosophical discussions, few make more references to historical accounts than does that concerning causation. In particular, the contrast between Kant and Hume is often the starting point for investigations into the general nature of our concept of causation, and our knowledge of causal relations.

Aristotle

Aristotle's well-known treatment of causation in his Physics set many of the terms (often literally) for arguments about causation over the next two millenia. To a modern reader, however, many of his claims about causation seem to fit poorly with our current use of the notion. It is useful to think of his claims about different 'causes' as claims about different bases of explanation of a thing's being the way that it is, of which our contemporary notion is a species.

Aristotle distinguished four types of cause:

  • The 'Material Cause' is the "raw material" from which a thing is produced - its parts, constituents, substratum, or materials. This rubric limits the explanation of cause to the parts (the factors, elements, constituents, ingredients) forming the whole (the system, structure, compound, complex, composite, or combination) (the part-whole causation). For instance, the material causes of a human body would be a set of organs (skin, heart, bones, etc.). Importantly, each of these organs would in turn have material causes (types of tissue). This division can be continued down at least to the level of the basic elements.
  • The 'Formal Cause' is the 'form' of a thing, in virtue of which it is the sort of thing it is. Any thing is thought to be determined by its definition, form (mold), pattern, essence, whole, synthesis, or archetype. For instance, the form of a human body would be the arrangement of the organs (muscle covering the bones, skin covering the muscle, etc.).
  • The 'Efficient Cause' or 'Moving Cause' is that entity which brings a thing into being. This notion fits best with out contemporary notion of causation. For instance, the efficient causes of a human body would be its parents. The efficient cause of a sculpture would be the artist who created it.
  • The 'Final Cause' is that for the sake of which a thing exists, or is done - including both purposeful and instrumental actions. The final cause, or telos, is the purpose, or end, that something is supposed to serve. For instance, the final cause of a hammer is to pound nails. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claimed that the final cause (or purpose) of humans is to act in accordance with virtue, and to contemplate. The legitimacy of the notion of final causation in the natural sciences has been a subject of much debate - see, for instance, Spinoza's attack on teleological explanation in the Appendix to part I of this Ethics.

Hume

The great Scottish philosopher David Hume discussed the notion of causation at length in his Treatise on Human Nature and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Beginning with the empiricist assumption that the content of all of our ideas had to be drawn from experience, Hume set out to determine what the content of our idea of causation is. One thing we normally take to be a central aspect of the idea, Hume claimed (drawing on the work of Malebranche), is the notion of necessary connection. If we believe that something A causes an effect B, we take B to have been a necessary consequence of A - given that A happened in the way it did, it was necessary the B should occur. This necessity is taken to be of a comparable strength to the connection between, for instance, 3+5 and 8.

Yet, turning to experience, Hume was unable to find any such necessary connection. In both the outer and inner worlds, all we experience is a succession of things - nowhere do we sense anything stronger than temporal connections between things. Where then does the thought of necessary connection come from? Hume claimed that our apparent experience of necessary connection was nothing other than the experience of a tendency of our own minds to anticipate consequences based on past associations. For instance, once we have experienced lightning followed by thunder a number of times, our minds begin to expect thunder every time we see lightning. We then simply confuse the inner sensation of our own expectation with an experience of connection - we effectively project a feature of our mind onto the objects.

Hume's analysis has been used as an argument against metaphysics, ideology and attempts to find theories for everything. A.J. Ayer and Karl Popper both claimed that their respective principles of verification and falsifiability fitted Hume's ideas on causality.

Kant

The most famous response to Hume's revisionist/skeptical views on our notion of causation comes from the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. In his Critique of Pure Reason and Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant accepted Hume's claim that we could not draw the notion of causation from outer experience, but drew the opposite conclusion from Hume. Whereas Hume combined this claim with the claim that all the content of our ideas had to come from experience, Kant combined the claim with the claim that it is unquestionable that our notion of causation involves genuine necessary connection. From that, Kant concluded that the empiricist claim is false in this case, and that the concept of causation is a priori - not drawn from experience.

Kant believed that more needed to be said in order to respond to Hume, however. For an advantage of knowing that some concept was directly derived from experience was that this yielded the knowledge that we were justified in applying that concept to experience. As an example, we can be sure that we are not misguided in applying our concept 'cat' to the world, for the world is the place from which that concept came. However, if the concept of causation was not drawn from the world, then one might legitimately worry what bases we had for thinking it had anything to do with the world at all. We have not drawn our concept 'magic' directly from experience, for instance, and that is part of the reason why we are not justified in applying it in our experience of the world.

In response, Kant appealed to a different way in which we might be justified in applying a concept in experience; namely, if experience itself is only possible when that concept is employed. As an analogy, consider someone asking how, as a police officer, one is justified in enforcing the law. The answer is that enforcing the law is constitutive of being a police officer, so that there can be no question of the justification of doing such insofar as one is a police officer. Of course, there is the further question of whether one is justified in being a police officer, but that is a separate question. Carrying the analogy over, if application of the concept of causation is necessary in order to have experience, then one can only be unjustified in applying the concept if one is unjustified in having experience. Yet no one, not even Hume, ever questioned the justification of that.

The major challenge for defenders of the Kantian line is then to show how application of the concept of causation is necessary for experience. Kant himself argued for this via the notion of an objective temporal sequence. More specifically, he claimed that experience requires experiencing things has having some temporal order other than the subjective order of one's own perceptions (for instance, the fact that I see one thing after another doesn't automatically entail that one thing happened after the other), but that the distinction between objective and subjective temporal orders requires the concept of causation.

Major theories

Regularity theories and the 'inus condition'

Hume is often taken as a proponent of an analysis of the notion of causation in terms of regularities. On such a view, to say that A causes B is just to say that A-type events are typically followed by B-type events.

Such a view does not obviously fit with many paradigm instances of causation. For instance, it is often said that a fallen lamp caused the Chicago fire, but it is hardly the case that falling lamps typically cause major fires, or even fires at all. In other words, the regularity analysis would seem to discount some events as instances of causation that seemed to be clear instances. Conversely, there seem to be many regular conjunctions of types of events that we do not count as causation. For instance, the event of having a first birthday party might be regularly followed by taking one's first steps, but this is not because the party causes one to learn to walk.

An influential amendment to the regularity theory was suggested by John Mackie.[1] Mackie suggested that all causes must be 'inus condition's of their effects. 'Inus' is an acronym for "insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition." Say that a throwing a rock causes the window to break. Now, strictly speaking, throwing a rock is not sufficient to break a window - for instance, there has to be a lack of intermediate walls that would block the rock. But, combined with a set of background conditions (such as a lack of intermediate walls), throwing a rock is sufficient to break a window. Yet this whole set of conditions is not necessary for breaking a window - after all, one could also break a window by crushing it with an anvil from above.

We can see how this amendment would help with the birthday party example. Of the various sufficient conditions for learning to walk, having a birthday party is just not a necessary component of any of them.

Counterfactual theories

The philosopher David Lewis notably suggested that all statements about causality can be understood as counterfactual statements.[2][3][4] So, for instance, the statement that John's smoking caused his premature death is equivalent to saying that had John not smoked he would not have prematurely died. (In addition, it need also be true that John did smoke and did prematurely die, although this requirement is not unique to Lewis' theory.) Cast in terms of possible worlds (a notion which Lewis did much to develop), we could also cast the claim that John's smoking caused his premature death as the claim that, in the nearest possible worlds where John smokes, he dies prematurely, and in the nearest possible worlds where he does not smoke, he does not die prematurely.

One problem Lewis' theory confronts is causal preemption. Suppose that John did smoke and did in fact die as a result of that smoking. However, there was a murderer who was bent on killing John, and would have killed him a second later had he not first died from smoking. Here we still want to say that smoking caused John's death. This presents a problem for Lewis' theory since, had John not smoked, he still would have died prematurely. In terms of possible worlds, this means that it is false that in the nearest possible worlds where John doesn't smoke, he doesn't die prematurely. Lewis himself discusses this example, and it has received substantial discussion.[5][6][7].

Probabilistic causation

In discussions of the regularity theory of causation, one issue that is brought to the front is how strict the regularities must be. One might tempted by thought that the regularities must be strict - that if A causes B, then all A-type events must be followed by some B-type event. But this is deeply problematic. In this sense, war does not cause deaths, nor does smoking cause cancer. As a result, many turn to a notion of probabilistic causation. Informally, A probabilistically causes B if A's occurrence increases the probability of B. This is sometimes interpreted to reflect imperfect knowledge of a deterministic system but other times interpreted to mean that the causal system under study has an inherently chancy nature. Philosophers such as Hugh Mellor[8] have analyzed the notion of causation in terms of a cause preceding and increasing the probability of the effect. One advantage of this approach is that it allows the full machinery of modern statistics to be brought in, allowing an impressive level of rigor.

The probabilistic approach is not without problems, however. The birthday party example still works as a counterexample: a person's having a first birthday party raises the probability that he will learn to walk soon, but the party is not a cause of the learning to walk. Much of the work done on probabilistic analyses of causation has therefore been directed at finding ways to 'narrow on' in the relevant features.

Another controversial feature of this analysis is that it makes no claims about temporal direction, for the notion of 'increased probability' is by itself insensitive to temporal facts. Some entity's having a funeral dramatically increases the likelihood that it was alive at some point, but in no sense can a funeral be a cause of being alive.

Manipulation theories

Some theorists have equated causality with manipulability.[9][10][11][12] Under these theories, x causes y just in case one can change x in order to change y. This coincides with commonsense notions of causations, since often we ask causal questions in order to change some feature of the world. For instance, we are interested in knowing the causes of crime so that we might find ways of reducing it.

These theories have been criticized on two primary grounds. First, theorists complain that these accounts are circular. Attempting to reduce causal claims to manipulation requires that the notion of manipulation is more basic than that of causal interaction. But describing manipulations in non-causal terms has provided a substantial difficulty.

The second criticism centers around the many apparent instances of causation that are beyond any possible manipulation by us. For instance, we might claim that the Big Bang caused the spread of matter throughout the universe, even though this is something completely and necessarily beyond any human practical concerns.

Among philosophers, the response to these criticisms has been to see the appeal to manipulation as something other than an analysis of the notion. Instead, the appeal might rather show us something illuminating about the role that the concept of causation plays in our mental lives. These account use manipulation as a sign or feature in causation without claiming that manipulation is more fundamental than causation.[13][14]

Special issues about causation

Almost every major philosophical problem has something to do with causation. There are, however, a smaller set of problems that bear a tight relationship to how we should understand causation.

Backwards causation

In his discussion of causation, Hume stated that it was an independent necessary condition of causation that the cause temporally preceded the effect. As we saw, Kant also held there to be a very tight connection between causation and time (though, unlike Hume, he held that temporality was not built into the concept of causation). However, most contemporary theories are formulated in ways where this is not a necessary consequence - the notions of counterfactuals, regularities and probabilities can all be applied to pairs of events without regard to which came first.

The question is whether this is a problem for the modern theories, or a virtue. Intuitively, it might seem that all our thoughts about causation involve the cause preceding the effect. However, we seem to have no deep difficulty in making sense out of stories of time-travel, in which something in the future changes something in the past. Further, recent developments in physics have begun to describe the structure of the universe in very strange ways, and it may be philosophically arrogant to claim that any physicist who proposes the possibility of backwards causation is speaking unintelligibly. (For more, see Time).

Mind-body caustion

We naturally assume that our minds and bodies causally interact: decisions cause our legs to move, and hitting our toe causes the feeling of pain. However, these mental and physical events seem, at least at first glance, to be radically different kinds of entities. Because of that, many philosophers have doubted whether it is possible to give laws describing their connection. Other philosophers (such as Spinoza, however, have claimed that it makes no sense to talk of causal connections that do not admit of some general intelligibility. (For more, see Philosophy of Mind).

Notes

  1. ↑ John Mackie. (1974) The Cement of the Universe. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  2. ↑ David Lewis, (1973) "Causality." The Journal of Philosophy 70: 556-567.
  3. ↑ David Lewis, (1979) "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow" Noûs 13: 445-476.
  4. ↑ Lewis, (2000) "Causation as Influence." The Journal of Philosophy 97: 182-197.
  5. ↑ Martin Bunzl, (1980) "Causal Preemption and Counterfactuals." Philosophical Studies 37: 115-124
  6. ↑ Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof, and Murali Ramachandran, (1996) "Counterfactuals and Preemptive Causation" Analysis 56(4): 219-225.
  7. ↑ L.A. Paul, (1998) "Problems with Late Preemption" Analysis 58(1): 48-53.
  8. ↑ D. H. Mellor. (1995) The Facts of Causation. (Routledge, ISBN 0415197562)
  9. ↑ R. Collingwood. (1940) An Essay on Metaphysics. (Clarendon Press).
  10. ↑ D. Gasking, (1955) "Causation and Recipes" Mind (64): 479-487.
  11. ↑ P. Menzies, and H. Price, (1993) "Causation as a Secondary Quality" British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (44): 187-203.
  12. ↑ G. von Wright. (1971) Explanation and Understanding. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.)
  13. ↑ Judea Pearl, (2000) Causality. (Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521773628)
  14. ↑ James Woodward. (2003) Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. (Oxford University Press, ISBN 0195155270)

References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

  • Abdoullaev, A. (2000) "The Ultimate of Reality: Reversible Causality." in Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston: Philosophy Documentation Centre, internet site, [1]. Paideia Project. Retrieved May 5, 2008.
  • Bunzl, Martin. (1980) "Causal Preemption and Counterfactuals." Philosophical Studies 37: 115-124
  • Collingwood, R. (1940) An Essay on Metaphysics. London: Clarendon Press.
  • Ganeri, Jonardon, Paul Noordhof, and Murali Ramachandran. (1996) "Counterfactuals and Preemptive Causation." Analysis' 56(4): 219-225.
  • Gasking, D. (1955) "Causation and Recipes." Mind (64): 479-487.
  • Green, Celia (2003). The Lost Cause: Causation and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford: Oxford Forum. ISBN 0953677214 Includes three chapters on causality at the microlevel in physics.
  • Lewis, David. (1973) "Causality." The Journal of Philosophy 70: 556-567.
  • Lewis, David. (1979) "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow." Noûs 13: 445-476.
  • Lewis, David. (2000) "Causation as Influence." The Journal of Philosophy 97: 182-197.
  • Mackie, John. (1974) The Cement of the Universe. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Mellor, D. H. (1995) The Facts of Causation. Routledge. ISBN 0415197562
  • Menzies, P. and H. Price. (1993) "Causation as a Secondary Quality." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44: 187-203.
  • Paul, L.A. (1998) "Problems with Late Preemption." Analysis 58.(1): 48-53.
  • Pearl, Judea (2000) Causality. Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521773628
  • Spirtes, Peter, Clark Glymour and Richard Scheines. Causation, Prediction, and Search. MIT Press, ISBN 0262194406
  • von Wright, G. (1971) Explanation and Understanding. Itaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
  • Woodward, James (2003) Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press, ISBN 0195155270

External links

All links retrieved April 25, 2013. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

General Philosophy Sources

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